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Chapter 1
General introduction
1.1 Setting the scene
For sure one of the most intriguing features of the Ancient Greek language is its large
inventory of the kind of small, invariable words which are traditionally referred to as
particles. For themost part, this class consists of lexical items that do not contribute to
the descriptive content of their host utterance or affect truth-conditions, but rather en-
code meaning elements of a discourse-procedural or interactional nature. Such ‘prag-
matic’ particles can essentially be regarded as linguistic cues that guide the interpre-
tation process, encoding instructions from speaker to addressee(s) as to how an ut-
terance is to be integrated into the communicative context at hand. They may serve,
for instance, to link their host utterance to the surrounding discourse, to indicate the
speaker’s subjective stance towards the content of the message or to manage the sup-
posed attitudes and expectations of the addressee(s). In other words, such particles
should not be treated as some kind of ‘meaningless fillers’, as has sometimes been sug-
gested, but rather as a crucial and essential means in facilitating smooth and felicitous
communication. They may be small words, but they have great effects.1 Some of the
most typical examples are ἀλλά, ἄρα, ἀτάρ, αὖ, γάρ, γε, δέ, δή, ἤ, ἦ, καί, μέν, μήν, νυν, οὖν,
περ, που, τοι and compound particles such as ἆρα, δήπου, καίτοι, μέντοι, μῶν, οὐκοῦν,
τοιγάρ and τοίνυν.
1. This is how Wakker (2009b) has felicitously put it in her (Dutch) inaugural speech on Greek parti-
cles, entitled “Daarom dan dus: kleine woorden, grote effecten”.
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2 Chapter 1. General introduction
As is a well-known fact, the words cited here generally belong to the most fre-
quently used expressions in our extant Ancient Greek texts and can be abundantly
found on every single page of them. As often, however, high frequency of use does
not guarantee semantic transparency, and particles are in fact often characterized as
highly elusive and slippery items, which evade easy translation. For many Greek parti-
cles, indeed, it turns out to be a far from straightforwardmatter to provide an adequate
analysis of their exact meaning contributions. Two main issues should be mentioned
in this respect.
First of all, particles resist an analysis in more traditional and conventional se-
mantic terms: they generally do not have a transparent lexical (referential) meaning
and often also lack a clearly recognizable etymological origin (i.e. they cannot be de-
rived from a concrete lexical root). Due to their strong context-dependency, in turn,
the ‘pragmatic’ (e.g. discourse-procedural, interactional) meaning aspects that are en-
coded by these items are usually a good deal more difficult to pin down than that of
clear content words such as adjectives, nouns or verbs. Fortunately, in the last three
decades or so, serious progress has beenmade in developing the proper linguistic tools
and technical vocabulary for describing this type of meaning aspects. In this respect, I
believe that the study of Greek particles can still benefit greatly from modern linguis-
tic theories, typological studies and recent descriptions of semantically similar items
in living languages such as English, French, German and Dutch.
A second complicating factor is the notorious versatility, or polyfunctionality, of
many particles: as a quick glance in any dictionary or lexicon shows us, particles gener-
ally appear to have different readings, senses or functions in different contexts of use.
That is, one and the same form often shows a wide variety, if not a bewildering diver-
sity, of different actual usages, the relation between which is often not immediately
clear. For some items, moreover, these variant usages even correspond to significant
differences in syntactic behaviour (e.g. position in the sentence). This puzzling state
of affairs immediately raises the question how to describe such particles in a consis-
tent and theoretically satisfying way. A unified account of a given particle, at any rate,
should consist of more than just a randomly ordered list of its actual usages or the lin-
guistic contexts in which it is found – the practice we find in most traditional lexicons
and reference grammars. Crucially, such an account should rather aim to provide a
principled explanation as to why a given form can receive multiple different senses or
interpretations. Do these have a semantic element in common, and if so, how should it
be defined? And if not, in what way are these various usages and senses related to one
another, on a synchronic or diachronic level of analysis? Needless to say, if we want
to achieve any reliable answers to such questions, a vast and varied research corpus is
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1.1. Setting the scene 3
indispensable, covering data from different genres and discourse types and from dif-
ferent stages in the development of the Greek language (see section 1.3 below). Only
in this way, a complete picture of individual particles can be arrived at, which can do
justice to the often messy details in their textual distribution.
In view of these two main issues, I take it that a unified account of a given Greek
particle should at any rate meet the following general requirements. First, it should be
firmly rooted in modern semantic and pragmatic theory. Second, it should properly
deal with the polyfunctionality issue. Third, it should be based on a sufficiently large
and heterogeneous research corpus. Now if we look at the current state of research
into Greek particles, I believe there to be quite some particles that still lack a unified
account that meets all of these three requirements (see section 1.2 below for a more
detailed overview of the earlier scholarship). The older particle handbooks of the 19th
and early 20th centuries, on the one hand, which aim to give a complete overview of
particle usage across genres, have become seriously outdated when compared tomod-
ern linguistic standards.More recent particle studies, on the other hand, which do em-
ploy modern linguistic tools in their analyses, are mostly fairly limited in scope, being
based on a restricted research corpus of just one particular text, author or genre. Ac-
cordingly, these studies often fall short in properly dealing with the polyfunctionality
issue. Moreover, observations and analyses of individual particles tend to be scattered
over many different publications. At present then, we are in need of unified accounts
that combine modern linguistic theory and a large-scale, varied research corpus.
The main purpose of the present study is to show what I believe such an account
should be like by providing a detailed case study of two of themost versatile Greek par-
ticles: μήν and δή. My reasons for specifically selecting these two items are twofold. For
one thing, both are among the Greek particles which currently still lack a widely ac-
cepted analysis in terms of modern discourse-pragmatic theories. On δή, in fact, there
has been quite some scholarly debate in the past decades. Second, these two parti-
cles also show a number of interesting similarities. In older lexicons and manuals, for
instance, both particles are often rendered or paraphrased by Latin vero ‘really’, and
they tend to be described by means of the same general labels, such as ‘Konfirmatives’
(Kühner & Gerth 1898–1904: ii, 123ff.), ‘emphatic’ and ‘connective’ (e.g. Dennis-
ton 1954: 203–240, 329–340). More recent studies, on the other hand, usually clas-
sify them among the group of attitudinal or interactional particles (e.g. Sicking 1993,
Wakker 1997a, 1997b, Cuypers 2005, van Emde Boas et al. 2019). Furthermore, as
has often been observed, these two particles show a considerable distributional over-
lap and are commonly found in the same type of structural contexts (e.g. in reactive
moves, inwh-questions, in imperative clauses and in combination with other particles
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such as καί; cf. van Erp Taalman Kip 2009). All this suggests that μήν and δή are com-
parable items which have quite a number of features in common. At the same time,
of course, this begs the question how they differ from each other – a question which
indeed will be amply addressed in the second part of this study.
One of themost interesting things about the Ancient Greek particles – something that
indeed became ever more clear to me in the course of my investigation – is that a
proper and satisfactory description of their various meanings in fact touches upon a
great many linguistic issues, some of which pertain to the very heart of semantic-prag-
matic theory. Linguistic topics that have proven to be relevant for my analysis include,
e.g., the general distinction between semantics and pragmatics, grammaticalization
and diachronic semantic change, the polyfunctionality issue mentioned above, dis-
course structure and discourse relations, speech acts and their various components,
common ground, focus, scalarity and intensification. These topics will accordingly be
addressed, to a greater or lesser extent, in chapters 2 and 3 of this study.
In addition, I believe that the study of the semantics and pragmatics of thesewords
should in fact not be conducted without paying proper attention to their formal fea-
tures as well. As has often been shown in studies on particles in modern languages,
differences in themorphosyntactic properties of particles (e.g. collocational and topo-
logical behaviour) are generally reliable indications for variation in meaning or dis-
course functions. I have therefore deemed it worth to make a connection between the
study of Ancient Greek particles and recent research on the syntax and word order of
the Ancient Greek sentence – which are in fact quite different from those of modern
languages such as English, French, Dutch and German (see chapter 4).
As it turns out then,many different subjects and linguistic domains come together
in the present investigation. It may thus be useful to make some preliminary remarks
about the nature of this study. First, I would like to emphasize that it has not been my
main intention to make a major contribution to any of the theoretical debates about
the individual linguistic notions mentioned above (speech acts, common ground, fo-
cus, AncientGreekword order etc.). In fact, as I have increasingly come to realize in the
past few years, each of these topics could easily be the subject of an entire study in its
own right and, accordingly, in-depth discussions would have simply taken me too far
afield from what is my primary concern here (i.e. the analysis of Ancient Greek parti-
cles). In other words, the primary value of this work, as I hope, lies in the way in which
all of these theoretical concepts are to be combined in order to arrive at a satisfactory
description of the items under consideration here.
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Second, given the large variety of linguistic concepts covered, I have deemed it
most appropriate not to confine myself to the boundaries of one particular theoretical
framework, but to employ as much as possible a framework-independent approach.2
In practice, then, I have tried to employ grammatical and linguistic concepts that ap-
pear to have been generally accepted and have wide currency within general semantic
and pragmatic theory. It also follows that I have not found any need to make a de-
liberated choice between theories that have a formal-semantic orientation and those
that take a cognitive-functional approach. As far as the study of pragmatic particles/
markers is concerned, I strongly feel that the difference between these two major lin-
guistic branches is by no means as big or as crucial as it may be in some other areas
of linguistic research. And, as we will see, very similar ideas and concepts have indeed
been developed within both sides of the linguistic literature.
To sum up, I hope that the present work will be relevant, on the one hand, for clas-
sical scholars and philologists, who may learn from the essentially linguistic analysis
as presented here, and, on the other hand, for general linguists engaged with the se-
mantics/pragmatics interface, language typology or particles, whomay find particular
interest in the many intricacies of the Ancient Greek data – notably when compared
to modern particle-rich languages such as German and Dutch.
1.2 Earlier scholarship
The scholarship on Ancient Greek particles has in fact quite a long history, going back
as far as the work of the ancient grammarians, who classified them all as σύνδεσμοι
(‘binders, conjunctions’).3 In the modern era, in turn, linguistic studies soon started
to appear that were entirely devoted to the group of particles: important early mono-
graphs that deserve mention are Devarius (1588) (ed. Klotz 1835), Hoogeveen
(1769), Hartung (1832–1833), Stephens (1837), Klotz (1842), Bäumlein (1861),
Paley (1881) and des Places (1929). In addition, elaborate sections on particles were
included in the traditional reference grammars of Ancient Greek, such as Kühner &
Gerth (1898–1904), Schwyzer & Debrunner (1950), Smyth (1956) and Humbert
(1960). In themeantime, contributions on single particles weremade within lexicons,
commentaries as well as dedicated articles and dissertations.4 The absolute culmina-
2. See Haspelmath (2010) for some arguments in favour of such an approach.
3. See for instance Hellwig (1974), Sluiter (1997) and de Kreij (2016a) for discussion.
4. A complete overview of the modern scholarship on some of the most frequent particles can now be
found in theOnline Repository of Particle Studies compiled by Bonifazi, Drummen&deKreij (2016: vol.
5).
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tion of the early research tradition, however, was reached in 1934, when John D. Den-
niston first published his seminal handbook entitled The Greek particles. This work
contains a true wealth of useful examples, observations and sensible remarks on most
of the Greek particles and their combinations. The second, revised edition of 1954,
which also contains an invaluable index locorum, became the standard reference work
on Ancient Greek particles for many years to come and is still an essential piece in the
library of every Hellenist.
It was not until the late 1980s that Denniston’s handbook would come to be se-
riously criticized (see e.g. Sicking 1986, Sicking & van Ophuijsen 1993, Wakker
1994a: 304–305 and the contributions in Rijksbaron 1997a). Most importantly, it
came to be acknowledged that his work, useful as it may be for the purposes of clas-
sifying data and looking up specific examples, often falls short in the analysis of the
syntax and semantics of individual particles. Rijksbaron conveniently summarizes it
as follows:
While the ‘fast food’ use ofDennistonundoubtedly accelerates our reading-pace,
things are less simple when it comes to finding the precise meaning and the
syntactic function of a given particle, especially in particle combinations. On
this count, The Greek Particles is all too often disappointing and inadequate.
(Rijksbaron 1997b: 2)
The point is that Denniston’s account often remains rather general and imprecise –
witness, for example, his repeated use of a vague semantic notion such as ‘emphasis’.5
In some cases, in fact, the same general notion is used to describe (usages of) multiple
particles, which clearly obscures the semantic and distributional differences between
these items (e.g. ‘emphasis’ for γε, δή and μήν).Moreover, Denniston often does not suf-
ficiently address the issue of the interrelations between the various, sometimes widely
divergent, meanings that he distinguishes for individual particles (e.g. the alleged ‘em-
phatic’, ‘adversative’ and ‘progressive’ senses of μήν). And finally, as was also noted by
Rijksbaron in the quote given above, Denniston is generally far from satisfactory in the
treatment of particle combinations. In some cases, for instance, semantic values are
attributed to combinations as a whole that are also used for just one of the component
parts (e.g. ἀλλὰ μήν), or it is merely supposed that one particle is used to ‘strengthen’,
‘emphasize’ or ‘reinforce’ another (e.g. ἀλλὰ δή).
5. More generally, as noted byWakker (1994a: 304), Denniston has a habit of making generalizing and
psychologizing statements such as the following: “Perhaps women, on the principle that τὸ θῆλυ μᾶλλον
οἰκτρὸν ἀρσένος [‘the female is more pitiful than the male’, kt], were peculiarly addicted to the use of
particles, just as women to-day are fond of underlining words in their letters” (1954: lxxiii).
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More generally speaking, following Wakker (1994a: 304–305), one might criti-
cize the lack of any systematic linguistic theory underlying the descriptions given by
Denniston, which appear to be primarily based on the one-sided view that natural lan-
guage is merely a means of expressing thoughts or emotions (rather than a means of
communication between speaker and addressee(s)).6 Major improvements in this re-
spect were made from the 1990s onward, when Greek linguists generally recognized
that the study of Greek particles would seriously benefit from recent insights in the
fields of pragmatics and discourse analysis. As observed by Rijksbaron (1997b), two
important sources of inspiration were the work of the French pragmaticist Ducrot and
colleagues (e.g. Ducrot et al. 1980, Anscombre & Ducrot 1983, Ducrot 1984) as
well as the theoretical framework that Kroon (1995) developed for the analysis of dis-
course particles in Latin, which in turn was firmly based upon the pioneering work of
Schiffrin (1987) on discourse markers and Roulet et al. (1991) on discourse orga-
nization in general. In addition, Chafe’s (1987, 1994) cognitively-oriented work on
information structure and information flow should be mentioned, which was of par-
ticular importance for the study of particles in Homeric epic.
These novel discourse-pragmatic approaches provided the tools for analyzing
Greek particles in a theoretically much more satisfying way than Denniston and his
predecessors were able to do. As a result, particle research started to flourish again and
a stream of new relevant publications appeared, which have greatly increased our un-
derstanding of many of these words.7 An important drawback of most particle studies
of the last decades, however, is their fairly limited scope. Many publications are papers
that focus on particle usage in a specific work, author or genre, and/or in one specific
structural context (e.g. in questions or at the start of new speech turns). Roughly speak-
ing, three main approaches can be recognized among these publications:
6. As shown byWakker (1994a: 304–305), this already follows fromDenniston’s definition of the con-
cept of particle: “I will define it as a word expressing amode of thought, considered either in isolation or in
relation to another thought, or a mood of emotion” (1954: xxxvii, emphasis mine). A closely related point
of criticism concerns the fact that, contrary to what the title of Denniston’s handbook suggests, some ex-
pressions that are normally treated as belonging to the class of particles are conspicuously absent from it
(notably αὖ, ἤ and νυν). I will return to the complex issue of defining particles in section 2.3.
7. Pioneering work was especially done by a number of Greek linguists from the Netherlands, no-
tably Sicking (1986, 1993, 1997), E. J. Bakker (1986, 1988, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c, 1997a), van Ophuij-
sen (1993), Wakker (1994a: ch. 7, 1996, 1997a, 1997b), Slings (1997a, 1997b, 2002) and Rijksbaron
(1997b, 1997c).
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(i) Many papers aim to investigate a single particle (combination) or to compare
the use of a small number of different items, but are (by necessity) restricted to
a relatively small research corpus.8
(ii) Other studies do not start by selecting one or more particles as their object of
research, but rather aim to investigate, more generally, the usage of (a subtype
of) particles within a specific author or genre.9
(iii) Finally, there are studies that rather take a specific structural context as their
vantage point and investigate the contribution of different particles within this
context. Here again, the research corpus is often limited in nature.10
As a consequence of this limited scope, these studies – notwithstanding their valuable
analyses – generally yield an incomplete picturewhen it comes to the description of in-
dividual particles. The point is that some of the usages of a particular itemmay simply
not be attested – or only very marginally – in the specific genre, author or text under
consideration, which in turn may lead to unwarranted conclusions. To put it differ-
ently, I believe we should be extremely wary to simply carry over the results obtained
by these studies to otherGreek texts or text types, let alone toAncientGreek in general.
A related consequence of the restricted focus of many modern studies is that the di-
achronic perspective, which was still very much present in Denniston’s handbook and
earlier work, has generally been lost sight of.11 A new, modern ‘Denniston’ is indeed
still a desideratum (cf. Spevak & Denizot 2017: 10).
8. Examples of such studies are vanOphuijsen (1993) on οὖν, ἄρα, δή and τοίνυν in Plato’s Phaedo,Wak-
ker (1997a) on μήν and other ‘emphatic’ particles in tragedy, Basset (1997) on ἀλλά in Aristophanes’s
Frogs, Slings (1997a) on ἀλλά, μέντοι and καίτοι in Herodotus, van Erp Taalman Kip (2009) on καὶ δή,
καὶ μήν and ἤδη in classical drama, Wakker (2009a) on οὖν and τοίνυν in Lysias and Tronci (2017) on
ἄρα, οὐκοῦν, οὖν and τοίνυν in Plato’s Theaetetus.
9. Examples are Oréal (1997) on particle usage in Demosthenes and Cuypers (2005) on interactional
particles in the epic genre. In addition, the recentmulti-volumework of Bonifazi, Drummen&de Kreij
(2016) needs to be mentioned here, which is engaged with particle usage in Homeric epic and the lyric
poetry of Pindar (vol. 2), classical drama (vol. 3) and Herodotus and Thucydides (vol. 4).
10. Examples are Sicking (1993) on particle usage at sentence beginnings (two speeches of Lysias),
Wakker (1994a: ch.7) on particle usage in conditional εἰ-clauses (vast research corpus),Wakker (1997b)
on attitudinal particles in embedded contexts (Herodotus and Thucydides) and Sicking (1997) on par-
ticle usage in questions (Plato’s Gorgias).
11. Two notable exceptions are Koier’s (2013) in-depth study of the particle που and Inglese’s (2018)
work on the particle ἀτάρ.
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To sumup,whenwe lookat the current state of the researchonAncientGreekparticles,
I feel that there is anurgent need for combining thediscourse-pragmatic approaches of
the last three decades with the use of a large-scale, heterogeneous research corpus à la
Denniston. In thisway, the best of bothworlds, so to speak, is brought together. It is this
approach, then, that I have also taken in my case studies of μήν and δή. The main goal
is to provide a ‘modern’ linguistic analysis of these two polyfunctional particles which
does justice to all of their recurrent usages. This further implies that my account does
not always present ideas which are completely new. For some of the individual usages
of μήν and δή, indeed, I will essentially follow proposals made by others, though I will
integrate them into the bigger picture of the account developed in the present study.
In many other cases, however, earlier proposals will be further specified, adjusted or
even completely discarded.
1.3 Data
As I have argued above, a unified account of a given particle requires a vast and het-
erogeneous research corpus; after all, our extant Ancient Greek texts by no means
form a monolithic block. Therefore, my research of μήν and δή is based on the ma-
jor literary texts from early and classical Greek, paying special attention to the fol-
lowing genres and authors:12 Homeric epic (both Iliad and Odyssey), lyric poetry
(Pindar), tragedy (Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides), comedy (Aristophanes), histo-
riography (Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon), oratory (Antiphon, Lysias, Isocrates,
Aeschines, Demosthenes) and philosophical dialogue (Plato, Xenophon). The corpus
also shows variation in themajorGreek dialects: Ionic (Homer,Herodotus), Doric (Pin-
dar, choral lyric in drama) and Attic (other texts).
From a diachronic perspective the authors studied can be represented as in ta-
ble 1.1. As shown here, we are dealing with texts that cover a considerable span of
time, ranging from about 800 bc (Homeric Greek) to 320 bc (late classical Greek). Di-
achronic developments of particles may in principle be expected to be found, not only
between Homeric and classical Greek, but also within the course of the classical pe-
12. Inscriptions are less suitable data from the perspective of particle research, or at least for the two
particles studied here. Inscriptions mostly contain texts of a highly formulaic nature (e.g. legal texts, fu-
nerary inscriptions) in which many Greek particles do not even occur. Moreover, these documents are
often of a very fragmentary nature (see footnote 15 below). I thus leave them out of consideration in the
present study.
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Period Authors
ca. 8th cent. bc Homer
6th–5th cent. bc Aeschylus (ca. 525–455), Pindar (ca. 520–433)
5th cent. bc Sophocles (496–406), Herodotus (ca. 485–425), Antiphon (480–411),
Euripides (480–406), Thucydides (ca. 460–400)
5th–4th cent. bc Aristophanes (ca. 445–385), Lysias (ca. 445–380), Isocrates (436–338),
Xenophon (ca. 430–355), Plato (ca. 425–348)
4th cent. bc Aeschines (389–314), Demosthenes (384–322)
Table 1.1:Diachronic overview of main authors in the corpus
riod, which covers about two full centuries.13 Although it would surely be interesting
to further extend the corpus with authors from the Hellenistic and still later periods, I
currently have to leave it at an occasional reference to studies that deal with μήν and
δή in such authors.14 A systematic analysis of these periods has to be left for future
research.
In studying μήν and δή in the corpus mentioned, I have conducted a mixed ap-
proach (cf. Kroon 1995: 3): a representative sample of instances has been systemati-
cally investigated, which in turn has been supplemented by the many (special) cases
that are provided and discussed in earlier studies, notably in Denniston (1954). Fur-
thermore, I have collected general quantitative data on particle frequencies and col-
locations, which have been drawn from the digital library Thesaurus Linguae Graecae
(tlg).15 An overview can be found in Appendix A at the end of this study.
13. An important general caveat in this respect concerns the fact that only a small fraction of the entire
bodyofAncientGreek literature survives and that the various genres arenot equally distributedover time.
We do not have, for instance, a historiographic work from the Homeric period, an early philosophical
dialogue or a tragedy dating from the late classical period. Given that certain usages of particles may
be more or less typical to occur in certain genres, general conclusions about diachronic developments
and semantic change need to be made with some caution and reservation (see Denniston 1954: lxiv–
lxv). For a more general discussion of the (in)adequacy of corpora within historical pragmatics, I refer to
Traugott & Dasher (2002: 45f.) and Hansen (2008: 126–128).
14. Examples are Blomqvist (1969: 48–75) on μήν in Hellenistic prose, Thyresson (1977) on μήν and
δή in Epicurus, Wakker (1996) on μάν in Theocritus, Cuypers (2005) on μήν/μάν and δή in Apollonius
Rhodius, and van der Pas (2014) on δή in Euclides.
15. Fragments I have left out of consideration in both the quantitative and qualitative analysis: frag-
ments tend to show a lot of textual uncertainties and generally lack the necessary co- and contexts which
are so crucial for the analysis of pragmatic particles.
559416-L-bw-Thijs
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 25
1.4. Methodology 11
At this point, a note is in place on textual criticism. The texts studied in the
present study have been transmitted to us only indirectly, i.e. on the basis of medieval
manuscripts, which have been copied with varying degrees of accuracy. Fortunately,
we can rely on the indispensable work of modern editors who aim to reconstruct the
original text – as closely as possible – from the available sources. Nevertheless, we
should be aware of textual uncertainties, variant readings and conjectural emenda-
tions of modern editors, which are listed in the critical apparatus. This is in fact all
themore relevant a qualification when the study of particles is concerned: these small
words are particularly prone to be confused in the transmission and variant readings
are indeed quite regularly reported (e.g. μήν vs. μέν, δή vs. δέ and δή vs. ἄν). I have judged
it methodologically most valid to leave textually uncertain cases (e.g. instances that
have a variant reading or turn out to be a modern emendation) out of consideration
(cf. Hansen 2008: 128). In collecting quantitative data, however, I have consistently
followed the readings of the text editions as used in the tlg, as the critical apparatus
has not (yet) been digitized.16
1.4 Methodology
Indetermining thediscourse-pragmaticmeaning aspects of particles inAncientGreek,
it goeswithout saying thatwe cannot rely on the intuitions or acceptability judgements
of native speakers. It thus follows that our approach, as opposed to that of particle re-
search in living languages, cannot be based on introspection or psycho-linguistic ex-
periments, but is corpus-based by definition. The most natural starting point for an
analysis of a given Greek particle, then, is to chart its recurrent, different actual usages,
which, as I have pointed out above, should be done in a sufficiently large and varied
corpus of texts. In turn, more general particle meanings may eventually be deduced
from the more specific usages distinguished.
Crucially, as pointed out by Kroon (1995: 102) in her seminal study on Latin dis-
course particles, this inventory of usages should not be established in a random or
ad hoc fashion, but should rely as much as possible on objective linguistic clues, i.e.
on observable distributional properties of the particle under investigation. Such clues
thus involve, in Kroon’s words, “the systematic co-occurrences (and constraints on co-
occurrences) of the particles with certain features of the context” (1995: 115–116).
16. In those cases where multiple editions of the same Greek text are present in the tlg, I have consis-
tently used the most recent one, which are usually of much better quality than the older editions of the
19th and early 20th centuries.
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Context should here be understood in a fairly broad sense, including the immediate
linguistic context (i.e. the co-text), the surrounding discourse context (i.e. preceding
and/or following discourse units) and the extra-linguistic, situational context inwhich
a text or conversation is integrated. Such contextual clues can thus be seen as heuris-
tic indicators of the kind of discourse-pragmatic instructions that are encoded by the
particle.
1.4.1 Linguistic clues in the corpus
In what follows, I will give a general overview of the linguistic parameters that I have
systematically taken into account in my investigation. The list is strongly inspired by
those given byKroon (1995: 115f.) and Schrickx (2011: 62f.) for pragmatic particles/
markers in Latin. It should be noted that some of these are closely interrelated, but are
treated separately for ease of exposition.
(i) Discourse type. Themain opposition here is that between themonological and
dialogical discourse type. Itmust be emphasized, however, that this is not a rigid
binary distinction, as a monological stretch of text may in fact display varying
degrees of ‘dialogicity’. That is, even though monological texts do not have the
formal characteristics of an actual dialogue, they may still show explicit traces
of a conversational mode. Speakers may for instance use meta-communicative
expressions that appeal to the attention or involvement of the hearer/reader,
or they may indirectly render, and react to, what was said or thought by oth-
ers (so-called ‘embedded voices’). Following Roulet et al. (1991) and Kroon
(1995: 111–115), I will speak about ‘diaphony’ in such cases. See section 2.5.2
for further discussion.17
(ii) Genre and text type. Differences in relative frequencies of a given particle
among the different genres (see section 1.3 above) may provide general clues
as to the type of particle we are dealing with (e.g. discourse connective or at-
titudinal-interactional particle). More relevant than the broad notion of genre,
however, appears to be the parameter of text type. Independent of its genre, a
particular discourse segment may be characterized as, e.g., narrative, argumen-
tative, descriptive, instructive or expository in nature. Although one particular
text type is typically the dominant one in a particular genre, other text types
17. When Ancient Greek particles are concerned, the importance of recognizing the concept of di-
aphony has been shown in particular by George (2009) in his criticism of the large-scale statistical stud-
ies as conducted by Duhoux (1997a, 1997b, 1998, 2006).
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may in principle also occur. Forensic oratory, for instance, may indeed mostly
consist of the argumentative text type, but also regularly consist of clearly nar-
rative passages. Historiography, by contrast, for the most part consists of narra-
tive passages, but these are often interrupted bymore argumentative sections in
which the author personally evaluates and comments upon the narrated events.
In addition, the ethnographic sections in Herodotus may rather be labeled de-
scriptive or expository, rather thanpurely narrative (cf. E. J. Bakker1997c, Buijs
2007, Allan 2007, 2009, Koopman 2018 on narrative/discourse modes in An-
cient Greek).
(iii) Oral vs.written language. SomeGreek texts showa considerable amount of fea-
tures that are characteristic of spoken rather thanwritten language. The texts of
the Homeric epics and Herodotus reflect in various ways that they originated
in an oral performance in front of a listening audience. In this respect they
are markedly different from, say, Thucydides’s Histories, which was meant for
a reading public from the very outset. It may be expected that this difference in
communicative medium also had an effect on the (frequency of) use of certain
particles. Typical features of oral grammar can further be found in the genre of
Platonic dialogue (e.g. anacoluthon). See especially the work of Slings (1994,
1996, 1997b, 2002) on theoral-writtendichotomy inAncientGreek.Cf.Hansen
(1998a: ch. 5) on this topic in relation to discourse particles more generally.
(iv) Discourse structure. This parameter concerns the position of the host utter-
ance of a particle within the larger structure of the text or conversation. It may
be, for instance, an initiating or reactivemovewithin a conversation, the start of
a digression, a return to the main theme, a next listed item in an enumeration,
the premise or conclusion of an argument, a parenthetical aside, and so on. We
thus examine the surrounding discourse context of the unit in which the parti-
cle occurs. In order to do justice to this parameter, it is generally important not
to restrict our view to the immediately preceding or following utterances, but to
take larger segments of discourse into account. I will come back to the notion
of discourse structure when discussing the class of discourse connectives (see
section 2.5.2).
(v) Illocutionary force and sentence type. The next important parameter is the il-
locutionary force of the utterance inwhich the particle occurs. I understand this
concept – in the spirit of Searle (1969, 1975a) and Searle & Vanderveken
(1985) – as referring to such speech act types as assertives (e.g. statements, con-
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clusions, descriptions), commissives (e.g. promises, threats, refusals), directives
(e.g. commands, requests, prohibitions), questions, wishes and exclamations. In
Ancient Greek, as in many other languages, illocutionary force is for an impor-
tant part determined by structural sentence types (e.g. declarative, interroga-
tive, imperative, exclamative), although there are by no means one-to-one cor-
respondences. Sentence type, in turn, is largely dependent upon the mood of
the main verb.18 See the discussion in Revuelta Puigdollers (2017) as well
as the general overview given by van Emde Boas et al. (2019: ch. 38). I will fur-
ther elaborate upon the notions of illocutionary force and sentence type in the
course ofmy discussion of attitudinal and interactional particles (section 2.6.2).
(vi) Information structure. Closely related to the parameter of discourse structure
is the information structure of the utterance in which the particle occurs. Of
special relevance here is the focus-background structure of the utterance and its
potential interaction with focus-modifying particles (e.g. also, even, just), which
I will deal with in section 2.7. The encoding of information-structural categories
in Ancient Greek will be shortly treated in section 4.1.
(vii) Position of the particle within the sentence. A particle’s position within the
Greek sentence may provide a valuable indication as to its syntactic scope
(phrase, clause, sentence), which in turn may tell us something about the type
of particle we are dealing with (e.g. discourse-structural or focus-modifying par-
ticle). Variation in syntactic position, if present, can thus be taken as important
formal evidence for variation inparticlemeanings.Aswewill see, this parameter
is of great importance for the analysis of δή in particular. The position and syn-
tactic scope of Greek particles will be discussed in detail in sections 4.2 to 4.4.
(viii) Syntactic status of the host clause. In case a given particle has clausal scope, it
is useful to make a distinction between main clauses and subordinate clauses,
which in turn may be of different types (temporal, conditional, causal, conces-
sive and so on). Of special interest in this respect is the questionwhether a parti-
clemay occur within embedded complement clauses (e.g. indirect speech, indi-
rect thought, dependent questions), whichmay point at perspective shifts. That
is, there may be evidence that a given particle needs to be evaluated from the
perspective of some other agent than the main speaker (e.g. a story character
18. In addition, Ancient Greek has a number of specialized illocution-marking particles, i.e. particles
that explicitly serve to mark certain types of speech acts (e.g. interrogative and wish particles). See sec-
tion 2.3.3 as well as footnote 22 below.
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rather than the narrator). For this phenomenon, see e.g. Döring (2013) with
regard toGerman, andWakker (1997b) andBonifazi (2016: ch.4)more specif-
ically on Greek particles.
(ix) Tense, aspect andmood of the verb in the host clause. This parameter appears
to be especially relevant for a better understanding of the class of attitudinal-
interactional particles, as has recently shown by la Roi (2019) with regard to
Ancient Greek. Furthermore, as I already noted above, the mood of the verb
may also be relevant for determining the illocutionary force of an utterance.
(x) Collocation possibilities. This important linguistic clue concerns the co-oc-
currence of a given particle with other (types of) lexical items in the imme-
diate linguistic context, such as negatives, conjunctions and other connective
items, modal and attitudinal particles/adverbs, focusmodifiers, intensifiers and
demonstrative and personal pronouns. In addition, the absence of certain (par-
ticle) collocations can be used as further support for an analysis of a particular
particle. Finally, cases of coalescence and univerbation may be taken into con-
sideration, i.e. cases in which a particle has become a fixed part of a new lexical
item (e.g. ἐπεί + δή > ἐπειδή; cf. section 2.3.2).
(xi) Descriptive content. A final relevant clue is provided by the specific descrip-
tive content of the unit in which the particle occurs. Of special importance, in
this respect, is the question how this content relates to the common ground of
the discourse participants at the moment of utterance. Can it for instance be
taken as expected, obvious, inferrable or generally known information? Or is it
rather to be seen as unexpected, unprecedented, climactic etc. in nature? Here
we can rely on, for instance, what has been said in the (immediately) preceding
discourse or on what can arguably be regarded as the general culturally-based
common knowledge of the Ancient Greeks. In dramatic texts, moreover, the ex-
tra-linguistic situational contextmay be relevant sometimes, in as far as this can
be constructed from the text spoken by the characters (e.g. the arrival of a char-
acter or the presence of a particular object on the stage). The notion of common
ground will be further elaborated upon in section 2.6.3.
1.4.2 Comparison to other languages
In addition to the evidence based upon observable distributional patterns discussed so
far, an analysis of a given particle may be further supported or further specified by tak-
ing a contrastive approach, i.e. by making a comparison to semantically similar items
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in other languages. For one thing, as I have already noted above, detailed descriptive
studies on individual pragmatic particles/markers in modern languages such as Ger-
man, English and French may generally be used as an important source of inspiration
for the study of Ancient Greek. Recent work on the so-called modal particles in Ger-
man, for instance, has been helpful in arriving in a more explicit and specific analysis
of some of the usages of μήν and δή.
Second, and more importantly, the findings of cross-linguistic, typological studies
may be useful. A given analysis of a linguistic phenomenon in Ancient Greek will be-
comemoreplausible if itmatcheswith the situation inother languages andcomplies to
cross-linguistic regularities or universals. This appears to be especially relevant in the
case of function/grammatical words such as prepositions, conjunctions and particles,
which tend to show a high degree of polyfunctionality (i.e. one form having multiple
different senses or usages, see section 1.1 above). Cross-linguistic comparison of such
items reveals which meanings are conceptually closely related to each other, so that
a semantic map can be drawn up, i.e. a graphical representation of the interrelations
between differentmeanings or functionswithin a particular semantic domain (see e.g.
Haspelmath 2003 for this concept and some clear examples).
As far as the class of pragmatic particles/markers is concerned, however, large-
scale cross-linguistic studies are unfortunately still very much longed for, and there is
in fact an ongoing debate on how to map and conceptualize the semantic domain(s)
covered by these items (see section 2.4 below). Nevertheless, there are a number of
comparative studies on some well-defined sub-domains, which have proven to be
useful for my analysis, notably König (1991a, 2017) on focus modifiers and Simon-
Vandenbergen & Aijmer (2007) on adverbs of certainty. From a diachronic perspec-
tive, moreover, a number of strong regularities in semantic change have been revealed
in the past few decades, which I will return to in section 3.2.
To end this section, some remarks are in place about the use of parallel transla-
tion corpora, another method that has often been employed in the study of pragmatic
markers (see e.g. Aijmer & Simon-Vandenbergen 2004, Aijmer, Foolen & Simon-
Vandenbergen 2006 and Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007). In this approach,
the different translations of a certain item into other (closely related) languages are
counted in order to establish so-called ‘translation networks’. In this way, translations
canbeused as a heuristic tool in determining the variousmeanings that a given linguis-
tic item may express. However, although I generally judge this to be a highly valuable
approach, I strongly doubt whether translations are a useful heuristic when it comes
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to pragmatic particles/markers in Ancient Greek.19 For one thing, the authors men-
tioned above advise a bi-directional translation corpus for their approach, which is of
course not available for Ancient Greek. Second, modern translations of Greek texts are
not always very strict or literal in nature, but tend to involve a certain degree of literary
creativity. Finally, I believe it is questionable whether these modern translators, even
though they are no doubt experts in the Ancient Greek language, can at all be expected
to have the correct intuitions on the values of particles,20 which is also suggested by
the fact that many particles often lack a translation altogether. Therefore, I do not re-
gard modern translations as a very reliable heuristic and I will not employ them in my
analysis.21
1.4.3 Clues we lack: two caveats
I would like to end this sectionwith a number of remarks on clueswedonot have at our
disposal in studying Ancient Greek (cf. Spevak & Denizot 2017). We have to accept
that we lack some of the linguistic information that has proven to be relevant for the
interpretation of particles in modern languages.
First, since the sources of Ancient Greek are written documents only, we do not
have direct access to features of intonation and prosody – which has a number of con-
sequences. It may for instance not always be possible to tell whether a given utter-
ance should be interpreted as a regular declarative or as yes/no-question, especially
because Ancient Greek – as opposed to many modern languages – does not encode
this distinction syntactically (e.g. by means of word order variation).22 In addition, in
the domain of information structure, we lack possibly relevant data on different types
of stress and/or focus accent. Although Ancient Greek is a discourse-configurational
19. See also Schrickx (2011: 49–50, 206), who makes very similar points with regard to Latin.
20. See Koier (2013: 165): “[W]e, as scholars, are second language learners with a very skewed input
of written texts and grammars, which are predominantly written by other non-native speakers.” As Koier
further observes, the issue is all the more relevant in case of such elusive items as pragmatic particles,
which are generally among the expressions that aremost difficult tomaster for second language learners.
21. In this respect, I deviate from the approach taken by Koier (2013: ch.8) with regard to the Greek
particle που. Although Koier is clearly aware of the problems concerned with using modern translations
as a heuristic, she decides to take them into account nonetheless.
22. To be sure, yes/no-questions can be indisputably marked as such by means of introductory inter-
rogative particles (e.g. ἆρα, ἆρ’ οὐ, μῶν and οὐκοῦν) or parenthetical illocutionary expressions like εἰπέ μοι
‘tell me’ or ἀποκρίνου ‘answer (me)’ (cf. Shalev 2001). The point is that, when such indicators are not
present, the difference between a yes/no-question (a rising declarative) and an assertion cannot bemade
on formal grounds, but only on interpretation of the surrounding discourse context. Thus we need to
keep in mind that, in these cases, it depends only on editor’s choice whether a period or a question mark
is printed. See also Sicking (1997).
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language and grammatical categories such as topic and focus are determined by vari-
ation in word order (see chapter 4 in this thesis), we cannot in principle rule out that
certain prosodic features have also played a role in this respect. The point is thatwe can
never definitely know this; and it thus remains unclear to us whether some particles
would perhaps interact with differences of this kind, as is the case for some of the Ger-
man particles (see e.g. Karagjosova 2012, Egg & Zimmermann 2012 on unaccented
vs. accented doch).
My second, related, caveat concerns the fact that the Ancient Greek documents
were originally set in scriptio continua: punctuation andword spacingwere only added
at a later date. In our modern editions, the punctuation practice tends to follow the
conventions ofmodern languages such as English or German, and editionsmay indeed
vary as to printing a comma, a colon, a period or a question mark at a particular point
in a text. It follows that we should be extremely wary in using punctuation as reliable
evidence for linguistic analyses (e.g. with regard to discourse segmentation or the dis-
tinction between clausal conjunctions and sentence connectives, cf. section 2.5.1).23
As far as word spacing is concerned, in turn, I would like to draw attention to the issue
of fixed collocations. In some cases, the questionmay arise whether we are still dealing
with two distinct words or rather with one single word (univerbation). As we will see,
this is an issue which is particularly relevant for the study of particles, some of which
tend to becomemore andmore attracted to the word theymodify and eventually fully
coalesce with them (see section 2.3.2). Again, there are certain cases in which editors
are at variance in their printing practice in this respect (e.g. νῦν δή vs. νύνδη and δή ποτε
vs. δήποτε). Although this choice does not tend to make a real difference as regards in-
terpretation, particle researchers should of course be aware of this variation, especially
when they are collecting quantitative data on particle frequencies.
1.5 Outline of the present study
The remainder of this study is subdivided into two major parts. Part 1 (chapters 2–
4) is entirely devoted to a discussion of the relevant linguistic theory and discourse-
pragmatic tools that are needed to come to a satisfactory account of particles in general
and μήν and δή in particular; part 2 (chapters 5–6) consists of my actual analysis of
these two particles respectively.
23. See Bonifazi (2016: section 3.3) for a detailed discussion of the issue of punctuation with regard
to Ancient Greek.
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In chapter 2, I will first have a closer andmore detailed look at the class of particles,
both froma formal and a semantic-functional perspective. This includes, for one thing,
a critical discussion of the ill-defined notion of particle itself and how I understand this
term in the present study. Second, I will address the question what it means exactly for
(a particular usage of) a given particle to be ‘pragmatic’ in nature: I will thus look into
the class of what in the literature are generally called ‘pragmatic markers’ (e.g. Fraser
1996, Aijmer & Simon-Vandenbergen 2011, Hansen 2012), which in turn touches
upon the vexed issue of the semantics-pragmatics distinction. Finally, I offer a general
overview of the semantic-functional spectrum that particles tend to cover, paying spe-
cial attention to the categories that are relevant with regard to Ancient Greek. These
are first of all the three classes that are more commonly distinguished in the litera-
ture on Greek particles, viz. connectives, attitudinal-interactional markers and focus
modifiers (e.g. Sicking 1986, Sicking & van Ophuijsen 1993, Wakker 1994a, 1997a
and van Emde Boas et al. 2019). In addition, I will shortly discuss two other classes,
which have received much less attention, but are of some interest for my account of
the particle δή: intensifiers and markers of non-straightforward communication. For
each of these categories, I will give a short overview of the state of the research, draw-
ing upon some of the most important studies in the field. Along the way, a number
of digressions will be made on some of the theoretical concepts that are required to
come to grips with the semantic contribution of these items, notably discourse struc-
ture, speech acts, common ground and scalarity.
Chapter 3 addresses the issue of polyfunctionality in semantic-pragmatic theory,
which I have already mentioned above. Here I will review the different theoretical ap-
proaches that are traditionally employed to deal with this issue (viz. homonymy, mo-
nosemy andpolysemy), and Iwill argue in particularwhy I in principle opt for a polyse-
mous approach. Crucially, this also involves the notion of diachronic semantic change,
and I will thus discuss some of the main research tenets in the field of historical prag-
matics. More in particular, I will look into some of the general cross-linguistic tenden-
cies of semantic change, which are also relevant for the development of many of the
Greek particles. I end the chapter with a number of methodological rules of thumb.
Chapter 4 further zooms into particles in Ancient Greek, and more in particular,
into their formal aspects. First, some general remarks are in place on the syntax and
word order of Ancient Greek, which is a discourse-configurational language. Then I
will look at the position of particles within the Greek utterance and what this may tell
us about their scope as well as their semantics. Here, I will especially draw upon the
general research on Greek word order, which has made some major improvements in
the past two decades, but has not been consistently employedwithin particle research.
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The gist of this chapter, then, is that differences in the position of a particle within the
Ancient Greek sentence can in principle be used as important linguistic evidence for
semantic-functional differences.
Then, in chapters 5 and 6, I will apply the linguistic theory and tools as discussed
in the first part to my analysis of the particles μήν and δή, respectively. These chapters
are structured in a similar fashion. First, I examine the particles from a distributional
perspective: I discuss the conspicuous facts concerning their textual distribution and,
on the basis of the discussion in chapter 4, their position within the Ancient Greek ut-
terance. This formal evidence in turn provides the basis for the semantico-pragmatic
analysis that follows: I give a detailed overview of the variety of different meanings the
particle in question may execute, dependent on its context of use. Here I will argue
that both particles are polysemous in nature – covering a variety of (historically) in-
terrelated meanings – and that it is not always possible to subsume different usages
under one common semantic denominator. Finally, I discuss how my own account of
both particles differs from – and, as I feel, further improves upon – some influential
accounts in the preceding literature, notably those of Denniston (1954), Sicking &
van Ophuijsen (1993), Wakker (1994a, 1997a, 1997b) and Bonifazi, Drummen &
de Kreij (2016).
Chapter 7, finally, summarizes the main argument and findings of this study. In
addition, suggestions for further research will be made.
1.6 Practical notes
∗ Within the given examples, the relevant linguistic phenomenon at stake is
consistently marked in boldface. In some cases, other linguistic phenomena
that are referred to in the running text (but are of secondary importance) will
be underlined. In chapter 4, italics will be used for postpositive expressions,
whereas a small = behind a Greek word indicates a prepositive expression (e.g.
ἐπί=). Some other technical symbols will be explained along the way.
∗ In order to make this work also accessible to those who do not know Ancient
Greek, the Greek examples are consistently provided with an English transla-
tion and, where necessary, a short description of the preceding discourse con-
text. Unless otherwise noted, the given translations are based upon the Greek-
English editions of the Loeb Classical Library. However, I havemade adaptations
where needed, especially with regard to the rendering of the particles in ques-
tion, which often turns out to be inadequate or simply lacking. Here it should be
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emphasized that my translations of particle meanings are only meant as rough
characterizations, as it is often difficult to find clear English equivalents. In some
cases, indeed, I have preferred a rendering by way of other linguistic means
such as contrastive stress.Within the translations, I have consistently added the
Greek particle, in brackets, after its English rendering. In case the Greek particle
is left untranslated, it is directly placed into the translation without any brack-
ets.
∗ References to Greek works and authors are in accordance with the practice in
the Greek-English lexicon of Liddell, Scott & Jones (lsj).
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Chapter 2
Particles: form and functions
Jespersen compared the function of
particles and other ‘grammatical
words’ with that of policemen
controlling the traffic, a daring but
appropriate comparison. Without
particles human communication
would of course still be possible, but
soon look like the traffic in Cairo at
rush-hour.
Albert Rijksbaron (1997b: 14)
2.1 Introduction
As I have noted in the general introduction, the two expressions under scrutiny in the
present study are particles. Thus far, I have used this term only in a rather intuitive
sense and I have not been very explicit on what particles actually are or how they can
be defined or further classified. These questions are addressed in more detail in the
present chapter, in which I introduce and define the various categories and the termi-
nology that will be used in the rest of this study. In doing so, I will pay special atten-
tion to the peculiarities of Ancient Greek, especially when compared to modern, well-
researched, languages such as English, German, Dutch and French. The procedure in
this chapter will be as follows.
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First, I find it useful to make some preliminary remarks concerning linguistic cat-
egorization, which are especially relevant when the study of particles is concerned
(section 2.2). Then, I shortly discuss the concept of particles in general, which I pri-
marily take as a form category. I will review the prototypical properties of particles and
show how these can be explained from their being highly grammaticalized items (sec-
tion 2.3). In the subsequent sections, I will turn to the classification of different types of
particles, which ismostly done on the basis of semantic-functional grounds. Thus, I of-
fer a general overview of some of the semantic-functional categories which are relevant
in particle research. Here I start with the broad,macro-category of so-called ‘pragmatic
markers’ (section 2.4). Thereafter, I will dive into a number of more specific categories,
which are of special interest for the analysis of Greek μήν and δή in part 2 of this study.
These are the following: connectives (section 2.5), attitudinal-interactional markers
(section 2.6), focus modifiers (section 2.7), intensifiers (section 2.8) and markers of
non-straightforward communication (section 2.9). For each of these five categories of
expressions, I will present a basic overview of their most important syntactic and se-
mantic-pragmatic properties and introduce a number of further relevant distinctions
which are generally made in the modern linguistic literature. In addition, I will make
three theoretical digressions on theoretical concepts that deserve special attention,
viz. discourse structure, speech acts and common ground. Section 2.10, finally, wraps
up and summarizes the main discussion.
Itmaybeuseful to emphasize in advance that, inmyconception, themeanings and
functions mentioned may in principle also be realized by markers which do not take
the form of prototypical particles, such as (polymorphemic) adverbs, prepositional
phrases or fixed multi-word idioms. Thus, as I take it, each functional class contains a
strictly formal subset of particles,which can accordingly be called connective particles,
attitudinal-interactional particles, focusmodifying particles and intensifying particles.
Of these, the first two groupswill in this study also be referred to by the term ‘discourse
particles’, amore general label which is neutral with respect to the distinction between
connective and non-connective (i.e. attitudinal-interactional) usages. Comments on
howmy conception and terminology differs from that of other researchers in the field
will be made along the way, mostly in footnotes.1
1. As has become a commonplace in the research field on particles and discourse/pragmatic markers,
matters of definition and classification are far from straightforward and much-debated issues and the
literature on the subject, unfortunately, suffers from quite a dramatic degree of conceptual and termi-
nological confusion. Obviously, an attempt to sort out the various terms, definitions and approaches in
a coherent way, if even possible, would be beyond the scope of the present study. The best I can do is
to be as clear as possible on the categories and terminology as used in the present study and relate my
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2.2 Preliminaries on linguistic categorization
In this section, I will discuss some basic assumptions concerning linguistic categoriza-
tion, which are especially relevant with respect to the study of particles and pragmatic
markers (cf. especially Diewald 2013).
Cross-linguistic variation. Languages vary widely in the way in which linguistic cat-
egories (e.g. word classes or grammatical categories) are realized and in the linguistic
features which are relevant in constituting them. Diewald conveniently puts it as fol-
lows:
Linguistic categories […] are not ontologically given items. Depending on the
respective language, they are subject to the specific conditions and restrictions
that are operative in that language, and thus, any two particular languages may
realize equivalent functions deploying very different formal and structural tech-
niques on different layers of the linguistic system (e.g. morphological marker
versus intonational contour). (Diewald 2013: 42)
We need to keep in mind then, that there need not be a one-to-one correspondence
between languages when it comes to the linguistic categories they exhibit. Some cate-
gories only occur in certain languages and are not universally relevant. In the context
of the present study, for instance, wemay consider the well-known fact thatmanyGer-
manic languages have a formally well-defined class of what are usually called ‘modal
particles’, whereas this grammatical category is conspicuously absent in present-day
English, which realizes the discourse-pragmatic functions of such particles by other
linguistic means, such as modal sentence adverbs, questions tags and the polar do-
construction (cf. Waltereit 2001, Fischer 2007). In other languages, moreover, par-
ticles are quite extensively used to mark grammatical categories such as case, tense,
mood, aspect and topicality (cf. e.g. Chino 2001 on Japanese). Such particle classes, of
course, are not present in mostWestern-European languages, which employ other lin-
guistic devices to express such features (e.g. inflection, word order variation, auxiliary
verbs and intonation).
own choices to some of the major positions in the general theoretical debate. This also implies that I will
keep the cross-linguistic perspective in mind in discussing the situation in Ancient Greek. In doing so, I
hope, a proper comparison is made possible between the present study and other studies in the field as
well as between Ancient Greek and other languages. Instructive overviews of the field and its main issues
are provided by, among others, Foolen (1996, 2011), Schourup (1999), Hentschel & Weydt (2002),
Fischer (2006b, 2014), Aijmer & Simon-Vandenbergen (2011), Degand, Cornillie & Pietrandrea
(2013b), Maschler & Schiffrin (2015), Drummen (2016a), Blühdorn, Foolen & Loureda (2017)
and Fedriani & Sansò (2017b).
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Prototypicality. Linguistic categories are not watertight compartments, but may
have fuzzy boundaries and shade into one another. Put differently, I prefer to concep-
tualize the categories used in the present study, not in terms of necessary and sufficient
criteria, but in termsof linguistic prototypes: some itemsmaybeprototypical instances
of a given category, whereas others can best be seen as borderline cases which reside
more at the periphery of a category or have prototypical features of more than one cat-
egory.2 Such a conception is particularly attractive, if not inevitable, when the grad-
ual process of language evolution and grammaticalization is taken into consideration,
which are of special interest when it comes to the study of particles (see sections 2.3.2
and 3.2).
Cross-categoriality. On a language-internal level, the categorization of a given lin-
guistic item is verymuch dependent on the way it is used in a particular linguistic con-
text and, consequently, what is materially the same item may in principle appear in
more than one word class or syntactic category.3 As is well-known, such cross-catego-
riality is a fundamental property of many of the items which are commonly called par-
ticles. InGerman, for instance, almost all items of the class ofmodal particles also show
usages belonging to other word classes. The lexical item eben, for example, can be used
as an adjective (‘flat, even’), a focus modifier (‘just’), a modal particle (‘as we all know’)
and an autonomous response signal (‘of course’) (cf. Autenrieth 2002, Karagjosova
2003, 2004; see section 3.1 for examples). A well-known example from Ancient Greek
is the lexical item καί, which can be used as a focus modifier (‘also, even’), a syntactic
coordinator (‘and’) and a discourse connective (‘and further, also’) (cf. Crespo 2017a).
Thus, instead of saying ‘expression x is a member of category y in language z’ it is gen-
erally more appropriate to say ‘expression x can be used as a member of category y in
language z’ (Foolen 1996: 2). I will have much more to say about the notorious poly-
functionality of particles in chapter 3.
2. For prototype theory in relation to linguistic categorization, I refer to Taylor (2003). For the useful-
ness of prototype theory in categorizing (types of) particles and discourse/pragmatic markers in partic-
ular, see for instance Hansen (1998a), Pons Bordería (2006), Bazzanella (2006), Fedriani & Sansò
(2017b) and especially Schoonjans (2013), where this topic is explicitly addressed.
3. Cf. Diewald (2013: 36): “Class membership cannot be reliably attributed to particular linguistic
items per se (whether lexical or not), i.e. it is not determinable on the basis of isolated segmental units,
but has to take into account contextual and functional features.”
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2.3 Particles
Ever since thepioneeringworkof the ancient grammarians, the term ‘particle’ has been
rather loosely used and in a number of different ways. Roughly speaking, two main
usages of the term can be distinguished in the linguistic literature, which I call the
broad and the narrow sense:4
∗ Broad sense. In a broad or collective sense of the term, on the one hand, parti-
cles are defined purely in terms of the formal criterion of morphological invari-
ability. More specifically, they are seen as simplex (i.e. monomorphemic) words
which have in common that they cannot change form through inflection. In this
conception, the class of particles stands in opposition to the inflected nominal
and verbal syntactic categories, but includes items which belong to the classes
of adverbs, adpositions (i.e. pre- and postpositions), coordinating and subordi-
nating conjunctions, interjections as well as various classes of other particles.5
∗ Narrow sense. In a narrow or functional sense of the term, on the other hand,
‘particle’ refers to a distinct part of speech which is a subset of the larger class of
invariablewords (i.e. particles in a broad sense). In this conception, particles are
distinguished from the other categories of invariables on the basis of semantic-
functional and additional formal (i.e. phonological, prosodic and syntactic-dis-
tributional) criteria. The class itself, in turn, is usually further subdivided into
various functional types of particles. Common examples of such subclasses –
which may or may not exist in a given language – are case particles, tense-as-
4. See for instance Schenkeveld (1988: 81–82), Kroon (1995: 34f.), Hartmann (1998: 657–658) and
Hansen (2008: 7–8). With respect to Ancient Greek in particular, the vexed issue of defining this word
class is treated by, among others, Hellwig (1974), RedondoMoyano (1993), Duhoux (2006), Loudová
(2014) and Revuelta Puigdollers (2014). I refer to Schenkeveld (1988) for an account of the history
of the term ‘particle’ from ancient times onward.
5. Note that, even in this broad conception of the term, there are significant differences between lan-
guages as to the kind of items that are to be identified as particles. For instance, in some languages many
of the adverbs are excluded from being particles, as they are productively derived by means of adverbial
suffixes (e.g. Ancient Greek -ως, English -ly, French -ment). In other languages, however, such as German,
this type of adverbial morphology is virtually absent, so that adverbs are included in the class of particles
almost by definition. In addition, we may consider the category of articles, which are inflected expres-
sions in one language (e.g. Ancient Greek, German), but non-inflected in the other (e.g. English). In the
latter case, but not in the former, they are to be seen as particles in the broad sense of the term. Finally, it
should be noted that in languages which make no or very little use of morphological inflection or deriva-
tion, the present distinction is not relevant at all and additional criteria are called for (cf. Hentschel &
Weydt 2002: 646–647).
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pect-mood particles, focus modifying particles, negative particles, interrogative
particles, discourse connective particles, modal/attitudinal particles and polite-
ness particles.
Thepresent study is primarily concernedwithparticles in thenarrowsenseof the term.
In the following then, the term ‘particles’ is to be understood as a shorthand for parti-
cles in this narrow sense. In other words, it refers to those invariable words which are
not (used as) an adverb, adposition, conjunction or interjection. To avoid confusion, I
will use the term ‘invariables’ to refer to the class of particles in the broad, morpholog-
ical sense of the term.6
The question now rises how the class of particles can be more specifically char-
acterized and on what linguistic grounds they can be demarcated from the other in-
variables. These are far from straightforward issues, however. The point is that parti-
cles – both across and within individual languages – generally constitute a function-
ally highly heterogeneous group of expressions, covering a wide spectrum of different
grammatical and/or discourse-pragmatic functions (see the various functional sub-
types of particles listed above). The formal distinctions between particles and other
invariables are in turn very much dependent upon the specific structural and typo-
logical properties of individual languages. In other words, languages may vary with
respect to the formal criteria and linguistic tests which are relevant in identifying a
specific item as a particle (rather than, say, an adverb) and in some languages this is a
much more straightforward matter than in others.
Nevertheless, I believe some general, language-independent, features of prototypi-
cal particlehood can still bementioned. Inwhat follows, Iwill present a number of (for-
mal and functional) linguistic properties which are typically ascribed to the category
of particles. I will discuss the extent to which the features can be used to demarcate
particles from other classes of invariables, paying special attention to the situation in
Ancient Greek. Then, I will show how this combination of features is well motivated
by the fact that particles are highly grammaticalized items.
6. Cf. for instance the practice in the Greek grammar of Schwyzer & Debrunner (1950: 411ff.), who
distinguish between a broad class of ‘Inflexibilia’ and “die Partikeln im engern Sinn”. The term ‘invariables’
I owe to Pinkster’s (1972: 135–136) study on Latin adverbs.
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2.3.1 Prototypical properties of particles
Semantics. From a semantic-functional perspective, particles can only be very gen-
erally characterized as grammatical words or function words (rather than lexical or
content words), which by definition carry a highly abstract or ‘empty’ lexical mean-
ing and do not refer to entities in the represented world. This means that particles are
synsemantic in nature in the sense that their meaning contribution is only established
in interactionwith other (autosemantic) linguistic elements in the context.7 This prop-
erty demarcates particles from most of the adverbs, which usually have a clear lexical
content. In addition, it shows how particles differ from prototypical interjections (e.g.
English ah, damn, hey, oh, oops, ouch, shh, wow, yeah; Ancient Greek ἆ, αἰαῖ, εἴα, ἰώ, οἴμοι,
παπαῖ, φεῦ), which donot normally need other linguistic elements to impartmeaning.8
However, the criterion of synsemanticism is not sufficient to distinguish particles from
adpositions, conjunctions or certain kinds of adverbs that do not show a concrete lexi-
cal content (e.g. phasal adverbs such as ἔτι ‘still’ and ἤδη ‘already’, intensifying adverbs
such as μάλα ‘very’ or connective adverbs such as ὅμως ‘nevertheless’).9
Morphology. As has been noted above, a necessary criterion for particlehood is their
morphological invariability. Particles are simplex (i.e. monomorphemic) words which
cannot be inflected and are not formedbywayof productivemorphological derivation.
In Ancient Greek, particles differ in this respect from many of the adverbs, as these
are often (productively) derived via regular morphological processes. Thus, they are
commonly formed on the basis of certain case forms of adjectives (e.g. ταχύ ‘quickly’
acc. neut. from ταχύς ‘quick’) or by means of adverbial suffixes, such as -ως for man-
ner adverbs (e.g. ἀληθῶς ‘truly’ from ἀληθής ‘true’) or -δε and -θεν for spatial adverbs
7. See Lehmann (1995) for the concept of synsemanticism. For synsemanticismas anecessary criterion
for particlehood, see for instance Hentschel &Weydt (2002: 646) and Rosén (2009: 327–328).
8. For interjections in Ancient Greek, I refer to the in-depth studies by Biraud (2010) and Nordgren
(2015).
9. Other researchers have definedparticles in terms ofmore specific semantic-functional requirements,
such as non-propositionality or context-dependency. In such accounts, the class is for instance restricted
to expressions that contribute discourse-functional or interactional meanings and do not contribute to
the truth-conditional content of an utterance. The term ‘particle’ is then used as a shorthand for what I
call ‘pragmatic particle’ or even for ‘pragmaticmarker’ (cf. section 2.4 below.) Although I do not deny that
many particles can indeed be analyzed in terms of these features, I do not see them as necessary criteria
for particlehood in general. That is, I do not rule out the possibility that particles may have an impact on
truth-conditions and contribute to the propositional content of their host utterance. In Ancient Greek,
for instance, this holds for the tense-aspect-mood particles ἄν and κεν as well as for the negative particles
οὐ and μή (see section 2.3.3 below).
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(e.g. οἴκαδε ‘to home’ and οἴκοθεν ‘from home’).10 However, as has been noted above,
morphological invariability is not sufficient to distinguish particles from adpositions,
conjunctions, interjections as well as a number of isolated or fossilized adverbs (e.g. εὖ
‘well’, πάλιν ‘back, again’, ἔτι ‘still’, μάλα ‘very’ and χθές ‘yesterday’).11
Phonology. Particles tend to be phonologically relatively ‘light’. That is, they are typ-
ically short expressions which are monosyllabic in nature. As indicated by van Baar
(1996: 263–264), this feature is best taken as a strong tendency rather than a necessary
criterion, which is indeed corroborated by the situation in Ancient Greek: most parti-
cles satisfy this criterion (e.g. ἄν, γάρ, γε, δέ, δή, ἦ, καί, μέν, μή, μήν, νυν, οὐ, οὖν, που and
τοι), but there are some exceptions of particles which consist of two (e.g. ἀλλά, ἄρα, δή-
που, μέντοι, οὐδέ/μήδε, οὐκοῦν and τοίνυν) or even three syllables (e.g. τοιγαροῦν).12 Note
that this property is neither sufficient to distinguish particles from the other classes of
invariables, whichmay also consist of monosyllabic words (e.g. the adverb εὖ ‘well’, the
preposition ἐν ‘in’ or the interjection φεῦ ‘ah, oh’).
A second phonological tendency mentioned by van Baar (1996) is that particles
do not normally receive stress or a focus accent. In studies on German particles, this
criterion has indeed been used to distinguish between different usages of the same
word: an unstressed use as a (modal) particle and a stressed use as an adverb.13 For
Ancient Greek, however, we lack the appropriate information on stress and intonation
to use this criterion, unfortunately (see section 1.4.3 above).
Prosody. From a prosodic point of view, particles are located somewhere around the
borderline between autonomous prosodic words and clitics, i.e. attenuated expres-
sions that are prosodically dependent upon a directly preceding or following word
10. Cf. also Koier (2013: 28) for this morphological distinction between adverbs and particles in An-
cient Greek. See de la Villa Polo (2006) for the explicit argument that many of the Greek adverbs are
not morphologically invariable. Cf. van Emde Boas et al. (2019: 83f.) for a recent overview of Greek ad-
verb morphology in general.
11. Semantically, such adverbs may in fact be rather similar to particles, witness the fact that both are
often characterized by the same labels. In the literature, we can find, for instance, such terms as ‘sentence
adverbs’ vs. ‘sentence particles’, ‘modal/attitudinal adverbs’ vs. ‘modal/attitudinal particles’, ‘connective/
conjunctive adverbs’ vs. ‘connective particles’, ‘phasal adverbs’ vs. ‘phasal particles’ and ‘intensifying ad-
verbs’ vs. ‘intensifying particles’. In such cases then, the distinctionbetween adverb andparticle is a purely
formal distinction, where particles show a higher degree of formal grammaticalization than adverbs (see
section 2.3.2 below).
12. Note that these are often fixed (univerbated) collocations of two other particles (e.g. μέντοι < μέν +
τοι, οὐκοῦν < οὐκ + oὖν and τοιγαροῦν < τοιγάρ + οὖν). See section 2.3.2 below.
13. See e.g. Thurmair (1989: 22–23) on the ‘Unbetonbarkeit’ of German modal particles.
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(Zwicky 1985, van Baar 1996). This means that particles tend to show a certain de-
gree of bondedness with another word. Although this feature does not appear to be a
very relevant property of particles in languages such as German and Dutch, it is in fact
a central feature of the items that are usually treated as particles in Ancient Greek. In
practice, thismeans that they take a position either before (proclitic, prepositive) or af-
ter (enclitic, postpositive) another word, in combination with which they constitute a
prosodic unit. This prosodic behaviour, as I take it, is a crucialmeans to formally distin-
guish particles fromboth adverbs and interjections,which constitute prosodic units on
their own account (with the exception of indefinite adverbs such as που ‘somewhere’
and ποτε ‘ever, once’). However, it is by nomeans a sufficient criterion for particlehood
inGreek, as this property is sharedwith otherword classes such as articles, adpositions
and conjunctions. In chapter 4 below, I will come back in muchmore detail to the po-
sition and prosodic behaviour of Greek particles, as it is an important formal means to
distinguish between different types of particles.
Syntax. From a syntactic point of view, particles – unlike prototypical adverbs – do
not have phrase or constituent value; they cannot for instance be modified, coordi-
nated, questioned or used autonomously as an answer to a question.14 More gener-
ally, we can say that particles do not in principle occur in isolation, i.e. are not real-
ized as completely autonomous (non-elliptical) utterances. Or, put differently, they
are by definition used in combinationwith some linguistic host unit (i.e. a single word,
phrase, clause, sentenceor larger chunkof discourse). This feature clearly distinguishes
particles from prototypical interjections, which are usually considered as sentence-
equivalents that occur in isolation by definition (cf. ‘semantics’ above). Finally, parti-
cles tend to bemodifiers that are syntactically optional and do not govern case. In this
respect, particles differ from both conjunctions and adpositions.
2.3.2 Particles and grammaticalization
I would like to emphasize that we are not just dealing with a random combination
of linguistic features, but that they are well motivated when considered from a di-
achronic grammaticalization perspective.15 In this respect I follow the line of thought
14. Note that for Ancient Greek such syntactic tests (i.e. coordination test, one-word test) are not with-
out difficulty, as we can only work with what is attested in the corpus. See Pinkster (1972) for similar
qualifications with regard to Latin.
15. Following Hopper & Traugott (2003: xv), I define grammaticalization as “the change whereby
lexical items and constructions come in certain linguistic contexts to serve grammatical functions, and,
once grammaticalized, continue to develop new grammatical functions.” Another term which is often
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pursued by van Baar (1996, 1997: ch. 6), who defines particles as highly grammatical-
ized items which have diachronically derived from other parts of speech such as verbs,
(pro)nouns, adjectives and adverbs. Consider, for instance, the following well-known
derivations of some of the Ancient Greek particles:16
(1) a. ἄλλα ‘other things’ (n. pl. from ἄλλος ‘other’) > ἀλλά ‘but’ (coordinator/discourse
particle)
b. τοι ‘for you’ (dative pronoun) > τοι ‘mind you, note that’ (discourse particle)
c. νῦν ‘now’ (temporal adverb) > νυν ‘well, now, then’ (discourse particle)
d. που ‘somewhere’ (indefinite spatial adverb) > που ‘I suppose, perhaps’ (dis-
course particle)
The central idea is that a particle has gradually lost the essential (formal or semantic)
properties of the part of speech it originally derives from, so that it can no longer be
counted as an instance of that category. In addition, it is clear that particles are in a
phase of grammaticalization “where the original material still has enough substance
to be an independent word or a clitic” (van Baar 1996: 265). If we look at the general
cline of grammaticalization as formulated by Hopper & Traugott (2003), particles
thus take some intermediate position between pure content items and affixes:
(2) Cline of grammaticalization
content item > grammatical word > clitic > inflectional affix
(Hopper & Traugott 2003: 7)
The point is that the status of particles as highly grammaticalized items is in turn re-
flected in the defining characteristics of the class. That is, the linguistic features pre-
sented above result from the various mechanisms which are involved in the general
process of grammaticalization, such as semantic bleaching/delexicalization (i.e. re-
duction or loss of lexical semantic content), morphological reduction (i.e. the loss of
the morphosyntactic properties of the source item), phonological erosion (i.e. short-
ening and reduction of phonological substance) and cliticization (i.e. an increasing
used in the literature is ‘pragmaticalization’, which refers to the development of ‘pragmatic’ (i.e. discourse-
functional, interactional etc.) meaning aspects. Here I follow Diewald (2011), Simon-Vandenbergen&
Willems (2011) and others in conceiving the latter as a species of the general process of grammatical-
ization, rather than a completely different phenomenon.
16. SeeAllan (2017a, 2021) for anup-to-date discussion of these examples in the light of grammatical-
ization theory. Cf. Koier (2013) for the development of που in particular. Most other particles in Ancient
Greek are etymologically obscure, unfortunately.
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degree of bondedness). In short, the class of particles has a strong diachronic motiva-
tion: they are semantically grammaticalized function words which also show some of
the typical features of formal grammaticalization.
I would further like to emphasize here that, since grammaticalization is an es-
sentially gradual process, the class of particles has fuzzy boundaries by definition. On
both ends of the grammaticalization cline we expect to find borderline cases, i.e. items
which – at a given stage of a language – do not yet or no longer show all of the for-
mal and semantic features of a prototypical particle. It follows that there is a grey area,
on the one hand, between particles and the parts of speech which they tend to derive
from (e.g. verbs, (pro)nouns and especially adverbs) and, on the other hand, between
(clitic) particles andboundmorphemes that are a fully integratedpart of anotherword.
To sumup, the class is best conceptualized as a prototype category and some flexibility
in categorization should simply be taken for granted (see section 2.2 above).
If we focus on Ancient Greek, examples of such borderline cases are expressions
such as μόνον (‘only’), ἔτι (‘still’), ἤδη (‘already, now’), πάλιν (‘again, back’), μάλα (‘very,
certainly’), τάχα (‘perhaps’) and ὅμως (‘nevertheless’).17Although these expressions are
syntactically and functionally highly similar to prototypical particles, they appear to be
more flexible in their position within the clause. That is, they seem to be more inde-
pendent from a prosodic point of view and are thusmore like adverbs in this respect.18
With respect to the fluid boundary between (clitic) particles and bound morphemes,
on the other hand, we can observe that it is not at all uncommon in Ancient Greek
that frequent collocations involving oneormoreparticles gradually coalesce over time.
Eventually, this may result into the generation of a new lexeme in which the original
particle has become fully integrated and does no longer have the formal properties of
a distinct word or clitic (univerbation). Some well-known examples of this process are
given in (3):19
(3) a. καί ‘and’ + περ (focus particle) > καίπερ ‘even though’
b. εἰ ‘if ’ + περ (focus particle) > εἴπερ ‘even if, exclusively if ’
c. ὅς ‘who’ (relative) + περ (focus part.) > ὅσπερ ‘precisely who, the very man who’
d. ἐγώ ‘I’ + γε (focus particle) > ἔγωγε ‘I, for my part’
e. ἐπεί ‘when, since’ + δή (discourse part.) > ἐπειδή ‘when, since, now/given that’
17. For a discussion of the alleged particle status of πάλιν, see Revuelta Puigdollers (2006).
18. It should also be noted that an expression like που is by definition ambiguous between an analysis
as an adverb (‘somewhere’) and an attitudinal-interactional particle (‘I suppose’), since it behaves as a
postpositive expression in both cases. See Koier (2013) for further discussion.
19. See Allan (2021) for the rise of μέντοι in particular.
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f. ὅστις ‘whoever’ (indefinite relative) + οὖν (discourse particle) > ὁστισοῦν ‘anyone
whosoever (indefinite pronoun)
g. μέν (discourse particle) + τοι (discourse particle) > μέντοι (discourse particle)
h. δή (discourse particle) + που (discourse particle) > δήπου (discourse particle)
Given the gradual nature of this process, it may not always be clear whether a given
instance of an item is still to be taken as a distinct (clitic) particle or rather as a fully
integrated part of a newly formed lexeme. Again, there is a grey area here which we
should simply take for granted.20
To sum up, I will use the term ‘particle’ in the narrow sense, referring to a subset of the
larger class of invariables. When Ancient Greek is concerned, there are in fact quite a
number of linguistic features that allow us to properly distinguish prototypical parti-
cles from other invariables, notably adverbs and interjections. These features reflect
the fact that particles have undergone a process of grammaticalization and have di-
achronically derived from lexical content words.Wemay thus define particles as those
strongly grammaticalized items that are not (used as) syntactic conjunctions or adpo-
sitions (cf. van Baar 1997).21
2.3.3 Semantic types of particles in Ancient Greek
Now that we have defined particles predominantly in formal-syntactic terms, further
subdivisions can bemade on the basis of semantic-functional grounds. That is, we can
distinguish between various semantic types of particles – which may or may not exist
in a given language (see section 2.2 above). For Ancient Greek, I havemade the follow-
ing broad classification of particle types:
20. Note that orthography is not always a useful criterion in distinguishing (clitic) particles from fully
integrated morphemes. Clitics may in general very well be attached to the word they depend upon (cf.
Latin -que ‘and’, -ve ‘or’ and English doesn’t). Thus, an item like -περ, even if orthographically no longer
realized as a distinct word, may in principle still be seen as an enclitic particle. For Ancient Greek, more-
over, we should take into account that it often depends on the individual preferences of modern editors
whether or not a given collocation is printed as a single word. See my remarks in section 1.4.3 above.
21. At this point, itmay be useful to emphasize thatmy use of the term ‘particle’ slightly differs from the
traditional practice in the field of classical linguistics, in which coordinating and subordinating conjunc-
tions are usually also called particles in the narrow sense (cf. Hellwig 1974, Redondo Moyano 1993,
Revuelta Puigdollers 2014). In the present study, I distinguish between subordinators, coordinators
and discourse connective particles, but I do allow for the possibility that one item may be classified –
dependent on its particular usage – in more than one of these categories. See section 2.5.1 for further
discussion.
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∗ tma-particles. These particles closely interact with the verbal categories of
tense, mood and aspect (tma) and are used to modify a described state of af-
fairs in a particular way. Greek has two particles – ἄν and its Homeric equivalent
κε(ν) – that pertain to the category of event modality and are used, for instance,
to indicate counterfactuality or potentiality of a state of affairs. In addition, the
so-called ‘epic’ use of the particle τε can bementioned here, whichmarks a state
of affairs as permanent, habitual or iterative (Ruijgh 1971).
∗ Focus modifying particles. These particles are used to highlight a focused ele-
ment in relation to a set of (scalar) alternatives. Typical examples are καί (‘also,
even’), οὐδέ (‘not … either, not even’), περ (‘even, precisely’) and the restrictive
particle γε. I will argue that some usages of the particle δή also belong here. See
section 2.7 for further details on the class of focus modifiers in general.
∗ Intensifyingparticles. These particles are used tomodify the extent or intensity
of semantically gradable properties. Althoughmost intensifiers are in fact better
treated as adverbs in Ancient Greek (e.g. μάλα, πάνυ, κάρτα and σφόδρα ‘very’),
this class is relevant to the extent that someof theundisputedparticles –notably
ἦ and δή – have also been claimed to have intensifying uses. See section 2.8 for
further details on the class of intensifiers in general.
∗ Polarity particles. These particles indicate positive or negative polarity. The
class consists of the simple negative particles οὐ and μή as well as their positive
(affirmative) counterpart ἦ. Itmust be noted that these particles also have ‘prag-
matic’ (i.e. non-descriptive) usages on the illocutionary level (see below).22
∗ Illocution-marking particles. These particles are markers of a particular sen-
tence type and/or illocutionary force. Ancient Greek has a number of interrog-
ative particles which introduce various different types of yes/no-questions, e.g.
ἦ, ἆρα (‘is it true that p?’, neutral/unbiased question), οὐ, ἆρ’ οὐ, oὐκοῦν (‘isn’t it
true (then) that p?’, positive bias), μή and μῶν (‘it isn’t true that p, is it?’, nega-
tive bias). In addition, there are specialized particles to indicate (unrealizable)
wishes, e.g. εἰ (γάρ), εἴθε and ὤφελον. Finally, we can mention the independent
22. For ἦ as the positive counterpart of οὐ, see Ruijgh (1971: 191) and Wakker (1997a: 218–223).
The particle οὐ – but not ἦ – is sometimes used independently as an elliptic answer to a preceding yes/no-
question (οὔ ‘it is not’; cf. Rijksbaron2009, 2012). This use of οὐ, then, is somewhat less prototypical from
a prosodic perspective, but I do not see this as a decisive reason to leave οὐ out of the class of particles
altogether (pace Duhoux 1997b, 2006).
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(i.e. non-subordinating) usages of the particles ὡς and ὅπως: the former may in-
dicate – mainly in poetry – a wish or exclamation, whereas the latter may be
used as an apprehensive marker (‘take care that’).23
∗ Attitudinal-interactional particles. These particles are essentially used to
manage the attitudes, beliefs and expectations of the discourse participants to-
wards the communicated content or the speech act made. That is, such parti-
cles signal how their host unit is related to, or evaluated in terms of, the non-
verbal communicative situation in which the discourse is integrated, including
the common ground of the speaker and the addressee(s). Their main function
may thus be said to be stance-taking and thenegotiationof commonground. Ex-
amples are τοι (‘mind you, take note, you know’) and που (‘I suppose, perhaps’).
As we will see, many of the usages of μήν and δή can be assigned to this class
too. See section 2.6 for further details on the class of attitudinal-interactional
markers in general.24
∗ Discourse connective particles. These particles are primarily used to explicitly
indicate rhetorical or discourse-structural relationships between two chunks of
discourse. That is, they signal how their host unit relates to another, preceding
or upcoming, discourse unit. Theirmain function thus concerns discourse orga-
nization and marking discourse coherence. Typical examples of such particles
are ἀλλά (‘but’), αὖ (‘in turn’), γάρ (‘for’), δέ (marks a discourse boundary), ἐπεί
(‘for’), καί (‘and further, also’), καίτοι (‘and yet’), μέν (prepares for an upcoming
discourse unit), νυν (‘now, then’), οὖν (‘so, now, anyway’), τοιγάρ (‘therefore, ac-
cordingly’) and τοίνυν (‘well then, now then’). I will argue that someof the usages
of μήν and δή also belong to this subclass. See section 2.5 for further details on
the class of discourse connectives in general.
23. For further discussion and examples of (the illocutionary usages of) these particles, see for instance
Sicking (1997), Rijksbaron (2009, 2012), Revuelta Puigdollers (2017) and van Emde Boas et al.
(2019: ch. 38).
24. In the literature, this class of particles is more generally labeled ‘modal particles’, especially within
the research tradition into the Germanic languages. However, in line with the general practice in the field
of AncientGreek linguistics, I prefer to use this term strictly for the particles thatmark eventmodality and
thus contribute to descriptive, truth-conditional content (i.e. ἄν and κε(ν), see above). In turn, I reserve
the term ‘attitudinal-interactional particle’ for the kind of pragmatic (i.e. non-descriptive) particleswhich
primarily refer to the attitudes and/or common ground of the discourse participants.
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At this point, it is important to note that the distinction between attitudinal-inter-
actional and discourse connective particles is not reflected in any major formal (e.g.
syntactic, topological, prosodic) differences. In other words, in Ancient Greek – as op-
posed to most Germanic languages – there does not appear to be any compelling for-
mal evidence to maintain a rigid division between these two subclasses of particles.
The distinction is purely made on the basis of semantic-functional and conceptual
grounds, which in turn implies that it may not always be straightforward – or even
useful – to assign a given instance of a particle to one or the other category. And in-
deed, attitudinal-interactional and connective meaning aspects may also go hand in
hand within the same form (cf. Wakker 2009a on τοίνυν). I will therefore use the label
discourse particles (dps) as a general cover term for both types of particles, which is
intended to be neutral with respect to the parameter of textual connectivity.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will further elaborate upon the semantic-functional
side of the picture, looking more closely to some of the functions and meanings that
were listed here (e.g. discourse connective, attitudinal-interactional and focus modi-
fying meaning aspects) in order to better understand the exact linguistic contribution
of such particles. Before we do so, however, it is useful to broaden our view a bit and
examine the general class of so-called ‘pragmatic markers’ and the central linguistic
properties of these items.
2.4 Pragmatic markers
As I have noted at the very beginning of this work and as we have already seen in the
preceding section, many of the items that belong to the formal class of particles in
Ancient Greek – including μήν and δή – express meaning aspects of a ‘pragmatic’ na-
ture. From a semantic-functional perspective, they can thus be generally character-
ized as what in the functionally-oriented literature have been called ‘pragmatic mark-
ers’ (pms).25 I am referring here to the kind of linguistic items which are used not to
contribute to the descriptive, truth-conditional content of the utterance in which they
occur, but rather “to signal aspects of the relationship between that utterance and its
co(n)text […], between the utterance and its speaker […], and/or between the speaker
and the hearer” (Hansen 2012: 589). Thus, pragmatic markers conventionally encode
meanings related to, inter alia, discourse organization, information packaging, com-
25. See e.g. Fraser (1990, 1996), Brinton (1996), Andersen & Fretheim (2000), Aijmer & Simon-
Vandenbergen (2011) and Foolen (2011).
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mon groundmanagement, illocutionary force, stance-taking and politeness strategies.
In short, these expressions directly reflect the fact that natural language, be it spoken
conversation or written text, is meant for communication and is used within a partic-
ular communicative context, i.e. by discourse participants who have particular com-
municative intentions or goals, entertain particular beliefs, attitudes and expectations,
and have particular social roles with respect to each other as well as a particular self-
image or face.
To be sure, the meaning types mentioned here may of course be communicated
by a wide variety of different linguistic phenomena, including paralinguistic devices
(e.g. stress, intonation contours, tone of voice, gestures, typographical signs in written
discourse), syntactic structures (e.g. word order phenomena, cleft-constructions, sen-
tence types), morphological suffixes (e.g. affective diminutives) and specialized words
or fixed phrases. Although all of these signals might in principle be called ‘pragmatic
markers’, I restrict the class here to the latter group of specialized words and short
phrases, i.e. to linguistic items which may arguably be considered to be lexicalized or
idiomatized.26
Nevertheless, the items which are used as pragmatic markers still constitute a
highly heterogeneous class and have in fact also been categorized as belonging to var-
ious other, more specific, linguistic categories. Among others, these include markers
of illocutionary force (e.g. please, performative verbs, question tags), discourse con-
nectives (e.g. so, but, however, furthermore), sentence adverbs (e.g. frankly, fortunately,
surely, indeed), modal particles (e.g. German ja, eben, doch, schon), expressive adjec-
tives (e.g. damned, as in your damned dog), focus modifiers (e.g. even, just), intensifiers
(e.g. totally, barely, at all), hedges (e.g. sort of, kind of, like), vocatives (e.g. my friend,
Sir), interjections (e.g. oops, ouch, oh, gee) and back-channeling/response signals (e.g.
26. This also means that, as has been pointed out by a number of authors, more complex (clausal)
constructions that have similarmeta-communicative functions but are non-lexicalized, are also excluded
from the class (e.g. to return to my main point, if you don’t mind my saying so, if you know what I mean, to
put it frankly). See e.g. Fischer 2006b for further discussion.
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hmm, yeah, okay).27 Some of these categories will be discussed in more detail in the
following sections, but first it is useful to take a somewhat broader perspective and to
make some comments on the main linguistic properties of the class of pms in general.
2.4.1 Formal properties
I would like to start by stating that I take pragmatic markers as a semantic-functional
class, which – apart from the criterion of lexicalization mentioned above – is not re-
stricted by any formal criteria (cf. Foolen 2011: 218–219). First, at themorphological-
phonological level, the term covers not only prototypical particles (see section 2.3),
but also less strongly grammaticalized expressions such as polymorphemic words (e.g.
moreover, actually, unfortunately) and fixed multi-word idioms (e.g. I mean, you know,
after all, by the way).
Second, the term is neutral with respect to the traditional part of speech divisions:
pmsmay in principle belong to – or be originally drawn from– various different syntac-
tic categories, such as adverbs (e.g. well, now, surely), conjunctions (and, but, because),
interjections, verbs (look, listen, say) and, if present in a language, a grammatical class of
modal particles (as in German and Dutch) or discourse particles (as in Ancient Greek;
cf. section 2.3 above).
Third, there are no restrictions with respect to the degree of syntactic-prosodic
integratedness and the topological behaviour of the marker. Although in English pms
quite regularly occur in a syntactically and prosodically detached position at the very
start of the utterance, in other languages they are also commonly found in other po-
sitions or constructional templates. The German modal particles, for instance, occur
in the syntactically integrated middle field of the sentence, many pragmatic particles
in Ancient Greek take the peninitial Wackernagel-position (cf. section 4.1), and quite
some languages also exhibit a class of utterance-final pms (see Hancil, Haselow &
27. For such a broad, inclusive conception of the class of pragmatic markers, see for instance Fraser
(1996, 2006), Foolen (2001, 2011), Hansen (2006, 2012), Aijmer, Foolen & Simon-Vandenbergen
(2006), Aijmer & Simon-Vandenbergen (2011), Schrickx (2011: ch. 3) and Crible (2017). On this
view, I should add, the term ‘discourse markers’ – which has also been used as a general umbrella term
for the items that conventionally encode non-truth-conditional meaning (e.g. Jucker & Ziv 1998b, Baz-
zanella 2006, Fischer 2014, Drummen 2016a) – is rather to be seen as a hyponym of ‘pragmatic mark-
ers’, referring to the kind of items which primarily fulfill meanings of a discourse-organizational nature.
In other words, discourse markers are here taken as a subset of the more comprehensive semantic-func-
tional class of pragmatic markers.
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Post 2015). It is not uncommon, in fact, that a given pm may occur in various differ-
ent positions within the utterance, which tend to correspond to variation in discourse-
pragmatic meaning (see, e.g., Diewald 2006, 2013, Fischer & Alm 2013).
The point is that these formal features are all very much dependent on the (typo-
logical) properties of individual languages. Correspondingly, categorization in terms of
these formal features should be done primarily from a language-internal, semasiolog-
ical perspective and I do not take them as decisive definitional criteria of the general
class of pms here (cf. my remarks in section 2.2 above).28
2.4.2 Non-truth-conditional codedmeaning
If we now turn to the semantic-functional side of the picture, themost important prop-
erty of pms, as has been noted above, is that they conventionally encode meaning
elements which go beyond the representation or description of some possible world
which is ‘talked about’, so to speak. Rather, these meaning elements somehow pertain
to the speech event itself and/or the immediate communicative context in which the
speech event is integrated, and it is in this sense that the label ‘pragmatic’ as used in
‘pragmatic marker’ is to be understood.
Let me emphasize, in turn, that ‘pragmatic’ is not meant here as being in contra-
diction with ‘coded’. Pragmatic markers, to be sure, conventionally encode the non-
truth-conditional meaning aspects mentioned (i.e. meanings that pertain to the utter-
ance/co(n)text, speaker/utterance or speaker/hearer relation). Accordingly, this use of
the term ‘pragmatic’ does not reflect how I generally draw the semantics/pragmatics
boundary, which I prefer to see as a distinction between, on the one hand, meaning el-
ements which are conventionally encoded in linguistic expressions and, on the other
hand, those that arise by way of contextual inferencing or conversational implicature,
i.e. as a result of the interplay between coded meanings and the communicative con-
28. In this respect, I feel, general definitions of pragmaticmarkers and discoursemarkers have too often
been based on the situation in the English language, in which these items are perhaps most commonly
studied. See, e.g., the list of formal criteria posed by Brinton (1996), who was one of the first authors to
use ‘pragmatic marker’ as a technical term.
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text in which these are used (Grice 1975, 1978).29 On this view then, the linguistic
items that I have termed ‘pragmatic markers’ clearly do have a semantics – albeit of a
completely different kind than that of regular truth-conditional items (see below).30
In the literature, the distinction between the two types of coded (i.e. conventional)
meaning mentioned above is in fact widely recognized, although the terminology dif-
fers and tends to depend on the linguistic framework in question. Inmore functionally
oriented approaches, for instance, it is usually put in terms of various different ‘levels’
at which a particular item may be at work. Thus, in the framework of Functional Dis-
course Grammar (fdg), a basic distinction is made between a ‘representational’ and
an ‘interpersonal’ level of linguistic organization (e.g. Hengeveld&Mackenzie 2008,
Keizer 2015),31 whereas Hansen (2008, 2012), in a similar vein, speaks about ‘con-
tent-level’ and ‘context-level’ (uses of) expressions. In turn, these distinctions appear to
correspond by and large to what, in a more formal-semantic and logically oriented ap-
proach, has recently been established as the distinction between truth-conditional or
descriptive meaning, on the one hand, and expressive or use-conditional meaning, on
the other (e.g. Potts 2007, 2012, Gutzmann & Gärtner 2013, Gutzmann 2015).32
Since I do not wish to bind myself too much to one of these theoretical frameworks,
I will henceforth simply speak about non-descriptive or non-truth-conditional coded
meaning (rather than e.g. use-conditional, expressive or context-level meaning).
In what follows, I will make three qualifications about the distinction made here.
First of all, it may perhaps be useful to note that in the formal-semantic literature there
is also the dichotomy between at issue and non-at-issue meaning, which is especially
due to Potts’s (2005) work on parenthetical expressions. As I take it, however, this
distinction must be seen as orthogonal to the distinction made above (cf. Gutzmann
2015: 269–273, Gutzmann& Turgay 2019). This is probably best illustrated by some
examples of parenthetical expressions:
29. Pragmatic markers are in fact more like the items that give rise to what Grice (1975) has labeled
‘conventional implicatures’ – which I take here as belonging to the study of semantics rather than prag-
matics.
30. I refer to Foolen (1993: ch.3), Hansen (2008: ch.2, 2012) and Gutzmann (2013, 2015: ch. 1)
for further discussion of the semantics/pragmatics distinction in the context of research into pragmatic
markers/particles.
31. The interpersonal level in fdg corresponds to what in Kroon’s (1995) earlier framework – which
has also been used bymany authors working onAncient Greek (cf.Wakker 1997a, 2009a, George 2009,
Tronci 2017) – are called the ‘presentational’ (or text-organizing) and the ‘interactional’ levels of dis-
course.
32. Defined by Gutzmann (2013: 33) as follows: “Use-conditional content affects the conditions under
which a sentence can be uttered felicitously, not the conditions that have to be fulfilled in order to make
a sentence true.” See also Kaplan (1999) and Recanati (2004) for earlier proposals along these lines.
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(4) Context: Where is Bruce from?
a. Bruce,who is a famous singer, is from New Jersey.
b. Bruce, a famous singer, is from New Jersey.
c. Bruce – he is a famous singer – is from New Jersey.
Even though parentheticals clearly express non-at-issue content, in as far as they do
not address the current issue or question under discussion, this content is clearly de-
scriptive in nature and can be evaluated in terms of truth-conditions (e.g. we can say
whether it is true or false that Bruce is a famous singer). The interpretation of paren-
theticals is not dependent on the immediate context of utterance, in contrast to the
meanings contributed by pms such as well, you know and bastard. Such items, indeed,
may also be seen as contributing non-at-issue meaning, but differ as to the parameter
of truth-conditionality.33
A second caveat concerns the fact that many of the items which are used as pms
also have other usages in which they do contribute to the truth-conditional content of
an utterance, as illustrated by the following pairs of examples:
(5) a. I don’t feel very well. (descriptive use)
b. Well, what’s the matter? (non-descriptive pm-use)
(6) a. He did it because he loved her so much. (descriptive use)
b. What are you doing tonight? Because there’s a good movie on. (non-descriptive
pm-use)
(7) a. πῶς γάρ τοι δώσουσι γέρας μεγάθυμοι Ἀχαιοί; (descriptive use)
For how shall the great-hearted Achaeans give you (τοι) a price? (Il. 1.123)
b. ἥ τοι γυνὴ φιλεῖ με, δήλη ’στὶν καλῶς. (non-descriptive pm-use)
The woman loves me, you know (τοι), that’s quite obvious. (Ar. Lys. 919)
In fact, as has now become widely recognized, the pm-usages usually are diachronic
meaning extensions of the original descriptive use of such expressions. The result of
such diachronic change is a situation of polysemy (see chapter 3). Therefore, as I have
explained in section 2.2 above, it is generally more straightforward to speak of linguis-
33. Let me note here that it might in fact not be impossible to provide a satisfying paraphrase of the
meaning expressed by pms that takes the form of a proposition and can be judged as true or false – al-
though for some items this would arguably be muchmore difficult than for others. The interjection oops,
for example, might be paraphrased as ‘I have just observed a minor mishap’ (Kaplan 1999), and the
French pronoun vous as ‘there is non-familiar social relation between speaker and addressee’. The essen-
tial difference, however, as argued for by Gutzmann (2013: 42–44), is that pms have a different mode of
expression than such paraphrases: they express or display this content rather than describe it.
559416-L-bw-Thijs
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 59
2.4. Pragmatic markers 45
tic items which are used as pms. Note, furthermore, that the diachronic viewpoint also
implies that some items at a given stage of a language may still be on the verge of ob-
taining additional pm-usages, and that the boundaries between the descriptive and
non-descriptive usages of such an itemmay not always be as clear-cut as in the case of,
say, English well.34
Now in order to tell the difference between the two types of coded meaning and
between the two usages of the items in examples (5) to (7), a number of heuristic tools
or tests are usually employed. First of all, since pms do not form a part of the informa-
tional content of their host utterance, it is predicted that they fall outside the focus-
background structure of this utterance. This is reflected in a number of negative prop-
erties concerning their syntactic behaviour. The following list – in one form or another
– is put forward by many authors working on the subject:35
∗ pms cannot fall in the scope of ordinary (i.e. non-meta-linguistic) negation
∗ pms cannot be part of what is elicited by interrogatives
∗ pms cannot occur as answers to wh-questions
∗ pms cannot be the focus of cleft-constructions
∗ pms cannot be modified by focus-sensitive adverbials (e.g. also, only, perhaps)
∗ pms cannot be part ofwhat is directly denied in a reactivemove (e.g. by saying ‘But that’s
not true’)
Another formal clue is concernedwith prosodic-syntactic integratedness. The fact that
pms do not form a part of the informational content of their host utterance is often –
though not necessarily (see section 2.4.1 above) – also formally reflected by the fact
that they are found in a position that is syntactically and prosodically detached from
the main utterance. They often make up an information or intonation unit on their
own. Such behaviour can thus be taken as another indication of a pragmatic, non-de-
scriptive, usage.
My third caveat concerns the fact that linguistic expressions may in fact conven-
tionally encode both types of codedmeaning simultaneously. That is, some itemsmay
impact truth-conditions and at the same time evoke certain non-descriptive meaning
elements.36 This is illustrated, for instance, by the distinction between familiar and
34. For someexplicit examples, see e.g. Aijmer, Foolen&Simon-Vandenbergen (2006: 102),Hansen
(2006: 27–28) and Kroon (2011: 179–180).
35. Cf. e.g. Greenbaum (1969) and Quirk et al. (1985) on the distinction between adjuncts on the one
hand and disjuncts/conjuncts on the other. See also the discussion in Hansen (2012) and Gutzmann
(2013). It must be noted that, in the formal-semantic literature, most of these tests are also commonly
used to determine non-at-issue meaning (see above).
36. These are what Gutzmann (2013, 2015) has termed ‘mixed use-conditional items’.
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formal pronouns that we find in languages such as German (du vs. Sie) and French (tu
vs. vous). These second person pronouns clearly contribute to the truth-conditional
content in the sense that they refer to a particular individual (viz. the addressee), but
additionally encode non-descriptive meanings which are to be explained in terms of
social deixis and politeness (e.g. the speaker signals a formal/non-familiar social rela-
tion between speaker and addressee).
2.4.3 Semiotic status
To end the discussion on pms, I would like to shortly attend to the question of their
semiotic status and the type of meanings which they tend to encode, given that these
are not descriptive or referential in nature. Following many authors in the field, I con-
sider these meanings to be essentially instructional or, in Relevance-Theoretic terms,
procedural in kind. This means that pms are mainly used to provide instructions from
speaker to addressee(s) in order to, for instance, guide the intended interpretation of
the utterance, ease the cognitive processing of information and manage the commu-
nicative process in general. More generally, we can say that pms are instructions on
how an utterance fits into its verbal and/or non-verbal context.37 In this capacity, I
would like to emphasize, pms must also be seen as important devices to create such a
context: they are often used by speakers to actively construct – rather than just mark
or point at – a particular context against which the utterance in question is to be inter-
preted.38 This in turn reflects the essentially dynamicnature of discourse and linguistic
communication.
This brings me to a final, closely related, property of many pms, which is usually
referred to as their meta-linguistic, meta-discursive, meta-communicative or reflexive
character. Such terms try to capture the fact that pms “support the interpretation of
more central informative aspects of the utterance by commenting implicitly on the
utterance or the text” (Aijmer, Foolen & Simon-Vandenbergen 2006: 105). Tak-
ing a somewhat broader perspective, this property can be nicely captured in terms
37. For the instructional or procedural meaning of pms, see among others Ducrot et al. (1980),
Anscombre & Ducrot (1983), Blakemore (1987, 2002), Kroon (1995: 45–46), Hansen (1998a: 77–
79, 2008: 17–26), Roulet (2006), Fischer (2014) andFedriani&Sansò (2017b). In a somewhat similar
vein, other authors have stressed thedeictic-indexical nature of pms. Just as other deictic expressions such
as pronouns, tense forms and adverbs like here and now, they can be said to point at a particular aspect of
the immediate communicative context. See among others Schiffrin (1987, 2006), Aijmer (2002), Aij-
mer, Foolen & Simon-Vandenbergen (2006), Diewald (2006, 2013), Fischer (2006c, 2014), Kroon
(2011) and Fedriani & Sansò (2017b).
38. For this same point, see Hansen (1998a: 75–76, 2006: 26), Aijmer, Foolen & Simon-
Vandenbergen (2006: 102), Fischer (2006c), Foolen (2011) and Maschler & Schiffrin (2015).
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of Clark’s (1996, 2004) theory of communication as joint activity, in which he distin-
guishes between a ‘primary system’ and a ‘collateral system’ of communication. The
former consists of the communicative acts that people use to coordinate their individ-
ual actions and is thus concernedwithwhat people primarily try to dowhen using lan-
guage: “the official business of their discourse” (Clark 2004: 366). The latter consists
of those communicative acts that are used to coordinate andmanage the primary lan-
guage, which reflects the fact that using language is in itself a kind of joint activity that
is in need of coordination. Thus, following Aijmer, Foolen & Simon-Vandenbergen
(2006), I take it that many pms can be felicitously understood as pertaining to this col-
lateral system of communication. They conveniently put this as follows:
By using pragmatic markers, speakers try to prevent explicit, time-consuming
side exchanges that risk causing irritation or even conflict. From the point of
view of reflexivity, pragmatic markers are condensed, grammaticalized sub-
stitutes for side exchanges. Speakers indicate that they are aware of certain
potentially problematic aspects of their utterances, while at the same time
they propose implicitly to the hearer to continue the “official” business of
conversation. (Aijmer, Foolen & Simon-Vandenbergen 2006: 106)
2.4.4 Conclusion
In the present section I have discussed a number of linguistic properties of the broad
class of pms. These can be seen as the kind of special words and lexicalized phrases
that conventionally encode non-truth-conditional or non-descriptive meaning as-
pects. Thesemeanings, moreover, are by definition tied to the immediate communica-
tive context at hand, pointing at aspects of the utterance/co(n)text, utterance/speaker
or speaker/addressee relation. Many of these items can essentially be seen as instruc-
tional or procedural in nature, providing meta-communicative cues from speaker to
addressee(s) as to how the host utterance is to be integrated into the communicative
context at hand.
Havingdiscussed thebroad category of pms, Iwill now turn to a closer examination
of a number of more specific semantic-functional categories, which are of particular
interest for the study of Greek particles.
2.5 Connectives
The first major functional class that is relevant for the study of Greek particles is the
class of connectives, which I broadly understand as the kind of linguistic items spe-
cialized to indicate a certain relationship between (the contents of) two discourse seg-
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ments. That is, connectives provide explicit cues as to how their host unit is related to
some other, preceding or upcoming, linguistic unit in the surrounding discourse con-
text.39As such, they are cohesive devices which contribute to establishing discourse
coherence, i.e. making a discourse more than just a random set of simply juxtaposed
utterances. The term ‘connective’ is here intended as a rather general cover term, be-
ing neutral with respect to (i) the morphosyntactic properties of the items involved
(e.g. part of speech distinctions) and (ii) the specific type of relationship indicated. In
the following, I will make a number of further distinctions on the basis of these two
parameters.
I will first approach the class from amorphosyntactic and sentence-linguistic per-
spective, making a distinction between four morphosyntactic kinds of connectives in
Ancient Greek (section 2.5.1). Subsequently, I will look at the class from a semantic-
functional and discourse-oriented perspective. In doing so, I will first make a little de-
tour and introduce a basic model of discourse structure in terms of which the seman-
tic contribution of connectives can be properly captured (section 2.5.2). After that, I
will employ this model to distinguish between a number of major semantic types of
connectives (section 2.5.3). Finally, I will summarize the most important points of the
discussion in section 2.5.4.
2.5.1 Morphosyntactic properties
When taking a sentence-linguistic perspective, the linguistic items that have a connec-
tive function may show considerable differences in their morphosyntactic properties.
Connectives may vary, for example, with respect to their syntactic scope (e.g. phrase,
clause, sentence), the sequential order of the connected units, the position they take
within their host unit and the syntactic form of their host unit (e.g. in terms of con-
stituent order). On the basis of such structural features different syntactic types of con-
nectives may in turn be recognized within a given language. As far as Ancient Greek
39. I use the term ‘linguistic (host) unit’ in a non-technical sense here. I understand it as the particular
stretch of discourse towhich the force of a given connective pertains. Although it is typically co-extensive
with the formal concept of a clause, this certainly need not be the case: it may also stand for smaller or
larger chunks of discourse. It thus ranges from single words or phrases on the one hand to full sentences,
groups of sentences and even larger discourse segments on the other. Cf. Quirk et al. (1985: 632), Kroon
(1995: 35, fn. 3) and Hansen (1998a: 73–74) for highly similar considerations. Connectives themselves
can in turn be defined as those linguistic items which (i) are invariable words, (ii) do not govern case (i.e.
are no prepositions) and (iii) express a two-place relation between two linguistically expressed units. Cf.
the practice in Pasch et al. (2003) and Lenker (2010).
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Class of connectives Key examples
syntactic coordinators καί ‘and’, τε ‘and’, οὐδέ/μήδε ‘and not, nor’, οὔτε/μήτε
‘neither, nor’, ἤ ‘or’, ἀλλά ‘but’, δέ ‘and/but’
subordinators διότι ‘because’, εἰ ‘if, whether’, ἐπεί ‘when, since’, ἵνα ‘in
order to’, μή ‘lest’, ὅτι ‘that’, πρίν ‘before, until’, ὡς ‘as,





εἶτα/ἔπειτα ‘then, next’, ἔτι ‘besides, in addition’, λοιπόν
‘further, then’, πάλιν ‘again, in turn’, ὅμως ‘nevertheless’,




ἀλλά ‘but’, αὖ ‘in turn’, γάρ ‘for’, ἐπεί ’for’, μέν … δέ ‘on the
one/other hand’, καί ‘and further, also’, καίτοι ‘and yet,
although’, μέντοι ‘yet, however’, νυν ‘now, then’, οὖν ‘so,
now, anyhow’, τοίνυν ‘well then, now then’
Table 2.1:Main syntactic classes of connectives in Ancient Greek
is concerned, we can distinguish between four of such types: (i) coordinators, (ii) sub-
ordinators, (iii) conjunctive adverbs and (iv) connective discourse particles. Some key
examples of each class are given in table 2.1.
Of these four types, coordinators and subordinators together constitute the class
of what are generally called ‘conjunctions’, and I use these terms as a shorthand for ‘co-
ordinating conjunctions’ and ‘subordinating conjunctions’ respectively. The essential
characteristic of this type of invariables, as indicated in the table, is that they establish
a structural connection at the syntactic level, combining two or more clauses into a
syntactically integrated whole. That is, these items operate within the boundaries of
an independent (compound/complex) sentence. The two types differ, however, as to
whether they indicate a paratactic or a hypotactic construction, respectively.
By contrast, conjunctive adverbs and connective discourse particles lack the syn-
tactic behaviour of conjunctions and are only connective at a semantic or discourse-
pragmatic level. In fact, such non-syntactic connectives often operate – some even ex-
clusively so – beyond the level of the independent sentence (rather than within it),
signaling various relations between successive sentences or larger units of discourse
(cf. section 2.5.3 below). These two types of connectives essentially differ, however, as
to whether they are formally realized as adverbs or as grammaticalized particles (cf.
section 2.3 above).
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In the following, I will further look into these four classes of Greek connectives
and their prototypical syntactic properties. Special attention will be paid to the class
of connective discourse particles, which is most relevant for my present purposes. In
order to show how it differs from the others, however, it is useful to look at these other
classes in some more detail as well.40
Coordinators
Coordinators (i.e. coordinating conjunctions) are invariable expressions which estab-
lish a syntactic link between two units which are of equal syntactic rank and have the
same (or highly similar) semantic and pragmatic functions within a sentence.41 An
important property of prototypical coordinators is their capacity to link a wide range
of different syntactic categories. That is, they may link not only finite main clauses
(see example (8) below), but also dependent clauses (see (9)) and elements below the
clause such as noun phrases, verb phrases and single words (see (10)). In the modern
literature on coordination, it is generally accepted that prototypical coordinators are
of threemajor semantic types: conjunctive/copulative (and, neither … nor), disjunctive
(or, either … or) and adversative/contrastive (but).42
(8) a. [ἤκουσας] [ἢ οὐκ ἤκουσας;]
Did you hear me or (ἤ) didn’t you hear me? (A.Th. 202)
b. [ἔσχε δὲ τὴν βασιληίην] [καὶ ἐκρατύνθη ἐκ τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖσι χρηστηρίου.]
He took possession of the sovereign power and (καί) he was confirmed in it by
the Delphic oracle. (Hdt. 1.13.1)
c. ἵνα δὲ μή … κινδυνεύῃ κατὰ τῆς κλίμακος καταβαίνουσα, [ἐγὼ μὲν ἄνω διῃτώμην,] [αἱ
δὲ γυναῖκες κάτω].
In order that … she would not run the risk of descending by the stairs, Ι μέν used
to live above and (δέ) the women below. (Lys. 1.9)
(9) a. δῆλα … ὅτι [ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ τῷ θείῳ], [τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῷ θνητῷ].
It is clear… that the μέν soul is like the divine, but (δέ) the body like themortal.
(Pl. Phd. 80d)
40. Highly similar discussions with regard to English and German can be found in Quirk et al. (1985:
631–647, 918–929), Huddleston & Pullum (2002: 775–779, 1289–1322), Pasch et al. (2003) and
Lenker (2010: ch. 2).
41. For an up-to-date treatment of the phenomenon of coordination in Ancient Greek, see especially
Crespo, Conti &Maquieira (2003: 338–354), Revuelta Puigdollers (2010), Muchnová (2014) and
Bonifazi (2015).
42. SeeHaspelmath (2007) andMauri (2008). Causal coordination (e.g. for, Germandenn) is disputed
and, if accepted, has only a marginal status.
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b. οὐδʼ αὖ Σωκράτους ὑπερέχειν [ὅτι Σωκράτης ὁ Σωκράτης ἐστίν] [ἀλλʼ ὅτι σμικρότητα
ἔχει ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου μέγεθος].
Nor, in turn, is he [sc. Simmias] greater than Socrates because Socrates is Socrates,
but (ἀλλά) because Socrates has smallness relatively to his greatness.
(Pl. Phd. 102c)
(10) a. ταῦτα δὲ [ἐποίεέ τε] [καὶ προηγόρευε] Θρασύβουλος τῶνδε εἵνεκεν, …
Thrasubulus did τε and (καί) commanded these things for the following reason:
[reasons follows] (Hdt. 1.22.1)
b. αὐτός τε [οὐκ ἐπὶ κακῷ], [ἐπ’ ἐλευθερώσει δὲ] τῶν Ἑλλήνων παρελήλυθα, …
And for myself, I have come here not for the misfortune but (δέ) for the freedom
of the Hellenes, … (Th. 4.86.1)
c. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο [οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς,] [ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ καταψηφισαμένους θάνα-
τον].
I say this not to all of you, but (ἀλλά) to those who voted for my death.
(Pl. Ap. 38d)
Two further general properties of coordinators deserve mention here. First, as in
many other languages, Greek coordinators invariably take a fixed position at the very
start of the coordinated unit. As can be seen in the given examples,most of themhave a
prepositive character and take initial position, but there are also coordinators, notably
δέ and τε, which are postpositive in nature and take peninitial position (see section 4.1
for further discussion). Second, the juxtaposition of two coordinators with the same
scope is impossible (S. C. Dik 1968: 34–41). Or, put differently, there can only be one
coordinator per coordinated unit. This means that we do not find such collocations as
*καὶ ἀλλά, *οὔτε ἀλλά, *ἢ ἀλλά and *ἀλλὰ δέ.43
Subordinators
Subordinators (i.e. subordinating conjunctions) are invariable expressions which in-
troduce subordinate clauses, establishing a syntactic link between a main and a de-
pendent clause within a complex sentence. In other words, they make one clause part
of another. This includes complementizers, which specifically introduce complement
43. This is not to say, to be sure, that two coordinators do never end up in juxtaposition. In our Greek
texts, indeed, most of the other possible collocations of coordinators (e.g. τε καί, καὶ ἤ, καὶ οὔτε, ἀλλὰ οὔ-
τε, οὔτε δέ) are actually not uncommon. However, these always involve cases of bisyndetic coordination
where the juxtaposed coordinators have a different scope. In case of the common coordination pattern A
τε καί B, for instance, the postpositive coordinator τε scopes over A, whereas the prepositive coordinator
καί scopes over B (see example (10a) above). The point is that juxtaposition of two coordinators with the
same scope is impossible (cf. S. C. Dik 1968: 39–40 for further discussion).
559416-L-bw-Thijs
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 66
52 Chapter 2. Particles: form and functions
clauses (e.g. Greek ὅτι ‘that’ and εἰ ‘whether’ in its use in indirect questions). Subordi-
nators are generally further classified along semantic lines, i.e. according to the type of
clauses they introduce (e.g. conditional, causal, concessive, purpose, result, compara-
tive and temporal clauses) – although many of these items are in fact polysemous in
this respect.
As to their syntax, I mention two further properties here. First of all, Greek sub-
ordinators take a syntactically fixed position and by definition occur as the very first
expression of the clause they introduce. Secondly, subordinators do not generally re-
quire a fixed sequential order of the connected units. Subordinate clauses may take
various positions with respect to the main clause in which they are integrated, and if
this order is changed the subordinator invariably moves along with the subordinate
clause, as shown in (11).44
(11) a. John married Sue, although she was poor.
b. Although Sue was poor, John married her. (Hansen 1998a: 52)
In this respect, subordinators significantly differ from the other three classes of con-
nectives, which all require a fixed sequential order of the connected units.
Conjunctive adverbs
Conjunctive adverbs are the kind of adverbs – or fixed adverbial phrases – which are
used to indicate various types of discourse relations between two linguistic units.45
Due to the high abundance of (connective) particles in Ancient Greek, conjunctive
adverbs have been virtually neglected in the major grammars and handbooks. More
recently, however, they have been given proper attention in the work of, among others,
Crespo (2009, 2011) and Jiménez Delgado (2013, 2014, 2018).46 From a syntactic-
44. This is not to say, of course, that the order between main and subordinate clause is completely ar-
bitrary: it usually reflects pragmatic differences which relate to discourse structure or information status.
See Lenker (2010: 28f.) for general discussion.
45. In the general linguistic literature, conjunctive adverbs have also been called ‘conjunct adverbials’
or ‘conjuncts’ (Greenbaum 1969, Quirk et al. 1985), ‘linking adverbials’ (Biber et al. 1999), ‘connec-
tive adjuncts’ (Huddleston & Pullum 2002), ‘Adverbkonnektoren’ (Pasch et al. 2003) and ‘adverbial
connectors’ (Lenker 2010).
46. I would like to emphasize here that most of these adverbs also have other usages (e.g. as modal,
phasal or temporal adverbs),which in factmaynot always be easy distinguishable from their use as proper
connectives. In this respect, it should be noted that conjunctive adverbs often derive from (pronominal)
demonstrative adverbs (e.g. so, thus, hence and then in English). Due to their essentially anaphoric/deictic
character, such adverbs are particularly prone to develop further usages as full-blown connectives, where
they explicitly indicate particular discourse relations between successive clauses, sentences or larger dis-
course segments and mostly take clause- or sentence-initial position. As shown by Jiménez Delgado
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distributional perspective, conjunctive adverbs generally show a number of properties
which reflect their adverbial status and set them apart from conjunctions. The follow-
ing examples will serve to illustrate these:
(12) It is only right that you too should go where you can win renown by your deeds.
πατρώιόν τε γάρ τοί ἐστι καὶ προσέτι ῥώμη ὑπάρχει.
For that is fitting for your father’s son and (καί) you are strong enough besides
(προσέτι). (Hdt. 1.41.3)
(13) … Ἀστυάναξ τε καὶ Ἕκτωρ οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν γραμμάτων ἔχει πλὴν τοῦ ταῦ, ἀλλʼ ὅμως
ταὐτὸν σημαίνει. καὶ Ἀρχέπολίς γε τῶν μὲν γραμμάτων τί ἐπικοινωνεῖ; δηλοῖ δὲ ὅμως τὸ
αὐτό.
The names ‘Astyanax’ and ‘Hector’ do not have any letters in common except the
‘tau’, but (ἀλλά) nevertheless (ὅμως) have the same meaning. And ‘Archepolis’, what
letters has it in commonwith them?But (δέ) itnevertheless (ὅμως) signifies the same
thing. (Pl. Cra. 394c)
(14) … καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον.
… even if (καὶ εἰ) our original hypotheses are acceptable to you, nevertheless (ὅμως)
we should look at themmore closely. (Pl. Phd. 107b)
First of all, conjunctive adverbs are regularly used in combination with one of the pro-
totypical coordinators. Thus, in (12)we find τε… καὶ προσέτι (‘and besides’) and in (13)
both instances of ὅμως (‘nevertheless’) are combined with an adversative coordinator,
viz. ἀλλά and δέ respectively. In such examples, the coordinator establishes a syntac-
tic link, whereas the conjunctive adverb merely serves to further specify the semantic
relationship between the coordinated units, i.e. in a more explicit way than the mere
coordinator does. This property, then, sharply distinguishes conjunctive adverbs from
coordinators, which, as we have seen earlier, cannot be combined when they have the
same scope.
Second, some conjunctive adverbs can be used to enhance the relation holding be-
tween main and subordinate clauses within complex sentences. Thus, they are some-
times found in correlative patterns with subordinators, e.g. εἰ καί … ὅμως (‘although …
(2013, 2014, 2018), similar considerations seem to hold for a number of Greek demonstrative adverbs,
e.g. οὗτως (‘in that way, thus, therefore’), ὡσαύτως (‘in that sameway, likewise’), τότε, ἔνθα, ἐνταῦθα (‘at that
time, then’), ἐντεῦθεν (‘from that time, hence, therefore’), εἶτα (‘in that case, then, next, so’), ἔπειτα (‘there-
upon, then, next’).We could also add here adverbial prepositional phrases that consist of a demonstrative
pronoun, such as διὰ τοῦτο (‘for that reason, therefore’), πρὸς τούτοις (‘in addition to that, furthermore’)
and μετὰ ταῦτα (‘after that, thereupon’). Cf. Pasch et al. (2003: 557f.) on the so-called ‘Prominaladverbien’
inGerman (e.g. außerdem, dabei, danach, deswegen, seitdem, trotzdem). In Greek, however, such adverbial
phrases do not seem to behave as fully grammaticalized connectives.
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nevertheless’) as in (14), ἐπεί… ἔπειτα (‘when… then’) and διότι… διὰ τοῦτο (‘because…
therefore’). Again, such a construction is not possible for syntactic coordinators, which
can only link units that are syntactically alike. In addition, conjunctive adverbs may in
principle occur in postposed relative clauses, i.e. in collocationwith relative pronouns.
Finally, some conjunctive adverbs entertain a certain degree of variability when it
comes to their positionwithin the clause, which has been shownby JiménezDelgado
(2014, 2018) for ἔπειτα, ὅμως, προσέτι and ὡσαύτως. Although these items strongly
favour clause-initial position (i.e. save for a possible prepositive coordinator), they can
also be found in a later position within the clause. In (13), for example, the first in-
stance of ὅμως occurs in clause-initial, but the second in clause-medial position. Such
positional variability shows that these items are sensitive to the pragmatic, informa-
tion-structural factors which generally determine constituent order in Ancient Greek
(i.e. they are ‘mobile’ words; see section 4.1). In turn, this property clearly distinguishes
them from the other three types of connectives, which all require a fixed (pre- or post-
positive) position at the start of their host unit (see section 2.3.1 and especially chap-
ter 4).47
Connective discourse particles
Wenow arrive at the class of connective discourse particles, which I understand as the
kind of particles that are used to indicate various types of discourse relations, without,
however, establishing a syntactic connection between the connected units. In other
words, they are the kind of particles which perform a connective function but do not
function as genuine co- or subordinating conjunctions. In fact, these items generally
operate beyond the level of the independent sentence, i.e. at discourse level.
When compared to conjunctive adverbs, on the other hand, which are similar
from a semantic-functional perspective, they differ in their being grammaticalized
particles, which involves the parameters that I have discussed in section 2.3 above.
Thus, whereas conjunctive adverbs may show adverb morphology (e.g. an ending in
-ως or -ον), have a relatively concrete lexical content and are realized as prosodically
autonomous words, connective particles are morphologically unmotivated, highly or
47. Here it should be noted that conjunctive adverbs may over time gradually obtain a more fixed po-
sition and thus become particle-like in this respect. See my remarks in section 2.3.2 above.
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fully delexicalized and prosodically dependent expressions (i.e. pre- or postpositives).
Most important at this point is that they are subject to very different restrictions when
it comes to their position in the clause or sentence (cf. the discussion of ὅμως above).48
It should be emphasized at this point that some items are included in this class
which are also regularly used as genuine conjunctions, notably καί (‘and, also’), ἀλλά
(‘but’), δέ (‘and/but’) and ἐπεί (‘when, since, for’). Clear examples of their use as con-
nective discourse particles are cases in which they occur at the start of a new speech
turn in dialogue (turn-initial use), as in (15) and (16):
(15) lovecleon. Then I’ll gnaw through this netting with my teeth!
ξα. ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ ἔχεις ὀδόντας.
xanthias. But (ἀλλά) you don’t have any teeth! (Ar. V. 164–165)
(16) orestes. Pray to the gods for continued success, proclaiming to them that your pre-
vious prayers have been fulfilled!
ηλ. ἐπεὶ τί νῦν ἕκατι δαιμόνων κυρῶ;
electra. For/Cos’ (ἐπεί) what success have the gods now granted me?
(A. Ch. 212–214)
In these examples, ἀλλά and ἐπεί clearly do not have a connective function at a syntac-
tic level (i.e. they do not link clauses to yield a compound or a complex sentence), but
only a rhetorical one at discourse level (see section 2.5.3 below). In other words, they
are not used as conjunctions here, but as connective discourse particles.49 It follows
that what is materially the same itemmay have – depending on the context –multiple
usages which belong to different syntactic categories of connectives.50
48. In the linguistic literature on Ancient Greek, this class is also commonly referred to by the term
‘connectors’, which was originally defined by Pinkster (1972) with regard to Latin: “connectors are those
words which establish various semantic relations between paratactic sentences, are no coordinators, and
can be shown not to be adverbs either.” It should be noted, however, that the formal (morpho-phonolog-
ical, prosodic) distinction between adverbs and particles appears to be much less clear in Latin than it is
in Ancient Greek. The term ‘connector’, furthermore, is potentially confusing as it is sometimes also used
as an equivalent to ‘connective’ or even to ‘conjunction’. I will therefore not use the term in the present
study.
49. Note that ἐπεί in this so-called ‘motivating’ use – in contrast to its use as a temporal subordinator
– requires a fixed order of the connected units. As a discourse connective, the particle invariably signals
a link to the preceding discourse. For this usage of ἐπεί, see Rijksbaron (1976) and Muchnová (2006,
2011). For turn-initial ἀλλά, see e.g. Basset (1997) and Drummen (2009).
50. From a cross-linguistic perspective, this kind of multi-functionality is in fact a well-documented
phenomenon (cf. e.g. Schiffrin 2006 on and as a discourse marker). With regard to Ancient Greek,
however, an important caveat is in place here. As I have noted in section 1.4.3, our lack of access to
punctuation often makes it difficult to make the distinction between two coordinated clauses forming
a compound sentence and two completely independent sentences. It follows that it may not always be
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In addition, Ancient Greek exhibits quite a number of connective particles which
are never used as regular conjunctions and are best taken as adverbial modifiers. Key
examples are αὖ (‘in turn’), γάρ (‘for’), καίτοι (‘and yet’), μέντοι (‘yet, however’), οὖν (‘so,
now, anyhow’), νυν (‘now, then’), τοίγαρ (‘therefore, consequently’) and τοίνυν (‘well
then, now then’). For some of these items, their adverbial status is further suggested
by the fact that they may be preceded by καί, ἀλλά or δέ. Thus, many sentences in An-
cient Greek are introduced by combinations of connective particles, such as καὶ αὖ, δ’
αὖ, ἀλλὰ γάρ, καὶ γάρ, ἀλλὰ μέντοι, καὶ μέντοι, ἀλλ’ οὖν, δ’ οὖν and καὶ τοίνυν.51 This juxta-
position test is thus an important formal means to make a distinction between these
two groups of connective particles.52
However, I believe that the distinction between these two groups should certainly
not be pushed too far, as it should be noted that the distinction between ‘conjunctions’
and adverbial (connective) particles is not formally marked in Greek sentence struc-
ture. In languages such asGerman andDutch, for example, conjunctions and adverbial
connectives occur in different syntactic ‘slots’ and have different implications for con-
stituent order (cf. Pasch et al. 2003). As such, a given connective may be classified on
the basis of their syntactic position in the formal make-up of the sentence.
In Ancient Greek, however, such considerations are not possible. Generally speak-
ing, each particle is either prepositive (initial position) or postpositive (peninitial po-
sition) in nature, a distinction which does not, however, systematically reflect a dif-
ference in syntactic function (e.g. coordinating vs. adverbial particle). The prepositive
particle ἀλλά, for instance, one of the Greek but-equivalents (cf. (9b), (10c) and (15)),
is sometimes also given an adverbial interpretation, viz. when it used in a main clause
following a subordinate clause (the so-called ‘apodotic’ use), as in (17):
(17) νῦν ὦν ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ὑμεῖς ἤρξατε τούτου τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλʼ ἡμεῖς ἄρχομεν.
Now, then, since you did not start this discussion, we will start it instead (ἀλλά).
(Hdt. 9.48.3)
Similar considerations hold for the postpositive particle δέ. Whereas it undisputedly
functions as a contrastive conjunction in examples such as (9a) and (10b) above, there
are also cases in which δέ is best taken as an adverbial particle. An example is (18):
straightforward to decide whether a given connective functions as a clausal conjunction or rather as a
connective discourse particle. See Kroon (1995: 106–107) for the same problem in Latin and some pos-
sible syntactic tests.
51. Not all combinations are possible, however. Moreover, καίτοι, νυν and τοίγαρ never occur in direct
collocation with another connective particle.
52. See van Ophuijsen (1993: 78–79) and George (2009: 165–166).
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(18) … ὁρῶντι μὲν ὁπλίτας πολλοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ὁρῶντι δὲ πελταστὰς πολλοὺς καὶ τοξότας
καὶ σφενδονήτας καὶ ἱππέας δὲ…
… [Xenophon], as he looked upon a great body of Greek hoplites, and looked upon
a great body of peltasts and bowmen and slingers, and (καί) horsemen, on the other
hand (δέ), … (X. An. 5.6.15, Rijksbaron 1997c: 194)
In such cases, as has been argued by Rijksbaron (1997c), καί must be taken as the
coordinator (‘and’) and δέ as an adverbial discourse particle, attributing a value similar
to English on the other hand, in turn or for that matter. Recall, in this respect, that there
can only be one coordinator per coordinated unit.
To sum up, the Ancient Greek language does not exhibit specialized syntactic
‘slots’ for conjunctions or adverbial (connective) particles. The functional distinction
can only be made on the basis of the surrounding verbal context (e.g. on the basis of
collocations or scopal relations). Categorization along syntactic linesmust thus be flex-
ible and connectivity is perhaps best treated as a gradient phenomenon.53 Such a con-
clusion, I should add, is all the more justified in view of considerations of diachronic
change. It has been shown, for instance, that an important diachronic source for co-
ordinators across languages are adverbial particles with a discourse connective func-
tion (cf.Mithun 1988). Thus, itemswhich start out as adverbial discourse connectives
may develop – through a process of grammaticalization – further usages as genuine
(clausal) coordinators. In fact, this also appears to have happened with Ancient Greek
δέ, and, as I will argue in chapter 5, possibly with μήν as well.54
In the following two sections, I will leave themorphosyntactic perspective behind
and will further examine the class of connectives from a semantic and discourse-ori-
ented perspective.
2.5.2 Discourse structure: act, move and exchange
I have said that the essential function of connectives is that they contribute to estab-
lishing discourse coherence by indicating a particular relationship between their host
unit and either the preceding or the upcoming discourse context. As such, they can be
seen as explicit signals of the manner in which a speaker/writer plans, organizes and
structures the communicated content and the communicative actions performed in
the ongoing discourse. In order to be more explicit on the different types of discourse
53. See also van Ophuijsen (1993: 79) for this view.
54. Another common process is that markers of subordination turn into adverbial discourse connec-
tives. Examples of such a process are English however and though (cf. Lenker 2010) and Ancient Greek
ἐπεί (see above).
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relations that connectivesmay signal (see section 2.5.3 below), it will be useful to have
a basic model of discourse structure at our disposal in terms of which the meanings of
these items can be properly described. For this purpose Iwill use the hierarchical-func-
tional discoursemodel as developed by Roulet and his colleagues of theGeneva school
(e.g. Roulet et al. 1991, Roulet, Filliettaz & Grobet 2001, Filliettaz & Roulet
2002), which in turn had a strong influence on both Kroon’s (1995, 1998, 2011) work
on Latin discourse connectives and the theory of Functional Discourse Grammar (e.g.
Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008, Keizer 2015). In the following, I will shortly intro-
duce the Geneva Discourse Model (gdm) and its basic components.
In all of the approachesmentioned, to start with, it is first of all recognized that ev-
ery discourse, whethermonological or dialogical in nature, is a formof communicative
action and as such closely related to the general communicative intentions and goals
of the language users (cf. section 2.4 above), which in turn may be subdivided into a
large number of interrelated smaller goals and sub-projects.55 Correspondingly, it is a
fundamental assumption that “discourse structure is a complex system of hierarchical
and linear relationships between various types of discourse units, rather than amono-
lithic sequence of semantically connected grammatical clauses” (Kroon 1998: 207).
These discourse units then, are essentially conceptualized as units of communicative
action, defined in terms of their communicative function and/or thematic organiza-
tion,whichneednot necessarily correspond to syntactic units (e.g. clause, sentence) or
content-based units (e.g. proposition). Following the ideas of Sinclair & Coulthard
(1975), the Geneva Discourse Model distinguishes between discourse units at five dif-
ferent levels, themost important of which are called, in increasing order of complexity,
act or discourse act, move and exchange. Figure 2.1 provides a graphic representation
of the way these three types of discourse units fit into the basic hierarchical discourse
structure postulated by the gdm.
As represented in the top of the figure, a conversation is conceived of as a series
of exchanges between the speech participants involved. An exchange can be defined
as “the maximal dialogical textual projection of a negotiation process” (Filliettaz &
Roulet 2002: 385). In the unmarked case, each conversational exchange can in turn
55. Cf. also Polanyi & Scha (1983), Mann& Thompson (1988) as well as Clark (1996) on the organ-
isation of ‘joint projects’ in communication and cooperative action in general.
55. These basic assumptions are in fact widely used by authors working on discourse connectives and
discourse markers. In addition to the works cited above, I also mention here Schiffrin (1987, 2006),
Redeker (1990, 2006), Hansen (1998a, 2006), D. M. Lewis (2006), Pons Bordería (2006), Waltereit
(2006) and, with respect to Ancient Greek in particular, Bonifazi, Drummen & de Kreij (2016) and
Allan (2017a, 2017b).
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Figure 2.1: The basic structure of the Geneva Discourse Model (from Risselada 1993: 53)
be analyzed as involving a combination of communicative moves made by different
speech participants, viz. an initiatingmove by speaker A, a reactive move by speaker B
and, possibly, an evaluating or ratifying move by speaker A.56 A constructed example
– adapted from Kroon (1995: 65) – of this basic exchange structure is given in (19):
(19) A: I have got a ticket left for the Bruce Springsteen concert in theGoffertpark tonight.
Do you want to come? (initiating move)
B: For sure! (reactive move)
A: That’s great! (evaluating move)
An exchange comes to an end when both speech participants “agree on the closure of
a negotiation process” (Filliettaz & Roulet 2002: 385), thus clearing the way for a
new exchange. Conversations typically start and end with strongly ritualized pairs of
moves involving greetings and the like.
A communicativemove, in turn, is defined by Kroon as “the minimal free unit of
discourse that is able to enter into an exchange structure” (1995: 66). Amove can thus
essentially be seen as a thematically and communicatively coherent unit which func-
tions as “an autonomous contribution to an ongoing interaction”, its most important
56. A pair of an initiating and a reactive move is very much comparable to what in the field of Con-
versation Analysis is called an ‘adjacency pair’, consisting of a ‘first pair part’ and a ‘second pair part’. Cf.
Sidnell (2010: ch. 4).
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property being that “it either is, or opens up the possibility of, a reaction” (Hengeveld
&Mackenzie 2008: 50). Communicativemoves then, will typically coincide with one
speech turn in conversation, as in (19). This need not necessarily be the case, however,
as demonstrated by the following example:
(20) A: Where’s the first aid kit?
B: It’s in the top drawer on the left. Why?
A: I just cut my finger. (Keizer 2015: 48)
In (20), B’s turn consists of two separate moves, one reacting to A’s initiating move (as
an answer toA’s question), the other (Why?) being initiating in nature, setting up a new
exchange and eliciting a reaction from A.57
In the bottom of figure 2.1, finally, we see that a move is always made up of one or
more discourse acts, which is themost basic unit of discourse distinguished. Following
Kroon, a discourse act can essentially be seen as “the smallest unit of communicative
behaviour”, which unlike a move does “not necessarily further the communication in
terms of approaching a conversational goal” (1995: 65). In other words, discourse acts
are the distinct communicative steps “which the language producer executes as a re-
sult of strategic planning in order to realize her communicative intention” (Hannay &
Kroon 2005: 121). In some cases, one single discourse act is already enough to count
as a complete move, i.e. to call forth a reaction from the addressee or function as a re-
action itself. This applies, for instance, to the reactive and the evaluating move in (19)
above. In other cases, however, a move consists of a configuration of multiple interre-
lated discourse acts. In (19), for instance, the initiatingmove of speaker A contains two
distinct acts, which are in a dependency relation: the former is a subsidiary act which
functions as a preparation or orientation for the central act that is to follow. The latter
can thus be seen as the most relevant act from the perspective of the communicative
intentions of the speaker (i.e. making an invitation).
It should be noted at this point that in actual texts and conversations discourse
acts may be realized in various different ways and identifying them is not always a
straightforwardmatter. In the literature, indeed, there is an ongoing debate as towhich
linguistic criteria aremost relevant in this respect, but there appears to be general con-
57. Conversely, there is the possibility that a single move consists of more than one speech turn – al-
though this appears to be a relatively rare phenomenon. In this case, two ormore speakers togethermake
up one communicative move by supplementing each other’s utterances. Imagine, for instance, that the
words Do you want to come? in (19) are not spoken by speaker A, but rather by a third speaker C. In that
case, the speech turns of A and C together constitute the initiating move (i.e. the invitation) to which
speaker B reacts. Cf. Kroon (1995: 150–152) for some nice examples from Latin comedy.
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sensus on a number of prototypical features. Roughly speaking, prototypical discourse
acts (i) are no larger than syntactic clauses, (ii) evoke some descriptive content that
effects a change in the current focus of attention and updates discourse memory, (iii)
have a basic illocution that reflects the speaker’s communicative intention and, most
importantly, (iv) coincide with a single intonation unit, being delineated by intona-
tion boundaries or, in written language, punctuation (cf. Chafe 1987, 1994). I will not
elaborate upon this complex issue any further here, but refer to the extensive treat-
ments in Hannay & Kroon (2005), Steen (2005), Degand& Simon (2009) and, with
respect to Ancient Greek in particular, Scheppers (2011) and Bonifazi, Drummen &
de Kreij (2016: chs. ii.2 and iv.3).
Now one of the crucial features of the gdm is that the system is recursive in nature,
meaning that discourse unitsmaybe embedded into eachother. This is particularly rel-
evant at the level of the move, which in fact may show various degrees of complexity.
In addition to the default structure as discussed so far, a move may also contain ex-
pansions in the form of embeddedmoves or embedded exchanges, which are involved
with, e.g., objections, possible challenges, preparatory checks and requests for clarifi-
cation or confirmation.58 Consider, for example, the relatively straightforward piece
of conversation between a bookseller (B) and a customer (C) in (21): 59
(21) C. I’m looking for a book on Greek vocabulary, please. (1)
B. What do you mean by ‘on’? (2)
C. You know, for school. I remember I had it in high school. (3)
B. Ah, do you perhaps mean Logos? (4)
C. Yes indeed. (5)
B. Well … then I don’t have it I am afraid. (6)
This example can be analysed as onemain exchangewhich consists of a complex initi-
atingmove, a buying request (1–5), and a less complex reactive one, a non-compliance
to that request (6). The initiating move contains two embedded exchanges which are
involved with the clarification of the precise object of the customer’s request, i.e. the
domain of use of the book (high school;moves 2–3) and after that the book’s exact title
(Logos; moves 4-5). Only when agreement is reached on the precise nature of the cus-
58. Embedded exchanges basically correspond to what in Conversation Analysis has been termed pre-
, insert- and post-expansions. See Sidnell (2010: ch. 6) for an overview and van Emde Boas (2017a,
2017b) for an application to the dialogues of Greek drama.
59. This is an adapted and simplified version of a muchmore complex French example as discussed by
Filliettaz & Roulet (2002: 377–388).
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tomer’s request (withmove 5), it can be felicitously reacted to (move 6). The possibility
of embedding thus brings in an element of recursivity, which is crucial for dealing with
the fundamentally hierarchical and dynamic nature of discourse.
A further important aspect of the gdm is that it is meant not only to account for
(spoken) conversation, but also for (written) text that is produced by a single speaker/
writer. A crucial basic assumption in this respect is that the constitutive moves of an
exchange may in principle remain implicit and need not be explicitly expressed. A
monological text (e.g. a narrative, a rhetorical speech, a philosophical treatise) is thus
viewed as part of a hypothetical or fictive exchange, in which reactive moves of the
intended addressee are only a virtual possibility. Kroon (1995: 80–89) speaks of an
‘extended monologue’ in such cases, which consists of a series of multiple, linearly or
hierarchically ordered, moves. In these genres then, moves typically correspond to a
single paragraph or a single narrative episode, although here too, there may be inter-
rupting moves in the form of digressions, elaborations, side-issues and the like. Again,
the notion of recursion is of crucial importance here.
So much for the basic features of the Geneva Discourse Model. Obviously, the or-
ganization of actual discourse is usually farmore intricate andmessy than the straight-
forward structure of the examples discussed here – especially so, I should add, when
relatively unplanned and spontaneous spoken conversation is concerned.60 For the
analysis of discourse connectives, however, this basic model will be sufficient. What
is most relevant is that the basic notions distinguished here (i.e. act, move, exchange)
are units of communicative action which are not – or not primarily – defined in terms
of traditional sentence grammar. In turn, the various discourse units in a given text or
conversation are related to each other in certain ways and it is the essential function
of discourse connectives to explicitly signal these relationships. Crucially, theymay do
so at various levels of the hierarchical discoursemodel. Thus, connectivesmay operate
on the level of the discourse act, indicating relations between the acts that are part of a
move, or they may pertain to a more global level of discourse organization, specifying
the relations that obtain between two moves or between two exchanges.
In the next section, I will provide some further examples, by looking into a number
of different semantic types of connectives.
60. See Hansen (1998a: 148–159) for some apt criticism on the gdm in this respect.
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2.5.3 Semantic types of connectives
I have said that connectives are used to indicate a particular relationship between two
discourse segments. From a conceptual perspective then, connectives can be further
characterized in terms of the type of relationship indicated, even though there is gen-
erally no strict one-to-one mapping between connectives and relations. In the past
decades, quite a lot of detailed taxonomies of individual discourse relations have been
proposed, which sometimes show considerable conceptual and terminological varia-
tion.61 Formypresent purposes, however, it will be sufficient only to introduce some of
the more general conceptual distinctions which are commonly made and have been
widely accepted in the field. Where necessary, more detailed considerations will be
made in my analysis of δή and μήν in chapters 5 and 6.
First of all, it is important to recognize that discourse coherence generally has both
a semantic and a pragmatic component. That is, two discourse units may be related
both by virtue of their descriptive content and by virtue of the communicative actions
that are performed by the language user. Thus, a first basic distinction can bemade be-
tween semantic (content-level) relations and pragmatic (discourse-level) relations.62
Semantic or content-level relations, on the one hand, obtain between two states of
affairs and hold within the described world that is ‘talked about’ in the discourse. Typ-
ical examples are causal, contrastive, alternative, conditional and temporal relations.
When such relations are overtly marked by connectives, we may speak of semantic
or content-level (usages of) connectives. This holds, for instance, for consequently and
because in the following examples:
(22) a. Tom had a serious knee injury. Consequently, he had to leave the race.
b. Tom had to leave the race because he had a serious knee injury.
An important characteristic of semantic relations is that they need not necessarily
obtain between (the contents of) two independent discourse acts, as is the case in
(22a), but may also occur act-internally, as in (22b). In this latter case, the subordi-
61. Some of themost influential theories in this respect are Rhetorical Structure Theory (rst, e.g.Mann
& Thompson 1988), Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (sdrt, Asher & Lascarides 2003)
and the cognitive approach to coherence relations as first developed in Sanders, Spooren&Noordman
(1992, 1993). See Kroon (1995: ch. 2 and 3) for a critical discussion of much of the earlier literature on
(classifications of) connectives and discourse relations.
62. See, amongmany others, vanDijk (1979),Mann&Thompson (1988), Sweetser (1990), Redeker
(1990), Sanders, Spooren & Noordman (1992, 1993), Kroon (1995), Asher & Lascarides (2003).
Alternative terms for semantic relations that are commonly used in the literature are, e.g., ideational,
representational, external, objective or content-level relations. Pragmatic relations, on the other hand,
have also been called, e.g., interpersonal, presentational, internal, subjective or context-level relations.
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nate because-clause is syntactically integratedwithin themain clause and functions as
a causal adjunct, which could in principle be focused, questioned, negated or modi-
fied. In this semantic use, these connectives are thus not to be seen as belonging to the
class of pms (cf. the features and tests as discussed in section 2.4 above).63
Pragmatic or discourse-level relations, on the other hand, pertain to the level of
the speech event itself and are characterized by the subjective involvement of the lan-
guage user. Such relations by definition obtain between units of communicative ac-
tion, i.e. between two discourse acts or, more globally, between two moves or two ex-
changes (see section 2.5.2 above). Typical examples of such relations are argument-
conclusion, motivation, correction, digression and topic shift (see further below). Im-
portantly, connectives used to signal this type of relations are called discourse con-
nectives in the present study.64 These items are thus to be seen as a strictly functional
(i.e. connective) subclass of the broader category of pragmatic markers as discussed in
section 2.4 above. Put differently, discourse connectives are pragmatic markers with a
discourse connective function.65 In the following, my focus will be on this class of dis-
course connectives, as this is in fact most important for the analysis of Greek particles
and of μήν and δή in particular.
When further classifying discourse connectives, a first important observation is
that the relations obtaining between two discourse units can be viewed, on the one
hand, from a semantic-functional or rhetorical perspective and, on the other hand,
from a strictly structural or sequential perspective (e.g. Redeker 1990, Kroon 1995,
González 2005, Crible 2017). Accordingly, a rough distinction can bemade between
two types of (uses of) discourse connectives: (i)markers of rhetorical relations, and (ii)
discourse-structural markers. Let us look at these one by one.
The first group of discourse connectives indicates rhetorical discourse relations.
These can essentially be defined in terms of the rhetorical function (e.g. conclusion,
correction, concession, motivation, preparation, specification) that a given discourse
63. More broadly speaking, it goeswithout saying that semantic relations also occur at a clause-internal
level, e.g. when they are signaled by linguistic devices such as prepositions and morphological markers
of case, tense and aspect. Recall, however, that these devices are not treated as connectives on formal
grounds. See footnote 39.
64. In order to emphasize that these items can generally only be felicitously understood as signaling
relations between two discourse units, I prefer to use ‘discourse connectives’ over ‘pragmatic connectives’,
which has also found wide currency in the literature (e.g. van Dijk 1979, Roulet et al. 1991). I follow
Kroon (1995) in this respect.
65. Class membership is in principle independent of themorphosyntactic properties of the connective
in question, i.e. independent of whether they syntactically behave as a conjunction, a connective adverb
or a discourse connective particle – although the latter are obviously discourse connectives by definition
(see section 2.5.1 above).
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unit fulfils with respect to another, more central or subsidiary, unit of the same rank,
viewed from the perspective of the communicative goals of the speaker/writer (Kroon
1995). One type of rhetorical relations has an explicit argumentative or epistemic
character, which means that the units involved are presented by the speaker/writer as
implicit arguments and conclusions within cognitive processes of inferential reason-
ing. Such relations can thus be labeled ‘argument-conclusion’, ‘conclusion-evidence’,
‘claim-counterargument’, ‘concession-correction’ and the like. Consider the following
examples:66
(23) a. Since/Given that you are wearing your new cycling outfit, you aren’t going to the
library (I suppose/conclude)?
b. Frank is wearing his new cycling outfit, so (I guess) he is going for a bike ride.
c. Andy must be going for a bike ride, because/since/for he is wearing his new cy-
cling outfit.
(24) a. Dumoulin is the top favourite towin theTour de France this year, although (Imust
admit) he hasn’t got a strong team around him.
b. Dumoulinmay not have got a strong team around him, but he is the top favourite
to win the Tour de France this year.
c. A: Dumoulin is the top favourite to win the Tour de France this year.
B: (For sure/Admittedly) Tom is one of the best riders of the peloton,buthe hasn’t
got a strong team around him. (So I would not consider him as the top favourite.)
In (23), we can say that the information given in the subsidiary act functions as an ar-
gument that supports the conclusion that is drawn in the main act. Such relations are
often called epistemic causal relations. In (24), on the other hand,we are rather dealing
with epistemic or argumentative contrasts: the speaker draws a conclusion in spite of
her acknowledgement of a possible counterargument (i.e. informationwhichnormally
implies that this conclusion does not hold). Note that in the (24c), the rhetorical con-
trast between the acts connected by but is of an indirect nature: the acts have opposite
argumentative orientations in that they give rise to conflicting implications. However,
the argument of the second act (introduced by but) generally has more weight in such
cases, as evidenced by the discourse continuation given here.
The epistemic reasoning involved in this type of relations tends to be based upon
what in the Argumentation Theory of Anscombre & Ducrot (1977, 1983) has been
termeda topos. This canbe seen as a regularity or a generalization about someaspect of
the world, which is assumed to be part of the common ground shared by the discourse
66. Example (23) is adapted from Sweetser (1990: 80) and Kroon (1995: 78).
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participants. In other words, a topos is a default (i.e. defeasible) rule which states what
is normally the case, such as ‘normally, if p, then q’ or ‘generally, p because q’) (see
section 2.6.3 below for further discussion). In example (23), for instance, the relevant
topos states that people wearing a cycling outfit normally go out for a bike ride (rather
than, say, visit the library). And in (24), the rhetorical contrasts are based upon the
topos – which is widely shared among cycling lovers these days – that a rider normally
needs a strong team to win the Tour de France (or to be regarded as its top favourite,
for that matter). It is such background assumptions which epistemic-argumentative
relations are based upon.
Not all rhetorical relations, however, obtain within the context of argumentation
proper (cf. Kroon 1995: 78–80). Others that are often mentioned in the literature are
such discourse relations as orientation, preparation, aside, background, motivation,
explanation, exemplification (cf. for instance, for example), specification (cf. that is (to
say)) and recapitulation (cf. in other words). Consider for instance the following exam-
ple of a piece of narrative discourse:
(25) When I saw her in the river I was frightened. Cos at that point the currents were
dangerous. (Kroon 1995: 79)
Here, the subsidiary cos-act is not to be regarded as an argument that supports an in-
ferential conclusion, but rather as a piece of additional background information that
helps understanding the events of themain story line. This relation could thusbe called
explanation.
Another group of rhetorical relations has a more meta-linguistic character in that
they primarily target the very uttering of one of the connected acts. Consider for in-
stance:
(26) a. They will be broadcasting the legendary 2002-edition of Paris-Roubaix today. So
what are you doing this afternoon?
b. Paris-Roubaix is on right now. Because/Cos you said you really want to see it,
right?
c. I don’t want to bother you, but do you know where I can find the restrooms?
d. You should see a doctor, if you want my advice.
In (26a), the first act can be seen as a preparation ormotivation for asking the question
that follows, which is explicitly signaled by so here. Conversely, because in (26b) indi-
cates that the second act is to be seen as themotivation or justification of the preceding
statement (‘I say this because’). And in (26c), finally, the contrastive discourse connec-
tive but indicates that the central act is performed in spite of the situation described
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in the subsidiary act (i.e. in spite of a possible motivation to not perform the act). In
the literature, this type of rhetorical relations between acts is often called speech-act
relations.
I now turn to the second major type of discourse connectives, which I call dis-
course-structural markers. These items do not – or not primarily – signal specific
rhetorical relationships, but rather pertain to the structural and/or thematic organi-
zation of a given text or conversation. That is, they basically serve to mark out the dis-
tinct units of discourse (i.e. act, move, exchange) and to indicate their hierarchical or
linear positionwith respect to each other. By using such items then, the speaker/writer
merely signals that a transition ismade to some other course of action, point of discus-
sion or discourse topic. They can thus be seen, so to speak, as the road signs of a text
or conversation.67
In this respect, it is useful to distinguish between two basic structural principles,
which are commonly called (i) dependence and (ii) listing (cf. Kroon 1995: 80–89).
Dependence, on the one hand, concerns the combination of a central and a subsidiary
discourse unit. Accordingly, we may distinguish between discourse connectives that
signal the transition to a subsidiary discourse segment, e.g. by introducing some side-
issue, opening a digression or presenting an afterthought, and those that indicate a
transition to a more central discourse segment, e.g. by closing a digression or return-
ing to the main issue of the discourse. Such items are also commonly called, following
Polanyi & Scha (1983), markers of discourse-push and discourse-pop, respectively.
Typical examples of push-markers are expressions such as English by the way, for in-
stance, French à propos, Latin nam and Ancient Greek γάρ. Typical examples of pop-
markers, on the other hand, are right, anyway, now then, to sum up, in conclusion,French
alors, enfin, bon, Latin igitur and the Ancient Greek particles οὖν, νυν and τοίνυν.68
Listing, on theother hand, involves the combinationof twoormorediscourseunits
of an equal hierarchical status. Herewemay think of connectives thatmark the various
items in an enumeration or indicate a shift to the next discourse topic, the next step in
an argument or the next stage in the development of a narrative. Typical examples in
English aremoreover, furthermore, next, finally, first/second/third, on the one/other hand
and the like. In Ancient Greek, the prototypical example of this kind is the particle
67. Here we may also include turn-taking markers and quotation markers (i.e. items that specifically
mark the start or the end of direct quotation).
68. See e.g. van Ophuijsen (1993), Slings (1997a), Wakker (2009a) and Allan (2017a).
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δέ, which is commonly treated as a relatively neutral marker of discourse boundaries
or thematic discontinuity, thus signaling shifts in discourse topic or, within narrative
discourse, in referential, spatial or temporal frame (E. J. Bakker 1993a).
It has to be noted that such sequential discourse connectives are often used at a
more global level of discourse, indicating transitions between larger stretches of dis-
course, i.e. between twomoves or between two conversational exchanges. I would like
to emphasize that the discourse connectivesmentionedhere are of special importance
in the context of the narrative genre. Narratives are typically structured into various
parts, some of which are informationally more central than others (e.g. orientation/
background vs. main story line). Furthermore, narratives usually do not only contain
purely narrative and descriptive sections, but also sections in which the narrator ‘steps
out’ of the narrative in order to evaluate the narrated events or comment upon the act
of narration from the perspective of his own here-and-now (see also my remarks on
text type in section 1.4.1). The transitions between the various ‘layers’ of a narrative
are often explicitly signaled by discourse-structural connectives.
2.5.4 Conclusion
I will now summarize the preceding overview of the class of connectives by listing a
number of points that are most important to keep in mind for the analysis of μήν and
δή in part 2 of this study.
∗ Pragmaticmarkersmayexpress discourse connectivemeaning aspects, inwhich
they explicitly signal a relation between two discourse segments. That is, they
signal how their host unit is related to another unit in the surrounding discourse
context.
∗ In Ancient Greek, particles share this connective function with three other
types of expressions, fromwhich they can be distinguished onmorphosyntactic
grounds. They differ from them in that they (i) do not express a connection at
the syntactic level (as opposed to co- and subordinators) and (ii) take the form
of strongly grammaticalized particles (as opposed to connective adverbs).
∗ In order to capture the semantic contribution of these items, we need to recog-
nize that discourse structure is essentially hierarchical in nature, as has for in-
stance been done in the Geneva Discourse Model. Elementary discourse units
(discourse acts) are combined to larger discourse segments (moves) whichmay
in turn enter into a dialogical exchange structure.
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∗ Discourse connectivesmay indicate relations at various levels of thehierarchical
discourse structure. That is, they may indicate relations between two discourse
acts, or they may connect two higher-level units (moves or exchanges).
∗ Twomajor typesof (uses of) discourse connectives can roughlybedistinguished.
On the one hand, there are discourse-structuralmarkers, which aremere indica-
tors of the structural or thematic organization of the ongoing discourse. On the
other, there aremarkers of rhetorical relations, which also signal amore specific,
semantic-functional relation between discourse units.
In my analysis of μήν and δή in part 2 of this study, I will argue that both of these par-
ticles show a number of discourse connective usages, both as markers of rhetorical
relations between acts and as discourse-structural markers, indicating larger thematic
discourse transitions. However, they also have a number of attitudinal-interactional
usages, which brings me to the next section.
2.6 Attitudinal-interactional markers
The second major functional class that is relevant for the analysis of Greek particles
is concerned with the linguistic markers which contribute modalizing/attitudinal or
interpersonal/interactional meaning aspects, rather than strictly connective or dis-
course-organizing ones. Such items have in common that they do not – or not primar-
ily – signal a relation between their host unit and a preceding or upcoming discourse
unit (i.e. linguistically expressed context), but rather pertain to the relation between
the utterance and the speaker and/or between the speaker and the addressee(s). In
other words, these items explicitly point at the involvement of the discourse partici-
pants in what is said, thus explicitly anchoring the host utterance to the interactional
or communicative situation in which the discourse is integrated (i.e. extra-linguistic,
situational context, cf. Kroon 1995). By lack of a better term, I will call this class of
expressions attitudinal-interactional markers (aims).
The expressions in this group may be used, for example, to indicate the speaker’s
subjective attitude or stance towards (the communicated content of) the host unit;
qualify the nature of the speaker’s commitment (e.g. in terms of degrees of epistemic
certainty or evidentiality); relate the host unit to the supposed attitudes, commitments
and expectations of the addressee(s) or to the common ground of the discourse par-
ticipants; boost or mitigate the strength of the speech act made; modify the basic illo-
cutionary force of the host unit; or otherwise manage the interactive process between
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speaker and addressee(s). In general, we could say that speakers, by using this type of
pragmatic markers, do not produce a completely neutral or objective utterance, but
rather provide it with a certain ‘nuance’, ‘shade’ or ‘colouring’.69
In the rest of this section, I will introduce some further general distinctions that
are often made in the literature. In line with the practice in the preceding section on
connectives, I will start with some remarks on the morphosyntactic properties of atti-
tudinal-interactional markers, thus introducing the various sorts of expressions I have
in mind here (section 2.6.1). Thereafter, Ι will turn to the semantic-functional side of
the picture. In doing so, I have found it useful to first introduce two important theo-
retical linguistic concepts in somewhat more detail, both of which are indispensable
in coming to grips with the exact meaning contributions of many attitudinal-interac-
tional markers: speech acts (section 2.6.2) and common ground (section 2.6.3). These
concepts will in turn be employed to distinguish between a number ofmajor semantic
types of attitudinal-interactional markers (section 2.6.4). Finally, I will summarize the
points that are most relevant in view of part 2 of this study (section 2.6.5).
2.6.1 Morphosyntactic properties
Whenwe take amorphosyntactic perspective, most aims can be treated as a particular
variety of adverbial sentence modifiers, which are often called ‘disjunct adverbials’ in
grammatical theory (e.g. Greenbaum 1969, Quirk et al. 1985).70 These are grammat-
ically optional elements which tend to fall outside the syntactically integrated clause
structure. Rather, they somehow modify the sentence or the utterance as a whole.
Furthermore, such adverbial modifiers may in principle take various morphological
shapes, which is in turn dependent on language-specific distinctions (see also sec-
tions 2.3 and 2.4 above). Let me give some examples here to get a basic idea of the
items I am interested in at this point.
First of all, there are aims that take the form of proper adverbs (or fixed adverbial
phrases), such as English frankly, fortunately, surely, obviously, probably, really, indeed,
in fact and their AncientGreek equivalents such as δῆλον, δηλονότι (‘clearly, obviously’),
ἴσως, τάχα (‘perhaps, probably’), ὡς ἀληθῶς, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, τῷ ὄντι (‘truly, verily, really’) and
69. Cf. the characterization of the class of GermanModalpartikeln by Thurmair (1989: 2): “Imwesent-
lichen dienenModalpartikeln dazu, eine Äußerung in den Interaktionszusammenhang einzubinden.Mit
ihnen kann auf den Gesprächspartnern gemeinsamesWissen verwiesen werden, auf Annahmen oder Er-
wartungen von Sprecher oder Hörer, es kann ein bestimmter Bezug zu einer vorangegangenen Äußerung
angezeigt werden, oder es kann der Stellenwert, den der Sprecher der Äußerung beimißt, gekennzeichnet
werden. Insofern modifizieren die Modalpartikeln auf je spezifische Weise Illokutionstypen.”
70. Cf. also the overview in Ramat & Ricca (1998).
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εἰκότως (‘reasonably’). Here it must be noted that these same adverbs may sometimes
also be used as adjuncts (e.g. as regular manner adverbs modifying predicates), which
is illustrated by the following examples:
(27) a. Alberto told him frankly that he didn’t had a chance. (manner adjunct)
b. Frankly, he doesn’t have a chance. (disjunct)
(28) a. He was flirting too obviously. (manner adjunct)
b. He was obviously flirting. (disjunct) (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 768)
A second common form concerns expressions which have grammaticalized from
parenthetical clauses or verbal imperatives, such as English I think, I guess, I suppose,
y’know, you see, look, listen, please and Ancient Greek οἶμαι (‘I suppose’), ἄγε, ἴθι, φέρε
(‘come on’) and the like.71 In addition, we may include utterance-final question tags,
such as English right, or Dutch nietwaar and toch. In Ancient Greek, the particle com-
bination ἦ γάρ; (‘For so it is, right?’) could be analyzed in this way.
Finally – andmost relevant for the purposes of the present study – there are some
languages which additionally contain a specialized grammatical class of what are usu-
ally called ‘modal particles’ or in German also ‘Abtönungspartikeln’, a termwhich orig-
inates from the groundbreaking work by Weydt (1969). This class is known in par-
ticular from many Germanic and Scandinavian languages, in which it is syntactically
well defined and is usually treated as a separate part of speech.72 The most important
formal characteristics of this type of particles are that they invariably occur in the so-
called ‘middle field’ of the German sentence and tend to remain unaccented.73 Some
of the prototypical members of this class in German are aber, auch, bloß, doch, denn,
eben, eigentlich, etwa, ja, mal, ruhig, schon and wohl. Here are some basic examples,
taken from Thurmair (1989):
(29) a. Das wundert mich nicht, daß der Paul immer solche Kopfschmerzen hat. Er
raucht ja eine Zigarette nach der anderen.
71. Grammaticalized imperatives in Ancient Greek have recently been treated by Zakowski (2014,
2018).
72. It should be noted that in the more recent formal-semantic literature, this specific grammatical
class is often also referred to by the term ‘discourse particles’, which is then used in quite a narrow (and
language-specific) sense. Examples of this practice are Zimmermann (2011) and Egg (2013). Given the
profound confusion that surrounds the term ‘discourse particle’, I rather prefer to stick with the more
traditional terminology here.
73. See, among many others, Thurmair (1989), Autenrieth (2002), Karagjosova (2004) and
Diewald (2006, 2007, 2013). See Schoonjans (2013) for a highly useful discussion of the class in terms
of prototype theory.
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b. Samwollte den Leoparden nicht stören und brachte das Fahrzeug deshalb nur so
in Position, daß nicht alle Photographierwünsche in Erfüllung gingen. So ist das
eben in freier Wildbahn.
c. Wenn das so weiter schneit, werde ich morgen wohl früher aufstehen müssen
und Schnee schaufeln.
d. A: Seit wann hast du denn den Zauberberg?
B: Den hast du mir doch vor zwei Jahren zum Geburtstag geschenkt.
e. Mach doch das Licht an! Du verdirbst dir ja die Augen.
f. Wie heisst du eigentlich?
In Ancient Greek, too, there are specific particles that appear to primarily convey atti-
tudinal-interactional meaning aspects. Clear examples are ἄρα (‘apparently, as it turns
out’), ἦ (‘truly’), που (‘I guess, perhaps’), τοι (‘you know, take note’) as well as a number
of usages of δή andμήν. To anticipate a little bit onmyanalysis in part 2 of this study, μήν
turns out to be semantically similar to German doch, whereas δή is more like ja, eben
or denn. Recall, however, that – in contrast to the situation in Germanic and Scandina-
vian languages – these particles do not constitute a distinct grammatical class in An-
cient Greek (see section 2.3.3). In terms of their topological and syntactic behaviour,
they fall in the same class as other types of discourse particles (i.e. particles with a dis-
course connective function). Or, put differently, they can only be distinguished from
connective discourse particles on semantic-functional grounds.
Now that we have a basic idea of the main morphosyntactic properties of aims, in the
remainder of this section I will further examine the class from a semantic-functional
perspective. As I have noted above, I start bymaking a theoretical digression on speech
acts and common ground, which are of particular interest for a proper understanding
of the items under consideration in this section.
2.6.2 Speech acts and illocutionary force
When looking at the analyses of aims made in the literature, the concepts of speech
acts and illocutionary force figure prominently. Individual items are often taken to op-
erate on speech act level and to interact with (e.g. modify, specify, determine) the illo-
cutionary force of the utterance in which they are used. Now since these notions will
also be relevant for an analysis of many pragmatic particles in Ancient Greek and for
(certain usages of) μήν and δή in particular, it will be useful to further look into the gen-
eral ideas developed in speech act theory and to introduce a number of linguistic tools
in terms of which the semantic contribution of these items can be properly captured.
In doing so, I will mainly basemyself upon the groundbreaking work on speech acts by
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the philosophers Austin and Searle. Austin (1962) can be seen as the founding father
of speech theory, introducing the concept in a reaction to the more narrow, truth-con-
ditional approach to language that was dominant in philosophy in his days. His ideas,
in turn, were further elaborated upon by Searle into a full-fledged theory of speech acts
(e.g. Searle 1969, 1975a, 1975b, Searle & Vanderveken 1985). In the following, I
will discuss some of the general ideas of Austin and Searle’s influential work.
Let me note here that I am well aware that the original ideas of Austin and Searle
have by no means remained unchallenged. Quite to the contrary, there is nowadays a
vast body of literature on speech acts, and the field is still flourishing. Formy purposes,
however, the basic elements that are already found in Austin and Searle’s work are
sufficiently suitable.74 This is not to say that there is no room for improvement – it is
well possible that details ofmyaccounts of μήν and δήwould slightly changedepending
on the specific speech act theory chosen – but since speech acts is only one of the
numerous topics relevant for the understanding of pragmatic particles it would lead
me too far astray to discuss the differences between the various theories.
Speech act types
Generally speaking, speech act theory can be seen as a theory of what speakers ‘do’
when using language (e.g. asking a question, giving an order, making a statement,
declaring war), thus being concerned with the actions speakers perform by means of
their utterances. Its central tenet can be paraphrased as “saying is (part of) doing, or
words are (part of) deeds” (Huang 2014: 119). Thus, Austin and Searle assume that
every speech act contains – generally in addition to some propositional content – a
particular illocution or illocutionary force, which refers to what an utterance ‘counts
as’ or ‘is intended as’. That is, this notion captures the type of action the speaker in-
tends to perform in the course of his utterance, as defined within the framework of
social institutions and conventions.75 In turn, Austin and Searle – and many others
after them – took pains in classifying the many individual speech acts in an orderly
way. Table 2.2 presents the taxonomy proposed by Searle (1975a), who distinguishes
74. A useful overview of their ideas, and some of the main issues within speech act theory in general,
can be found in Huang (2014: ch. 4).
75. Let me note that I use the term ‘speech act’ in its narrow sense, i.e. as a shorthand for ‘illocutionary
act’. As these appear to be less relevant for the analysis of aims, I will not have much to say here about
the two other types of subacts distinguished by Austin and Searle, viz. the ‘locutionary act’ (producing
a meaningful utterance) and the ‘perlocutionary act’ (bringing about certain non-verbal effects on the
addressee). This latter notion, however, will play some role in my discussion of so-called meta-directives
in combination with the particle δή. See section 6.2.2.
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speech act
type
illocutionary point direction of fit examples







directives speaker attempts to get the
addressee to perform some
future course of action
make the world





commissives speaker commits to per-








expressives speaker expresses his atti-
tude or emotion about some





declarations speaker brings about an
immediate change in some








Table 2.2: Searle’s taxonomy of speech act types
between five major speech act types.76 This classification depends upon the main il-
locutionary point expressed by the utterance and the way in which the speech act is
related to the world (called ‘direction of fit’).
In the present study, I will generally follow Searle’s classification of basic illocution
types, but apply two slight modifications. First of all, for the class of representatives I
will use the term ‘assertives’, which appears to be the more common term within lin-
guistic studies. My second point of revision concerns the status of questions. Searle
includes questions in the class of directives, since these have in common with proto-
typical directives (e.g. requests, orders) that the speaker attempts to get the addressee
to perform some course of action – in this case the performance of a speech act (i.e.
76. Quite a lot of different classifications of speech act types have been proposed in the literature, but
Searle’s appears to remain the most influential one. See e.g. Sadock (2004) and Kissine (2013) for an
overview and comparison of different classifications. With regard to classical linguistics in particular, the
treatment by Risselada (1993: ch. 2) has been influential, who summarizes much of the early literature
on the topic and argues that a prototype approach to classifying speech acts ismost promising – aposition
which I would very much agree with.
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providing the answer). In terms of direction of fit, however, I believe questions are in
fact more akin to assertives: they are primarily concerned with facts about the world
(i.e. with how words fit the world) rather than with actions.77 From a more linguistic
perspective, too, it makes good sense to take questions apart from directives, if only
because most languages have specialized grammatical constructions to encode them
(e.g. interrogative sentence types). In ongoing discourse, moreover, orders/requests
and questions generally do not allow for the same kinds of reactions of the addressee.
Reactions to questions generally cannot take the form of a compliance, as illustrated
by (30):
(30) a. A: Take out the garbage, please. – B: Okay.
b. A: Is the garbage outside yet? – B: *Okay.
c. A: At what time should the garbage be outside? – B: *Okay.
In the present study, I will therefore reserve the term ‘directives’ for the prototypical
directive speech acts such as requests, orders and commands, whereas I treat standard
questions as a distinct illocutionary type, which can be defined as an attempt of the
speaker to elicit some information from the addressee.78 In my discussion of μήν and
δή in part 2 of this study, I will be particularly concerned with the use of these items in
assertives, directives and questions.
Speech act components
According to Searle (1969) and Searle & Vanderveken (1985: ch. 1), every speech
act can be analyzed in terms of a number of interrelated components. Most important
for my present purposes are the notions of felicity conditions and degree of strength.
Felicity conditions, to start with, can be seen as certain conditions of appropriateness
that should be met for a successful performance of the speech act in question. They
can thus be seen as the constitutive rules that are conventionally tied to that particular
speech act. Searle (1969) distinguishes between four kinds of them:
(i) propositional content conditions, which specify restrictions on the proposi-
tional content of the speech act being performed.
(ii) preparatory conditions, which specify the real-world prerequisites for the
speech act being performed.
77. See e.g. Risselada (1993: 32–45) for further discussion.
78. In particle research, others have followed the same practice. See e.g. Kroon (1995: 90–92) on Latin,
who uses the term ‘elicitation’, and Karagjosova (2004: 122–123) in the context of the German Modal-
partikeln, who speaks about the ‘erotetic’ speech act type.
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(iii) sincerity conditions, which pertain to the sincerity of the speaker’s intentions
in performing the speech act.
(iv) essential conditions, which define the basic illocutionary point of the speech
act in the sense that they capture the general intention the speaker pursues by
performing the speech act (cf. table 2.2 above).
Let me shortly illustrate this with the example of a request. For a request to be felici-
tously performed, its propositional content must refer to a future course of action per-
formed by the addressee; you cannot, for instance, request something that has already
happened (propositional content condition). In addition, the speaker should believe
that the addressee is able and willing to perform the requested action – otherwise the
request would have no point in the first place (first preparatory condition). Further-
more, it should not already be obvious to the discourse participants that the addressee
would perform the action of his/her own accord (i.e. without being requested) in the
normal course of events. Again, making a request would have no point if s/he would
(second preparatory condition). The sincerity condition needs to be satisfied if the re-
quest is to be performed sincerely. That is, the speaker must genuinely want the ad-
dressee to carry out the action referred to.79 Finally, the essential condition determines
that the request is indeed intended by the speaker to ‘count as’ as a directive speech
act.
In table 2.3, I give an overview of the felicity conditions for prototypical assertives
(assertion/statement), prototypical directives (request/order) and prototypical ques-
tions (i.e. standard information seeking questions), which can be either yes/no-ques-
tions orwh-questions.Here it shouldbenoted that I havemadeone important addition
to the overview as given by Searle (1969: 66), viz. the third preparatory condition for
questions.We have seen above that questions are like directives in their addressee-ori-
ented character, and they may indeed be characterized as requests for information or
confirmation. Accordingly, I believe we should add – in line with the first preparatory
79. As also noted by Searle, we obviously have no access to the actual psychological states of people
engaged in conversation. For instance, people may – for whatever reasons – assert something which they
do not really believe in. However, irrespective of their actual beliefs, intentions, feelings etc., speakers
do undertake certain commitments with respect to their addressees, which can be used for future coor-
dination of their actions. For the view that human communication is first of all a matter of negotiating
commitments (rather than conveying mental states), see Geurts (2019) and references therein.
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condition for requests – the condition that (the speaker believes that) the addressee is
able to provide the elicited information, which implies that (the speaker believes that)
the addressee knows the answer.80
Now the various felicity conditions of speech acts play an important part in on-
going conversation. When a speaker makes a particular utterance in conversation, it
will automatically follow – given general principles of cooperative communicative be-
haviour – that he is committed to the felicity conditions that are conventionally asso-
ciated with the speech act made in that utterance. The utterance of an assertion, for
example, will commit the speaker, not only to the truth of the expressed proposition
p (sincerity condition), but also to his having evidence for the truth of p (first prepara-
tory condition). Similarly, the very utterance of a request commits the speaker, among
other things, to a belief that the addressee is able to perform the requested action.
What’s is most relevant to my current purposes is that aims may in turn inter-
act with felicity conditions (and the speaker commitments that conventionally derive
from them) in various ways. Especially with regard to the class of modal particles in
German, felicity conditions – and the preparatory conditions in particular – play an
important role in the recent literature.81 Waltereit & Detges (2007: 78), for exam-
ple, state that these items essentially involve answering the question “What do I believe
that you believe concerning the felicity of my speech act?”82 It may be helpful at this
point to look briefly at some examples:
(31) A: Seit wann hast du denn den Zauberberg?
B: Den hast du mir doch vor zwei Jahren geschenkt.
(A: ‘Since wenn have you owned the Zauberberg? – B: You actually gave it tome two
years ago.’) (Thurmair 1989, Egg 2013)
In (31) we have an example of the modal particle doch – a contrastive particle that
is generally used to signal potential inconsistencies between two contextual proposi-
tions (e.g. König & Requardt 1991, König 1997, Egg 2013). In this particular exam-
ple, as explained by Egg (2013), it signals that the proposition expressed in the doch-
utterance is incompatible with one of the felicity conditions of the preceding question
80. In studies on the German modal particles, this same move has been made by, for instance,
Karagjosova (2004: 125) and Egg (2013: 134).
81. See e.g.Waltereit (2001), Karagjosova (2004), Foolen (2006),Waltereit&Detges (2007) and
Egg (2012, 2013).
82. Consider also Waltereit (2001: 1414): “Their purpose is essentially to accommodate at minimal
linguistic expense the preparatory conditions of the speech act they occur in. ‘Atminimal expense’means
that justification is not done explicitly; rather, it is achieved by invoking a speech situation that typically
has the desired preparatory conditions.”
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by speaker A, viz. that A himself does not know the answer to his own question (first
preparatory condition). After all, the information given in B’s reaction – which is part
of their mutually shared background knowledge (cf. section 2.6.3 below) – raises the
expectation that A does in fact know this answer. In his reactive move, then, B takes
issue with the felicity of the preceding question, suggesting that its performance was
actually out of place.
Alternatively, modal particles may interact with the preparatory conditions of the
speech act itself. Consider for instance the following examples of the Dutch modal
particle toch discussed by Foolen (2006):
(32) a. Ach, hou toch op met dat gezeur.
(‘Oh, stop nagging, for goodness’ sake!’)
b. Maar ik kan toch thuis koffie zetten.
(‘But I can make coffee at home, can’t I?’) (Foolen 2006: 66–67)
In (32a), Foolen explains, toch targets the second preparatory condition of a request,
viz. that the addressee does not know that the speaker wants him to do something.
The contrastive particle signals that this usual condition does not hold for the current
speech act, thus suggesting that the addressee does in fact know that the speakerwants
him to do this. Such an utterance would be appropriate, for instance, in a situation in
which the request has already been made earlier. The result is that a request modified
by toch may have a somewhat indulgent character.83 And in (32b), in turn, a prepara-
tory condition of assertions is targeted, viz. that the addressee does not already know
the information conveyed by the speaker. Again, the particle signals that this usual
condition is cancelled: the speaker assumes that the addressee did know this infor-
mation. As a result, Foolen points out, utterances like these function as a check: the
speaker checks whether the addressee has indeed taken this information for granted
andwhether they are still on the same page, so to speak.84 Such an analysis in terms of
felicity conditions will also play an important role in my analysis of μήν and δή in part
2 of this study, especially when their use in directives and questions is concerned.
83. See also Karagjosova (2004), Egg (2013) for a similar analysis of German doch in imperative
clauses.
84. Interestingly, as shown by Foolen, it has even become common to use ‘checking’ toch as a tag at the
end ofDutch utterances (like English tag-questions or the colloquial ‘right?’), as in:Wat is nou consequent?
Het kan alle kanten op vliegen, toch? (‘It can develop in any directions, can’t it?’; Foolen 2006: 67). In this
respect, Dutch toch differs significantly from its German cognate doch, which cannot be used in that way.
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Another important component of speech acts – in addition to the concept of felic-
ity conditionsdiscussed so far – is their degreeof strength (e.g. Searle&Vanderveken
1985: ch.1). In some cases, a speech act can be seen as a stronger or weaker variant of
another speech act of the samebasic illocutionary type. Thus, an ordermaybe seen as a
stronger directive than amere suggestion, swearing (that p) as a stronger assertive than
stating (thatp) and a solemnvowa stronger commissive than a regular promise.What’s
interesting for our present purposes is that speakers may use special constructions or
lexical items to reinforce or mitigate the strength of the speech act being performed.
As examples of pragmaticmarkers that can reinforce the strength of the speech act
wemay consider Latin vero and its English counterparts as illustrated by the following
examples taken from Kroon (1995: 299–309):
(33) a. frater vero heri advenit.
(‘Really, my brother arrived yesterday’, i.e. ‘I’m serious’, ‘you can takemy word for
that’, ‘I tell you’, ‘I assure you’, etc.)
b. – Scio te bona esse voce, ne clama nimis. – Ego hercle vero clamo.
(‘I know you have a good voice. Don’t strain it, yelling.’ – ‘By Hercules, I will cer-
tainly yell’, i.e. ‘I assure you’, ‘I tell you’)
(34) a. Minue vero iram.
(‘Really, restrict your anger’)
b. I vero, refer.
(‘Do go, I urge you, and bring it back’)
In assertives such as (33), vero may work, as proposed by Kroon, “as a way to high-
light the speaker’s own commitment” (302), whereas in directives such as (34) it rather
serves “to indicate that the speaker is highly committed to the actual realization by the
addressee of the intended action” (305).85 Put differently, we may say that such mark-
ers emphasize the sincerity of the speech act made.
By contrast, pragmatic markers such as I think, I suppose, Ancient Greek οἶμαι, που
(‘I think, I suppose’) and perhaps also the German particle wohl may be analyzed as
items that mitigate the force of an assertive speech act. The addition of such expres-
sions turns a regular statement into a hedged one, thus qualifying the commitment
that is normally associated with a statement.
85. Similar comments are in place, I believe, when English really is concerned (note the translations
given here).
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I conclude that aims may in principle interact with various components of the speech
acts inwhich they are used. Theymay, for instance, semantically target the preparatory
conditions of the speech act in which they occur. Or they may be used to reinforce or
mitigate the degree of illocutionary strength. It is in these ways, as I take it, that such
expressions can be said to modify the speech acts in which they occur. I will return to
these possibilities in my discussion of μήν and δή in part two of this study.
2.6.3 Common ground and context
The second important theoretical concept that will be helpful in analyzing aims is the
notion of common ground. The common ground of the discourse participants indeed
forms a crucial component of the communicative context of a given utterance. Com-
monground is pervasive in everythingwedowith others and it is a necessary condition
for coordinating our joint activities and joint actions, including communication by us-
ing language (Clark 1996, Verhagen 2015, Geurts 2019). Thus, when two people
enter into a conversation, they will not only each bring their individual backgrounds
(assumptions, beliefs, knowledge etc.), but also presuppose certainmutually shared or
common background assumptions, which their current interaction can be based upon.
At the same time, they will expand their common ground with each communicative
act made and, as the discourse proceeds, they will continuously keep track of these
step-by-step changes (see especially Stalnaker 1974, 1978, 2002).
Since the concept of common ground was first introduced by Grice in his William
James lectures of 1967, it has become an indispensable tool for every linguistic the-
ory that recognizes the important role of ‘context’ in linguistic analysis, and it figures
prominently in theories on pragmatic phenomena such as convention (e.g. D. K. Lewis
1969, Geurts 2018), reference (Clark & Marshall 1981), presupposition (Stal-
naker 1974, 2002) and conversational implicature (Grice 1975). In addition, it has
proven to be highly relevant for the analysis of pragmatic markers, and in particular
those that perform attitudinal-interactional functions. In the literature on modal par-
ticles in German, for instance, negotiation of common ground has even been marked
as a constitutive feature of the class as a whole.86
I therefore find it useful to shortly introduce the concept and the way it is under-
stood in the present thesis in some more detail. I will subsequently discuss (i) what
common ground is and how it is created, (ii) the threemajor types of common ground,
86. See e.g. Diewald & Fischer (1998), Karagjosova (2003, 2004), Diewald (2006, 2007), Fischer
(2007) and Alm, Behr & Fischer (2018).
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(iii) how it is related to the cognitive concept of activation. Finally, I will shortly look at
the related notion of the conversational table – which is yet another important com-
ponent of the communicative context of utterances.
A shared basis
What exactly is common ground and how is it achieved? I start here with the crucial
observation, following Clark (1996), that common ground is a form of self-awareness.
The general idea is that a mental agent is always aware of certain information he has
at its disposal in a given situation, including information about himself. Crucially, this
also includes, in a reflexive way, this very awareness itself (i.e. self-awareness). Now
when a second agent enters the scene, the first also becomes aware of this second
agent, including the fact that the other is analogous to him in his awareness and self-
awareness. Correspondingly, as Clark (1996: 94) states, “common ground is a form of
self-awareness … in which there is at least one other person with the analogous self-
awareness.”
Following D. K. Lewis (1969: 52–60) and Clark (1996: ch. 4), this can be repre-
sented as follows:
(35) p is common ground for members of community C if and only if:
1. every member of C has information that basis b holds;
2. b indicates to every member of C that every member of C has information that b
holds;
3. b indicates to members of C that p.
In this representation, b is the shared basis for the piece of commonground that propo-
sition p holds. Shared bases are of different types and give rise to various subtypes of
common ground, which will be further discussed below. The community C consists
of two or more members (e.g. the speaker and addressee(s) of a particular conversa-
tion, the people in a class room etc.). The phrase ‘has information’ is used here as a
general cover term for concepts like knowledge, belief, assumption and awareness via
perceptual experience.87
87. Note that the given definition includes the required notion of reflexivity, viz. in proposition 2. Other
representations of common ground found in the literature rely exclusively on the notion of reflexivity
and do not take the notion of a shared basis into account. One of these is a definition using iterated
propositions: both A and B know that p and know that they both know that p and know that they both
know that they both know that p, and so on ad infinitum. However, as was already pointed out by D. K.
Lewis (1969: 52–53), representations like these cannot be the basic ones, but can only be inferred from
the shared-basis representation as given in (35). To verify that there is common knowledge p, speaker and
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Let’s look at an example taken from Clark (1996): suppose my wife and I walk
on the beach, find a rare conch shell and examine it. Here, my wife and I are a small
community and the shared basis can be seen as, for instance, the present situation and
circumstances. Given that shared basis, it is common ground that we are on the beach
examining a conch shell, since (1) both of us are aware of the present situation, (2) the
present situation indicates to both of us thatweboth are aware of the present situation,
and (3) thepresent situation indicates to both of us thatwe are on thebeach examining
a conch shell. The shared basis could also involve, for instance, the fact that we had
the same type of basic education and share a good deal of background knowledge. It
follows, then, that it is also common ground that the shell has been washed ashore,
since (1) we both know the fact that we share a basic educational background, (2) the
fact of our shared educational background indicates to both of us that we both know
that we share this background, and (3) our shared educational background indicates
to both of us that shells on a beach have been washed ashore.
The given definition in terms of a shared basis also suggests that people are gener-
ally able to give a justification for their common ground. This is formulated by Clark
(1996: 96) as follows:
(36) The principle of justification of common ground
In practice, people take a proposition to be common ground in a community only
when they believe they have a proper shared basis for the proposition in that com-
munity.
Three sources of evidence
The common ground of the participants in a communicative event can be further clas-
sified according to the source of evidence concerned, i.e. the type of shared basis. Imake
a three-way distinction here in immediate, personal and communal common ground
(Clark & Marshall 1981, Clark 1996, Verhagen 2015).88 Of these, the first has a
temporary character, whereas the latter two are related to long-termmemory (see the
section on activation below). Let’s look at these types one by one.
addressee only have to verify that there is a shared basis from which p can be inferred. It is not necessary
for the speaker to explicitly verify that the addressee knows that the speaker knows that p, and so on. See
alsoClark&Marshall (1981) (on the ‘mutual knowledge paradox’), Clark (1996: ch.4) andVerhagen
(2015: 237–240) for further discussion.
88. I owe the term ‘immediate common ground’ to Krifka &Musan (2012).
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First, commongroundcanbe immediately basedon the very communicative event
in which the discourse participants are currently involved. Common ground based on
this source of evidence I call immediate commonground, which in turn has a physical
and a discourse component.89 The former concerns the extra-linguistic, physical situ-
ation in which the communicative event is set (discourse participants, time, location,
circumstances etc.), which constitutes a perceptual basis for common ground. The lat-
ter concerns the preceding linguistic or discourse context: a preceding communicative
act can be taken as an actional basis for common ground, involving joint attention to
what is said and meant by the discourse participants. By means of these sources of ev-
idence we can account for, e.g., the existence of various types of demonstrative and
anaphoric expressions.
Second, there is what I call the personal common ground, which arises from the
common personal history of the discourse participants, i.e. their mutually shared ex-
periences and their mutual knowledge of each other. We might see this as a kind of
personal diary containing records for all of the past experiences, events or actions (in-
cluding conversations) inwhich the discourse participantswere jointly involved. Thus,
personal commonground is lacking for strangers, but is quite extensive for good friends
and intimates. This source of evidence is linguistically relevant, for instance, with re-
gard to the felicitous use of proper names. When a speaker uses a proper name, he re-
lies on the addressee identifying the unique referent intended, i.e. the individual who
is the most salient to them given their common personal history. Wemay also think of
special nicknames that people use for good friends or lovers (personalized lexicons).
Third, discourse participants may be on common ground by virtue of the fact that
they are members of the same community: communal common ground. People can
be categorized into various cultural communities on the basis of their nationality, eth-
nicity, culture, religion, gender, place of residence, work, hobbies, and so on. Once two
people have established it as common ground (e.g. on the basis of perception or con-
versation) that they belong to the same community, this mutual membership forms
the shared basis for a great deal of further common ground: communitymembers have
shared expertise about both general and specific concepts or practices (in terms of cul-
turalmodels, conventions, jargon etc.) as well as some shared attitudes (e.g. political or
89. Cf. especially Clark&Marshall (1981) for amore detailed discussion of, in his terminology, phys-
ical and linguistic ‘co-presence’. Necessary basic assumptions for the establishment of commongroundon
the basis of physical and linguistic co-presence are simultaneity, attention and rationality of the mental
agents involved.
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religious beliefs or judgements).90 Note that being human can also be understood as a
property that establishes a ‘community’, as it evokes common ground about, e.g., phys-
ical properties, emotions and rationality. Mutual acquaintance with a particular lan-
guage is another example, as it justifies mutual knowledge of the conventional mean-
ings of the linguistic expressions and grammatical structures within that language (cf.
Verhagen 2015, Geurts 2018).
Thus, we could see the communal common ground as a large encyclopedia, con-
taining separate records for the various different communities that someone is amem-
ber of. These records contain the expert knowledge the community members can be
generally supposed to share.91 By way of illustration, I quote here the examples given
by Verhagen:
[O]n the basis of some evidence that my interlocutor is a linguist, I will assume
mutual knowledge of a specific meaning of the terms subject and paradigm. On
the basis of evidence that he is Dutch, I assumemutual knowledge about a huge
variety of things, such as the system of parliamentary elections in The Nether-
lands, the name of the Dutch king, the location (roughly) of the airport named
Schiphol, the fact that the country’s capital is not the seat of its government, and
also such lexical items as betekenis (roughly: ‘conventional meaning’, as in This
word meant something totally different 200 years ago) and bedoeling (roughly: ‘in-
tended meaning’, as in He meant something totally different than what you were
thinking), a conceptual distinction not conventionally associated with formally
distinct lexical signals in English, for example. On the basis of evidence that my
interlocutor is American, I will not be justified in assuming these pieces of in-
formation to be mutually known, but I will be in assigning some others that
status, including the lexical items commitment and obligation, a conceptual dis-
tinction not conventionally associated with formally distinct lexical signals in
Dutch. (Verhagen 2015: 243)
For my present purposes, it is important to note that the culturally oriented body of
commonground also involves particular cognitive schemata or frames aswell as gener-
alized topoi, a concept that originates from thework of Anscombre&Ducrot (1983).
As we have already seen in section 2.5.3 above, these are default rules that are based
90. This would be ‘inside information’ in Clark’s terminology. Inside information covers the particular
information “that members of a particular community mutually assume is possessed by the members of
the community.” ‘Outside information’ of a community, on the other hand, covers “the types of informa-
tion that outsiders assume is inside information for that community” (Clark 1996: 101)
91. In the literature, indeed, this type of common ground is also commonly called ‘encyclopedic knowl-
edge’ or ‘world knowledge’.
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Type of common ground Source of evidence / shared basis
immediate physical joint perception of physical discourse situation
linguistic joint attention to preceding discourse acts
personal mutual personal history
communal mutual cultural community membership
Table 2.4: Sources of evidence for common ground
on regularities within particular communities. These rules are default in that they typ-
ically apply, but are by nomeans universally valid. They can bemodelled as defeasible
inferences of the type ‘normally if p, then q’ or ‘generally, p because of q’. Examples are
‘normally, if you study hard, you will pass the test’ and ‘conch shells are typically found
on the beach (and not in the forest)’. The presence of topoi in the common ground
between discourse participants is highly relevant when their reasoning processes in
terms of argumentative inferences are at stake.
To sum up, common ground is a cover term for various different types of mutually
shared information, which is based on various sources of evidence. This is summarized
in table 2.4.
Common ground and activation
So far, we have seen that two discourse participants may entertain quite a large body
of mutually shared information. But obviously, due to the limitations imposed on the
human mind and short-term memory, they cannot be actively aware of this, or attend
to it, all at the same time – which Chafe has put as follows:
Althougheveryhumanmind is devoted tomodeling a larger realitywithinwhich
it (or the organism it inhabits) occupies a central place, only one small piece of
that model can be active at one time. At any given moment the mind can focus
on nomore than a small segments of everything it “knows”. (Chafe 1994: 28)
Thismeans that, at any givenmoment in ongoing discourse, certain pieces of informa-
tion stored in themind of the discourse participants – including their common ground
– inherently have amore primary or salient cognitive state than others. Put differently,
some ideas will be cognitively less ‘costly’ to retrieve frommemory and to focus atten-
tion upon than others.
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high active / in current focus of attention
semi-active / accessible by virtue of preceding discourse,
physical discourse situation or inferencing
low inactive / unused / stored in long-termmemory
Table 2.5: Activation states and degree of accessibility
Thus, in addition to concepts such as common knowledge or common belief, it is
useful to take cognitive concepts such as joint attention and activation into account.92
The common ground at a given point in discourse can then be further classified in
terms of what are usually called ‘activation states’ or ‘degrees of accessibility’. Differ-
ences of this kind have been broadly discussed in the literature: I mention here the in-
fluential work on information structure by Chafe (1976, 1987, 1994), Prince (1981),
Gundel, Hedberg & Zacharski (1993) and Lambrecht (1994) as well as the ideas
developed within Accessibility Theory (Ariel 1990, 2001) and Centering Theory (e.g.
Walker, Joshi & Prince 1998). Although these theories may differ on the details and
the terminology used, the basic idea that underlies them all can be summarized as in
table 2.5.
Activation should essentially be seen as a scalar phenomenon: at one pole there is
the information that is actively ‘lit up’ in the current focus of attention of the discourse
participants, mostly because it has just beenmentioned in the immediately preceding
discourse or is saliently present in the physical discourse situation. At the other pole
there is completely inactive information, which has not been used in the current dis-
course and has thus remained stored in long-termmemory. In between we find the in-
formation that is not in the primary focus of attention, but in oneway or anothermore
salient than information with a fully inactive status. It may be accessible, for instance,
because it has beenmentioned a little earlier in the preceding discourse, by virtue of its
presence in the wider physical discourse situation or on the basis of inferential knowl-
edge (i.e. on the basis of general frames and topoi in the communal common ground).
Obviously, these cognitive stateswill continually change as the discourse proceeds and
information flows in and out of the focus of attention of the discourse participants.
92. The term ‘consciousness’ has also been used to refer to this limited activation process (e.g. Chafe
1994, Lambrecht 1994). I will not do so because of the many different (unwanted) connotations this
rather loaded termmay evoke.
559416-L-bw-Thijs
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 102
88 Chapter 2. Particles: form and functions
Importantly, the discourse participants will keep track of these changes and “also
attempt to appreciate parallel changes that are taking place in the minds of their lis-
teners” (Chafe 1994: 54). Indeed, language and communication is indeed very much
dependent upon the fact that speakers have assumptions not only about the content of
the common ground in terms ofmutual knowledge, but also about the cognitive states
of that content in a given discourse situation. Typically, the physical and linguistic con-
text of a speech event provides common ground that is actively lit up in the mind of
the discourse participants, or at least highly accessible. Given the fact that this con-
text continually changes over time, the common ground of this type is of a temporary
nature. On the other hand, most of the information in the personal and communal
common ground is stored in long-term memory and is of a long-lasting nature. Most
of it is not in the primary attention of the speech participants and has an inactive or at
most an accessible status.
Now the relevance of the concept of activation to linguistic analysis is probably
best known from the work on reference and the linguistic form of discourse referents
(cf. the authors and theories cited above). That is, when a speaker wants to refer to
a particular discourse referent, the way he does this – the linguistic form he eventu-
ally utters – is partly dependent on the assumed cognitive state of the mental repre-
sentation of this referent in the minds of the discourse participants at the moment of
utterance. For example, if I want to introduce the dean of our faculty into our conversa-
tion, I might say ‘the dean of our faculty’ or simply ‘Christoph’, in case you would know
him personally. But if I already mentioned him in the immediately preceding utter-
ance, the mental representation of the dean would be highly active and, accordingly,
I would normally refer to him by means of an anaphoric pronoun (‘he’, ‘him’ etc.). The
theoriesmentioned above have indeed establishedmany andmuchmore fine-grained
distinctions along these lines.
For our present purposes, however, it is crucial to recognize that the relevance of
the activation parameter goes well beyond the question of the linguistic form of dis-
course referents. As I take it, full propositions may indeed also be analyzed in terms of
activation states (e.g. Walker 1993, Dryer 1996, Karagjosova 2004). Crucially, this
will influence the communicative strategies of speakers, i.e. the ways in which they try
to achieve their communicative goalswith regard to their addressee(s). Since a speaker
cannot assume that his addressee is aware of all of their common ground in a given
discourse situation, it may be necessary for him – provided that he wants to be coop-
erative and facilitate smooth communication – to use separate communicative acts
in order to retrieve and (re-)activate particular pieces of knowledge from the personal
or communal common ground. For instance, he may simply remind his addressee of
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some common ground information, signal a potential conflict between a preceding ut-
terance of the addressee and the common ground, recapitulate some of the informa-
tionmentioned or agreed upon earlier in the same discourse, retrieve common ground
information as an explicit premise for, or justification of, a particular conclusion, (re-
)introduce an identifiable entity as the next discourse topic, and so on.
Inmany languages, there are pragmaticmarkers that are used to explicitly indicate
(one or more of) such strategies. I will call such items markers of common ground
(cf. Fetzer & Fischer 2007). Thus, languages may contain linguistic expressions that
mark the communicated content (or a felicity condition) of their host unit as part of the
commongroundor as (un)expected in viewof topoi present in the commonground.As
I mentioned above, the group of Germanmodal particles is generally taken to perform
such a function. In Dutch, too, there are markers such as immers and dus (e.g. Evers-
Vermeul 2005), and in Latin we find near-equivalent expressions such as ergo and
enim (Kroon1995, 2011). In English, sentence adverbs such as of course, obviously and
surely can be used in this way (Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007). In chapters 5
and 6, I will argue that Greek μήν and δή are also to be seen as markers of common
ground in some of their usages.
Common ground and the table
In addition to the concept of common ground, there is another component of the com-
municative context that has proven to be relevant for the analysis of certain particles,
which Farkas & Bruce (2010) have called the conversational table. The table compo-
nent records the issues and propositions that are still up for discussion and need to be
decidedupon in subsequent discourse. Letme illustrate the conceptwith the following
(constructed) mini-dialogues:
(37) George: Trump won the election.
Barack: Yes, he did. / That’s true indeed.
(38) George: Trump won the election.
Barack: No, he didn’t. / That’s not true.
In these examples, George asserts a proposition p that Trump won the election. In do-
ing so, he does not only commit himself to p (cf. section 2.6.2 above), but also makes
a proposal for updating the common ground with p (cf. Stalnaker 1978, Farkas &
Bruce 2010 and references therein). In other words, p is put on the table as the next
issue that needs to be settled in the conversation. After George’s utterance then, p is
an activated context proposition, but is not yet part of the common ground of the dis-
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course participants (i.e. in the sense that they are jointly committed to its truth).93
This only happens when it is accepted and agreed upon by the addressee. Thus, with
Barack’s reactive move in (37), the proposition p moves from the table to the common
ground.However, we could easily envisage a situation inwhich the addressee disagrees
and does not accept the table proposition. In (38), for instance, Barack’s reactivemove
is an explicit rejection, so that the table-proposition is prevented from being added to
the common ground. Such a case will lead to a conversational crisis, or, alternatively,
the participants may simply agree to disagree.
The preferred reaction, however, is one of confirmation or acceptance, thus re-
sulting in an addition of the table-proposition to the common ground. Note, further-
more, that assertive speech acts are often silently accepted by the addressee, if only
for the purposes of the current conversation. In non-dialogical discourse, moreover,
acceptance and the notion of the table do not play a role at all, since there is no phys-
ically present addressee who may accept or reject the information presented by the
speaker. In such cases, writer and reader will simply act as if all information is directly
added to their common ground, if only for the purposes of the current discourse. Thus,
if Herodotus in hisHistorieswrites, say, that Cambyses starts a campaign against Egypt,
he simply takes it for granted that this information is added to the common ground of
him and his audience.
Now what is relevant for my present purposes is that pragmatic markers may in-
teract with the table-proposition in various ways. English indeed, for example, may
essentially be seen as a confirmatory adverb, by means of which a speaker explicitly
signals confirmation of a table-proposition and thus adds it to the common ground, as
in (37) above (cf. Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007: 104–105). Also, some lan-
guages contain answer particles that show specific sensitivities to the polarity of the
table-proposition. Thus, in addition to the equivalents of English yes and no, some lan-
guages have particles that are specifically used to deny a negative table proposition.
Examples of such expressions are French si, German doch and Dutch ( ja)wel, as in the
following constructed conservation:94
93. Note that other information is directly added to the common ground by means of George’s utter-
ance, e.g. the very fact that George made an assertive speech act, the fact that George is committed to p
(sincerity condition), that George normally has some evidence for the truth of p (first preparatory con-
dition) as well as the fact that p is on the table and in the current focus of attention of the discourse
participants.
94. See e.g. Hogeweg (2009), Farkas & Bruce (2010), Hogeweg, Ramachers & Wottrich (2011),
Egg & Zimmermann (2012) and Roelofsen & Farkas (2015).
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(39) a. A: Trump hat die Wahl nicht gewonnen.
B: Doch! / Er hat die Wahl doch gewonnen.
b. A: Trump heeft de verkiezingen niet gewonnen.
B: (Ja)wel! / Hij heeft de verkiezingen wel gewonnen.
c. A: Trump did not win the elections.
B: He did! / He did win the elections.
As shown in (39), stressed doch andwel explicitly react to a negative table-proposition
and cannot be used to deny a positive one. Note that present-day English does not con-
tain such an expression, but employ the emphatic do-construction for this particular
communicative function.
Conclusion
In the present section, we have further looked into a number of components of the
communicative context that are relevant for the analysis of aims. We have seen that,
at a given point in discourse, the propositions that reside in the communicative con-
text may differ as to their current communicative status: they may be part of the com-
mon ground, but they may also be on the table and still up for discussion. Aims may
in turn interact with such contextually given propositions in various ways, and some
items may in fact be used for both functions. German ja, for example, can be used as
a regular answer particle, confirming a table-proposition, but it may also be used as
a modal particle in assertives, indicating that the asserted proposition is already part
of the common ground. As we will see in section 6.2.1 something similar applies to
Ancient Greek δή.
When the notion of common ground is concerned, furthermore, it is useful to
make further distinctions between different types of common ground: immediate (lin-
guistic and physical), personal and communal common ground. Crucially, this latter
component also consists of regularities or topoi, describing what normally is the case.
Again, aimsmay interact with the common ground in various ways: theymay indicate,
for instance, that a proposition is retrieved from the personal or communal common
ground, theymay evoke and interact with a particular topos or theymay serve to point
at a potential inconsistency between a preceding speech act and the common ground.
In my analysis of μήν and δή, these various types of common ground will play an im-
portant role in distinguishing between different usages of these particles.
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2.6.4 Semantic types of attitudinal-interactional markers
In the preceding two sections on speech acts and commonground,wehave seenwhich
linguistic notions and parameters are relevant in accounting for the semantic contri-
butions of attitudinal-interactionalmarkers. Having these concepts inmind, I will now
distinguish between a number of major semantic types of aims.
Illocutionary vs. content level
A first relevant parameter for further classification of themeanings performed by aims
involves the question of their semantic scope, i.e. the ‘level’ of the host utterance
which they semantically apply to: the communicated content or the illocution. In other
words, we can make a basic distinction between markers that target the propositional
content expressed in the host utterance and those that somehow relate to its illocu-
tion, operating upon the level of the speech act that is performed by the speaker (see
section 2.6.2 below). The relevance of this distinction is generally accepted in the lit-
erature on both (lexical) sentence adverbials and (grammaticalized) modal particles.
Let me discuss these two classes one by one.
When sentence adverbials in English are concerned, to start with, a broad distinc-
tion is often made between illocutionary or style disjuncts on the one hand, and con-
tent or attitudinal disjuncts on the other.95 Clear examples of the former category are
adverbs such as frankly, honestly, truthfully, confidentially, briefly, and the like, which
can be seen as a speaker’s meta-linguistic comment on the manner in which the cur-
rent speech act is performed. Consider for example:
(40) a. Honestly, I didn’t do it.
b. Frankly, he doesn’t have a chance.
c. Confidentially, what do you think of the plan?
Such adverbs can often be paraphrased by way of an explicit clause containing a first
personperformative verb of speech: I tell you honestly, I ask you confidentially and so on,
in which the same adverbs function as regular manner adjuncts (see also section 2.6.1
above). Note, furthermore, that this type of disjuncts can also be realized by (seman-
tically related) adverbial phrases or clauses, such as in all honesty, frankly speaking, in
brief, to put it briefly, if I may say so, if you must know and the like.
95. Cf. Greenbaum (1969), Quirk et al. (1985), Biber et al. (1999) and Huddleston & Pullum
(2002). For disjuncts in Ancient Greek in particular, see Crespo (2015).
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Content or attitudinal disjuncts, on the other hand, have in common that they
involve the speaker’s comment upon the content that is communicated in the host
utterance, rather than upon the form of this utterance or the performance itself. In
turn, this type can be roughly subdivided into two semantic subclasses: evaluative and
modal sentence adverbials. Evaluative sentence adverbials, on the one hand, express
the speaker’s subjective evaluation or value judgement towards the propositional con-
tent expressed. Typical examples are such adverbs as fortunately, surprisingly, sadly,
ironically, regrettably and the like. Modal sentence adverbials, on the other hand, can
be generally characterized as expressions that are used to qualify the nature or degree
of the speaker’s commitment towards the truth of the proposition expressed. Again, a
number of different modal categories are usually distinguished.
First of all, it includes epistemic adverbs such as certainly, definitely, no doubt,
surely, probably and perhaps, which indicate the speaker’s judgement of the probability
that the proposition is true, ranging from absolute certainty to strong doubt. Ancient
Greekexamples are ἴσως, τάχα (‘maybe, perhaps’; cf. RuizYamuza2000, 2014) andπάν-
τως (‘by allmeans, certainly’; cf. H. Dik 2014). A second relevant class concerns eviden-
tial adverbs such as obviously, clearly, evidently, apparently, seemingly and allegedly (cf.
Ancient Greek δῆλον/δηλονότι ‘clearly, evidently’). By using such adverbs, the speaker
gives an explicit indication as to the source of information which the communicated
proposition is based upon, which may be of various different kinds. Nuyts (2006), for
example, distinguishes between the following evidential values: experiential (based on
direct perception), inferential (inferred on the basis of other directly perceived infor-
mation), reasoned (derived from or compatible with other general background knowl-
edge) and hearsay/reportative (received from others).96 Yet another type of sentence
adverbs may be called expectation adverbs (Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007),
as they primarily indicate that the expressed proposition accords with (e.g. of course,
naturally) or runs counter to (e.g. in fact, actually) general expectations based upon the
common ground.
96. Here it should be noted, as indicated by Nuyts (2006), that the categories of epistemic modality
and evidentiality cannot always be strictly kept apart as two distinct categories: certain evidential values
by definition suggest or imply a certain degree of probability. Direct experiential evidence, for exam-
ple, is generally considered more reliable than hearsay evidence and may thus imply a higher degree of
certainty. Inferential and reasoned adverbs, moreover, tend to express certain degrees of reliability (e.g.
clearly/obviously > plausibly/presumably > seemingly), which are comparable to the degrees of certainty
distinguished for epistemic modality. We are thus dealing with partial overlapping categories here. See
Van Rooy (2016) for the category of evidentiality in Ancient Greek in particular.
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I will now turn to the group of grammaticalized Modalpartikeln in German. Here
too, the analyses that are offered in the recent literature, usually distinguish between
different semantic arguments for particles (e.g. Karagjosova 2004, Egg 2012, 2013).
Let me recapitulate here some of the examples given earlier to illustrate this:
(41) a. Das wundert mich nicht, daß der Paul immer solche Kopfschmerzen hat. Er
raucht ja eine Zigarette nach der anderen.
b. So ist das eben in freier Wildbahn.
c. Mach doch das Licht an! Du verdirbst dir ja die Augen.
In assertive speech acts, the semantic target of a particle is usually taken to be the
proposition that is expressed by the host utterance. Thus, in the examples given here,
the particles ja and eben signal that the proposition expressed in the particle utterance
is part of the common ground of the discourse participants (roughly ‘as is evident’, ‘as
we all know’). However, it is well-known thatmany of these particles also occur in non-
assertive speech acts. Aswe have seen in section 2.6.4 above, a useful way inwhich this
can be modeled is in terms of the felicity conditions and/or the degree of strength of
speech acts. Thus, in (41c), doch may be analyzed as targeting a preparatory condition
(i.e. that it is not obvious for the hearer to put on the light) of the directive in which
it occurs, signaling that this condition does not hold in this particular case (i.e. it is
already obvious or part of the common ground that the addresseewill put on the light).
I would like to emphasize, however, that it may not always be easy to assess
whether a linguistic item semantically targets the propositional content or (some as-
pect of) the illocution of their host unit. The English hedge I think, for example,may be
analyzed as an indicator of epistemic uncertainty, but at the same time we could say
that it serves to mitigate the strength of the assertive speech act. In fact, it would not
be insensible to say that it performs both functions at the same time.
Subjective and intersubjective meanings
A second relevant parameter in classifying aims markers concerns the distinction be-
tween subjective and intersubjective meaning components.97 Following Traugott
(2003, 2010), I take it that subjective meanings are speaker-oriented in nature, encod-
ing the perspective, beliefs, attitudes etc. of the speaker/writer, whereas intersubjec-
97. It must be noted that the literature on linguistic subjectivity and intersubjectivity is vast and unfor-
tunately not always consistent in its definitions and terminology. For a useful overview and discussion of
the literature I refer to De Smet&Verstraete (2006) andCuyckens, Davidse&Vandelanotte (2010).
I will use these terms in the sense of Traugott (2003, 2010).
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tive meanings are also addressee-oriented in nature, explicitly encoding (the speaker/
writer’s attention to) the perspective of the addressee, either cognitively (in terms of
beliefs, expectations, attitudes etc.) or socially (in terms of social identity, face and
power). As I take it, intersubjective meanings are by definition also subjective in na-
ture. Put differently, whereas both types of meanings are grounded in the communica-
tive situation at hand, they differ as to whether or not the perspective of the addressee
is explicitly included.98
Some relevant examples of expressions that encode subjective meanings are eval-
uative sentence adverbs (e.g. fortunately), epistemic modal adverbs (e.g. certainly, re-
ally, probably), epistemic parentheticals (e.g. I think, I suppose), evaluative scalar ex-
pressions (e.g. even, see section 2.7) and expressive uses of adjectives (e.g. damned in
My damned car won’t start). For Ancient Greek, clear examples are epistemic modal
adverbs such as ἴσως, τάχα (‘perhaps’) as well as the attitudinal discourse particles ἦ
‘truly’, που (‘I suppose, perhaps’) and ἄρα (‘apparently, as it turns out’). Key examples
of expressions that encode intersubjective meanings, on the other hand, are first of
all markers of common ground, which I have discussed in section 2.6.3 above. Other
examples are interaction managing markers such as you see, listen and look, markers
of social deixis (e.g. honorific pronouns) and other markers of politeness strategies.
In Ancient Greek, clear examples of intersubjective particles are τοι (‘you know, take
note’) as well as both δή and μήν, as we will see in part 2 of this study.
It might be useful to emphasize at this point that my use of the terms ‘subjec-
tive’ and ‘intersubjective’ only applies to the conventionalized, coded meanings of the
markers in question. Consider in this respect the following quote by De Smet & Ver-
straete (2006),who explicitly distinguishbetween twokinds of linguistic subjectivity,
one pragmatic and one semantic in nature:
[Pragmatic subjectivity] is inherent in language use and is independent of the
semantics of a particular expression. The choice of an expression with its spe-
cific construal of reality is necessarily based in the speaker’s perspective: calling
somebody honest, tall or freckled always involves the perspective of the speaker
using that particular expression and his or her reasons for doing so. […] [T]he
pragmatic subjectivity inherent in the use of any expression is not to be confused
with speaker-relatedness as a semantic feature of a particular expression.
(De Smet & Verstraete 2006: 384–385)
98. In the field of classical linguistics, very similar distinctions aremade in Kroon (1995: 95), Cuypers
(2005) and Schrickx (2011: 38–39).
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Semantic subjectivity, then, concerns the conventionalized encoding of speaker-ori-
ented meanings of particular expressions.
In a similar vein, it is clear that many subjective markers may be (pragmatically)
used inmanaging the intersubjective relation between speaker and hearer, i.e. in an in-
direct, rather than a linguistically explicit way. For example, expressions that encode
a low degree of epistemic certainty or commitment on the part of the speaker (e.g. the
English parenthetical I think or Ancient Greek που) have a subjective, speaker-oriented
meaning in so far as they provide an indication of the speaker’s epistemic stance, but
they may be used to achieve an intersubjective goal, for instance, to adopt a face-sav-
ing politeness strategy.99 More generally, it is typically the case that explicit speaker-
positioning with regard to some communicated content (e.g. bymeans of epistemic or
evidential adverbs) also implies some rhetorical function: the speaker strategically uses
these adverbs, not just to somehow qualify his/her commitment, but also to rhetori-
cally position himself vis-à-vis the possible stance or opinion of the addressee or other
mental agents.100
In fact, it may well be the case that diachronically such strategies become grad-
ually conventionalized as part of the coded meaning of an expression, resulting in a
transition from subjective to intersubjective meaning (cf. Traugott & Dasher 2002;
see also chapter 3 below). Such a process has been recorded, for example, for the En-
glish adverbs surely, which tends to be used with an implicit request for confirmation
by the addressee (Downing2001, Simon-Vandenbergen&Aijmer2007), and in fact,
which has gained a meaning aspect of counter-expectation (cf. section 3.2 below). As
we will see in chapter 5, something similar appears to have happened with Ancient
Greek μήν.
99. For a description of που along these lines, cf. Sicking (1993: 59): “with που a speaker presents his
statement as a surmisewhose accuracyhedoes not vouch for so that disputing it neednot impair the basis
for an understanding between the two partners in the conversation.” He also argues that this analysis fits
the question-based character of Platonic dialogue, which in turn explains the high relative frequency
of που in Plato (as opposed to e.g. tragic dialogue or oratory). I do not agree with Koier’s (2013) more
recent analysis of που as primarily a marker of obvious or accessible information. In my view, this lacks
the important conversational aspect of Sicking’s analysis. Moreover, such a function is more appropriate
for δή, as I will argue in chapter 6.
100. This is one of the central tenets of the study on English epistemic and expectation adverbs by Aij-
mer & Simon-Vandenbergen (2004): “speakers use epistemic markers to explicitly recognise the possi-
bility of divergence of opinion” (1789). Cf. also Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer (2007). Other relevant
theories in this respect are Appraisal Theory as developed by White (2003, 2011) and Du Bois’s (2007)
work on the so-called ‘stance triangle’.
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I conclude then – in line with the distinction between semantic and pragmatic
subjectivity outlined above – that aims may differ in the extent to which they are
merely used to manage the intersubjective relation between speaker and addressee(s)
or actually encode this as part of their conventional semantic meaning.
2.6.5 Conclusion
I will now summarize the preceding overview of the class of aims by listing a number
of points that are most important to keep inmind for the analysis of μήν and δή in part
2 of this study.
∗ Pragmatic markers may express attitudinal or interactional meanings aspects.
These items primarily pertain to the relation between the utterance and the
speaker and/or between the speaker and the addressee(s). They are essentially
used to manage the attitudes, beliefs and expectations of the discourse partici-
pants towards the communicated content or the speech act made. That is, such
particles signal how their host unit is related to, or evaluated in termsof, thenon-
verbal communicative situation in which the discourse is integrated, including
the common ground of the discourse participants.
∗ In Ancient Greek, particles share this type of meaning with other types of ex-
pressions such as modal and evaluative sentence adverbs (e.g. δῆλον, ἴσως) as
well as grammaticalized verbal markers (e.g. ἴθι, φέρε, οἶμαι).
∗ In order to capture the semantic contribution of these items, we need first of all
take into account the various components of speech acts, notably their various
felicity conditions and their degree of strength. Particlesmay interactwith these
components in various ways and can thus be said to modify the speech acts in
which they occur.
∗ In addition, we should recognize that the communicative context of a given ut-
terance is build up of various different components. One the one hand, there is
the common ground,which is the body of information that the discourse partic-
ipants mutually share. This can be subdivided into different types according to
the source of evidence for common ground, viz. immediate, personal and com-
munal common ground. This latter component also consists of regularities or
topoi, describing what normally is the case. On the other hand, there is the con-
versational table, which consists of the propositions that are not yet mutually
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accepted and are currently up for discussion. At a given point in discourse, con-
textually given propositions may thus differ as to their current communicative
status.
∗ Aimsmay interact with the propositions in the common ground or on the table
in various ways. Generally speaking, such items serve to indicate a link to (i.e.
point at) contextually given material, which, however, need not necessarily be
explicitly expressed in the immediately preceding discourse. This implies that
they do have a general linking or relational function, but do not have any dis-
course connective properties in a strict sense, i.e. do not explicitly mark rhetor-
ical or discourse-structural relations between two units of discourse (see sec-
tion 2.5.3).
∗ Aims can broadly be classified along two main parameters. First, we can make
a distinction between items that semantically target the communicated propo-
sitional content and those that operate at speech act level. Second, we can dis-
tinguish between subjective or speaker-oriented items and intersubjective or
addressee-oriented items, which also includes the class of markers of common
ground.
In my analysis of μήν and δή in part 2 of this study, I will argue that both of these par-
ticles indeed show a number of attitudinal-interactional usages. In these usages, both
particles can be seen as strongly intersubjective particles that serve to manage the at-
titudes and the common ground of the discourse participants. As we will see, both of
them occur in various speech act types and may operate on the level of the proposi-
tional content as well as on the level of the speech act.
2.7 Focus modifiers
The third major functional category that I take to be relevant for the analysis of Greek
particles – after connectives and attitudinal-interactional markers – is the class of fo-
cus modifiers (fms), which appears to constitute a relevant category in almost every
language. Some typical examples are English only, also, even, just, at least, German
nur, auch, sogar, gerade, eben and Ancient Greek μόνον (‘only’), καί (‘also, even’), περ
(‘even, precisely’) and γε (‘at least’).101 Inmy discussion of this class, I will mostly draw
101. Itmust be noted that the class of focusmodifiers ismore typically called ‘focus particles’ (cf. König
1991a). In Ancient Greek linguistics, moreover, the term ‘scope particles’ is also commonly used (cf. van
Ophuijsen 1993, Wakker 1994a: ch.7 and van Emde Boas et al. 2019: ch. 59). I prefer ‘modifiers’ over
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upon the seminal comparative study by König (1991a), who provides a highly use-
ful overview of the syntax, the semantics and the history of fms across a number of
different languages (notably English and German).102 In the following, I will first in-
troduce some of the basic notions that are required for the analysis of focus modifiers
(section 2.7.1) and then give a basic classification of different semantic types of fms
(section 2.7.2).
2.7.1 Focus, alternatives and semantic scope
As is widely recognized in the literature, the central property of focus modifiers is that
they interact or associate with an expression that is in focus. In the literature, much
has been written about the linguistic category of focus and there are various different
conceptions of it on the market (cf. Krifka & Musan 2012 for an overview). Most
relevant for the study of fms, however, is the basic idea about focus as found in the
framework of Alternative Semantics (e.g. Rooth 1985, 1992). Following the overview
paper by Krifka &Musan (2012), this can be very generally phrased as follows:
Focus indicates the presence of alternatives that are relevant for the interpreta-
tion of linguistic expressions. (Krifka &Musan 2012: 7)
The central idea, then, is that a focused expression by definition evokes a restricted set
of possible alternative focus values, i.e. values which the focus value could in principle
be replaced by. By definition, these possible alternatives are of the same semantic type
as the focus value and are relevant in the given discourse context. Letme illustrate this
principle with a simple constructed example:
(42) a. Achilles showed his shield to [Odysseus]foc.
Background: Achilles showed his shield to x.
b. Achilles showed [his shield]foc to Odysseus.
Background: Achilles showed x to Odysseus.
c. Achilles [showed]foc his shield to Odysseus.
Background: Achilles x his shield to Odysseus.
d. [Achilles]foc showed his shield to Odysseus.
Background: x showed his shield to Odysseus.
‘particles’ because the class in principle also includes expressions which are not prototypical particles,
such as fixed phrasal idioms (e.g. in particular, at least, let alone and French ne … que) and expressions
which clearly show adverbial morphology (e.g. especially, merely and Greek μάλιστα ‘especially, in partic-
ular’). See also Gast (2013) on this point. The term ‘focus modifiers’ I owe to Traugott (2006).
102. More recent cross-linguistic overviews of (subsets of) fms are provided by Gast & van der Auw-
era (2011), Gast (2013) and König (2017).
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Here we have four instances of the same sentence, which differ in their focus-back-
ground structure (here marked by variation in intonation).103 In (42a), the expression
Odysseus is in focus, which will evoke – given an appropriate discourse context – al-
ternative focus values such as Agamemnon, Menelaus, Nestor and other Greek heroes
present at Troy. In other words, these heroes are to be seen as possible values for the
variable in the open proposition ‘Achilles showed his shield to x’. A similar analysis can
be given for (42d), in which Achilles is in focus. In example (42b), on the other hand,
the focus expression his shield will naturally evoke such alternatives as Achilles’s spear,
sword, helmet or other kinds of Greek weaponry. And in (42c), finally, the focus is on
the verb showed and will thus indicate alternatives to showing something to someone
(e.g. giving, borrowing or dedicating something to someone). It is true that in this case
there are also possible alternatives to, e.g., Achilles whichmay be relevant for sentence
interpretation, but the point of the given definition is that a focus “especially stresses
and points out the existence of particular alternatives” (Krifka &Musan 2012: 7).
With this concept of focus in mind we can now look more closely at the interpre-
tation of fms themselves. Their central property is that they syntactically and seman-
tically associate with a focused expression, which can thus be called the focus of the
modifier. Crucially, the position of fmswithin the sentence is generally highly variable,
as they are often syntactically adjoined to their focus and function as phrasalmodifiers.
Thus, fms have the capacity to, as it were, move through the sentence – which can be
illustrated, for instance, by adding even to the examples given above:104
(43) a. Achilles showed his shield even to [Odysseus]foc.
b. Achilles showed even [his shield]foc to Odysseus.
c. Achilles even [showed]foc his shield to Odysseus.
d. Even [Achilles]foc showed his shield to Odysseus.
The general function of fms, in turn, is to operate upon or quantify over the set of con-
textually relevant alternatives that are evoked by the focused expression. More in par-
ticular, they indicate a specific relation between their focus and its alternative values.
The basic idea can be illustrated with the following two constructed sentences:
103. A focus may of course also be marked in other ways than by intonational prominence. Examples
are syntactic cleft-constructions (e.g. It was his shield that Achilles has shown to Odysseus) or variation in
word order patterns, as is indeed the case in Ancient Greek (see section 4.1 below). Cf. also footnote 105
below.
104. It should be noted that not all fms are as flexible as English even in this respect. Other items show
specific syntactic or selectional restrictions. Also, it goes without saying that much depends upon the
syntax of the language in question. For Ancient Greek, I follow the communis opinio that fms indeed
occur adjoined to their focus, although I do believe more systematic research is needed in this respect.
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(44) a. Zeus listened also to [Athena]foc.
b. Contribution fm: Zeus listened to somebody other than Athena.
c. Open proposition: Zeus listened to x.
(45) a. Only [Zeus]foc listened to Athena.
b. Contribution fm: Nobody other than Zeus listened to Athena.
c. Open proposition: x listened to Athena.
In these examples, the contribution of the focus modifiers to the interpretation of the
a-sentences is given in the b-sentences. Thus, in (44), also indicates that at least one
alternative to the value of the focused expression (i.e. Athena) is included as a possible
value for the corresponding open proposition. And in (45), by contrast, only indicates
that all possible alternatives to Zeus are excluded as possible values in the correspond-
ing open proposition. Other types of semantic contributions will be discussed in sec-
tion 2.7.2 below.
At this point, it is important to note that the contribution of a focus modifier to
the interpretation of an utterance does not only depend on its focus but also on its
semantic scope (König 1991a: 29–32, 46–53). In the most straightforward case, their
semantic scope is equivalent to the open proposition as expressed by the clause or
sentence that hosts the modifier. This is what we have seen so far in the examples in
(44) and (45) above. However, the scope of fms may also be more restricted and it
may interact in various ways with other scope-bearing elements such as quantifiers,
sentenceadverbials andnegations. The following threeminimal pairs serve to illustrate
this in somewhat more detail:
(46) a. Odysseus also drinks [wine]foc very often.
b. Very often does Odysseus also drink [wine]foc. (cf. König 1991a: 30)
(47) a. Not even [three days ago]foc did the Greeks manage to take the city.
b. Not even [three days ago]foc, the Greeks managed to take the city.
(cf. König 1991a: 30)
(48) a. I do not like Brad Pitt just [because he played the role of Achilles in Troy]foc, but
also because …
b. I do not like Brad Pitt, just [because he played the role of Achilles in Troy]foc.
In all of these three pairs of examples, the focus modifier in question associates with
exactly the same focused expression in both variants, i.e. with wine in (46), three days
ago in (47) and the causal because-clause in (48). The difference in interpretation be-
tween the two variants reflects a difference in semantic scope of the focus modifier in
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question. In (46a), also scopes over the full sentence, but in (46b) the adverbial phrase
very often is excluded. The scope of also and its semantic contribution to the interpre-
tation of both sentences can thus be spelled out as follows:
(46)’ a. scope: Odysseus drinks x very often.
contribution fm: Odysseus drinks something other than wine very often.
b. scope: Odysseus drinks x.
contribution fm: Odysseus drinks something other than wine.
In a similar vein, we find that (not) even scopes over the full sentence in (47a), but
only over the adverbial phrase three days ago in (47b). In this latter case, this adver-
bial phrase functions as an extra-clausal setting constituent and the information in
themain clause is not relevant for spelling out the semantic contribution of (not) even.
In such cases, the focus and the scope of themodifier in fact coincide. These examples
thus show us that the focus of an fm need not necessarily be equivalent to the focus of
a full clause or sentence.
In (48), finally, the difference in interpretation concerns the relative scope of just
(and the subordinate because-clause)with respect to the negation not. That is, justmay
fall either within or outside of the scope of the negation, as shown in (48a) and (48b)
respectively. Conversely, the negation is excluded from the semantic scope of just in
the first case, but included in the second:
(48)’ a. The reason I like Brad Pitt is x.
b. The reason I do not like Brad Pitt is x.
As is well-known, an important factor in determining the semantic scope of a focus
modifier is intonation, as this tends to coincide with the intonation unit in which
the modifier occurs. Note, for instance, the comma’s in the examples (47b) and (48b)
above, which tend to correspond to intonational boundaries.
Having discussed some of the basic theoretical concepts required for understand-
ing the contributionof fms, Iwill nowmoveon to an examinationof the different types
of fms that are generally distinguished in the literature.
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2.7.2 Semantic types of focus modifiers
As I have noted in the preceding section, the general function of fms is to specify how
the value of the focused expression relates to its contextually relevant alternatives.105
Individual fms can further be categorized according to the semantic type of this re-
lation and the kinds of alternatives that are selected. Two semantic parameters are
especially relevant in this respect: (i) inclusion vs. exclusion and (ii) scalarity. In the
following, I will shortly discuss both of these parameters, which allows us to distin-
guish between restrictive and additive modifiers on the one hand, and between scalar
and non-scalar modifiers on the other. After that I will introduce a final, somewhat
different, class of fms which I have labeled ‘identifying fms’.
Restrictive and additive fms
The first parameter which is commonly used in classifying fms is the opposition be-
tween inclusion and exclusion of the alternatives under consideration, which has al-
ready been mentioned in the previous section. This gives us the broad distinction be-
tween additive and restrictive fms. Additive fms, on the one hand, indicate that one or
more of the alternatives are included as possible values for the variable in their scope.
More specifically, they signal that there exists at least one contextual alternativewhich
satisfies the open proposition in their scope and to which the current focus value is
added. Typical examples are English also, too, even, as well, either, German auch, selbst,
sogar, ebenso, Dutch ook, zelfs and evenzo. Thus, in (49a), it is indicated by also that
there is someone other than Patroclus whom Achilles loves, to which the focus value
‘Patroclus’ is now added.
(49) a. Achilles also loves [Patroclus]foc.
b. Achilles only loves [Patroclus]foc.
c. Achilles especially loves [Patroclus]foc.
105. Let me note here that in some languages – notably African and Australian languages – particles
are sometimes employed as ‘pure’ focus markers, i.e. as purely grammatical markers of the category of
focus (König 1991a: 29, Hansen 1998a: 49). In most European languages, however, such grammatical
items do not appear to exist, as the category of focus – and information structure in general – tends to
be expressed by other linguistic means such as intonation, specialized syntactic constructions or specific
word order patterns (see section 4.1 for Ancient Greek in this respect). Possible exceptions are found in
spoken, informal conversation, where pragmatic markers may sometimes develop such pure focus mark-
ing usages. Cf. for instanceHansen (1998a: 348–350) andWiese (2011) on certain usages of French alors
and German so, respectively.
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Restrictive fms, on the other hand, are rather used to exclude alternatives as possible
values for the variable in their scope. That is, they signal that the validity of the utter-
ance in their scope is restricted in a certain way, most typically to the value of the fo-
cused expression alone. Typical examples are English only, just, but, purely, exclusively,
German allein, nur, erst,Dutch alleen, maar, slechts and pas. In (49b), for instance, only
indicates that all alternative focus values are excluded from the open proposition in its
scope. Thus, only explicitly expresses that there is no other person than Patroclus who
is loved by Achilles.
Many authors further recognize a category of so-called particularizers, which in-
cludes expressions such as English especially, in particular, notably,German besonders,
zumal, vor allem, Dutch vooral and met name.106 These can be defined as items which
indicate that the focus value is a particularly clear case for the predication or open
proposition in their scope, whereas the relevant alternatives exhibit the property ex-
pressed less clearly. Particularizers have sometimes been analyzed as a special type
of restrictive fms,107 but I agree with König (1991a: 96–97) and Foolen (1993: 146)
that this is not a very illuminating classification. Like also and even, these items clearly
have existential presuppositions: especially in (49c), for example, indicates that there
are others than Patroclus whom Achilles loves, albeit to a lesser extent. Thus, particu-
larizers are considered here as a special subtype of the group of additive fms.
Scalar and non-scalar fms
The second important parameter concerns the set of focus alternatives that are se-
lected by a given focus modifier, which may be either ordered or unordered with re-
spect to the focus value. That is, fms may or may not be associated with a scalar order-
ing of some sort. This is best illustrated by minimal pairs such as the following, which
concern the contrast between English also and even and that between Dutch alleen
and maar, respectively:
106. The term ‘particularizer’ is not used in a uniform way in the literature. In some studies, particu-
larizers are defined as the kind of fms which “identify or specify the focus value under discussion” (Trau-
gott 2006: 340, who follows Nevalainen 1994: 254). In this conception, the class does not only include
the items mentioned above, but also such expressions as English precisely, exactly, just, German eben,
gerade and genau. In my view, however, these two groups of fms are quite different in nature and are
better treated separately. I will treat the latter type of expressions under the heading of ‘identifying focus
modifiers’ below.
107. Cf. e.g. Quirk et al. (1985: 604): “Particularizers restrict the application of the utterance predom-
inantly to the part focused” (emphasis mine). Cf. Crespo (2017b) on Ancient Greek, who speaks about
‘partial restriction’.
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(50) Context: Achilles has killed many Trojan heroes.
a. He has also killed [Hector]foc.
b. He has even killed [Hector]foc.
(51) a. Context: John never works behind the counter.
Hij is alleen [vakkenvuller]foc.
(‘He works as a stock boy only.’)
b. Context: Paul is a lawyer and a politician, but John is less successful.
Hij ismaar [vakkenvuller]foc.
(‘He is but/only a stock boy.’)
In (50), both examples imply that Achilles has killed someone other than Hector, as
both also and even are additive fms. As opposed to also, however, even imposes a scalar
ranking on the values under consideration. It signals that the included alternatives (i.e.
other Trojan heroes) rank lower than the focus value (i.e. Hector) on some contextu-
ally relevant scale. In this case, this may be a scale of physical strength or excellence
in battle. As a result, it is suggested by even – but not by also – that it is more diffi-
cult to kill Hector than the other Trojans considered. In (51), in turn, both alleen and
maar are restrictive fms which exclude alternatives, but only maar has an additional
scalar meaning aspect. Thus, the utterance with alleen expresses that John works as a
stock boy only and does not have any other task; all contextually evoked alternatives
(e.g. cashier or teammanager) are excluded. In the utterance with maar, however, the
excluded alternatives rank higher on a scale of social status or success in life. As a re-
sult, the use of maar suggests that the job of stock boy is not very highly appreciated
in comparison with the relevant alternatives (i.e. lawyer and politician).108
On the basis of the parameter of scalarity, a basic distinction can thus bemade be-
tween scalar and non-scalar fms. Typical examples of scalar fms, which are invariably
associated with a scalar ordering, are English even, so much as, let alone, but, at least,
German sogar, selbst, erst, gleich, Dutch zelfs, maar, pas and liefst. The particularizers
also belong to this group, as they always evoke some comparative ranking (see above).
Non-scalar fms, which do not generally interact with a scale, include English also, too,
as well, either, purely,German ebenso, allein,Dutch evenzo and alleen. In addition, there
are fms which are underspecified with respect to the ordering parameter andmay dis-
play both scalar and non-scalar usages, depending on the context and the type of focus
they select. Put differently, such items may but need not interact with a scale. Exam-
108. See Foolen (1993: 150–157) for a more nuanced analysis of the Dutch fms alleen and maar and
their interaction with different kinds of scalar contexts.
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ples of this kind are English only, German nur, auch, Dutch slechts and ook. Note, for
instance, that in example (51) above English only is used as a translation in both of the
utterances given: it may be used in both scalar and non-scalar contexts.109
As regards the group of scalar modifiers, a further important aspect of their mean-
ing is that they express a speaker evaluation (König 1991a: 43–46). Scalar fms do not
only evoke alternatives on a scale, but also rank the focus value on that scale. Some
evaluate their focus as ranking higher than the alternatives under consideration; such
an evaluation as high or maximal is indicated, for instance, by additive modifiers of
the even-type, as has been illustrated by (50b) above. Others rather attribute a low or
minimal scalar value to their focus, which means that the focus value is evaluated as
ranking lower than the selected alternatives. Typical examples of such modifiers are
Dutch maar, English but and scalar only, as we have seen in example (51b) above. Fi-
nally, there are scalar fms which evaluate their focus as a medium value on a scale, i.e.
as neithermaximal norminimal. Typical examples are expressions of the at least-type,
as in:
(52) At least he [tried]foc to win the race (though he didn’t succeed).
(cf. Gast 2013: 112)
In examples like this one, at least characterizes the focus as a less than maximal value
on an evaluative scale, as it excludes a more preferred or expected contextual alter-
native (e.g. succeeding to win the race). Nevertheless, the focus value is still positively
evaluated, as it ranks higher than a possible ‘negative’ alternative (e.g. not trying at
all).110
At this point, I would like to emphasize that scalar modifiers need not necessarily
be additive or restrictive in nature. Some scalar modifiers express a purely evaluative
meaning and do not include or exclude alternative values. Consider for instance Ger-
man gleich in the following examples:
(53) a. Er hat gleich [vier]foc Zeitungen gekauft.
(‘He bought as many as four papers.’)
b. Du hättest ihn nicht gleich [schlagen]foc sollen.
(‘There was no need to actually hit him.’) (König 1991a: 45)
109. See König (1991a: 42, 63–64, 99–101) for further discussion and examples.
110. I refer toGast (2013) for amuchmore detailed analysis of the various usages of at least and similar
expressions in other languages. I also believe his analysis may be helpful in coming to grips with (some
usages of) Ancient Greek γε.
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This particle evaluates the focus as ranking high and it is thus suggested that the focus
value is remarkable or higher than expected. However, as opposed to modifiers of the
even-type, it is not implied that the open proposition also holds true for an alternative
value. Furthermore, a purely evaluative meaning is present when the modifier does
not take scope over a full proposition, as in the following examples (see section 2.7.1
above):
(54) a. For only [ten]foc euros, you can get a very nice meal in this restaurant.
b. Not even [a year ago]foc, he managed to make a profit. (König 1991a: 50–51)
In these examples, the fms operate purely within the first phrase of the sentence. Only
signals that the its focus value (i.e. ten) is evaluated as remarkably low, whereas even
contributes to the evaluation ‘more recent than may have been expected’.
Scalar fms and different types of scales
Looking at the examples given so far in this section, it may be useful to make a small
detour and pay some further attention to the nature of the scales that scalar fms may
interactwith. In this respect, a basic distinction is commonlymade between twomajor
types: semantic (context-invariant) scales and pragmatic (context-sensitive) scales.111
Semantic scales involve sets of contrastive expressions which – by virtue of their very
semantics – are inherently ordered with respect to each other. The most important
type of semantic scales are so-called Horn-scales, which are defined in terms of logi-
cal or semantic entailment (Horn 1972). This means that a sentence consisting of an
inherently scalar expression semantically entails that the same sentence with a lower
ranking expression holds true as well. For example, given the Horn-scale for quanti-
fiers ⟨all, most, many, some⟩), the sentence in (55a) semantically entails the sentence
in (55b), since many ranks higher on that scale than some. At the same time, uttering
(55a) gives rises to the (scalar) conversational implicature that the stronger statement
in (55c) does not hold.112
(55) a. Many Trojans were afraid of Achilles.
b. Some Trojans were afraid of Achilles.
c. All Trojans were afraid of Achilles.
111. Cf., among others, Fauconnier (1975), Anscombre & Ducrot (1983), E. J. Bakker (1988), Kay
(1990), König (1991a: 37–42), Schwenter (1999), Traugott (2006), Israel (2011: ch. 3), Gast & van
der Auwera (2011) and Huang (2014: 44–54).
112. For the notion of conversational implicature, see Grice (1975, 1978). For scalar or quantity im-
plicatures in particular, see Geurts (2011).
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Other typical expressions which constitute semantic Horn-scales are modals (e.g.
⟨certain, probable, possible⟩), the cardinal numbers (⟨n, …, 4, 3, 2, 1⟩) and certain sets
of adjectives (e.g. ⟨boiling, hot, warm⟩ and ⟨identical, similar⟩).113 Some constructed
examples of fms interacting with such scales are given in (56):
(56) a. Bruce knows many of Dylan’s songs, perhaps even [all]foc of them.
b. Paul has five children, but John has only [two]foc.
c. These two songs are identical, or at least [highly similar]foc.
Most scalar fms, however, may also combine with focused expressions which do
not have an inherently scalar semantics. In such cases, scales of the pragmatic kind
are evoked. Pragmatic scales do not involve inherent lexical contrasts as exemplified
above, but are construed ad hoc on the basis of information from the context. They are
essentially based upon inferences or expectations derived from the common ground
of the interlocutors, notably common knowledge about regularities in the world (cf.
section 2.6.3 above). Consider for example:
(57) a. Adam is really good at learning languages. He speaks English, German, Dutch,
Spanish and even [Chinese]foc.
b. George cannot even [boil an egg]foc, let alone [prepare a dinner for eight]foc.
c. Hector thought he killed Achilles, but it was just [Patroclus]foc.
In (57a), a scale is evoked which concerns the difficulty of learning certain languages.
It involves the widely shared assumption – in most Western countries at least – that
Chinese is a notoriously difficult language to learn. Chinese is thus evaluated as amore
remarkable or exceptional language than the others in this context. Example (57b), in
turn, relates to our knowledge of certain cooking skills: boiling an egg ranks low on a
scale of cooking proficiency, whereas preparing a dinner for eight ranks high. In (57c),
finally, Greek heroes of the Trojan war are ranked by their excellence in battle and,
consequently, by the degree to which the Trojans would like to see them killed. Such
a scale obviously relates to our knowledge of the main characters and events in the
Trojan war, notably the fact that Achilles was the best fighter of the Greeks and the
most fearsome enemy for the Trojans. For the Trojans, the death of Patroclus is thus
valuated lower than that of Achilles – which is explicitly marked by scalar just here.
113. A further important type of semantic scale are degree scales, which involve the degree or intensity
of semantically gradable properties. I will return to this type in my discussion of intensifiers (e.g. very,
extremely, a bit) in section 2.8 below.
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The crucial point here is that in these cases – as opposed to the examples given
in (56) – there is nothing in the semantics of the focused expressions that implies a
scalar ordering of any kind: the relevant scale is pragmatically evoked on the basis of
contextual information in the common ground (cf. also (50b) and (51b) above). Note,
moreover, that these pragmatic scales are not ordered by a semantic entailment re-
lationship. Speaking Chinese, for example, does obviously not entail speaking one of
the other, lower ranking, languages. In such cases, using a higher ranking expression
results in an utterance with a higher degree of argumentative or rhetorical strength, in
the sense that it provides a stronger argument for a particular conclusion (cf. Anscom-
bre & Ducrot 1983, Verhagen 2005). In (57a), for instance, the fact that Adam has
masteredChinese canbe seen as a stronger argument for the conclusion that he is good
at learning languages than his proficiency in the other languages mentioned.
Scalar focus modifiers may in turn be described in terms of their sensitivities to
different kinds of scales and different kinds of focus expressions. Most of these mod-
ifiers (e.g. English even, only, at least, let alone) may interact with both semantic and
pragmatic scales. That is, they may but need not combine with inherently scalar ex-
pressions such as quantifiers, numerals or intensifiers. Othermodifiersmay havemore
specific selectional restrictions, however. An example is Dutch liefst (‘as much/many
as’), which is only used in combination with quantifying expressions, evaluating the
value in question as maximal and higher than expected. For example:
(58) Liefst [vier]foc Nederlandse wielrenners doen een gooi naar een podiumplaats in de
Giro d’Italia.
(‘Asmany as four Dutch cyclists will take a shot at a podium in the Giro d’Italia.’)
(Telegraaf, 3 January 2017)
Finally, it should be noted here that some languages have specialized modifiers for fo-
cused expressions with a temporal value. That is, such items specifically interact with
scales of a temporal nature. Examples are German erst and Dutch pas, which are both
translated by English only (see König 1991a: 111–121 for examples and discussion).
Identifying fms
The final major group of fms distinguished by König (1991a: ch. 6, 1991b) is some-
what different than the others and cannot felicitously be described in terms of the two
parameters that have been discussed so far (i.e. inclusion vs. exclusion and scalar vs.
non-scalar). Typical examples are English precisely, just, German eben, genau, gerade,
ausgerechnet and Dutch net, juist, precies and uitgerekend. By lack of a better term, I
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will call these items ‘identifying fms’.114 The following are some typical examples from
Dutch and German, two languages in which this type of expressions is particularly at
home:
(59) Uitgerekend/juist [Achilles]foc is gestopt met vechten.
(‘It is Achilles of all peoplewho has stopped fighting.’)
(60) Zijn concurrenten demarreerden juist/net [op het moment dat hij materiaalpech
had]foc.
(‘His rivals dashed off at just the time he had a mechanical problem.’)
(61) Völler war vier Monate verletzt, und gerade/eben [dieser Völler]foc hat den Aus-
gleichstreffer geschossen.
(‘Völler was injured for four months and it was precisely this Völler who scored the
equaliser.’) (König 1991a: 129)
(62) Context: Tom Dumoulin had prepared himself optimally to win the Giro again. Only
one factor could not be controlled: bad luck.
En precies/juist [dat]foc overkwam Dumoulin vlak voor de finish in etappe vier.
(‘And it was just/precisely that which happened to Dumoulin right before the finish
in the fourth stage.’) (adapted from Trouw, 15 May 2019)
The primary function of this group of fms is best described in terms of emphatic or fo-
cused assertion of identity (cf. König & Gast 2006). More specifically, these fms have
in common that they “are primarily used emphatically to assert the identity of one
argument in a proposition with an argument in a different, contextually given propo-
sition” (König 1991a: 127). That is, they are often used in contexts of identification,
whichmakes them comparable in function to syntactic cleft-constructions (cf. the En-
glish translations in (59), (61) and (62)).
It follows from this analysis that this type of expressions is highly context-depen-
dent: by definition they establish a link with a contextually given proposition. In most
cases, this proposition is explicitly activated in the surrounding discourse, which is
why these modifiers often occur within sentences consisting of a main and a subordi-
nate clause, as in (60), or in combinationwith demonstrative pronouns and anaphoric
expressions, as in (61) and (62). Simplex sentences containing thesemodifiers are typ-
ically felt to be incomplete without an appropriate context. In (61), for instance, the
114. Some authors use the term ‘particularizers’ to refer to these items. But see footnote 106 above.
559416-L-bw-Thijs
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 125
2.7. Focus modifiers 111
clause with gerade/eben would be difficult to comprehend without the information
given in the preceding clause. And (59), in a similar vein, only makes sense against a
background assumption that Achilles is the best Greek fighter present at Troy.
Like scalar focus modifiers, fms of this type have an evaluative meaning compo-
nent. Identifying fms evaluate their focus values as, in König’s terminology, ‘identical
values in conflicting roles’. That is, they signal some sort of dissonance or incompati-
bility of the two related propositions. The pragmatic motivation for emphasizing the
identity of two values is that something special or remarkable is the case. As such, the
use of these fms usually leads to a strong evaluative implication of remarkability. This
evaluative aspect, in turn, explains why this type of fms is historically closely related
to scalar additive modifiers of the even-type.115
2.7.3 Focus modifiers in Ancient Greek
When we look at Ancient Greek in particular, it appears that the class of focus mod-
ifiers has remained relatively understudied in the modern literature, especially when
compared to the group of (connective) discourse particles. The most relevant con-
tributions in this respect are E. J. Bakker’s (1986, 1988, 1993) work on the particle
περ, Wakker’s (1994: 308–342) treatment of the use of γε, περ and καί in conditional
clauses and H. Dik’s (1995: 39–47) remarks on particles in the context of her study on
Greekword order and information structure. However, there has not been a large-scale
and up-to-date study on the class as a whole, which analyses and compares the rele-
vant items in terms of a consistent and modern linguistic framework along the lines
given in the preceding sections.116 More in particular, it would be worth the effort to
systematically connect such a study with the recent research into Greek syntax, word
order and information structure (see chapter 4).
Based on what we know so far, however, the following basic classification of Greek
fms can be made in terms of the parameters discussed above:
115. See e.g. König (1991a: 129–132), Traugott (2006) and, on Ancient Greek περ, E. J. Bakker
1993b.
116. Someuseful preliminary steps in this directionhave recently beenmadebyCrespo (2015, 2017b),
although I amcritical at hiswork in twomain respects: (i) the class of identifying fms is completely absent
from his discussion; (ii) Crespo includes quite a number of adverbs (e.g. σχεδόν ‘almost’, μόγις ‘hardly’ and
ἁπλῶς ‘simply’) which in my opinion are better treated under the heading of intensifiers or exactness
markers (rather than focus modifiers). See sections 2.8 and 2.9 below.
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∗ Additive fms. Theprototypical examplehere is adverbial καί, whichmayormay
not receive a scalar interpretation (‘also’ vs. ‘even’). The same is true for its neg-
ative counterparts οὐδέ and μήδε (‘not … either’ vs. ‘not even’). The particle περ,
moreover, can be seen – at least in its use in Homeric Greek – as a scalar addi-
tive modifier (E. J. Bakker 1988, Wakker 1994a: 315f.). Examples of the group
of particularizers, finally, include the adverbs μάλιστα (‘especially, in particular’)
and οὐχ ἥκιστα (‘not in the least, especially’; cf. Crespo 2017b).
∗ Restrictive fms. As for the restrictive fms, the key example would of course be
μόνον, a clear counterpart of English only.117 Second, we may want to include
the particle γε in this class (cf. E. J. Bakker 1988: 97–98,Wakker 1994a: 308f.),
but it should be noted that γε is a highly complex particle which in my opinion
is still not completely understood. It is sometimes taken as the Greek counter-
part of contrastive stress in English, but it is also often translated as ‘at least’ (cf.
Denniston 1954: 114f.). In that case, it may perhaps be seen as a scalar particle
indicating a medium value, but more research is very much needed here.118
∗ Identifying fms. Here we can mention Attic -περ (‘precisely’) in its usage in
relative and other subordinate clauses, as in ὅσπερ (‘precisely who, the veryman
who’) and ἐπείπερ (‘precisely because’; cf. E. J. Bakker 1986, 1993b).
In chapter 6 below, I will argue that the particle δή in some of its usages must also be
seen as a focus modifier. In combination with demonstrative and deictic expressions,
I propose, it can generally be seen as an identifying fm. Second, I take it that δή has
a usage as a scalar evaluative particle, notably in combination with inherently scalar
expressions. Finally, δή occurs in the fixed combination καὶ δὴ καί, which may be seen
as a special kind of particularizing construction.
117. Further research is needed with respect to the scalar behaviour and possible evaluative implica-
tions of μόνον.
118. I refer to Goldstein (2019) for some interesting first steps toward a modern discourse-pragmatic
account of γε.
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2.8 Intensifiers
As I have noted in the general introduction of this study, the class of intensifiers is
not normally discussed in the context of Greek particles. However, individual particles
have sometimes been attributedwith an intensifying force, including δή (e.g. Bonifazi,
Drummen & de Kreij 2016). It is useful, then, to shortly look into this category here
and examine some of the relevant semantic distinctions that are typically made.
2.8.1 Intensification and degree
The class of intensifiers is crucially concerned with the semantic notion of degree or
gradability. Many concepts are semantically gradable in terms of extent or intensity.
This holds in particular for the properties denoted by many adjectives (e.g. young,
quick, long, full) and adverbs (e.g. quickly, willingly, certainly), but also for those de-
noted by certain verbs (e.g. like, want, believe, enjoy, agree) and nouns (e.g. pleasure).
Intensifiers, in turn, are expressions which are used to modify the extent or intensity
of such gradable properties and can usually be paraphrased by phrases such as ‘to a
great/minimal/complete extent’ and ‘to a high/low degree’.119 Some of the most typi-
cal examples of intensifiers in English are very, extremely, fairly, quite, a bit, absolutely,
almost, (not) at all and utmost.
It must be emphasized from the outset, however, that intensification in general
may take many different forms.120 Although in the literature most attention is paid to
intensifying adverbs, adjectives or particles, intensification may also be realized, for
instance, by way of the first part of a compound adjective (e.g. crystal clear ‘extremely
clear’, Dutch aalglad ‘eel-slippery, extremely slippery’, keihard ‘rock-hard’) or in the
form of a prefix-like morpheme such as ultra- (e.g. ultra-sensitive, ultra-short), Dutch
bere- (‘as a bear’, e.g. beresterk ‘as strong as a bear, very strong’, beregoed ‘very good’) and
oer- (‘proto’, e.g. oeroud ‘extremely old’, oersaai ‘terribly boring’). In addition, languages
may also consist of specialized intensifying constructions, such as English asAdj as np
(e.g. as slippery as an eel ‘extremely slippery’) as well as the specific intensifying usages
of the comparative and superlative forms: comparatives are sometimes used to express
119. In the literature, the term ‘intensifier’ has beenused in several differentways (cf. Paradis1997: 14–
15, Klein 1998: 23–24). In the present study, I use the term – following the practice in Bolinger (1972)
and Quirk et al. (1985: 589f.) – as a broad umbrella term for degree modifiers in general, irrespective of
the level of degree they express (i.e. high, low or somewhere in between). Put differently, ‘intensifier’ is
used here as an equivalent of the functional label ‘degree modifier’.
120. The following is based upon the detailed overviews as given by Breindl (2007) and van der
Wouden & Foolen (2017). My English and Dutch examples are mostly borrowed from the latter paper.
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a moderate degree (‘rather x’), whereas superlatives may have a so-called elative use,
expressing an extremely high degree (e.g. I just had the worst nightmare ‘an extremely
bad nightmare’). Finally, we may mention reduplication (e.g. a long, long journey) and
paralinguistic means such as strong accent or lengthening (e.g. a looooong journey) as
examples of intensifying strategies. In short, intensification is a pervasive feature in
natural languages and comes in different shapes. Here, I will primarily be concerned
with the marking of intensification by way of special words or phrases, which oper-
ate as syntactically phrasalmodifiers (including intensifying particles in particular).121
And it is in this sense that the term ‘intensifier’ is to be understood here.
A further point that needs to be emphasized is the distinction between intensifiers
and scalar focusmodifiers (see section 2.7.2 above). Although both of these express an
evaluation of the speaker and are inherently related to scalarity, they differ in the type
of scales theymay interact with and the kind of expressions they combine with. Inten-
sifiers can in principle only occurwith semantically gradable expressions such as those
mentioned above; they interact with degree scales which can be seen as a particular
kind of semantic scale.Most scalar focus particles, by contrast, are not restricted in this
way andmay also combinewith expressions that are not inherently scalar in nature; as
I have illustrated above, they tend to evoke pragmatic scales that involve expectations
and inferences on the basis of the common ground.
2.8.2 Semantic types of intensifiers
From a semantic-functional perspective, the class of intensifiers is commonly further
subdivided into a number of different types. In the following, I will discuss two of the
most important parameters for classification: (i) level of degree and (ii) boundedness.
Level of degree
A first, fairly straightforward, way in which intensifiers can be classified is by looking
at the various levels of degree or intensity which intensifiers may in principle express.
That is, we can distinguish them in terms of the part of the gradability scale which
they conventionally encode. In this respect, some studies on intensification onlymake
a broad distinction between intensifiers that scale upward (amplifying or reinforcing
intensifiers) and those that scale downward (downtoning or attenuating intensifiers),
121. A detailed overview of the different shapes of intensification in Ancient Greek can be found in
Thesleff (1954) – although his descriptive framework is somewhat outdated by now.
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degree Dutch English German
i absolute volkomen, absoluut completely, absolutely völlig, absolut
ii approximative bijna, vrijwel almost, nearly beinahe, fast
iii extremely high uiterst, ontzettend extremely, awfully aüßerst, schrecklich
iv high erg, heel very arg, sehr
v moderate nogal, tamelijk rather, pretty, fairly ziemlich, recht
vi minimal enigszins, een beetje somewhat, a bit etwas, ein wenig
vii quasinegative weinig, nauwelijks little, hardly, barely wenig, kaum
viii negative niet, volstrekt niet,
geenszins




Table 2.6: Classification of levels of degree (after Klein 1998: 19–22)
but inmany other studiesmore fine-grained distinctions aremade.122 To give a general
impressionof this variation, I reproducehere the classification as usedbyKlein (1998)
in his study on intensifying adverbs in Dutch, English and German (see table 2.6), in
which he discerns as much as eight different degree types, ranging from the absolute
to the negative degree.123
Boundedness
As has often been recognized, however, most intensifiers are subject to further selec-
tional restrictions and cannot simply be combined with every type of gradable expres-
sion (e.g. *absolutely quick, *almost long, *fairly identical, *extremely dead). In this re-
spect, there is a second important distinction to bemade –which cross-cuts the classi-
fication given in table 2.6 – between intensifiers that imply boundary restrictions and
those that do not. The relevance of this distinction has been shown in particular by
Paradis (1997, 2001, 2008), who has extensively studied the collocations of intensi-
fiers and gradable expressions in English. I will follow her model here and speak of
‘totality modifiers’ and ‘scalar modifiers’ respectively.124
122. See Klein (1998: 17–19) for a comparative overview of the literature.
123. In addition, we can distinguish a set of intensifying expressionswhich specifically occurwith com-
parative and/or superlative constructions, specifying the degree to which the elements compared differ
from each other. Examples are English by far, Dutch verreweg, German bei weitem for superlatives (e.g. by
far the greatest) and English much, Dutch veel and German viel for comparative forms (e.g. much bigger).
See Breindl (2007).
124. A highly similar classification with respect to German can be found in Breindl (2007), in which
totality and scalar modifiers are respectively labeled ‘Grenzwert-Intensifikatoren’ and ‘Bereichs-Intensi-
fikatoren’. Cf. also Klein (1998: 65–73). A similar distinction can already be found in Thesleff’s (1954:
19–22) studyon intensification inAncientGreek: concepts of absolute value vs. concepts of relative value.
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Totality modifiers, on the one hand, evoke a conception of totality (an ‘either-or’
conception) and are associated with a definite boundary or an absolute scalar end-
point. Paradis (2008: 321) further divides them into those that “highlight the perfect
match with a maximum or a boundary” (‘maximizers’, i.e. markers of absolute degree
such as completely and absolutely) and those that “indicate that a gradable property
falls short of thatmaximumor that boundary” (‘approximators’, i.e. markers of approx-
imative degree such as almost and nearly). Scalarmodifiers, on the other hand, evoke a
conception of scalarity (a ‘more-or-less’ conception) and are unbounded in nature, as
they indicate a particular range of an open scale. Thesemay either reinforce the inten-
sified property and express a high or even an extremely high degree (‘boosters’, e.g. very,
extremely, awfully, elative constructions), theymay attenuate this property and express
a minimal degree (‘diminishers’, e.g. a bit, somewhat), or they may fall somewhere in
between and rather target the middle range of the scale in question (‘moderators’, i.e.
markers of a moderate degree such as rather, pretty and fairly).125
The crucial point here is that the dichotomy between totality and scalar modifiers
is reflected in the gradable properties they modify. This is probably best illustrated by
looking at adjectives in particular. Following themodel of Paradis (1997, 2001, 2008)
again,we can first of all oppose gradable adjectives tonon-gradable ones, i.e. the kindof
adjectives which are not normally modified by intensifying expressions (e.g. wooden,
financial, Greek, round). Gradable adjectives can in turn roughly be divided into two
major types, which correspond to the distinction made for intensifiers above. Limit or
bounded adjectives, on the one hand, evoke an either-or conception and inherently
imply some definite boundary or endpoint (e.g. empty, true, dead, identical and their
opposites). These adjectives do not occur in comparative and superlative form and
tend to be modified by totality modifiers. Scalar or unbounded adjectives, by contrast,
evoke amore-or-less conception and are associated with an unbounded scale (e.g. big,
125. Note that the expressions indicating quasinegative and negative degree are not explicitly men-
tioned in Paradis’s model. I restrict myself here to the following observations: ‘quasinegatives’ (e.g. barely,
hardly) express the approximation of a negation and in this sense can be regarded as the negative coun-
terpart of approximators (Klein 1998: 151f.). In addition, minimizing negative polarity items (e.g. at all,
in the least and German gar) usually strengthen a negative expression and may thus be seen as a kind of
‘negative maximizers’ (Quirk et al. 1985: 597). In general, however, the relationship between intensifi-
cation and polarity is a much more complex topic, which I will not pursue any further here. See, among
others, Quirk et al. (1985: 597f.), Klein (1998: 85f.) and Israel (2011).
559416-L-bw-Thijs
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 131
2.8. Intensifiers 117
long, deep, interesting and their opposites). These adjectives can be marked for com-
parative and superlative degree and are prototypically modified by intensifiers of the
scalar type.126
To put it more generally, there tend to be harmonic relations between intensifiers
and the properties they modify. Unbounded meanings usually combine with scalar
degree modifiers (e.g. very quick, extremely well, pretty long, a bit odd, very many, love
very much, extreme pleasure), whereas bounded meanings usually combine with to-
tality modifiers (e.g. completely empty, absolutely identical, almost dead, virtually all,
totally agree, a perfect mess). It must be noted, however, that other combinations can
be created for ad hoc-purposes in specific contexts. Thus, as explicitly emphasized by
Paradis, “[i]t is almost always possible to coerce a bounded reading into an unbounded
reading, i.e. laying it out on a scale” (2008: 328). We can easily think of situations in
which a scalar modifier can be felicitously combined with bounded concepts (e.g. very
true, extremely full, rather sober) or even with non-gradable concepts (e.g. a very Greek
story, a very financial journal). And in a similar vein – though much less commonly –
totalitymodifiers are sometimes used in combinationwith unbounded (e.g. completely
good) or non-gradable concepts (e.g. a totally financial journal). An important conclu-
sion of Paradis’s research is that speakers are creative in this respect and may force a
particular interpretation by using a particular intensifier.
Now if we look at Ancient Greek in particular, intensifiers usually take the form of
proper adverbs (see Thesleff 1954). Typical examples are μάλα, πάνυ, κάρτα, σφό-
δρα (‘very’), ὑπερφυῶς (‘exceedingly’), πάμπαν (‘altogether, completely’) and σχέδον (‘al-
most’). But in the literature some allegedly ‘emphatic’ particles (δή and γε) have also
been claimed to have intensifying usages (e.g. Denniston1954, Thesleff 1954, Boni-
fazi, Drummen&deKreij 2016). As for δή in particular, however, I have to admit that
I am not fully convinced of such an interpretation. I will come back to this topic in sec-
tion 6.4 below.
126. A further category of gradable adjectives recognized by Paradis are extreme adjectives, i.e. sub-
jective-evaluative adjectives such as excellent, brilliant, disastrous and awful. These constitute a some-
what special group as they already lexicalize an extreme or maximum scalar value (e.g. excellent equals
‘extremely good’) and are thus by definition associated with the boundaries of a scale. They tend to be
modified by maximizing totality modifiers (e.g. absolutely brilliant, totally disastrous).
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2.9 Markers of non-straightforward communication
In this final subsection, I would like to draw attention to a category which appears
to have gone largely unnoticed as far as Ancient Greek is concerned, but is of some
relevance for a proper understanding of δή, I believe. I am referring here to the kind
of pragmatic markers which speakers essentially use to meta-linguistically comment
upon the appropriateness or applicability of their wording. Following the typology of
Hengeveld & Keizer (2011), I roughly distinguish between two main types here:
pragmatic markers of approximation (e.g. so to speak, as it were, sort of, more or less)
and pragmatic markers of exactness (e.g. literally, really/real, truly/true, right). From
a somewhat broader perspective, both of these types can be seen as what Hengeveld
& Keizer call expressions of non-straightforward communication, i.e. expressions that
speakers use to indicate that “the message they intend to convey is not straightfor-
wardly covered by the basic properties of the elements contained in their utterance”
(2011: 1963).127 In this respect, a crucial background assumption is that in normal
language use speakers often talk rather loosely, using expressions in an imprecise, fig-
urative or exaggerating rather than a precise or strictly literal way (e.g. Sperber&Wil-
son1986, Andersen1998). Themarkers under consideration here can in turn be seen
as specialized expressions to regulate such loose talk, either by explicitly signaling it
(approximation) or by explicitly ruling it out (exactness).
For my present purposes, pragmatic markers of approximation and exactness are
of special interest in as far as they quite regularly occur – like intensifiers and focus
modifiers – asmodifiers at the level of the individual phrase (rather than the full clause
or sentence), where they reflect upon “the selection of the appropriate predicative lin-
guistic means” (Hengeveld & Keizer 2011: 1965). That is, they comment upon the
applicability of an expression that denotes a particular property (e.g. an adjectival, ad-
verbial, nominal or verb phrase), either qualifying or emphasizing it. In the following,
I will look in somewhat more detail at these two types of phrasal modifiers, using ex-
amples from English.
I start with pragmaticmarkers of approximation, which also have been commonly
referred to as ‘hedges’ (e.g. Lakoff 1973, Aijmer2002: ch. 5) and ‘markers of loose talk’
(e.g. Andersen 1998). As phrasal modifiers, they signal that the properties evoked by
the expression(s) in their scope apply only approximately. That is, the appropriateness
127. In addition to approximation and exactness, Hengeveld & Keizer (2011) recognize a third type
of non-straightforwardness: un- or underdeterminacy. This type is of no relevance in the context of the
present study, however, it being merely concerned with dummy expressions such as English so-and-so,
whatsisname and Dutch dinges.
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of assigning this property is explicitly qualified by the speaker. In English, common
examples of such markers are more or less, sort of (sorta), kind of (kinda), about and
like, as in the following examples:128
(63) a. The first half of the 34.2km routewasmore-or-less flat before someminor bumps
in the second half.
b. It was pretty much the worst race, but with a very charismatic winner, which
made people sort of happy.
c. The first 20 minutes after I had to let the group go I was really dizzy and empty.
But then the last four or five kilometres Iwas good again. So itwaskindof strange.
d. With about 60 kilometers to go, race organizers momentarily stopped the pelo-
ton.
e. … even comedymovies will have scenes of people running people off the road or
running pedestrians down, and it’s sort of, you know, like laughed at.
(Hengeveld & Keizer 2011: ex. 28a)
In addition, boundmorphemes are sometimes used as an approximating means, such
as English -ish (e.g. yellowish), -like (e.g. a hurricane-like storm) and Dutch -achtig (e.g.
roofdierachtig gedrag ‘predator-like behaviour’). With regard to Ancient Greek, certain
usages of the particle που can be analyzed along these lines, for instance in its colloca-
tion with numerals (‘about’).129
Pragmaticmarkers of exactness, on the other hand, are essentially used “to achieve
the opposite effect of approximation” (Hengeveld & Keizer 2011: 1969). As phrasal
modifiers, they explicitly signal that the properties evoked by the expression(s) in their
scope apply exactly: the modified expressions are fully appropriate in the given con-
text of utterance and loose (e.g. imprecise, figurative, exaggerating) interpretations
are explicitly blocked. In English, such an effect is commonly achieved by (the non-
descriptive usages of) expressions such as true/truly, real/really, proper, right and liter-
ally, as in the following examples:130
(64) a. He’s grown alongside the team into one of the world’s best riders and he is a true
champion.
b. …we are choosing to look back positively andwith enormous pride on our amaz-
ing years with a truly fantastic athlete.
128. Unless otherwise noted, the examples in this section are taken from the internet.
129. See the recent treatment of που by Jiménez Delgado (2019) for further discussion and examples.
130. Many of these expressions occur in the class that Quirk et al. (1985) has simply labeled ‘empha-
sizers’. These are modal expressions which, in their words, “have a reinforcing effect on the truth value
of the clause or part of the clause to which they apply” and thus add to “the force (as distinct from the
degree) of a constituent” (Quirk et al. 1985: 583).
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c. Winning the Giro was a real life achievement, but getting married goes beyond
that.
d. Reach out to your great aunt and tell her that you still love her even though she’s
a proper idiot for supporting Trump.
e. From Brexit to Trump, from one terrorist attack to another – the world seems to
be losing itself in a rightmess.
f. The marketing opportunities here are literally endless.
With regard to Ancient Greek, near-equivalents such as the adverbs ὄντως (‘really’) and
ἀληθῶς (‘truly’) could be mentioned here, but more research in this direction is still
needed.
In addition, wemay consider the non-prototypical usages of very as exemplified in
(65) below (cf. König 1991a: 136–138), as well as the use of the particle just as in (66),
where it modifies expressions that inherently denote an extreme value on a scale – a
use which is usually referred to as ‘emphasizing’ just (e.g. Lee 1991, Kishner & Gibbs
1996, Aijmer 2002: ch. 4).
(65) a. These stars, which have been at the very centre of the Milky Way for billions of
years, contain extremely low amounts of metal.
b. After enjoying a seamless build-up to his victorious 2017 Giro, Dumoulin opted
to replicate the very same race programme this spring.
c. Tom Dumoulin was the very first rider down the ramp, powering along the flat
before taking on the ascent.
(66) a. The smell is just awful and it is only going to get worse in this weather.
b. That was just nuts. … Never seen anything like it, just astonishing. Best finish to
a race I think I’ve ever seen.
At this point, it must be noted that the class of markers of non-straightforward
communication is in fact closely related to the class of intensifiers as discussed in the
preceding section. On a theoretical level, the main distinction is that intensifiers by
definition presuppose the semantic notion of gradability, whereas themarkers treated
here do not. These rather are to be taken as indicating a somewhat different, ‘prag-
matic’, type of degree. viz. “the extent to which [the speaker] is able to (or willing to)
provide the exact amount of information needed for successful or felicitous communi-
cation” (Hengeveld & Keizer 2011: 1975). In practice, however, the distinction may
not always be that clear. The expression of meta-linguistic approximation, for exam-
ple, may be difficult to distinguish from that of the approximative level of degree (see
section 2.8.2 above), as illustrated by Quirk et al. (1985) with examples such as the
following:
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(67) a. She just about alienated her audience on that occasion.
b. He almost / nearly / virtually stóle the money. (Quirk et al. 1985: 619)
As argued for by Quirk and colleagues, it is not easy to know in such cases whether the
meaning of the modifier is intended to be ‘almost but not entirely x’ (intensifier) or
‘what I might almost call x’ (pragmatic marker of approximation).
Furthermore, the two classes also appear to be related on a diachronic level. Mark-
ers of exactness, for example, are particularly at home with expressions that denote
high or extreme scalar values, i.e. with expressions that denote semantically gradable
concepts. In such cases, proper intensifying meanings may eventually arise for these
markers. One of the main diachronic sources for intensifiers, indeed, are modalizing,
truth-averring expression such as really, definitely and true (Lorenz 2002). Such ex-
pressions, then, start out as meta-linguistic markers of exactness and may eventually
develop pure intensifying uses. The clearest example of this path is most probably
English very, which derives from French verrai (‘true, real’) and has developed a fully
grammaticalized use as an intensifier marking high degree (e.g. very much). A similar
process appears to be going on for really (Lorenz 2002).131
To conclude then, there is a close relationship betweenmeta-linguistic markers of
approximation and exactness, on the one hand, and certain kinds of intensifiers, on
the other hand, and in practice the distinction may not always be easy to make.
In part 2 of this study, I will show that some of the usages of δή may in fact be nicely
captured in terms of the notion of exactness as discussed in the present section. How-
ever, as I have noted above, I do not consider it to be likely that δή has developed a
further, grammaticalized use as an intensifying means. I will return to this particular
point in section 6.4.
131. In general, the class of intensifiers is highly susceptible to innovation and semantic change (cf.
Bolinger 1972, Klein 1998: ch. 2, Lorenz 2002). Newly coined intensifiers usually have a strong ex-
pressive or emotional meaning component in addition to their grading meaning (e.g. awfully, terribly),
but over time – by increasing frequency of use – their expressive force tends to decrease. As Lorenz
(2002: 145) puts it, “intensifiers seem to be losing in force and denotational meaning from the very mo-
ment of their inception. Themore often an intensifier is used, the less marked and expressive it becomes.
Consequently, all items of the paradigm are located somewhere along a continuum from fully lexical to
fully grammatical meaning.”
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2.10 Wrapping up
It has become high time to take stock of this chapter and summarize the main ideas
presented in it. I have started out by looking in some detail at the general class of parti-
cles inAncientGreek,which canbe seenas thekindof strongly grammaticalizedwords
which are not (used as) syntactic conjunctions or adpositions. Their highly grammat-
icalized nature comes about in such prototypical formal properties as morphological
invariability, monosyllabism, prosodic dependency and the inability to occur in isola-
tion–propertieswhich strongly distinguish them frommost adverbs and interjections.
Then wemoved on to the semantic-functional perspective on particles. Given the
fact that many Greek particles contribute meanings of a ‘pragmatic’ (discourse-ori-
ented, interactional, expressive etc.) nature, we have first looked into the broad se-
mantic-functional category of pragmatic markers. These I have defined as the kind
of lexicalized or idiomatized items which conventionally encode meanings of a non-
truth-conditional or non-descriptive nature. These meanings, moreover, must be seen
as instructional in nature and are by definition tied to the immediate communicative
context at hand, pointing at aspects of the utterance/co(n)text, utterance/speaker or
speaker/addressee relation. To sum up, most of the items under consideration in the
present work – including μήν and δή – belong to the intersection of the classes of par-
ticles (form) and pragmatic markers (function), and can thus indeed felicitously be
labeled ‘pragmatic particles’.
In the second part of this chapter, in turn, I have further zoomed into a number
of major semantic-functional classes which I have judged to be especially relevant for
the analysis of Greek particles and for my discussion on the meaning contributions
of μήν and δή in particular. In each of these sections, I have discussed a number of
relevant morphosyntactic and especially semantic-functional distinctions, so that we
are able to interpret and map out the meaning contributions of Greek particles in a
broader theoretical framework fed by cross-linguistic data. A general overview of these
classes can be found in table 2.7 below. For each category some key examples from
Ancient Greek have been added, both particles and non-particles. Moreover, in order
to anticipate a bit on part 2 of this study, I have already added μήν and δή in the relevant
categories.132
In line with the remarks made in section 2.2, two important qualifications should
be borne in mind here. First, I consider these classes as prototype categories which
do not have rigid boundaries. In particular, the distinction between discourse connec-
132. A question mark behind an expression indicates that more research is needed.
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markers of non-straightforward communication
comment upon the appropriateness of the words
used; signaling or ruling out loose talk
δή, που ὄντως?, ἀλη-
θῶς?
Table 2.7:Overview of the relevant semantic-functional categories
tives and attitudinal-interactional markers is not always easy to make in actual prac-
tice. Both connectives and common groundmarkers have a relational meaning in that
they signal a link to the communicative context. The main difference is that connec-
tives explicitly create a textual link with (i.e. point at) linguistically expressed context,
whereas this need not be the case for common groundmarkers, which primarily relate
to non-verbal or extra-linguistic context. In actual practice, however, it may be difficult
to assess whether or not textual connectivity is explicitly signaled by a marker (as part
of its codedmeaning) or that a particular discourse relation only arises due to the con-
text. The issue is particularly relevant for Ancient Greek, which, as I have noted before,
does not distinguish between these two groups of discourse particles on any formal
grounds. And indeed, wemay also find pragmatic markers that express discourse con-
nective and attitudinal-interactional meaning aspects at the same time. The particle
τοίνυν is a good case in point, which is generally taken to mark a new important step
in the discourse (discourse-structural νυν), which is of particular relevance or interest
for the addressee (attitudinal-interactional τοι; cf. Wakker 2009a).
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Similar classification issues apply to the three classes of phrasal modifiers, which
showquite somepoints of contact. InAncientGreek, indeed, it is not always easy to de-
termine whether a particular (instance of a) particle functions as, say, a focus modifier
or an intensifier. I will return to this point inmore detail in the course ofmy discussion
of phrasal δή (section 6.4).
A second important qualification concerns the possibility of cross-categoriality.
As I have noted in section 2.2 above, one and the same itemmay show various usages
that belong to different syntactic and/or semantic-functional classes. This also applies,
indeed, to the two particles at stake in part 2 of this study, as can be seen in table 2.7.
This property raises the question, already mentioned in the general introduction of
this work, of how the polyfunctionality of grammatical items should be properly dealt
with. This question will be the main topic of the next chapter.
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The meanings of particles, more than
any other part of speech, are fluid.
πάντα ῥεῖ.
John D. Denniston (1954: lvi)
3.1 Introduction
Within the field of research into particles and pragmatic markers, it is a commonplace
that – at a particular stage of a language – linguistic items often have different actual
interpretations, senses or readings in different contexts. That is, what is materially one
and the same linguistic form may show a variety of different actual usages – a phe-
nomenonwhich is usually called ‘polyfunctionality’ in the literature (e.g. Foolen1993,
Kroon 1995, Hansen 2008). Typical examples of highly polyfunctional items in con-
temporary Western languages are such expressions as German eben and Dutch maar
(cf. also the examples in section 2.4 above):1
(1) a. In Holland fahren alle Fahrrad, weil es dort so schön eben ist. (‘flat’, adjective)
b. Peter hat eben das Haus verlassen. (‘a moment ago’, temporal adverb)
1. For the different usages of eben, seeAutenrieth (2002), whose examples I have used here. ForDutch
maar, see especially Foolen (1993). I have by no means aimed at exhaustiveness in my examples.
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c. Eben die Frau, die du letzte Woche kennegelernt hast, lässt dir einen Gruß aus-
richten. (≈ ‘precisely’, identifying focus particle)
d. A: Es ist schon nach 8 Uhr.
B: Eben. (≈ ‘of course’, answer particle)
e. ImWinter ist es eben kalt. (≈ ‘simply, as we all know’, modal particle in declara-
tives)
f. Steh eben früher auf, wenn du noch in Ruhe Zeitung lesen willst. (≈ ‘simply’,
modal particle in imperatives)
(2) a. Nairo is niet grootmaar klein. (‘Nairo is not big but small.’ – conjunction express-
ing substitution)
b. Egan is rijk maar aardig. (‘Egan is rich but nice.’ – conjunction expressing
counter-expectation)
c. Maar goed, wat doe jij vanavond eigenlijk? (‘But anyway, what are you doing
tonight?’ – discourse connective expressing change of discourse topic)
d. Hetwasmaar een klein foutje. (‘It wasbut a smallmistake.’ – scalar focus particle
indicating a minimal value)
e. Gamaar zitten. (‘Just sit down.’ – modal particle in imperatives)
f. Ik gamaar naar huis. (‘I’ll just go home.’ – modal particle in declaratives)
Importantly, as illustrated by these examples and as I have noted in section 2.2 above,
linguistic itemsmay even showusages that belong to completely different grammatical
or functional categories, pertaining to various different levels of utterance interpreta-
tion. German eben, for instance, does not only occur as a grammaticalized (pragmatic)
particle, but also shows usages as a regular adjective and a temporal adverb (i.e. as a
content word rather than a function word, cf. section 2.3.1 on particles above). Dutch
maar has manifestations as a grammatical conjunction, a focus particle and a modal
particle. Similar cases from Ancient Greek that have already been mentioned are που
(local adverb ‘somewhere’, attitudinal particle ‘I suppose’), τοι (pronoun ‘for you’, atti-
tudinal particle ‘you know, take note’) and καί (conjunction ‘and’, focus particle ‘also,
even’). In the present study, I will speak about ‘cross-categorial polyfunctionality’ in
such cases (cf. Kroon 1995: 43).
A further fact that plays an important role in research into particles and pragmatic
markers is that the array of variant meanings or functions of linguistic items typically
tends to evolve over time: newmeaning aspectsmay arise out of existing ones, whereas
older meanings may eventually become obsolete. Newly developed meanings, how-
ever, need not necessarily replace the original source meanings. The more typical sit-
uation is that the older meanings remain to co-exist alongside the newer ones, a sit-
uation which has been called ‘layering’ in the literature (cf. Hopper 1991, Traugott
& Dasher 2002, Hopper & Traugott 2003). This situation is visually represented in
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Figure 3.1: Layering (from Koier 2013: 20)
figure 3.1 above, in whichwe see a hypothetical example of the development of a poly-
functional item. From this perspective then, a situation of synchronic polyfunctional-
ity can essentially be seen as the result of processes of diachronic semantic change.
It should be emphasized that this diachronic dimension is of special interest for
the present investigation, since, as we have seen in the general introduction of this
thesis, my corpus covers a considerable span of time, consisting of texts that stem from
different stages of the Ancient Greek language. And indeed, as we will see later on,
certain usages of μήν and δή do not yet appear in early Greek but only in later stages of
the language (i.e. in texts from the classical and late classical periods), which strongly
suggests that we are dealing with later meaning extensions.
Now one of the main challenges for the particle researcher is to account for these
two states of affairs (i.e. polyfunctionality and diachronic evolution) in an elegant and
theoretically satisfactory way. That is, we need an analytical framework in which both
the synchronic variety of meanings of a given item and the interaction between syn-
chronic meanings and diachronic developments can be properly treated. This will be
the topic of the present chapter, in which I will present the framework that I will use
for my analysis of the particles μήν and δή. My approach is mainly inspired by (i) Trau-
gott’s influential work in the field of historical pragmatics (e.g. Traugott & Dasher
2002, Hopper&Traugott 2003, Traugott 2004) and (ii) Hansen’s work on particles
and pragmatic markers in particular (e.g. Hansen 1998a, 1998b, 2006, 2008, 2012).
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With regard to particles in Ancient Greek, approaches very similar to mine have been
taken by E. J. Bakker (1993b) for περ and, more recently, by Koier (2013) for που and
Allan (2017b) for a number of adversative particles.
The procedure in the rest of this chapter will be as follows. I start by presenting
some of the general mechanisms of semantic change and a number of relevant cross-
linguistic diachronic tendencies (section 3.2). Subsequently, I introduce and review
the threemain approaches on polyfunctionality in semantic theory – homonymy, mo-
nosemyandpolysemy–and arguewhy I take apolysemyapproach in thepresent study
(section3.3). I end this chapterwith somemethodological reflections (section 3.4) and
a short summary of the main points discussed (section 3.5).
3.2 Diachronic change
As I have noted above, processes of diachronic linguistic change play an important
role in the investigation of Ancient Greek particles, including μήν and δή. In my analy-
sis of these items, I will make use of a number of different theoretical concepts, which
I will shortly introduce in the present section: the conventionalization of pragmatic
inferences (section 3.2.1) and Traugott’s tendencies of semantic change, including (in-
ter)subjectification (section 3.2.2).2
3.2.1 Semantic change and pragmatic inferencing
How exactly does the diachronic evolution of meaning comes about? What are the
mechanisms underlying this process of semantic change? In the past few decades, it
has become increasingly clear that the crucial ingredient within this process is the no-
tion of pragmatic inferencing, as is usefully described in Traugott’s Invited Inferencing
Theory of Semantic Change (see e.g. Traugott&Dasher 2002, Hopper& Traugott
2003, Traugott 2004).3 The general idea of this theory is that semantic change is es-
2. Another important theoretical concept is grammaticalization, which I have shortly treated in sec-
tion 2.3.2 above.
3. See Traugott&Dasher (2002: 27–30, 75–81) for amoredetailed discussionof themore traditional
views onmechanisms of semantic change, viz. conceptualmetaphorization (change based onmetaphor-
ical analogy) and conceptual metonymization (change based on metonymic association). It is the latter
that is especially captured by their model.
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tablished through the gradual conventionalization of contextually evoked pragmatic
inferences, which account for the fact that speakers often try to communicate more
than they explicitly say in an utterance (Grice 1975).4
Theprincipalmechanismworks as follows: an invited inference that initially arises
on the fly in the context of strategic interaction within a particular communicative sit-
uation, gradually takes flight and occurs more and more frequently within a speech
community, so that it becomes routinized and generally associated with particular ex-
pressions or grammatical constructions used. Eventually, themeaning of this inference
becomes fully entrenched as part of the coded content of these expressions or con-
structions and can also beused in other contexts than the one inwhich it first occurred.
In short, what starts out as amere pragmatic (i.e. defeasible)meaning or a contextually
induced side-effect of some expression, may gradually develop into a semantic, con-
ventionally encoded (i.e. non-defeasible) meaning aspect.5 Semantic change is thus
essentially to be seen as the outcome of continuous processes of language production
and interpretation by interlocutors in actual speech events, i.e. of speakers/writers and
hearers/readers negotiating meaning. It is important to stress here that in the gradual
process of semantic change – as well as in processes of formal grammaticalization –
frequency of use is a crucial aspect (cf. Hopper& Traugott 2003: 126–130 and Bybee
2006, 2015). The more speakers in a given community use the new meaning and the
more frequently it is used by these speakers, the sooner it will become entrenched and
recognized as a distinct conventionalized sense. The decrease of the use of a particular
meaning, on the other hand,may cause it to gradually disappear from the speech com-
munity. Change might indeed happen quite fast sometimes, even within the lifetime
of a single person.
4. The term ‘invited inference’ is an alternative term for the Gricean concept of ‘conversational impli-
cature’ (Grice 1975). Traugott & Dasher prefer this term in order to emphasize the role of interactive
negotiation of meanings by the speaker/writer and addressee(s) in the process of language change.
5. The suggestion that generalized conversational implicatures may become conventionalized over
time can already be found in the work of Grice (1975: 58, 1978: 115). I refer to Traugott & Dasher
(2002: 78–81) for a discussion of other (earlier) literature that is compatible with the theory. Let me
also note here that there has been quite some debate on the exact details of Traugott’s theory. For exam-
ple, the proposed three-step pattern of change (i.e. invited inference > generalized invited inference >
coded meaning) has been criticized on account of its general validity. See e.g. Hansen (2008: ch. 3) for
a detailed discussion. The general idea of the conventionalization of pragmatic inferences, however, is
uncontroversial and will be sufficient for my current purposes.
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3.2.2 Regularities in semantic change
Cross-linguistically, semantic change tends to go into the samedirections over andover
again. In the past few decades, a lot of work has been done to establish the underlying
principles of these changes,which resulted in a number of general unidirectional paths
of semantic change. Traugott distinguishes between three closely-related and partly
overlapping tendencies (Traugott 1989, 1990, Traugott & Dasher 2002: 94–99),
which she describes as follows:6
(i) Meanings based in the external described situation > meanings based in the
internal (evaluative/perceptual/cognitive) described situation.
Amuch-cited example of this first tendency is the fact that English boor ‘farmer’
has gained an additional, more evaluative, meaning ‘rude person’. A Greek ex-
ample is the verb φοβεόμαι, which in Homeric Greek consistently means ‘to be
put to flight’ but has later obtained a more abstract and cognitively-oriented
meaning ‘to fear’.7
(ii) Meanings based in the external or internal described situation > meanings
based in the textual and meta-linguistic situation.
This second tendency covers, for instance, the rise of connective (text-linking)
meaning aspects as well as the fact thatmany pragmaticmarkers originate from
regular content items; crucially, this also involves a change from truth-condi-
tional to non-truth-conditional and from contentful to proceduralmeanings as-
pects (cf. section 2.4 above). Clear examples are adverbials such as English in
fact, actually, indeed and well, which have gained additional discourse connec-
tive meanings (see below for more details).
(iii) Meanings tend to become increasingly based in the speaker’s subjective belief
state or attitude toward the proposition.
This third tendency covers, for instance, the rise of concessive meanings out of
purely temporal ones (e.g. the conjunction while ‘during the time that > ‘al-
6. Note that these regularities are no fixed absolute rules and exceptions can be found.
7. Cf. lsj s.v. φοβέω and the discussion in Kakouriotis & Kitis (1999).
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though’), the rise of epistemic modal meanings out of deontic ones (e.g. the
modal auxiliary must ‘it is required that’ > ‘I am certain that’) and the devel-
opment of evaluative (scalar) focus modifiers such as even.8
These three tendencies, and the third one in particular, have become known by the
term ‘subjectification’, which indicates that meanings tend to develop into the direc-
tion of an increasing degree of subjectivity, i.e. become increasingly grounded within
the subjective perspective of the speaker/writer. Traugott &Dasher’s definition runs as
follows:9
Subjectification is the semasiological process whereby [Speakers/Writers] come
over time to develop meanings for [Lexemes] that encode or externalize their
perspectives and attitudes as constrained by the communicative world of the
speech event, rather than by the so-called “real-world” characteristics of the
event or situation referred to. (Traugott & Dasher 2002: 30)
Another, closely related, development that is often mentioned in the literature is
the process of ‘intersubjectification’, which refers to the gradual development of in-
tersubjective encoded meanings, i.e. meanings which explicitly involve (the speaker/
writer’s attention to) the perspective of the addressee(s) (cf. Traugott 2003, 2010,
Cuyckens, Davidse & Vandelanotte 2010; see also section 2.6.4 above). Intersub-
jectification thus occurs, for instance, in the rise of markers of social deixis, markers of
8. Cf. Traugott (1995: 39–42) for a more detailed analysis of while. For semantic change and subjecti-
fication in the field of modality, see e.g. Traugott (1989, 1995), Traugott & Dasher (2002: ch. 3) and,
with respect to Ancient Greek in particular, Allan (2013). The development of focusmodifiers is treated
by, e.g., Traugott (1990, 2006).
9. Traugott’s view slightly differs from the theory on subjectification as developed by Langacker (1990,
1998, 1999), mainly because they emphasize different aspects of it. Langacker puts more focus on situ-
ation types and event-structures and the way these are conceptually construed from the perspective of
the speaker. In his view, the conceptualizing speaker “is construed with maximal subjectivity when it re-
mains offstage and implicit, inhering in the very process of conception without being its target” (1999:
149, emphasis original). Traugott, on the other hand, explicitly takes a diachronic and discourse-oriented
approach, especially emphasizing the development of discourse-pragmatic phenomena such as social
deixis and discourse connectives. In her view, subjectification implies that speaker subjectivity rather be-
comesmore explicit, as it gradually becomes part of the codedmeaning of particular expressions and con-
structions (see section 3.2.1 above). See e.g. Traugott (1999), Langacker (1999), Traugott&Dasher
(2002: 97–99) and Cuyckens, Davidse & Vandelanotte (2010) for a comparison of the two theories.
Although both of these approachesmay not be completely incompatible in the end, I consider Traugott’s
workmore relevant for the present study due to its focus on diachronic evolution and pragmaticmarkers/
particles.
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politeness strategies andmarkers of common ground. In Traugott’smodel, intersubjec-
tive meanings by definition arise out of subjective meanings, which gives us the cline
in (3a):
(3) a. nonsubjective > subjective > intersubjective
b. nonsubjective > (inter)subjective
In line with other researchers, however, I take it that this need not necessarily be
the case: meanings may also develop directly from nonsubjective into intersubjective
kinds, as is exemplified, for instance, by the development of the Greek discourse par-
ticle τοι ‘you know, take note’ out of the second person pronoun ‘for you’. In this case,
there does not appear to be an intermediate stage in which τοι is a mere subjective
discourse particle. In other words, intersubjectification is perhaps better seen as a par-
ticular subset of the process of subjectification at large, rather than a necessary later
stage in the development (cf. e.g. Ghesquière 2010). This is represented in (3b) above.
In addition to the more general underlying principles of semantic change pre-
sented so far, more specific cross-linguistic tendencies or clines have been proposed
to capture the regularities that occur in specific linguistic or functional domains (e.g.
modality, social deixis, discourse structure). For our purposes, the development of ad-
verbial expressions into discourse connectives will be of special interest – which in-
volves the second and the third tendenciesmentioned above. The cline in question can
be represented as follows (Traugott 1997, 1999, Traugott & Dasher 2002: ch.4):
(4) Cline of semantic development of adverbial expressions
clause-internal adverbial > sentence adverbial > discourse connective/marker
As shown in Traugott’s work, the relevance of this cline can be clearly shown bymeans
of the historical development of English adverbials such as besides, so, well, indeed, in
fact and actually. Byway of illustration, I will presently discuss some of Traugott’s ideas
on in fact (see Traugott 1999, Schwenter & Traugott 2000), the development of
which, as we will see later on, shows a number of similarities to that of Ancient Greek
μήν. In each of the following examples, we see a different sense of in fact, which is
combined with a difference in structural position in the utterance:
(5) a. Humanity, comfortably engaged elsewhere in the business of living, is absent in
fact but everywhere present in feeling.
b. It’s almost as if he were avoiding the evening’s moment of truth. The moment is,
in fact, about 45 minutes, the main body of the play, during which Mr. Quinton
[…] holds the stage and acts up a primeval cataclysm all by himself.
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c. Polling isn’t The World’s Oldest Profession, although around election time it
might seem like it. In fact, once upon a time, way back in the first third of this
benighted century, modern polling wasn’t yet even a gleam in the eye of a small-
town Iowa kid named George Gallup.
(Traugott 1999: 182–183)
In the first stage of the cline, the adverbial expressions in question behave as regular
adverbialsmodifying a verb (i.e. as grammatical adjuncts): here they have scopewithin
the clause and contribute to truth-conditions. For in fact, this stage is shown in (5a),
where we find a clear lexical contrast between fact and feeling. In this use, in fact tends
to occur in clause-final position.
In the next stage, the items in question have developed into sentence adverbials
that scope over full clauses, semantically apply to full propositions and are no longer
truth-conditionally relevant. At this stage, evidential and epistemicmeanings of a sub-
jective nature have come into being (tendency 3): the speaker takes an explicit stance
towards the proposition expressed (see section 2.6 above). In case of in fact, we can
also recognize an intersubjectivemeaning aspect, as it crucially involves the rhetorical
strategy of counter-expectation: the speaker indicates that the proposition expressed
runs counter to what the addressee(s) could have expected to be the case (e.g. on the
basis of what has been said in the preceding discourse and/or common ground infor-
mation). In this use, in fact occurs either after a complementizer or adjacent to the
tensed verb, as is the case in (5b) above.
In the third stage, finally, the adverbial expressions have developed discourse-
organizational meanings (tendency 2), taking scope over the whole of the following
(complex) discourse unit. In these discourse connective usages, they primarily express
the specific (rhetorical or sequential) discourse relation that holds – according to the
speaker – between the host unit and the preceding discourse unit. In case of in fact, as
exemplified in (5c), this is a relation of elaboration, specification or more precise re-
formulation, without the notion of counter-expectation being fully absent. In fact as a
discourse connective invariably occurs in a prosodically detached position at the very
start of the utterance.
Now what is characteristic of this particular cline is that the rise of textual/meta-
linguistic and (inter)subjective meaning aspects (i.e. tendencies 2 and 3) strongly cor-
relates with an increase in semantic scope. Items that start out as items that contribute
to the proposition expressed (proposition-internal meaning), may develop further us-
ages in which they semantically target full propositions. Eventually, they may even ex-
tend their scope up to the illocutionary and discourse levels, applying to single dis-
course acts or even more complex segments of discourse (i.e. moves, see section 2.5.2
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above).10 In the case of connectives, this also explainswhy discourse-level connectives
often arise from content-level connectives (see section 2.5.3 above). And connectives
that mark rhetorical (epistemic) discourse relations may taken to be historically prior
to those that mark sequential (discourse-structural) relations.11
As we will see later on, these tendencies concerning the development of (dis-
course) connective meanings are of particular interest for my analysis of both μήν and
δή in part 2 of this study.
3.3 Homonymy, monosemy and polysemy
Given the possibility of the situation of layering mentioned above (i.e. the situation in
which older usages remain to co-exist alongside newly developed ones), the question
rises how the association between a single form and its various different interpreta-
tions is actually represented in the lexicon. In recent studies on particles – and in se-
mantic theory more generally – it is commonly accepted that there are basically three
alternative ways of conceiving of this association:
(i) homonymy: one form has multiple unrelated meanings (maximalist position)
(ii) monosemy: one form has one meaning (minimalist position)
(iii) polysemy: one form has multiple interrelated meanings
In the following, I will further zoom into these three approaches to polyfunctionality
and argue why I take the polysemy approach in the present study.12
10. Traugott’s ideas in this respect are compatible with the clines proposed by other researchers. Cf.
for instance Sweetser (1990): content > epistemic > speech act, and Abraham (1991): localistic >
temporal > logical > illocutive/discourse functional.
11. Cf. Waltereit (2006), who aptly describes the rise of discourse markingmeanings as follows: “Dis-
course markers are historical relics of speakers’ strategies for manipulating the structure of the discourse
or the interaction. Speakers discover that some word forms may have a certain appeal for textual and in-
terpersonal purposes. They then start to employ these forms in communicative contexts that do not prop-
erly justify their primary use. Hearers will then discover that the form is being used “abusively”, thereby
reanalyzing it as a discourse marker. Many of the properties of this new discourse marker can be shown
to be related to the initial rhetorical strategies” (2006: 66).
12. Discussions of the polyfunctionality problem in particle research can be found in, for instance,
Foolen (1993), Kroon (1995), Hansen (1998a, 1998b, 2008), Aijmer (2002), Fischer (2006b), Koier
(2013) and Allan (2017b). It should also be noted that the issue of meaning maximalism vs. meaning
minimalism has quite a long history, which goes back as far as the debate between Locke and Leibniz in
the 17th century, as is shown by Foolen (1993: 50–53).
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Homonymy
In a strict homonymy or maximalist approach, to start with, the variant interpreta-
tions of one form are seen as unrelated encodedmeanings, which are separately stored
in the lexicon. In this case, the different interpretations are in fact associated with
different lexemes, which (accidentally) ended up as having the same phonological/
orthographic form. One of the traditional examples of homonymy is English bank,
which could refer for instance to the side of a river or a financial institution, two com-
pletely unrelated meanings. A case in point that is relevant to the present study con-
cerns Ancient Greek μήν: in addition to its use as a discourse particle, this same expres-
sion also happens to occur as (the nominative singular of) a noun meaning ‘month’, a
use which is etymologically completely unrelated to the discourse particle μήν.13
When (pragmatic) particles are concerned, the maximalist approach is often re-
flected by the practice in (older) lexicons and referential grammars, in which the va-
riety of different usages of a particle are simply listed in apparently random fashion,
sometimes associated with the structural contexts in which they occur.14 Although
such a practicemay suffice for the purposes of suchworks, the homonymy approach is
of course unattractive due to its lack of explanatory power. In analyzing particles, we
would like to see an explanation of why one and the same particle has so many differ-
ent interpretations. Moreover, a homonymy approach is entirely unsuitable for cases
where diachronic meaning extensions are documented. In Hansen’s words: “since
meaning maximalism is unable to show the relations between ‘homonymous’ items,
it cannot explain the observation […] that there are certain unidirectional tendencies
in lexical change” (Hansen 1998a: 87).
Modern particle researchers, indeed, most generally exclude the homonymy or
maximalist approach as the right analysis. In this respect, it is telling that within the
elaborated volume on discourse particles edited by Fischer (2006a) none of the con-
tributors explicitly argues for a homonymy approach. This leaves us with the two other
approaches – which have given rise to much debate in the literature.
Monosemy
A strict monosemy or minimalist approach can basically be seen as the opposite of
a homonymy approach. Its general assumption is that each form is associated with a
single invariant coremeaning or aGesamtbedeutung.The various different actual inter-
13. Cf. Beekes (2010: ii, 944–945), s.v. μήν 1 and μήν 2.
14. Cf. for instance the entries on δή in lsj and Powell’s (1938) lexicon of Herodotus.
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pretations, in turn, arise only through the interaction of this coremeaningwith aspects
of the linguistic and/or situational contexts in which the form in question is used (e.g.
an interaction with particular syntactic constructions or with general pragmatic infer-
ence patterns à la Grice). On this account then, the different readings of an item are
not attributed to the encoded meaning of that item itself: semantics has in fact little
work to do and much is left to pragmatic and contextual factors in order to arrive at
these readings.
When particles are concerned,monosemy is for instance strongly advocated in the
German particle tradition ofWeydt, who poses the following rule as one of his ‘general
theses on particle meaning’:
Every particle can be assigned a constant basicmeaning, which appears in every
occurrence of that particle. […] In the process of discovering themeaning of the
particle, the semanticist first establishes a hypothesis about the meaning of the
particle and then tries to corroborate it, exposing it to as many occurrences of
the particle as possible. […] As soon as a usage appears which is not covered by
the hypothesis, this hypothesis must be given up or modified in such a way that
a new hypothesis covers every known occurrence, including the noncomplying
case. (Weydt 2006: 209–210)
In theminimalistic approach then, unification is the central notion: a common seman-
tic denominator is searched for that is compatible with all of the variant readings and
actual instances of a particle.
From a purely synchronic perspective, the minimalistic approach to particles is of
course a highly appealing theoretical position by virtue of its “elegant and descriptively
parsimon[i]ous nature” (Hansen 2008: 35). In actual practice, however, it is more
problematic than at first glance may be expected. One of the main drawbacks of this
approach, as has often been noted in the literature, is that in order to cover all of the di-
vergent actual usages of a given particle, the postulated coremeaning usually needs to
be of an extremely abstract, schematic or general nature. Thismay be illustrated by the
basic meanings given by Kroon (1995) for a number of Latin discourse particles, such
as ‘subsidiarity’ (nam), ‘distinctiveness’ (autem), ‘actuality/reality’ (vero) and ‘consen-
sus’ (enim). In a somewhat similar vein, Wakker (1994a, 1997a, 1997b) has proposed
the notion of ‘special attention’ as the basic value of Greek δή. In my opinion, such
highly abstract core meanings are problematic in a number of respects.
First of all, we may question whether such basic meanings are of any significant
practical value for actual language users. In the context of language acquisition, for
instance, highly abstract meanings are unlikely to be learnable as such by immature
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language users. In fact, it seems more likely that they learn certain (more salient) us-
ages of a particle earlier than others. Recognizing a core meaning, then, may not be as
relevant for actual language users as it appears to be for descriptive linguists.
A second issue concerns the lack of predictive power of such abstract definitions
of particles. The core meanings may be so general that they cannot correctly predict
in which contexts the particle is actually used and in which contexts it is not. That is,
monosemic definitions may end up “generating unacceptable readings alongside the
attested ones” (Hansen 2008: 35).Moreover, there is the risk that the semantics of one
particle may in fact become indistinguishable from that of others. A clear example of
this problem can in fact be found in the way Denniston (1954) uses the notion of
‘emphasis’. He employs this concept as a rather general label for (certain usages of) a
number of different particles, including μήν and δή. However, this general label clearly
does not suffice to tell the difference between these two ‘emphatic’ particles and to
account for their variant distributional patterns. ‘Emphasis’ is not specific enough, for
example, to predict that δή, but not μήν, is often used in combination with superlative
forms (see chapters 5 and6). Thus, such anabstract semantic coremeaning– assuming
that there is any in the first place (see below) – is arguably too general to count as
the only stored knowledge of a language user about a given polyfunctional particle.
Further specifications are needed about the kind of contexts in which the item can be
felicitously used in actual practice. In Allan’s words, “monosemous definitions often
fail to provide sufficient as well as necessary semantic features and thus fall short of
being a valid semantic description of a linguistic item” (Allan 2017b: 278).
In addition to the issue of abstract core meanings, another problem for a a strict
minimalismapproach ariseswhendiachronic evolution is taken into account. Themo-
nosemyapproach assumes that for a newly developed reading of an item its coremean-
inghas toundergo somequalitative change inorder to still incorporate thenewand the
old readings within a unified semantic representation (cf. Weydt’s quote above). Each
time, accordingly, this basic representation will become more general or abstract. As
Hansen (2008: 35) argues, significant conceptual reorganisation like this is unlikely
to occur on a regular basis and it obscures the fact that language change is a gradual
process (see section 3.2 above).15
15. We may also put forward that, on a monosemic account, there is no principled explanation as to
why all possible interpretations are not available at every stage of the language in question. If the various
interpretations are arrived at via general pragmatic principles, why is it that certain usages of an itemonly
occur at a later stage of a language and others disappear?
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Anevenmore serious problemconcerns the fact that semantic changemay inprin-
ciple go into very different, sometimes even opposite, directions, which gives rise to
the possibility that it becomes more and more difficult, if not downright impossible,
to retain an invariant core meaning at all (cf. Koier 2013: 12–13). With respect to An-
cient Greek, a clear example of such a state of affairs is provided by the particle περ in
classical Greek. As convincingly shown by E. J. Bakker (1993b), περ has two main us-
ages in classical Greek, which do not have anything in common semantically: (i) περ as
a marker of concessive phrases and (ii) περ as a marker of identification (‘precisely’).
Bakker points out that these usages can only be related by looking at the diachronic
dimension, as they derive from one and the same historical source: περ as a scalar fo-
cus particle (‘even’). This original source meaning of περ has thus developed into two
divergent directions. At the same time, the original meaning itself gradually became
obsolete. The example of περ clearly shows that the search for a core meaning or a Ge-
samtbedeutung, as for instance advocated byWeydt (see the quote above), should not
be our first and primary concern in the linguistic analysis of particles.
Polysemy
The third and final option – and the one which I will retain in the present study –
is the polysemy approach, which has been particularly prominent in cognitively-ori-
ented theories of lexical semantics.16 This approach can be placed somewhere in be-
tween the two extremes of the homonymy and themonosemypositions just discussed:
it assumes, on the one hand, that most linguistic forms actually do have a number of
different encoded (i.e. conventionalized) meanings and, on the other hand, that these
various meanings are not discrete but related to each other in motivated, if not fully
predictable, ways. The semantics of a given expression can thus be represented as a
network of interconnected senses, which are related to each other as extensions from
a prototype and/or through family resemblances in a chain-like fashion (see further
below). Although the polysemy approach is perhapsmostly applied in research on the
semantics of regular content words, it has also found its way to the study of particles
and pragmatic markers and has notably been advocated by Hansen (1998a, 1998b,
2006, 2008).17
16. See Gries (2015) for an overview and further references.
17. Other researchers in the field of pm-research who explicitly take such an approach are for instance
Waltereit (2006), D.M. Lewis (2006, 2011), Aijmer, Foolen& Simon-Vandenbergen (2006), Foolen
(2006) and Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer (2007).
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The polysemy approach to the semantics of particles has a number of advantages
over the other approaches. For one thing, since polysemous accounts do not in princi-
ple assume invariant core meanings, they do not – or not to the same degree at least
– struggle with the issues of minimalist approaches involving the extreme degree of
generality or schematicity of such meanings (see above). The evidence for recogniz-
ing different polysemous meanings indeed involves actually observable distributional
patterns in text corpora.
Second, andmost importantly, the polysemy approach is well-suited to handle his-
torical developments. Diachronic semantic extensions can be elegantly represented
as new nodes within a polysemous network. In fact, the interrelationships between
the distinct senses in a polysemous network tend to reflect the observable cross-lin-
guistic tendencies and patterns of semantic extension, such as metonymy, metaphor
and pragmatic inferencing (cf. section 3.2 above). In other words, “where there is a
synchronic sense relationship there is usually a historical relationship” (Traugott &
Dasher 2002: 13). As such, as has often been recognized in the field of historical prag-
matics, polysemy is the approach par excellence to deal with aspects of diachronic
meaning change and, conversely, diachronic studies cannot do without a theory of
polysemy.18 It thus appears that there is a natural tendency for natural languages to
enhance polysemy, rather than to stick to a strict one-form-one-meaning principle. In
my view, a rather plausible explanation for this fact is given by Hansen, who puts it as
follows:
the communicative needs of language users are continually evolving as those
users adapt to new contexts and situations, and it seems farmore economical for
lexical items to be flexible enough to support gradual extension of their range of
meaning than for users to be obliged to constantly innovate (and subsequently,
remember) new expressions, which may differ only slightly in meaning from al-
ready existing ones. (Hansen 2008: 36)
18. Traugott & Dasher (2002: 11) formulate this as follows: “Semantic change cannot be studied
without drawing on a theory of polysemy because of the nature of change. Every change, at any level in
a grammar, involves not “A > B”, i.e. the simple replacement of one item by another, but rather “A > A∼
B” and then sometimes “> B” alone.” The latter situation (i.e. the complete loss of an earlier meaning) is
relatively rare. Cf. the concept of layering as illustrated in figure 3.1 above.
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Now what does a polysemous network look like in practice? Basically, such a net-
work can be structured bymeans of two principles of organization: we can distinguish
between a prototype structure and a family resemblance structure. These structures
are well-known from psychological and lexical semantic work on the cognitive organi-
zation of referential categories. Letme shortly discuss theirmost important features.19
A prototype structure, on the one hand, is based upon the assumption that cate-
gories exhibit degrees of typicality. Thus, a distinction is made between central or core
members and peripheral ormarginalmembers of a given referential category. The cen-
tral members possess a cluster of salient and prototypical features, some but not all of
which are shared by the more peripheral instances. Peripheral instances then, always
have a certain degree of resemblance with the prototype, but do not necessarily need
to have any (basic) features in common. The classical example is the category ‘bird’: a
robin and a sparrow are usually seen as prototypical instances of this category, having
all of the salient features of a bird (flying, having feathers and a beak, being relatively
small, building nests, laying eggs, and so on). A penguin and an ostrich, on the other
hand, are peripheral instances, as they lack the salient feature of flying and are fairly
larger than most other birds. Similarly, there may also be birds that do not lay eggs or
build nests.
In a family resemblance structure, on the other hand, there are no central mem-
bers. Rather, the different category members are linked in a chain-like fashion: mem-
ber A is connected with member B, which in turn shares some features with C, and so
on. Members that are at the opposite end of a chain may thus be fairly different. The
classical example of this structure is the category ‘game’.
It should also be emphasized that the boundaries of referential categories may be
fuzzy or blurred, as peripheral members may also have features that belong to other
categories. For instance, a whale is a member of the ‘mammal’ category, but it also
has clear features that prototypically belong to the ‘fish’ category (having fins, living
under water). In both of these structures then, the defining features of the category,
i.e. its intension, cannot be a single set of necessary and sufficient attributes. They are
rather “a set that occur in many members (but need not occur in all), and they do not
necessarily distinguish one category from another” (Bybee 2015: 197).
Now, crucially, these organizational principles for cognitive referential categories
have also been applied to linguistic categories, viz. in order to account for the rela-
tions between the variant meanings of a linguistic form (cf. also section 2.2). In the
19. Cf. especially the work of Taylor (2003) on this. Cf. also discussion in Hansen (1998a: 82–85) and
Bybee (2015: 196–197).
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Figure 3.2: A polysemous network for French déjà (from Hansen 2008: 225)
present study, following the practice inHansen (2008), Iwill use a framework inwhich
prototype and family resemblance structures may in principle be combined to yield
complex networks of meaning relations.20 As an example of what such a complex net-
work might look like I give the network as proposed by Hansen for French déjà (see
figure 3.2). In this network, boxes with unbroken lines are presumed to be encoded,
i.e. conventionalized, meanings, whereas boxes with broken lines are taken to be non-
coded, contextually determined interpretations. Arrows indicate the presumed direc-
tion of diachronic extension. The phasal and scalar sense of déjà are the earliest and
most prototypical senses.
Final remarks
Two final remarks are in place about the picture presented so far. First, I would like
to emphasize that a polysemous account in practice need not necessarily exclude the
possibility that (some of) the interrelated meanings in the network have a more ab-
stract semantic feature in common. This means that a (partial) synthesis may be pos-
20. In the literature, this framework has been labeled ‘extended prototype semantics’, but as Hansen
(2008: 36) argues, this name is actually somewhat misleading because it explicitly contains the term
‘prototype semantics’, whereas the structure of many linguistic categories cannot be described in terms
of prototypes but only in terms of family resemblances. She also discusses what the differences in focus
are between the ‘standard’ version of prototype theory and the extended version: whereas the former is
essentially onomasiological in nature in that it elucidates how cognitive categories are lexicalized, the
latter starts from the opposite, semasiological angle, as it is concerned with “the principles that allow
speakers to use a particular linguistic item to refer to cognitively different entities and notions” (ibid.).
The latter angle ties in well with the bottom-up approach on particles as argued for in the present work.
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sible between the polysemic and monosemic accounts – a position which has been
in particular advocated by Langacker in his Complex Category Network Model (e.g.
1987: ch. 10, 2000: ch. 4). In this model, a complex category consists of both an ‘ab-
stract schema’ (i.e. a basic core meaning) and a number of ‘lower-level’ instantiations
or ‘elaborations’ of this schema (i.e. conventionalized encoded meanings). A good ex-
ample of this possibility can be found in the work of Allan (2003) on the Ancient
Greek middle voice, where he distinguishes as many as eleven related meanings for
this construction, but also signals an important abstract generalization that subsumes
all of these meanings (‘subject-affectedness’). With respect to particles, a clear exam-
ple is the way in which Foolen (2006) treats Dutch toch and German doch. Although
he provides a polysemous analysis, he also proposes a more abstract meaning (in the
form of a 3-step conceptual scheme) which is common to all of the actual uses of these
expressions.21
It must be emphasized, however, that although such a generality may indeed be
part of the linguistic knowledge of language users, it is probably not the one that is
most saliently activated in actual contexts of use.22 Crucially, Langacker’s theory is a
usage-based and bottom-up approach to linguistic structure, in which more abstract
meanings are deduced by speakers from the lower-level meanings that are encoun-
tered in actual usage events. Likewise, as I take it, the particle researcher should not
start by making hypotheses about an item’s constant basic meaning, as Weydt has
it (see above), but rather by examining the full inventory of all possible usages (and
matching distributional properties) of the particle concerned, including the less pro-
totypical instances. Only then, more general meanings may be postulated – if possible
at all – by deducing them frommore specific particle usages.
With regard to Ancient Greek particles in particular, this course of action has in
fact alreadybeen explicitly proposedby Slings in the conclusionof his important 1997-
paper,wherehe takes stance against the focus onbasic values thatwasprevalent at that
time:
21. Cf. also Aijmer, Foolen & Simon-Vandenbergen (2006: 105) for this option: “We simply want
to stress that within the polysemy network, one of the nodes often has a prototypical or core status, or,
alternatively, that an abstraction over the different nodes is possible, resulting in a core meaning. Par-
ticularised and generalised implicatures, polysemy networks, prototypical meanings and abstract core
meanings, are all potentially relevant in a full description of the meaning of a particle”.
22. See e.g. Langacker (2000: 125): “I am suggesting that these context-dependent variants may be
more fundamental than the context-neutral schematization we tend to regard as primary.”
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I feel that amoratorium on basic values for Greek particles would, in the current
state of affairs, be highly desirable. […] Only through the painstaking examina-
tion of various types of contexts, and through the comparison of Greek particles
with particles in other languages, canwe really advance. Until then,making pro-
nouncements on basic values amounts to little more than armchair linguistics
– it is hardly more helpful than the practice of most classical scholars, for whom
the be-all and end-all of the study of Greek particles is the ability to find the
correct page in Denniston. (Slings 1997a: 126–127)
Given the preceding discussion and my remarks in section 1.2 above, it goes without
saying that I fully subscribe with Slings’s view.
My second remark concerns the possibility that, at a given point of time, the actual
language users may no longer recognize that certain senses of the same linguistic item
are interrelated or originate from the same historical source, and have actually come
to see them as fully independent entries of form-meaning pairs, i.e. as distinct lexical
items (cf. Croft 1998, Traugott&Dasher 2002: 14–15). For instance, whenwe look
at the examples given in (1) above, it seems likely that speakers of present-dayGerman
do no longer recognize the historical relation between the adjective eben (‘flat’) and
the grammaticalizedmodal particle eben (‘as we all know’). It must be noted, however,
that questions that concern the exact way in which the distinct senses of one form are
synchronically represented in the minds of actual language users are not of primary
interest here. The point is that these can only be definitely settled by taking recourse to
psycho-linguistic experiments tapping speaker intuitions (cf. Croft 1998: 169–170),
an option which is of course not possible for earlier stages of a language, let alone for
dead languages such as Ancient Greek.
3.4 Methodological reflections
Theoretically, given its suitability to deal with diachronicmeaning change, a polysemy
approach to the polyfunctionality of particles seems to be essentially on the right track.
However, the polysemy approach has also been criticized – especially when the syn-
chronic level of analysis is concerned – and some methodological qualifications are
certainly in place here. One of the objects of criticism of the polysemy approach is pre-
cisely the fact that it tends tomultiplymeanings. The question can be put how specific
the encoded meanings should be? When is it exactly that contextually evoked inter-
pretations of a form change into full-blown conventionalized senses? How should a
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linguist decide whether an interpretation is part of the encoded meaning of a form or
rather a contextually induced ad hoc interpretation or side-effect? In other words, it
seems useful to restrict the proliferation of particle meanings in some principled way.
Therefore, I have chosen to adhere to the principle of ‘methodological minimal-
ism’, which has been advised by various researchers in the field.23 According to this
principle, we should “try as far as possible to maintain the minimalist assumption of
a common core meaning, while aiming for relative precision of description” (Hansen
1998a: 88). In other words, we should not pose a new related meaning for a particle, if
it is not strictly necessary. To adhere to this principle, I will generally use the following
rules of thumb (Hansen 2008: 38–39):
∗ substantially different logical or argumentative properties suggest the existence
of distinct meanings; 24
∗ if interpretationsA andB appear to associatewith distinctmorphosyntactic cat-
egories, evidenced by formal distinctions in syntactic behaviour (i.e. cross-cat-
egorial polyfunctionality), this suggests that these interpretations are separate
meanings;
∗ if interpretation A occurs at a substantially later date than interpretation B,
these interpretation are separate meanings;
∗ if interpretations A and B appear to co-exist at a particular stage of the language
and the difference in interpretation can systematically be attributed to contex-
tual factors and general pragmatic principles, this suggests that these interpre-
tations are subsumed under one single meaning.
On top of the evidence based on distributional patterns in the corpus, additional
support may come from contrastive and cross-linguistic data. Thus, if two closely re-
lated languages “have corresponding lexical items which share one or more salient
uses, then it is tempting to suppose that any uses of those same items that are not
so shared must have the status of independent senses” (Hansen 2008: 39). It is well
23. See e.g. Foolen (1993: 64–69), Kroon (1995: 97–98), Hansen (1998a: 88–89, 2008: 36–39) and
Traugott & Dasher (2002: 44–45). Cf. also Grice (1978: 118–121) for the principle he calls ‘Modified
Occam’s Razor’ (‘Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity’).
24. Cf. Traugott &Dasher (2002: 44): “In written records, clear evidence of semanticization of a pol-
ysemy typically comes from the appearance of an item in a “new” context in which earlier meaning(s) of
the item would not make sense.”
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known, for instance, that the English conjunction but can be used to indicate a denial-
of-expectation contrast (e.g. He is rich but unhappy) as well as a substitution contrast
(e.g.He is not rich but poor), but that in related languages the difference between these
two types of contrast comes about through different lexicalizations (e.g. aber vs. son-
dern in German and pero vs. sino in Spanish).25 Such a state of affairs, then, suggests
that English but has two distinct though related meanings.
3.5 Wrapping up
I will now summarize the most important conclusions of the present chapter:
∗ The synchronic polyfunctionality of particles is the result of the historical ex-
tensions of newmeanings and functions, which involves regular processes of se-
mantic change and grammaticalization. Semantic change comes about through
the gradual conventionalization of invited inferences and involves the process
of (inter)subjectification, which also implies that linguistic items tend to be-
come more procedural or discourse-oriented in meaning and increase their se-
mantic scope.
∗ Given the nature of these processes of diachronic extension, on a more syn-
chronic level the polysemy approach to the polyfunctionality of particles seems
to be essentially on the right track. This means that multiple conventionalized
particle meanings are distinguished which are nevertheless semantically inter-
related. More abstract schematic meanings may possibly be deduced from the
set of more specific usages of a particle, but this should not be our primary con-
cern: a bottom-up or usage-based approach is in principle most viable.
∗ From a methodological viewpoint, it is reasonable to restrict the proliferation
of meanings by complying with the principle of methodological minimalism,
which prescribes not to assume separate meanings when it is not strictly nec-
essary. This principle must be combined with evidence on (frequencies of) dis-
tributional patterns in our corpus as well as evidence based on cross-linguistic
comparison.
25. See e.g. Anscombre & Ducrot (1977), Foolen (1991) and Rudolph (1996).
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Chapter 4
Position and scope of Greek
particles
In the preceding chapters we have seen that in modernWestern languages differences
in the formal aspects of particles, notably in their syntactic position within an utter-
ance, can generally be taken as important clues for distinguishing between different
particle categories and different meanings. In the present chapter, I will demonstrate
that the same line of reasoning applies to Ancient Greek as well by looking into the is-
sueof thepositionand syntactic scopeofGreekparticles. The courseof actionwill be as
follows. I start by introducing some basic information about Ancient Greek syntax and
word order, which is significantly different from those in modern Western languages
(section 4.1). After that, I will discuss in more detail the formal aspects of the cate-
gories of prepositive and especially postpositive expressions in Ancient Greek, which
are of special interest for the study of (pragmatic) particles andmy analysis of μήν and
δή in particular (sections 4.2 and 4.3). Finally, I draw conclusions on how the position
of particles within an Ancient Greek utterance can be used as linguistic evidence for
differences in syntactic scope and meaning (section 4.4).
4.1 Greek syntax and word order
In the past two decades, it has become widely accepted that Ancient Greek is a dis-
course-configurational language, not unlikemodern languages such as Hungarian and
Finnish. Themost important features of such languages are thepossibility of discontin-
uous constituency as well as a relatively ‘free’ word order, meaning that word order is
predominantly determined not by syntactic but by pragmatic factors, i.e. by discourse-
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and information-structural concepts such as topic, focus and contrast.1 For Ancient
Greek in particular, it has become increasingly clear in recent years that it exhibits
quite a complex and flexible word order system, which reflects rather fine-grained in-
formation-structural differences. Distinctions are made, for instance, between differ-
ent kinds of focus constructions (narrow and broad) as well as between different kinds
of topic constructions (e.g. new/contrastive topic, resumed topic, given topic). AGreek
utterance thus typically consists of a combination of a particular focus construction
with one or more topic constructions, which may result in a variety of actual word or-
der patterns.2
As has long been recognised, however, not all words in Ancient Greek behave simi-
larlywhen it comes to their position in the sentenceor clause. In this respect, it is useful
to adopt the traditional distinction, originating from Dover (1960), between mobile
(M), prepositive (p) and postpositive (q) words.Whereasmobile words are sensitive to
the information-structural factors just mentioned and obtain their position by virtue
of their pragmatic function, both pre- and postpositive words are subject to quite dif-
ferent, syntax- and prosody-oriented, placement rules. It is these latter two categories
that are most relevant for the study of the position of pragmatic particles in Ancient
Greek. Therefore, I will proceedwith amore detailed discussion of the placement rules
of pre- and postpositive words, paying special attention to pragmatic particles.
4.2 Prepositive expressions
Traditionally, prepositives are defined as words that always precede another word and
can never end a clause. However, this class is still a mixed bag, containing words of
various syntactic and functional categories, some of which show a higher degree of
autonomy – are less closely tied to other words – than others. I therefore make a fur-
1. For a discussion of the concept of discourse-configurationality and the languages that are considered
to be discourse-configurational in nature, I refer to the overview given by Kiss (1998). I should add here
that it might well be that in Ancient Greek – just as in living languages such as Hungarian and Finnish –
prosodic features like stress and pitch accent were also relevant for determining information structure.
See Goldstein (2016a: 29) for discussion and further references.
2. It would lead me too far astray at this point to discuss these notions in more detail. I refer to the
groundbreaking work of H. Dik (1995, 2007) as well as to Matić (2003), Bertrand (2010) and Allan
(2014) for somemajor improvements and elaborations on Dik’s basic model. See Goldstein (2016a) for
a formal-semantic approach to topic and focus in Herodotus.
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morphosyntactic category Greek expressions
prepositives
proper
articles ὁ, ἡ, τό etc.
prepositions ἀπό, ἐπί, ἐν, κατά, περί, ὑπό etc.
focus particles καί, οὐδέ, μήδε
simple negative particles οὐ(κ/χ), μή
introductives relatives ὅς, ὅστις, οἷος, ὅσος, οὗ, ὅθεν, ᾗ etc.
subordinators ὡς, ὅπως, ὅτι, ὅτε, εἰ, ἐπεί, ἵνα, πρίν etc.
coordinators / connective parti-
cles
ἀλλά, ἀτάρ, ἤ, καί, καίτοι, οὐδέ, μήδε,
οὔτε, μήτε, οὔκουν, τοιγάρ etc.
polarity/interrogative particles ἦ, οὐ(κ/χ), μή, ἆρα, οὐκοῦν, μῶν
interrogative pronouns/adverbs τίς, τί, πότε, πῶς, ποῦ etc.
interjection-like expressions ὦ (+ vocative), νή/μά in oaths, ναί
Table 4.1: Prepositive expressions in Ancient Greek
ther subdistinction between prepositives proper and what have been called ‘introduc-
tory prepositives’ (Marshall 1987) or simply ‘introductives’ (Scheppers 2011). An
overview is given in table 4.1.3
Prepositives proper, on the one hand, are words that immediately precede the ex-
pression they syntactically belong to on the phrasal level. These are genuinely proclitic
innature,whichmeans that they cannot be realized as an autonomous intonationunit,
but have a strong bond with the word (group) that immediately follows. The class in-
cludes articles, prepositions, certain focus particles and simple negative particles. In-
troductives, on the other hand, are words that have an intrinsic attraction to the initial
position of their clause or utterance, or,more generally, intonation unit. However, their
bond with the immediately following word is less restricted than that of prepositives
proper: in some cases, introductives are realized as an autonomous intonation unit or
even as an autonomous utterance. This groupmainly consists of relatives, connectives
and illocutionary markers, including illocutionary particles (cf. also section 2.3.3).
Observe that the dividing line between the two categories of prepositives should
not necessarily be seen as a strict one. Some expressions have an ambiguous status and
occur in both of the categories, depending on their specific usage and/or scope. Thus,
καί, οὐδέ and μήδε behave as prepositives proper in their use as a focus particle (‘also’,
‘not … either’), but as introductives in their use as coordinators (‘and’, ‘nor’). And in
3. Table 4.1 is my summary of the discussion in Scheppers (2011: 67–79).
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a similar vein, the simple negative particles are realized as prepositives proper when
they have phrasal scope (e.g. τὸ μὴ ὄν ‘the non-being’), but as introductives in case of
clause or sentence scope (cf. Scheppers 2011: 78–79, Goldstein 2016a: 96–106).
Now, as can be seen in the table, some of theGreek particles belong to the category
of prepositives. In addition, this class plays an important role in the exact determina-
tion of the position of most other particles, which rather are postpositive in nature.
This brings me to the next section.
4.3 Postpositive expressions
In contrast to prepositives, postpositive words always follow another word and can
never take the initial position within a clause or utterance. More in particular, they
comply with Wackernagel’s Law and are always found in the second position (Wack-
ernagel 1892).4 An overview of the different groups of postpositive words is given
in table 4.2, which is based on those given by Bertrand (2010: 359) and Goldstein
(2016a: 6–7). As can be seenhere, pragmatic particles are not the only class of postpos-
itive expressions in Ancient Greek. However, they slightly differ frommost of the other
postpositives as far as the exact determination of the ‘second’ position is concerned
(see section 4.3.1 below). This difference justifies the subdivision between two major
categories of postpositives: q-postpositives and r-postpositives (Scheppers 2011: 79–
90).5
Let me emphasize here thatWackernagel’s Lawmust not be understood as a strict
linguistic convention or rule, but is better seen, in Goldstein’s words, as “an honorary
designation of a descriptive generalization about the surface position of a class of
words” (2016: 5). In other words, Wackernagel’s Law has no explanatory power in it-
4. There is a considerable body of literature on Wackernagel’s Law and (the position of) postpositives
and enclitics in Ancient Greek. Some key publications – which the present section is based upon – are
Fraenkel (1932, 1933), Dover (1960), Marshall (1987), Ruijgh (1990), H. Dik (1995), Bertrand
(2010), Scheppers (2011) and notably Goldstein (2010, 2016a), in which much more references and
literature can be found, both with regard to Ancient Greek and other (Indo-European) languages. The
exact distinction between enclitics and postpositives (cf. Goldstein 2016a: ch. 3) will be of no special
importance for my present purposes and I will follow Bertrand (2010) and Scheppers (2011) in using
the latter term as a common denominator.
5. Marshall (1987) makes a very similar distinction, but does not establish one encompassing cate-
gory for the r-postpositives. The forms of pronominal ἡμ-, ὑμ- and αὐτ- are in principle ambiguous and
may also be interpreted as mobile words (Scheppers 2011: 57–58). The same ambiguity holds for the
nominative forms ἐγώ and σύ, as H. Dik (2003) explicitly argues for. In addition, some (unaccented) ver-
bal forms may also have a postpositive character, e.g. ἐστι, εἰμι and φημι.
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q-postpos. coordinators τε, δέ
various kinds of prag-
matic particles
ἄρα/ῥα, αὖ, αὖτε, γάρ, γε, γοῦν, δέ, δή, δῆθεν, δήπου,
δῆτα, μέν, μέντοι, μήν/μάν, νυ(ν), οὖν/ὦν, περ, που/
κου, τοι, τοίνυν
r-postpos. tma-particles ἄν, κε(ν)




σφας/σφεας, σφεων, σφιν/σφισι(ν), σφε(α)
indefinite pronouns/
adverbs
τις, τι, τινος/του, τινι/τῳ, τινα, τινες, τινων, τισι(ν), τινας
πῃ/κῃ, ποτε/κοτε, που/κου, πω/κω, πως/κως
other postpositive
pronouns
oblique cases of αὐτός in anaphoric sense
oblique cases of ἡμεῖς and ὑμεῖς
unemphatic ἐγώ and σύ
Table 4.2: Postpositive expressions in Ancient Greek
self, but simply refers to a set of observable distributional patterns and strong tenden-
cies, which result from the prosodic and syntactic organisation of utterances in certain
(Indo-European) languages.
In fact, as far asAncientGreek is concerned, the original ideas ofWackernagel have
been reinterpreted and specified in variousways.Most importantly, it has becomeclear
that the secondposition is not an absolute secondposition, but that it is better to speak
of the peninitial position, which is relative in nature.6 In other words, a postpositive
selects the expression in the initial position as its host. The actual selection of such a
host is determined by an interplay of syntactic and especially prosodic factors. In this
respect, I follow the prosody-dominant model as advocated by Bertrand (2010) and
6. Contra Scheppers (2011), who distinguishes between (absolute) P1 and P2 positions. See e.g.
Hengeveld &Mackenzie (2008: 311–312) on absolute and relative positions more generally.
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Goldstein (2010, 2016a).7 The general idea of thismodel is that a Greek postpositive,
being a prosodically attenuated expression, selects as its host the first prosodic word
within the domain it functionally pertains to.
In the following subsections, I will further explain and exemplify this basic idea
by examining: (i) the prosodic host of postpositives, (ii) the domain of postpositives,
(iii) postpositive clusters and (iv) postpositive position in the genre of Greek drama. In
doing so, I will mainly focus on the class of pragmatic particles (i.e. on q-postpositives).
4.3.1 The prosodic host of postpositives
In this section, I will discuss what counts as a first position host for a postpositive ex-
pression. In Ancient Greek, as noted above, this host is generally determined along
prosodic lines. More specifically, a postpositive generally selects the first prosodic
word as a host, rather than the first morphosyntactic word or constituent.8 For q-
postpositives, a number of possible patterns can in actual practice be distinguished.
In the first pattern, the host of the q-postpositive is only a single prepositive ex-
pression, i.e. p q. The following are examples of articles and prepositions respectively,
i.e. prepositives proper (cf. section 4.2 above).9
(1) a. τῶν δ’ ἄλλων (Od. 21.210)
b. οἱ μέν νυν ἄλλοι παῖδες (Hdt. 1.115.3)
c. τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ (Pl. Ap. 23d)
(2) a. ἐν δὲ ἑκάστῃ (Il. 2.509)
b. μέχρι μὲν ὦν τούτου (Hdt. 1.4.1)
c. κατὰ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον (Pl. Cra. 393c)
7. Goldstein’s theory on postpositives and enclitics – which focuses on postpositives in the clausal do-
main and is based on Herodotus only – is employed more generally by Bertrand (2010: ch. 4) in his
work on Ancient Greek word order. Consequently, it is the latter I follow in the present discussion. Cf.
also Thijs (2012: ch. 6).
8. The concept of prosodic word is generally recognized as one of the phonological constituents in the
prosodic hierarchy (cf. Cruttenden 1997: 22–25, Spencer & Luís 2012: 99–103, Goldstein 2016a:
44–47). Prosodicword (ω) is lower than utterance (υ), intonational phrase/intonation unit (ι) and phono-
logical phrase (φ), but higher than e.g. syllable (σ). Most generally, a prosodic word consists of either a
lexical word or a lexical word in combination with proclitic function words, i.e. most of the prepositive
expressions in Ancient Greek (cf. Vis 2014). For the exact prosodic status of enclitics and postpositives
in relation to the notion of prosodic word in Ancient Greek, I refer to Luraghi (2014) and Goldstein
(2016a: ch. 3).
9. In the Greek examples of the present chapter, postpositive expressions are printed in italics.
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The host can also be an introductive expression, as in examples (3) and (4) below
(markers of subordination and illocutionary markers respectively):
(3) a. εἰ δ’ ἐθέλεις (Il. 6.150)
b. ὡς γὰρ δὴ οἱ Λυδοὶ (Hdt. 1.13.1)
c. ὅς γε τυγχάνει ὢν (Pl. Euthphr. 4a)
(4) a. ἦ γὰρ ὀΐομαι (Il. 1.78)
b. τίνες δὲ οἱ Παίονες (Hdt. 5.13.2)
c. ἆρ’ οὖν ἄν τι ὠφελοῖ (Pl. Euthd. 280b)
In addition, one may think of such common particle collocations as καὶ γάρ, καὶ μήν,
καὶ δή, ἀλλὰ γάρ, ἀλλὰ δή and ἀλλά μήν.
In the literature, there is an ongoing debate about how this first pattern should be
prosodically analyzed, since proclitic functionswords –most of the Greek prepositives
– are traditionally not regarded as autonomous prosodic words. An additional compli-
cating factor in this respect is that prepositives proper can only host postpositives of
the q-category, which in turn constitutes the main distributional difference between
q- and r-postpositives.10 I will not pursue these issues any further at this point, since I
ammainly interested in the various positional patterns of q-postpositives, rather than
the exact prosodic analysis that could explain them. I will simply follow Goldstein
(2016a: 75–80) in assuming that in Ancient Greek proclitics may in fact be promoted
to a prosodic word, so that they become a licit host for a postpositive expression.11
In the other patterns, the prosodic host indeed consists of a genuine prosodicword
(indicated by the symbol ω). In the most clear-cut case, the first prosodic word sim-
ply coincides with a mobile word, i.e. Μω q. Examples can probably be found on ev-
ery page of Ancient Greek: ταῦταω μέν, πολλάω δέ, δῆλονω γάρ and so on. In addition,
a prosodic word sometimes consists of a combination of multiple prepositive expres-
sions, i.e. (pp)ω q, as in (5).12
10. Marshall (1987: 29–34) makes highly similar observations with regard to some of the introduc-
tives (rules xx–xxiii).
11. As suggested by Bertrand (2010: 362–363) and Goldstein (2016a: 80–84), an alternative ex-
planation could be that q-postpositives – as opposed to r-postpositives – are also sensitive to syntactic
factors, clinging to either the first morphosyntactic word or first constituent of the sentence. This would
also imply that prepositives proper are in fact not realized as full prosodic words, as they cannot be the
host for r-postpositives. In my view, the issue is in need of further (statistical) research.
12. A prepositive proper is here marked bymeans of a small ‘=’ behind it, indicating that it clings to the
immediately following word.
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(5) a. (ἀλλ’= ὅτε)ω δή ῥ’ ἐκ τοῖο (Il. 1.493)
b. (ἐν= τῇ)ω ὦν παρελθούσῃ εὐεστοῖ (Hdt. 1.85.1)
c. (περὶ= ὧν)ω δ’ ἄν τις ἀντιλέγῃ τούτων (D. 19.57)
And finally, a combination of one or more prepositive expressions with a mobile
word is possible, such as (pM)ω q and (ppM)ω q, as in (6).
(6) a. (περὶ= τρίποδος)ω γὰρ ἔμελλον (Il. 11.700)
b. (καὶ= δοκέουσι)ω δέ μοι οὗτοι (Hdt. 2.44.5)
c. (ἀπὸ= τούτων)ω τοίνυν τῶν ἀγαθῶν (X. Ath. 1.9)
d. (μὴ= ἰατρικοῦ)ω δέ; (Pl. R. 350a)
e. (ὡς= ἐν= κεφαλαίῳ)ω ἄρα εἰρῆσθαι (Pl. Hp.Ma. 366b)
f. (μετὰ= τοῦ= θεοῦ)ω μέντοι. (Pl. Alc. 1 105e)
What is demonstrated by these examples is that the ‘second’ position of postposi-
tive particles is a relative notion and that its apparent variation or flexibility can be
ascribed to the fact that prepositive expressions have an ambiguous prosodic status:
sometimes they are promoted to an autonomous prosodic word, sometimes they con-
stitute a prosodic word together with another prepositive or a mobile word.13
4.3.2 The domain of a postpositive
A second concept that is relevant for the surface position of a postpositive expression
is the domain in which it takes the peninitial position. This domain is first of all syn-
tactic in nature and may be (i) sentence, (ii) clause or (iii) constituent/phrase. As a
general rule, a postpositive expression selects a prosodic host within the syntactic do-
main it functionally pertains to in a given context. This is schematically represented in
(7) below.
The sentence domain consists not only of multiple clauses (main or subordinate),
but also of possible extra-clausalmaterial in pre- or postposed position (Ppre andPpost),
which is generally realizedas adistinct intonational phrase (ι) or intonationunit (iu).14
In this case then, the postpositive takes as a host the first prosodic word in the leftmost
13. Letme note here that the combination of a prepositive and a q-postpositive is prosodically ambigu-
ous with regard to the position of r-postpositives. The combination may in itself function as a prosodic
word that hosts an r-postpositive: (pq)ω r, as in (κατά γε)ω ἄν τὴν ἤπειρον (Hdt. 7.139.2). Alternatively –
and more typically – the combination appears to remain prepositive in nature, so that it needs a mobile
word to form a prosodic host: (pqM)ω r, as in (τὰ= μὲν= ἄλλα)ω μοι… (Pl. Tht. 161c). Postpositive particles
themselves may thus be a constitutive part of a prosodic word that hosts an r-postpositive.
14. See also section 2.5.2 above for the notion of iu and its strong correspondence to the concept of
discourse act.
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iu of the sentence. In case of a clausal domain, which can be a main or subordinate
clause, the postpositive selects the first prosodic word of the iu that constitutes this
clause.15 Finally, in case of a constituent/phrase domain, the host is the first prosodic
word of a phonological phrase (φ).16
(7) [Ppre [clause [constituent] ] Ppost]
sentence [ω q ]
clause [ω q ]
constituent/phrase [ω q ]
(after Bertrand 2010: 366, q = any postpositive)
As can be seen in the scheme above, variation in the syntactic domain of postpositives
may cause them to occur at different peninitial positions within one and the same
utterance. The following examples serve to illustrate this fact:
(8) (ταῦταω μὲν)ι (ἐς= Ἄδρηστόνω οἱ ἐπεποίητο.)ι
These things μέν, had been carried out by him (οἱ) against Adrastos.
(Hdt. 5.68.1, Goldstein 2016a: 141)
(9) (πρότερονω δὲ)ι (ἦνω ἄρα ἀνώνυμος ὥσπερ αἱ ἕτεραι.)ι
But (δέ) before, apparently (ἄρα) she was nameless like the others. (Hdt. 4.45.5)
(10) (οὐ γάρ που (τό γε τοιόνδε)φ φῄς·)ι
For (γάρ) Ι presume (που) you do not affirm the following γε point: … (Pl. R. 338c)
(11) (ἔτιω τοίνυν)ι (ἐνθένδεω ἂν μᾶλλον (πᾶςω τις)φ ὁμολογήσειεν ταὐτὰ ταῦτα,)ι (εἰ= περὶ=
παντόςω τις τοῦ εἴδους ἐρωτῴη)ι (ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυγχάνει ὄν.)ι
To proceed then (τοίνυν), based on this point ἄν everyone (τις) would more readily
agree to these same things, if someone (τις) would ask about the whole class which
the advantageous belongs to. (Pl. Tht. 178a, Bertrand 2010: 366)
In (8), the forward-linkingdiscourse connectiveμέν scopes over thewhole sentence, in-
cluding preposedmaterial (an extraclausal Theme constituent), whereas the pronom-
inal enclitic οἱ (‘by him’), serving as an argument of the verb, takes the central clause
15. With regard to r-postpostives an important qualification is in place here, which concerns the possi-
ble diachronic weakening ofWackernagel’s Law (cf.Wackernagel 1892: 392). From the classical era on-
wards, clausal ἄν and pronominal postpositives appear to occur with increasing frequency in a ‘deferred’
position, taking the verb as a prosodic host, rather than the first prosodic word of the clause. I refer to
Marshall (1987: 13–14), Ruijgh (1990: 641–642), Bertrand (2010: 369–376), Luraghi (2014) and
Goldstein (2016a: 293, 2016b) for further discussion.
16. A phonological phrase is generally taken as the prosodic counterpart of the syntactic constituent or
phrase. See footnote 8 on the prosodic hierarchy.
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q-postpositives r-postpositives
sentence discourse particles (e.g. ἄρα,
γάρ, δέ, δή, μήν, νυν, οὖν, που,
τοι, τοίνυν)
–
clause discourse particles (e.g. ἄρα, δέ,
δή, μέν, μήν, που, τοι)
tma-particles (ἄν, κε)
pronouns/adverbs as arguments/
adjuncts of the predicate
constituent/
phrase
focus particles (γε, περ)
coordinating τε
pronouns/adverbs as phrase mod-
ifiers (e.g. possessive and indefi-
nite determiners)
Table 4.3: Prototypical categorization of postpositives with respect to
syntactic domain in Ancient Greek
as its domain. Similarly, in (9), the discourse particle δέ has sentence scope, whereas
attitudinal ἄρα scopes over the main clause only. In (10), we see that the connective
γάρ and attitudinal που both take the sentence or clause as a domain, whereas the fo-
cus particle γε pertains to the constituent τὸ τοιόνδε only. And in example (11), finally,
the discourse connective τοίνυν takes the whole sentence as a domain – semantically,
it most probably even executes its force to a whole speech turn; the modal particle ἄν
and the second instance of τις (‘someone’, the subject of the subordinate εἰ-clause) both
pertain to the syntactic clause they belong to and cling to the first prosodicword of this
domain (resp. ἐνθένδε and εἰ= περὶ= παντός); and the first instance of τις is amodifier on
the phrasal level and takes the subject constituent πᾶς as a host.
On the basis of this line of reasoning, postpositive expressions can in turn be cat-
egorized according to the syntactic domain they typically pertain to, which is based
upon the semantic properties of the item in question. This is here done in table 4.3
above.17 If we focus on the scopal properties of q-postpositives in particular, it is clear
that both discourse connective and attitudinal-interactional particles pertain to the
sentence or clause domain, whereas focus particles (γε, περ) and connective τε typi-
cally pertain to the constituent/phrase domain.
17. Cf. the similar overview by Goldstein (2016a: 87–91) for postpositives in Herodotus. I do not ac-
cord, however, with his choice to take the particles μέν and δέ as topicmarkers on the phrasal level. Rather,
these typically indicate discourse boundaries and function as discourse connective particles that pertain
to either the sentence or clause domain.
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As to the individual particles within the former group, I do not make any further
general distinctions at this point, as I contend that most of them are not strictly tied
to either the clause or the sentence domain, but are inherently flexible in this respect.
That is, in actual discourse, instances of these items can generally be found both in the
sentence-peninitial position (sentence scope) and in the interior of a sentence, scoping
over a main or subordinate clause only.18 For some particles, these scope differences
may also reflect differences in meaning. In the end then, the syntactic domain of a
particle and its position within an utterance strongly depend upon the meaning of a
particular instance in a given context. And, conversely, the position of a particle may
provide a valuable clue with regard to its meaning contribution in discourse – a prin-
ciple which will play an important role in the present study and which I will return to
in more detail in section 4.4 below.
Observe, incidentally, that it also follows from this overview, as we have seen be-
fore, that there are in principle no structural distinctions between the categories of
discourse connective and attitudinal-interactional particles inAncientGreek: both are
typically realized as unaccented postpositive expressions and are in principle found in
the peninitial position of the sentence or (main/subordinate) clause which they per-
tain to in a given context. In turn, this fact is in line with themore general idea that the
distinction between these categories is not rigid but fluid in nature, and that in some
cases properties of both categories are in fact combined (see sections 2.3.3 and 2.10).
4.3.3 Postpositive clusters
As opposed to the examples we have seen in the previous subsection, it may happen –
and indeed frequently does – that the left-boundaries of the various syntactic domains
of postpositives coincide. Thismay result in a situation inwhich different postpositives
select the same prosodic host and, as a consequence, surface in a postpositive cluster.
Consider the following examples:
18. One exception deserves mention here, viz. the discourse connective particles that are strictly used
to indicate relations between sentences or even larger stretches of discourse (i.e. moves), such as γάρ,
τοίνυν and νυν. Given their semantics, these items are clearly restricted to the sentence domain and sen-
tence-peninitial position. By contrast, other primarily connective items (e.g. δέ, μέν, μέντοι and τε) may in
addition pertain to the relation between the clauses that make up a complex sentence. As such, they are
more flexible in their scopal and positional behaviour.
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(12) πρόσθενω μὲν γὰρ δή μοι ἀεικέλιος δέατ᾿ εἶναι
νῦν δὲ θεοῖσιν ἔοικε, …
For (γάρ) μὲν δή earlier he appeared to me (μοι) to be disgraceful, but now he is like
the gods, … (Od. 6.242–243)
(13) πολλάω τε γάρ μιν καὶ μεγάλα τὰ ἐπαείροντα καὶ ἐποτρύνοντα ἦν, …
For (γάρ) thereweremany τε andweighty reasons that impelled and encouragedhim
(μιν), … (Hdt. 1.204.2)
(14) καλῶςω τοίνυν ἂν ἡμῖν ἡ πρεσβυτῶν ἔμφρων παιδιὰ μέχρι δεῦρ’ εἴη τὰ νῦν διαπεπαισμένη.
Now then (τοίνυν), it would ἄν seem that up to this point the ancients’ game of reason
has now been finely played by us (ἡμῖν). (Pl. Lg. 769a, Bertrand 2010: 367)
In all of these cases the start of the sentence coincideswith the start of themain clause,
since extra-clausal material in Ppre is absent. As a result, postpositives that pertain to
the sentence (γάρ) and those that pertain to the clause (μέν, ἄν, personal pronouns) end
up in a cluster. Moreover, note that the connective τε in (13) functions on the phrasal
level (corresponsivewith καί in the phrase πολλά τε καὶ μεγάλα). In this case then, πολλά
is the first prosodic word in all of the three syntactic domains and functions as a host
for sentential γάρ, clausal μιν and phrasal τε.
Now, as has been shown by various authors, the order of the items within such
a postpositive cluster is predictable according to a number of fixed regularities. First
of all, on the most general level, there is a very strong tendency that q-postpositives
precede r-postpositives.19 For example, the particle cluster μὲν γὰρ δή precedes μοι in
(12), the cluster τε γάρ precedes μιν in (13), and τοίνυν precedes both ἄν and ἡμῖν in
(14).
Second, more specifically, regularities are discernible within both of these cate-
gories. For q-postpositives, on the one hand, Scheppers gives the following basic order
on the basis of a large corpus of classical prose texts:20
(15) Typical order of q-postpositives in clusters
δέ < τε < μέν < γάρ < τοίνυν < οὖν < γε < δή < που/ποτε < ἄρα
(Scheppers 2011: 94)
19. See Marshall (1987: 26, rule xiv) and Scheppers (2011: 91–93), who shows that this rule allows
but few exceptions in classical Greek.
20. For the basic particle order in Homeric epic, which is highly similar in nature, I refer to Ruijgh
(1990), Wills (1993) and Soulètis (1998). With regard to the Homeric order of ‘adverbial’ particles,
Ruijgh (1990: 221) offers the interesting theory that it reflects the chronological order of ‘postpositiva-
tion’ of the particles: particles that have obtained a postpositive status at a diachronically later stage, also
occur later in the postpositive particle chain.
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As shown by Scheppers, this order is almost without any exceptions.21 The general
tendency is that discourse connective particles precede the non-connective particles
with an attitudinal-interactional function. Moreover, δέ and the forward-linking parti-
cles μέν and τε always precede the other connectives such as γάρ and τοίνυν, as in (12)
and (13). Finally, phrasal particles that scope over the first constituent, generally pre-
cede the discourse connective ones and are sometimes even affix-like in nature (cf. περ
in ὅσπερ, εἴπερ; see also section 2.3.2 above).22
For r-postpositives, on the other hand, it has been shown that ἄν typically precedes
indefinite enclitics, which in turn precede personal pronouns (both enclitics and post-
positive αὐτ-forms).23 This is illustrated in (14), where ἄν precedes ἡμῖν. These regular-
ities thus result into the following schematic generalization:
(16) Typical order of postpositives in clusters
q-postpositive < r-postpositive
phrasal < connect. dp < att.-int. dp ἄν < indefinite < enclit. pronoun/αὐτ-
4.3.4 A qualification: postpositives in Greek drama
Although the characterizationof thepositional behaviour of postpositives discussed so
far generally holds true for theAncientGreek language, there is onemajor qualification
to be made. Within the genre of Greek drama, the distribution of postpositive words
appears to be much more flexible and brings about some important deviations from
themodel presented so far. As suggested by Goldstein (2010: ch. 5) in his study on ἄν
and the pronominal enclitics, this flexibility can be adduced to the metrical character
of these texts, which is also a prosodically-oriented concept. More specifically, Gold-
stein proposes that within the metrical patterns of dramatic dialogue (i.e. the iambic
trimeter and the trochaic tetrameter) the intonational boundaries of caesura and verse
21. I refer to Scheppers (2011: 93–95) for data on the frequency of occurrence of particle clusters.
Three qualifications are in place here: (i) some of the particles (μήν, μέντοι, τοι) are not taken into consid-
eration in his table, because they do not occur very frequently in clusters; (ii) the particle αὖ always comes
last in the clusters in which it occurs; (iii) one important exception is the possible alternation between
the orders οὖν δή and δὴ οὖν.
22. See Ruijgh (1990: 215–220), Wills (1993: 63, 66–70) and Goldstein (2016a: 86–88). A complex
issue, inmy opinion, is the position of the particle γε. In Scheppers’s overview, γε takes a position between
the connective and attitudinal-interactional particles – given clusters like δέ γε, μέν γε (οὖν) and γε δή.
However, we also find the clusters γε μήν and γε μέντοι, where μήν and μέντοι are discourse-connective
in nature (not taken into consideration in Scheppers’s table, cf. footnote 21). In my view, the difference
in position might correlate with scopal (and meaning) differences, but this would require a large-scale
research on the position and functions of γε as well as its interaction with other particles. I leave this for
further research.
23. See Ruijgh (1990) and Scheppers (2011: 95–97).
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end give rise to alternative locations for a postpositive to select a prosodic host, which
may differ from what we would expect on the basis of its syntactic domain.24 Let me
shortly discuss the two additional patterns that are given by Goldstein.
In the first pattern, postpositives take a verse-initial or post-caesural host. Al-
though this often coincides with the first prosodic word of a syntactic clause or sen-
tence, this certainly need not be the case, as illustrated by the following examples.25
(17) [ιρ.] τὸ χρή νιν ἐξέσῳζεν, οὐδ’ εἴα πατὴρ
Ζεύςω νιν κακῶς δρᾶν | οὔτ’ ἔμ’ οὔθ’ Ἥραν ποτε·
iris. … Fate was keeping him alive, and father Zeus allowed neither me nor Hera to
ever harm him (νιν). (E. Heracl. 828–829)
(18) amphitryon. … Creon became the father of this Megara,
ἣν πάντες ὑμεναίοισι Καδμεῖοί ποτε
λωτῷ συνηλάλαξαν ἡνίκ’ εἰς ἐμοὺς
δόμους ὁ κλεινὸς | Ἡρακλῆςω νιν ἤγετο.
whom all Cadmaeans at her wedding once escorted with pipe music, when the fa-
mous Heracles brought her (νιν) into my house. (E. Heracl. 10–12)
Ιn (17) the postpositive νιν selects the verse-initial host (Ζεύς) rather than a clause-
initial one (οὐδ’). And in (18), νιν selects post-caesural Ἡρακλῆς as a host, rather than
the clause-initial subordinator ἡνίκ’.
In the second pattern, a postpositive appears to select a host not at the left- but
at the right-edge of an intonational unit. In other words, it takes a verse-final or pre-
caesural host, as in the following examples:26
(19) σι. οὐκ οἶδ᾿, Ὀδυσσεῦ· πᾶνω δέ σοι | δρῴημενω ἄν.
silenus. I don’t know, Odysseus. But (δέ) we would ἄν do everything for you (σοι).
(E. Cyc. 132)
(20) [αγ.] ἤδη δ᾿ ὑπερβαίνοντα γεῖσα τειχέων
βάλλει κεραυνῷ Ζεύςω νιν· ἐκτύπησε δὲ
χθών, ὥστε δεῖσαι πάντας·
messenger. … And just as he was scaling the parapet of the walls, Zeus strikes him
(νιν) with a thunderbolt. The earth resounded, so as to scare everyone.
(E. Ph. 1180–1182)
24. Cf. Goldstein (2010: 97): “[T]he metrical template itself enriches the prosodic constituency of a
clause by parsing it into constituents (specifically, intonational phrases) that would not arise from phrase
structure alone. As a result, clitic distribution is far more variegated than what we find in prose.”
25. Examples (17) to (20) I owe to Goldstein (2010: ch. 5).
26. Cf. also verse-final ποτε in (18) above and pre-caesural ἄν in (25) below.
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In (19), ἄν takes verse-final δρῴημεν as prosodic host, whereas a host at the left edge
of the iu is also available (πᾶν) – observe that postpositive δέ and σοι do take πᾶν as a
host. And in (20), νιν selects the final word in the first part of the verse as a host (i.e. a
pre-caesural host) rather than the first word at the left-edge of the verse.
Unfortunately, both of these metrically-conditioned patterns are still poorly un-
derstood and I accord with Goldstein’s conclusion that the distribution of clausal cli-
tics in Greek drama is “a very complex, even mysterious phenomenon, which requires
considerably more research” (Goldstein 2010: 120). Ιn my view, moreover, very simi-
lar qualifications are in order with respect to the position of pragmatic particles within
the q-category, even if not primarily studied by Goldstein.27 Although there generally
appears to be a strong preference for the usual peninitial position in the clause or sen-
tence, themetrically-conditioned patterns as exemplified above, especially Goldstein’s
right-edge pattern, are not unexceptional for these items too.
As for the discourse connective particles, Denniston (1954: lx) in fact explicitly
designates Attic drama as a source of exceptions in which “postponement” is at stake,
which he adduces to “metrical convenience”.28 Consider, for instance, the following
examples of right-edge patterns of the connectives γάρ and δέ respectively:
(21) [πη.] πολλῶν νέωνω γὰρ | καὶ γέρων εὔψυχος ὢν
κρείσσων· τί γὰρ δεῖ δειλὸν ὄντ᾿ εὐσωματεῖν;
peleus. … For (γάρ) even a graybeard, if he be brave, is more than a match for many
young men. For what use is bodily vigor if one is a coward? (E. Andr. 764–765)
(22) πρ. διὰ τἀργύριον πολεμοῦμενω γάρ; |
λυ. καὶ τἄλλα γε πάντ᾿ ἐκυκήθη.
magistrate. For (γάρ) arewe atwar on account of themoney? – lysistrata. Yes, and
everything else got messed up too. (Ar. Lys. 489)
(23) [κη.] ἐν νυκτὶ δυσκύμανταω δ᾿ | ὠρώρει κακά·
herald. … But (δέ) in the night there arose a terrible wave of troubles. (A. Ag. 653)
(24) [φι.] φόνον φόνουω δὲ | ῥύσιον τείσω τάλας
πρὸς τοῦ δοκοῦντος οὐδὲν εἰδέναι κακόν.
27. To my knowledge, there is no study that systematically investigates the issue of the position of q-
postpositives in Attic drama, but some conclusions can in fact be drawn from Denniston (1954), who
consistently comments upon the position of individual particles, such as ἄρα (pp. 41–42), γάρ (95–98),
δέ (187–188), οὖν (427) and που (493).
28. It must be noted, however, that Denniston employs an absolute second position as the general rule,
rather than a relative peninitial position which is prosodically determined (see section 4.3.1 above). This
means that some of his examples of ‘postponement’ are in fact no exceptions but in full accordance with
the prosody-dominant model as outlined above (e.g. patterns pMq, ppMq).
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philoctetes. … And (δέ) I shall pay blood as compensation for blood, poor fellow,
through the act of one who seemed innocent of evil. (S. Ph. 959–960)
In these examples, the connectivedoesnot select the first prosodicwordwithin the
clause as a host (i.e. πολλῶν, διὰ= τἀργύριον, ἐν= νυκτί and φόνον respectively). Rather, it
selects a pre-caesural host, the connective particle ending up right before the main
caesura.29
Furthermore, if we look at the discourse particles with an attitudinal or interac-
tional function, it turns out that these may also select a verse-final host. Consider the
following examples of που and ἄρα:30
(25) [αι.] ἀλλ᾿ ὧδέ γ᾿ Ἀτρείδας ἂν | εὐφράναιμίω που.
aias. … But in that way, I suppose (που), I would ἄν give pleasure to the sons of
Atreus. (S. Aj. 469)
(26) [τε.] νῦν δ᾿ εἰμὶ δούλη. | θεοῖς γὰρ ὧδ᾿ ἔδοξέω που
καὶ σῇ μάλιστα χειρί.
tecmessa. … But now I am a slave. For (γάρ) that was the will of the gods, I suppose
(που), and of your strength in particular. (S. Aj. 489–490)
(27) [τρ.] σὺ δ᾿ οὐκ ἀνέξῃ; | χρῆν σ᾿ ἐπὶ= ῥητοῖςω ἄρα
πατέρα φυτεύειν ἢ ᾿πὶ δεσπόταις θεοῖς
ἄλλοισιν, εἰ μὴ τούσδε γε στέρξεις νόμους.
nurse. … But you won’t stand for this? Your father apparently (ἄρα) should have be-
gotten you (σε) on fixed terms or with a different set of gods as masters, if you are not
going to put up with these rules. (E. Hipp. 459–461)
(28) αγ. ψευδῶς λέγουσαί μ᾿ αἵδ᾿ ἀπήλαυνον δόμων,
ὡς ἐκτὸς εἴης· | σὺ δὲ κατ᾿ οἶκον ἦσθ᾿ω ἄρα.
messenger. These women tried to drive me away from the temple by telling lies,
saying you were elsewhere. But (δέ) apparently (ἄρα) you were inside.
(E. IT 1309–1310)
Crucially, the verse-final host in these examples does not coincide with the first
prosodic word of the syntactic clause they pertain to. Note, moreover, that in all exam-
ples the attitudinal particle differs in position from other postpositives in the clause
(i.e. ἄν, γάρ, σε and δέ respectively). Again, the exact prosodic analysis of these right-
29. Cf. also Goldstein (2010: 118–120) on the even more extreme freedom of the position of γάρ
within the comedies of Menander (circa 340–290 bc), the most important representative of Greek New
Comedy.
30. Note that in (25), the host is post-caesural and verse-final at the same time.
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edge patterns is in need of further research, but it seems warranted, at any rate, to
conclude that the exceptional positional behaviour of postpositive particles in Attic
drama should be adduced to the metrical template used in this genre.
To sumup, in Attic drama the position of postpositives, including postpositive par-
ticles, is influenced by the prosody of themetrical template, which in some cases over-
rides the syntactically-conditioned principles that we know from other Greek texts. In
turn, it can be inferred that in Attic drama the position of a (pragmatic) particle does
not necessarily align with its syntactic scope. In the next section, the relation between
particle position and syntactic scope will be discussed in more detail.
4.4 The position of particles as linguistic evidence
In this final section, I point out how the general prosodic and syntactic behaviour of
AncientGreekparticles as discussed in theprevious sectionsmay in turnbeused as lin-
guistic evidence in the analysis of individual particles. Most generally, I claim that the
position of a postpositive particle within an Ancient Greek utterance may be taken as
formal linguistic evidence for its syntactic scope (constituent/phrase, clause, sentence)
and, in some cases, for the particle category it belongs to (focus-modifying, attitudinal-
interactional, discourse connective). In this respect, I generally apply the following six
rules of thumb:
(i) An introductive particle as a prosodic host. If a postpositive particle takes an
introductive particle as prosodic host (i.e. a discourse connective, interrogative
or polarity particle; cf. section 4.2 above), we can conclude that the postpositive
does not have scope over a phrase or constituent. This is because introductive
particles by definition pertain to either the clause or the sentence: they do not
constitute or introduce a constituent/phrasewhich thepostpositive could scope
over.
(ii) Sentence-peninitial position. Given the fact that the left boundaries of syntac-
tic domains may coincide, a particle in sentence-peninitial position is in prin-
ciple ambiguous as to its syntactic scope: it may of course scope over the full
sentence, but it cannot be a priori ruled out that it scopes over the first clause or
the first constituent of that sentence (but see (i) above). This holds in particular
for those cases in which there is no extra-clausal material in the left-periphery
of the sentence, i.e. cases in which sentence and clause are co-extensive (cf. sec-
tion 4.3.3).
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(iii) Clause-peninitial position. In this pattern, a particle takes peninitial position
in a postposed (main or subordinate) clause, i.e. a clause that is not at the start of
a new sentence, but occurs after extra-clausal material in Ppre or after a preced-
ing (main or subordinate) clause. This entails that sentence scope is definitely
ruled out and that there is in principle ambiguity between clausal or phrasal
scope (but see (i) and (vi) for exceptions). In turn, this implies that the particle
does not function as a discourse connective that indicates (coherence) relations
between full sentences or larger units of discourse. That is, it does not function
on the level of themove. Moreover, if the particle features in a postposed clause
introduced by a subordinating conjunction, a connective function on act level
is generally ruled out as well (the connection being made by the subordinator).
(iv) Clause-internal position. A particle takes clause-internal position if it does not
select the first prosodic word of the clause as prosodic host, but is found in a po-
sition later in the clause. This position provides unambiguous evidence for syn-
tactic scope over a constituent/phrase (but see (vi) below). In turn, this strongly
suggest a reading as, e.g., a focus modifying or intensifying particle (with the
exception of coordinators on the phrasal level such as τε).
(v) Position within a postpositive cluster. Within a postpositive cluster, an un-
expected position of a particle with respect to other postpositive particles may
provide an indication of its type. For example, there are some instances inwhich
δή occurs in front of genuine discourse connectives (i.e. Χω δὴ μέν/γάρ), rather
than behind them, as wewould expect on the basis of the typical patterns intro-
duced in section 4.3.3 above. This anomalous position, in turn, strongly suggests
that the particle in these cases has phrasal scope, or should even be read as af-
fixal in nature.
(vi) Qualification for Attic drama. In Attic drama, the position of particles within
an utterance cannot in principle be used as unambiguous indicators of its syn-
tactic scope due to the additional metrically-conditioned patterns that apply in
this genre. This overrides principles (iii) and (iv) above.
Especially for particles that still lack an adequate description of their meaning(s), a
study of its positional behaviour along the lines described so far is in principle a good
starting point. If the positional evidence generally points to differences in scope or
particle category, we can conclude that the particle also has different meanings. That
is, as in other languages, positional evidence in Ancient Greek may provide tangible
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linguistic clues in favour of a polysemous analysis of a particular particle. It is this line
of line of reasoning that is highly relevant for my analyses of μήν and especially δή in
the second part of this study.
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Chapter 5
The particle μήν
The present chapter contains the first of two detailed case studies offered in this study,
which is concerned with the particle μήν. The chapter is structured as follows. I will
first set the scene by providing a general overview of the main distributional proper-
ties of the particle (section 5.1), paying special attention to the relation with its cog-
nate forms μάν and μέν. In the subsequent sections, I turn to my examination of the
various different usages of μήν. In doing so, I will make a broad distinction between
its usages as an attitudinal-interactional marker on the one hand (section 5.2), and
its usages as a discourse connective on the other (section 5.3). After that, I will wrap
up the discussion and bring together the main findings into a coherent, polysemous,
picture (section 5.4). Finally, I will re-examine two of the most influential accounts of
μήν given in the earlier literature, viz. those of Denniston (1954) andWakker (1995,
1996, 1997a), and I will show how I believe these are improved upon by the polyse-
mous account given here (section 5.5).
It should be noted that many of the ideas presented in the present chapter have
already been set forth in Thijs (2017a, 2017b), in which I have studied the particle in
the genre of Platonic dialogue. The present chapter must be seen as a more elaborate,
extended and updated version of these two earlier papers.
5.1 Setting the scene
In linewith the bottom-up approach advocated in the present study, I startmy analysis
of μήν by giving a first general impression of the data that need to find an explanation
in a unified account of the particle. That is, I will give an overview of the syntactic-dis-
tributional properties of μήν, looking into (i) variation in position and syntactic scope
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(section 5.1.2) and (ii) the kind of linguistic contexts inwhich it recurrently occurs, e.g.
in terms of basic speech act types and collocations with other particles (section 5.1.3).
Before we do so, however, it is necessary to make some preliminary remarks concern-
ing the dialectical variation of the lexical item that is at stake here (section 5.1.1).
5.1.1 The forms μήν, μάν and μέν
An intricate issue which immediately pops up when talking about the particle μήν is
its relationship with the cognate forms μάν (with long ᾱ) and μέν. As has been widely
recognized in the literature, these three forms vary in their general distribution among
the main dialect groups of Ancient Greek, as shown in table 5.1.1
dialect ‘affirmative’ use preparatory use
Aeolic and Doric μάν
μέν in all dialectsAttic μήν
Ionic μέν
Table 5.1: The distribution of μήν/μάν/μέν among the main Greek dialects
The form μήν only occurs in Attic Greek, whereas μάν is used instead in the Doric and
Aeolic dialects: in my corpus we find it in Homeric epic, Pindar, the choral parts of
tragedy and in the speech of a number foreign characters in Aristophanic comedy. The
Ionic dialect, on the other hand, rather has the shortened form μέν in the kind of con-
texts where we find μήν/μάν in the other dialects, in particular in the collocation with
καί, γε, ἦ and negatives (καὶ μέν, γε μέν, ἦ μέν, οὐ μέν and so on; cf.section 5.1.3 below).
This usage of μέν is notably found inHomeric epic andHerodotus. Different dialectical
variants are thus used for the same lexical item, which – in its original use at least – is
usually regarded as an ‘affirmative’ or ‘emphatic’ particle, i.e. as an attitudinal-interac-
tional marker.2
1. The issue of the relationship between μήν, μάν and μέν is treated by, among others, Hartung (1832–
1833: ii, 372–416), Wackernagel (1916: 177–182), Leumann (1949), Schwyzer &Debrunner (1950:
569–570), Denniston (1954: 328–329, 359), Ruijgh (1971: 197–204, 741–742), E. J. Bakker (1993c,
1997a: 80–85), Morpurgo Davies (1997), Cuypers (2005), de Kreij (2016b: §2.4) and Fresch (2017).
See also the lemmas on μήν/μάν in Chantraine (1968–1980) and Beekes (2010). I will restrict my pre-
sentation to the situation in Ancient Greek and will not go into the possible Proto-Indo-European roots
of these forms.
2. The exact dialectical/historical relationship between affirmative μάν, μήν and μέν remains uncertain.
Although the alternation between Doric/Aeolic μάν and Attic μήν could in principle be accounted for by
means of the regular historical sound laws inGreek (ᾱ > η), the existence of affirmative μέν in Ionic cannot,
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The form μέν, however, is in fact far more commonly used as a discourse connec-
tive particle with a so-called ‘anticipatory’, ‘forward-linking’ or ‘preparatory’ function.
In this use, μένmarks the first part of a contrastive or correlative pair and thus prepares
the ground for an upcoming piece of discourse, where it is usually resolved by δέ or an-
other connective particle. Here wemay comparemodern construction such as English
on the one/other hand and German zwar/aber, although such translations are actually
much too strong in many cases.3 Some typical examples are given in (1).
(1) a. ἐννῆμαρ μὲν ἀνὰ στρατὸν ᾤχετο κῆλα θεοῖο,
τῇ δεκάτῃ δ᾿ ἀγορήνδε καλέσσατο λαὸν Ἀχιλλεύς.
For nine days μέν themissiles of the god ranged through the army, but (δέ) on the
tenth Achilles called the army to the place of assembly. (Il. 1.53–54)
b. ἐγὼ δὲ λέξω δεινὰ μέν, δίκαια δέ.
And what I will say is μέν shocking but (δέ) right. (Ar. Ach. 501)
c. Δαρείου καὶ Παρυσάτιδος γίγνονται παῖδες δύο, πρεσβύτερος μὲν Ἀρταξέρξης, νεώτε-
ρος δὲ Κῦρος.
Darius and Parysatis had two sons born to them, the elder μέν Artaxerxes, the
younger δέ Cyrus. (X. An. 1.1.1)
From a diachronic perspective, this preparatory sense is commonly assumed to
have originated from the affirmative sense of the particle, i.e. as a later meaning ex-
tension. Such a development indeed appears quite plausible to me, as this path of
semantic change is a common phenomenon cross-linguistically. We may compare
for instance the development of concessive markers like German zwar (< ze ware ‘in
truth’), Dutch weliswaar (< wel is waar ‘it is true’) and English certainly (cf. Simon-
Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007: 92–93). Affirmative markers are often used in con-
cessive/contrastive contexts and in the course of time these contextual meanings may
gradually become a conventionalized part of the semantics of these items (see sec-
tion 3.2.1 above). The original affirmativemeaning, on the other hand, tends to bleach
away and may eventually completely disappear. As far as Ancient Greek is concerned,
however, we must assume that such a process has taken place well before the time
of our earliest textual sources, as preparatory μέν already shows up in Homeric epic
since we would have expected to find μήν in Ionic as well. The most plausible view, in my opinion, is that
affirmative μέν is a phonologically reduced (i.e. grammaticalized) form of μήν, which in Ionic apparently
occurred across the board and in Attic only in certain recurrent particle clusters (see below).
3. Preparatory μέν need not be resolved by another particle, the contrast remaining implicit. This phe-
nomenon is usually referred to as μέν solitarium. For the μέν/δέ pattern in Ancient Greek, see especially
the work of E. J. Bakker (1993a, 1993c, 1997a: 80–85).
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and is a widespread phenomenon among all of the Greek dialects. In other words, the
preparatory sense of μέν appears to be a fully entrenched and distinct usage already in
early Greek.4
It follows then, as shown in table 5.1, that the Ionic dialect does not formally dis-
tinguish between the affirmative and preparatory meanings, as it employs the form
μέν for both purposes. In this respect, Ionic significantly differs from the other dialect
groups, where the two main functions are in principle encoded by different forms (af-
firmative μάν/μήν vs. preparatory μέν). One important qualification needs to be made
here, however, which involves the distribution of these forms in a number of recurrent
postpositive particle clusters (cf. section 4.3.3). It is a conspicuous fact that the form
μήν does never occur in direct collocation with the discourse particles οὖν, δή and τοι
(*μὴν οὖν, *μὴν δή, *μήν τοι). In Attic, just as in Ionic, the shortened form μέν is invari-
ably used in such contexts: μὲν δή, μὲν οὖν and μέν τοι. The latter collocation, in fact,
has grammaticalized into the univerbated particle μέντοι in classical Greek (cf. Allan
2021; see also section 2.3.2).5 Importantly, μέν in these combinations may in princi-
ple perform both of the functions mentioned above: in some cases it is clear that μέν
is used as a preparatory particle (e.g. with a corresponding δέ), but in others it is the
equivalent of what elsewhere would be μήν/μάν, in particular in collocation with καί,
ἀλλά, γε, ἦ and negatives (καὶ μὲν δή, γε μὲν δή, οὐ μὲν δή and so on).
It follows that the restriction of not using μήν in these clusters seems to be of a
mere formal character: a phonological reduction of μήν takes place when it is followed
by another discourse particle in the same postpositive cluster – which is in principle
irrespective of the meaning contributions of these particles.6 We can thus conclude
that, in Attic too, the form μέν is at least partially ambiguous in nature.
4. Leumann (1949) argues that the preparatory use of μέν most probably originated in Ionic Greek
and subsequently spread to the other Greek dialects. More in particular, he connects this process with
the spread of the scientific discourse that started out in the Ionic area. The latter strikes me as a rather
implausible assumption, however, given that the preparatory use already seems to be fully entrenched
across all dialects at the start of the historic period.
5. With respect to Doric μάν, this restriction appears to be less strict: the form μάντοι has been attested
in an inscription from Epidaurus (4th century bce), whereas Theocritus (3rd c. bce) twice uses the col-
location ἦ μὰν δή.
6. This is perhaps too strong a generality, given that the collocation μήν που does in fact occur, albeit
marginally. This seems to suggest that the vowel reduction (μήν > μέν) especially occurred in collocational
patterns with a high frequency of usage, which are more easily inclined to become fixed units or even
coalesce into new lexemes, as in the case of μέντοι. Some scholars, indeed, would even prefer to write
fixed μενδή and μενοὖν (see e.g. Hartung 1832–1833: ii, 399–402). See also section 1.4.3 above on the
issue of univerbation in Ancient Greek.
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An important consequence of the state of affairs just described is that it is difficult to
map out the exact distribution of the lexical item under consideration in the present
chapter. If one wants to give a complete picture of the meaning and use of the particle
μήν in Ancient Greek, one must of course include its dialectic/formal variants μάν and
μέν as well. Whereas this does not pose any problems for μάν, the Doric/Aeolic coun-
terpart of μήν, the case of μέν confronts us with a methodological difficulty due to the
double duty of this form in Ionic and, to a lesser extent, in Attic. In Homeric epic and
Herodotus, in particular, any instance of μέν in principle raises the question whether
we are dealing with the Ionic equivalent of μήν/μάν or with preparatory μέν. Although
in many cases the collocation with other expressions (e.g. other particles and nega-
tives) provides clear evidence in providing an answer to this question, other instances
are in fact much less straightforward to decide upon.
Given this difficulty, I take it to be themethodologicallymost valid approach to ex-
amine themeaning and use of the forms μήν and μάν first, which do not show the same
ambiguity as μέν. Thus, the primary focus of the present chapter will be on μήν/μάν,
whereas the form μέν, however interesting it may be, has not been a systematic object
of investigation, nor is the compound particle μέντοι. Nevertheless, it is of course im-
portant to keep in mind that the functions of μήν/μάν may also be performed by the
form μέν in certain contexts, notably when it occurs in certain postpositive particle
clusters.
5.1.2 Position and syntactic scope
If we examine the position of μήν in the Ancient Greek sentence, it turns out that we
arrive at a fairly one-sided picture. Of the three possible positions of postpositive parti-
cles distinguished in chapter 4, the particle predominantly occurs in sentence-penini-
tial position, as in the following examples:7
(2) – ἀλλὰ μὴν μὴ ὄν γε οὐχ ἕν τι ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ὀρθότατ’ ἂν προσαγορεύοιτο;
– πάνυ γε.
– μὴ= ὄντιω μὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπέδομεν, ὄντι δὲ γνῶσιν;
“But (ἀλλά) μήν themost accurate word for what is not isn’t ‘one thing’ but ‘nothing’?”
– “Certainly.” – “We μήν had to set ignorance over what is not and knowledge over
what is?” (Pl. R. 478c)
7. Cf. Denniston (1954: 330): “μήν almost invariably occurs near the opening of a sentence”.
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(3) Having emptied this great flood of words into our ears all at once like a bath atten-
dant, Thrasymachus intended to leave.
οὐ μὴν εἴασάν γε αὐτὸν οἱ παρόντες, ἀλλ’ ἠνάγκασαν ὑπομεῖναί τε καὶ παρασχεῖν τῶν εἰρη-
μένων λόγον.
Those present μήν did not let him, but made him stay to give an account of what he
said. (Pl. R. 344d)
In the three instances of μήν presented here, the particle occurs at the start of a new
sentence, taking ἀλλά, μὴ ὄντι and οὐ as a prosodic host respectively. Note that we find
μήν both at the start of a new speech turn in conversation (turn-initial usage of μήν), as
in the two instances in (2), and within the interior of a speech turn, as in (3).
In addition, there are cases in which μήν occurs in clause-peninitial position, i.e.
in peninitial position in a clause which is not at the start of a new sentence. This phe-
nomenon, however, is restricted to a small number of specific patterns, including the
following:
(4) κλ. μόγις μέν πως ἐφέπομαι, λέγε μὴν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα ὡς ἑπομένου.
clinias. I have μέν some difficulty in keeping pace with you, move on μήν to the next
point on the assumption that I do. (Pl. Lg. 644d)
(5) σω. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω γε πράττοντας ὑμᾶς ἐθέλω ἐγγυήσασθαι ἦ μὴν εὐδαιμονήσειν.
socrates. But (ἀλλά) μήν if you act in that way I am ready to warrant that you truly
(ἦ) μήνmust be happy. (Pl. Alc. 1 134e)
In (4), μήν occurs in a clause that is prepared for by a preceding clause that has prepara-
tory μέν (see section 5.1.1).8 And in (5), the second instance of μήν occurs – in combi-
nationwith ἦ – in an embedded complement clause. At the same time, (5) exemplifies
the highly exceptional situation inwhich a single sentence containsmultiple instances
of μήν.
What is perhaps much more important to observe at this point is that μήν is al-
most completely absent from the other possible positions for postpositive particles.
For one thing, I have not found any cases of μήν in postposed subordinate clauses, and
we but rarely find it in apodoticmain clauses.9 Moreover, there is the conspicuous fact
8. It should be noted that it is in fact not always clear – due to our lack of information on intonation and
punctuation (section 1.4.3) – whether we are dealing with a new sentence or with a coordinated main
clause within a complex sentence. Thus, some of these examples of μήν might in fact just as well be read
as cases of sentence-initial μήν.
9. Nor did I find any instances of μήν in main clauses after preposed, extra-clausal material (pattern:
Ppre | Xω μήν …). See section 4.3.2 above for some examples of this pattern.
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that μήν does never occur in clause-internal position, which strongly suggests that it
cannot have phrasal scope and cannot be used as, e.g., a focus modifying particle (see
section 4.4).
5.1.3 Major distributional patterns
Here I will mention three important distributional facts about μήν in my corpus (see
Appendix A for a precise quantitative overview). Recall, first of all, that in Ionic Greek
the form μήν (μάν) is not used, so that we do not find the expression in Herodotus
and only very little in Homeric epic. In the rest of the corpus, on the other hand, it
is especially at home in the more ‘dialogical’ genres, e.g. in Attic drama and Platonic
dialogue (see also Denniston 1954: 329–330). Secondly, as to the kinds of speech acts
in which the particle occurs, we can state that it predominantly occurs in assertives,
but is not excluded from other types of speech acts such as directives, wh-questions
and yes/no-questions. In section 5.2, I will successively examine the use of the particle
in each of these four major speech act types. Finally, I would like to emphasize that
the particle in the majority of cases occurs in collocation with other particles, notably
with ἀλλά, γε, ἦ, καί and the negatives οὐ and οὐδέ (see also the comments made in
section 5.1.1 above). Put differently, solitary μήν is the exception rather than the rule.
On the other hand, it is quite remarkable that the collocation of μήν with common
discourse particles such as γάρ and δέ is completely absent in the corpus. I will here
not systematically discuss the clusters mentioned, but will comment on them where
needed in my treatment of individual examples of μήν.
After this short preliminary overview of μήν’s position and most significant distribu-
tional properties, I will next turn to my examination of the different usages of the par-
ticle.
5.2 Μήν as an attitudinal-interactional particle
In its prototypical use, as I take it, μήν can be characterized as an attitudinal-interac-
tional particle with a strongly intersubjective (i.e. addressee-oriented) character (cf.
section 2.6.4). On a rather abstract level of analysis, I argue, μήν generally signals that
there is a discrepancy or contrast between the view of the speaker of the μήν-unit and
the assumptions, attitudes or expectations thatmaybe entertainedby the addressee(s)
(cf. Sicking 1993, Wakker 1997a). That is, it is used by speakers in reaction to some
possible alternative point of view. We can thus say that the particle creates a link with
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(i.e. points at) some propositional information q that is assumed to reside in the com-
municative context of the μήν-act (see section 2.6.3). In the case of μήν, as I take it,
this contextually given q-proposition can be modeled as the negative counterpart of
the semantic target p of the particle (i.e. not-p). In this respect, I believe attitudinal-
interactional μήν shows interesting similarities to such contemporary expressions as
English in fact, actually, French quand-même, German schon, doch as well as Dutch
toch and wel.10
Support for the strongly addressee-oriented nature of μήν comes from the fact that,
in the early stages of Ancient Greek at least, it predominantly occurs in dialogical con-
texts of interactive speech (see above). In Homer, for instance, μήν (μάν) is virtually re-
stricted to passages of direct speech spoken by the story characters (cf. Cuypers 2005).
Andwhenwe look at the early classical period, it is telling that μήν’s relative frequency
is significantly higher in the dialogues of tragedy and comedy than in the Histories of
Thucydides, in which an addressee/narratee remains at the background most of the
time. In the latter work, in fact, μήν only occurs in stretches of (in)direct speech or
in evaluative passages in which the author steps out of the story world and unfolds
his personal reflections upon the narrated events (cf. George 2009: 158–164). Fur-
ther support comes from the high compatibility of μήν with sentence negations (cf.
Wakker 1997a), which can also be seen as expressions that inherently react to some
alternative view (cf. e.g. Verhagen 2005: ch. 2).
Now, as I take it, the rather abstract or schematic meaning of μήν that I mentioned
above may come about in a number of different ways, which results into a variety of
more specific usages of the particle. In order to properly account for them,wewill need
a number of different parameters, which can be drawn from the general discussion of
aims in section 2.6 above. I will discuss them one by one.
(i) The nature of μήν’s semantic target p.
The first parameter concerns the exact element of μήν’s host unit which the particle
semantically applies to (p). As we have seen in section 2.6.4, this may either be the
propositional content that is expressed by its host unit or one of the accompanying
10. Some examples of studies that deal with these items are Traugott (1999), Schwenter & Trau-
gott (2000) andAijmer&Simon-Vandenbergen (2004) for English in fact (cf. also section 3.2.2 above),
Waltereit (2001) for French quand-même, Thurmair (1989), Karagjosova (2003, 2004) and Egg
(2012, 2013) forGerman schon anddoch, Foolen (2006) forGermandoch andDutch toch, andHogeweg
(2009) for Dutch wel.
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felicity conditions of the speech act made. Τhis parameter intends to capture the ob-
servation that μήν is found in a variety of different speech act types, some of which do
not express full propositions.
In the case of assertions, it is indeed most natural to take the asserted proposition
as the semantic target of μήν, thus indicating that this information runs counter towhat
the addresseemayassumeor expect on thebasis of the communicative context at hand
(see below). In the case of directives and wh-questions, however, the particle can only
be analyzed in terms of the directive or interrogative illocution and its accompanying
felicity conditions. More precisely, I will argue that μήν signals that the negative coun-
terpart of one of the preparatory conditions is contextually given. Or, put differently,
the particle cancels one of its own preparatory conditions (cf. the analysis of German
doch and Dutch toch in section 2.6.2 above). As I will argue below, a similar kind of
analysis is most natural for the cases in which μήν occurs in what appear to be yes/no-
questions.
The first parameter then, is concerned with the linguistic variation that is encoded
in the μήν-act itself. After all, differences in illocutionary type are typically encoded
by means of formal linguistic means (e.g. variation in verbal mood or the presence
of an interrogative expression). The other parameters intend to capture the variation
that arises from the different kinds of communicative contexts in which the μήν-act is
used. That is, these parameters are concerned with the q-proposition that resides in
the context.
(ii) The type of contextual evidence for the accessibility of q.
I have said that attitudinal μήν generally points at propositional material q (i.e. an al-
ternative view not-p), which is assumed to be given in the communicative context of
the μήν-act. The second parameter is concerned with the different ways in which the
q-proposition may be contextually given. In other words, it is concerned with the dif-
ferent types of evidencewhich the contextual accessibility of qmaybe based upon (see
section 2.6.3 above). For μήν, two options are particularly relevant:
(a) Common knowledge. First, the q-proposition may be a piece of information
which is stored in the general body of common knowledge of speaker and ad-
dressee(s). In other words, it is accessible on the basis of their mutual personal
history (personal common ground) or their mutual membership of certain cul-
tural communities (communal common ground). What μήν indicates, in this
case, is that the information presented in the μήν-act runs counter to what one
would expect on the basis of general common ground information.
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(b) Inferential reasoning. The second option is that the q-proposition is explicitly
triggered bywhat is said in the preceding discourse. In this case, that is, the alter-
native view which μήν reacts to follows from the discourse context on the basis
of a process of inferential reasoning. On the one hand, this involves salient infor-
mation from the immediate discourse context (say, a proposition r) which trig-
gers the inferential process. On the other hand, it involves an inferential pattern
which is stored within the body of common knowledge of the discourse partici-
pants. Most typically, this can bemodeled as a topos, which – as we have seen in
section 2.6.3 – is a default rule which describes what normally is the case (e.g. r
> q ‘normally, if r then q’). In this case then, μήν is used to cancel some implica-
tion of the immediately preceding utterance, whichmay be either spoken by the
addressee (turn-initial μήν) or by the speaker of the μήν-act him-/herself (turn-
internal μήν). In the latter case, I will argue, it is attractive to assign μήν the sta-
tus of a discourse connective particle, i.e. as an explicit marker of the denial-of-
expectation relation (see section 5.3.1 below).
(iii) The communicative status of q.
At this point, it is convenient to mention a third potentially relevant parameter, which
in fact turned out to be of less relevance to μήν, viz. the communicative status of the
q-proposition. Recall from section 2.6.3 that we may distinguish between contextu-
ally given propositions that are already part of the common ground and those that
are still on the table as mere proposals for updating the common ground. In case of
μήν, however, the q-proposition does never appear to have the status of a table-propo-
sition. Put differently, the particle is never used, as far as I can see, in direct denials:
there are no examples in which not-p is explicitly asserted (i.e. put on the table) by the
addressee in the preceding move. This strongly suggests that μήν cannot be used to di-
rectly deny a negative table proposition. In this respect, μήν significantly differs from
modern near-equivalent expressions such as German doch and Dutch wel, notably in
their use as (accented) answering particles (see section 2.6.3 for examples). For An-
cient Greek μήν, the alternative view that the particle reacts to typically tends to arise,
as I have indicated above, by means of inferential reasoning on the basis of a common
ground topos.
In the following, I will further specify the analysis given here by looking at some typical
examples of μήν in different types of speech acts.
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5.2.1 In assertives
I start with looking at the use of μήν when it occurs in regular assertive speech acts,
formally marked by the declarative sentence type. In assertives, as I take it, the con-
tribution of μήν can be roughly paraphrased as follows: ‘contrary to what you may as-
sume/expect, I assure you that p is true’, where p is the proposition expressed in the
μήν-act. This paraphrase aims to capture two closely-related meaning aspects. First,
there is an affirmative meaning aspect (‘I assure you’): μήν indicates a strong degree of
commitment towards p and as such strengthens the force of the assertive speech act
(see section 2.6.2 for the notion of illocutionary strength). Second, there is the seman-
tic feature of counter-expectation (‘contrary to what you may suppose/expect’): μήν
signals that p stands in opposition to the possible assumptions or expectations of the
addressee(s). Put differently, the particle reacts to and points at a possible alternative
point of view, i.e. a contextually given proposition not-p.
The close interaction of these twomeaning aspects can be explained from the fact
– mentioned earlier – that affirmative markers such as surely, certainly, really, in truth
and in fact are in general frequently used by speakers to explicitly recognize the possi-
bility of a divergent stance and forestall objections on the part of the addressee.11 From
a diachronic perspective then, it seems plausible that the notion of counter-expecta-
tion started out as a contextually induced side-effect of affirmative μήν, but eventually
conventionalized as part of its coded semantics – which is not unlike the development
of English in fact (cf. the examples in section 3.2.2).12 Let us look at some of the con-
texts in which μήν in assertives tends to show up.
With generally remarkable information
First of all, attitudinal-interactional μήν may accompany propositional information
which can be characterized as surprising, unexpected, unprecedented, abnormal or
otherwise remarkable in character, i.e. information which goes against general knowl-
edge about regularities in the world. Consider the following example:
(6) [Echecrates and Phaedo talk about Socrates’s last day in prison and his death.]
εχ. … ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ὡς ἂν δύνῃ ἀκριβέστατα διεξελθεῖν πάντα.
φαιδ. καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε θαυμάσια ἔπαθον παραγενόμενος. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα με
11. See e.g. Traugott (1999), White (2003), Aijmer & Simon-Vandenbergen (2004) and Simon-
Vandenbergen & Aijmer (2007). See also the discussion in section 2.6.4 above.
12. Recall, furthermore, that the preparatory ‘concessive’ particle μέν has most plausibly developed
from the same historical source (see section 5.1.1 above).
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ἀνδρὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἔλεος εἰσῄει.
echecrates. … But try to tell us every detail as exactly as you can. – phaedo. And I
actually/in fact (μήν) had strange emotionswhen Iwas there. For Iwas not filledwith
pity as I might naturally be when present at the death of a friend. (Pl. Phd. 58e)
In (6), the function of μήν can be analysed as signalling that the proposition that
Phaedo had strange emotions (θαυμάσια) comes unexpected for Echecrates. This is
based on the general regularity (present in the cultural common ground of the inter-
locutors) that one typically is filled with pity when a friend dies, as is explicitly spelled
out in the following γάρ-unit. Thus, μήν signals a discrepancy between the presented
information and some general knowledge that is assumed to be present in the cultural
common ground (and thus also entertained by Echecrates).
In addition, μήν is at home in utterances that contain scalar focus particles of the
even-type. As we have seen in section 2.7.2, such particles indicate that their focus
ranks high on contextually given scale, thus marking the proposition expressed as un-
expected, surprising or remarkable. Given its semantics of counter-expectation, I take
it that μήν is strongly compatible with this type of scalar focus particles. Consider the
following Homeric example, which features both περ and καί:
(7) [Achilles returns in the Greek assembly.]
καί ῥ᾿ οἵ περ τὸ πάρος γε νεῶν ἐν ἀγῶνι μένεσκον,
οἵ τε κυβερνῆται καὶ ἔχον οἰήια νηῶν
καὶ ταμίαι παρὰ νηυσὶν ἔσαν, σίτοιο δοτῆρες,
καὶ μὴν οἱ τότε γ᾿ εἰς ἀγορὴν ἴσαν, οὕνεκ᾿ Ἀχιλλεὺς
ἐξεφάνη, δηρὸν δὲ μάχης ἐπέπαυτ᾿ ἀλεγεινῆς.
And the very (περ) people who earlier remained where the ships are gathered – they
who were pilots and wielded the steering oars of the ships, and were stewards at the
ships dealing out food – even (καί) they, in fact (μήν), came at that time to the place
of assembly, because Achilles had appeared, and he had long kept himself away from
grievous battle. (Il. 19.42–46)
Example (7) is one of the few instances of μήν/μάν in Homeric narrator-text (rather
than in direct speech of a character) and here further underscores the highly surprising
nature of the event narrated here (cf. Cuypers 2005: 46–47). Normally the supporting
personnel of the Greek heroes did not attend assemblymeetings – a fact present in the
common ground of the narrator and his narratees – and μήν is used to signal that this
regularity does not hold in this particular case.
Another group of instances that can be classified under this heading concerns the
use of μήν in utterances that describe what happens in the immediate situational con-
text (i.e. the physical, non-verbal context in which the utterance is integrated). The
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speaker thus draws the addressee’s attention to the events that s/he presently perceives
andwith μήν s/he signals that these events run counter to expectations (i.e. are remark-
able, exceptional, unprepared for etc.). As is to be expected, this particular context of
use is especially common in classical drama (cf. Denniston 1954: 356–357, Wakker
1997a, van Erp Taalman Kip 2009). Here are some typical examples:
(8) [Chorus to Creon:]
ὅδε μὴν Αἵμων, παίδων τῶν σῶν
νέατον γέννημ᾿·
Here comes Haemon, in fact (μήν), the latest born among your sons!
(S. Ant. 626–627)
(9) [Chorus leader to Hecuba:]
καὶ μὴνὈδυσσεὺς ἔρχεται σπουδῇ ποδός,
Ἑκάβη, νέον τι πρὸς σὲ σημανῶν ἔπος.
And here comes Odysseus, in fact (μήν), with haste in his step, Hecuba, to bring you
fresh news. (Ε. Hec. 215–216)
(10) [Xanthias and Dionysus in the underworld.] xanthias. We’d best be moving along,
because this is the placewhere he [sc. Heracles] was talking about those awful beasts.
– dionysus. And he’ll regret it! He was bluffing, trying to scare me. […]
χα. νὴ τὸν Δία· καὶ μὴν αἰσθάνομαι ψόφου τινός.
xanthias. By Zeus! I actually (μήν) do hear a noise! (Ar. Ra. 277–285)
In (8) and (9) the speaker rapports that somebody is coming over to them, i.e. that
a new character has entered the stage. If (καὶ) μήν is present in such a rapport, as has
been noted byWakker (1997a) and vanErp TaalmanKip (2009), this always involves
arrivals which have not been prepared for or announced in the preceding discourse.
That is, we are always dealing with unexpected arrivals of a new character at the scene.
In (10), on the other hand, we rather find (καὶ) μήν with a verb of perception or hear-
ing: whilewalking through the underworld, Xanthias suddenly hears someunexpected
noise.
It should be emphasized here that, since the arrival of a new character on stage
or the sudden perception of some event by definition also involves a new unexpected
move in the ongoing conversation, this type of examples is closely linked to the us-
age of μήν as a marker of unexpected discourse transitions, which I will discuss in sec-
tion 5.3.2 below.
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In reactive moves: cancelling inferences
In interactive speech – notably in Attic drama and Platonic dialogue – the use of μήν is
often closely related to what has been said in the immediately preceding discourse. In
this case, as I have noted above, the alternative view (not-p) can be construed as an in-
ference or conclusion that has been drawn from the preceding move of the addressee.
Consider the following examples:13
(11) Then Agathon said, “It turns out, Socrates, I didn’t know what I was talking about in
that speech.”
– καὶ μὴν καλῶς γε εἶπες, φάναι, ὦ Ἀγάθων.
“And you did in fact (μήν) speak beautifully, Agathon,” said he. (Pl. Smp. 201b–c)
(12) χε. ἦ χαλεπὸν ἐνδείξασθαι πρᾶγμα ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα γέγονεν, ὡς φαίνεται.
νε. σω. πάντως γε μὴν ῥητέον.
visitor. What it seems we have to deal with, in that case, is certainly a difficult
thing to show. – younger socrates. We do in fact (μήν) have to discuss it in every
respect. (Pl. Plt. 306a)
In (11), Agathon says that he knew nothing of what he was talking about. From this
utterance Socrates infers that Agathon might assume now that he has not spoken κα-
λῶς (‘beautifully’) either. This however, is not in accordance with Socrates’s own view,
which warrants the use of μήν in his following utterance: ‘and unlike what you may
think now, I assure you that you did speak καλῶς’. In (12), the Visitor’s rather cautious
statement – notice ὡς φαίνεται (‘as it seems’) – that the explanation needed is difficult,
makes Young Socrates draw the conclusion that the Visitor may not give the explana-
tion at all. This is in contrast to Socrates’s own view and μήν is used to signal this. In
cases such as these, I believe, μήν actually comes rather close to its discourse-connec-
tive use as a marker of denial-of-expectation contrast (‘yet’, ‘however’). I will return to
that use in section 5.3.1 below.
A further interactive context in which attitudinal-interactional μήν regularly oc-
curs concerns confirmatory reactive moves, i.e. moves that express agreement, assent
or compliance on the part of the speaker.14 Although a strongly affirmative meaning
aspect is of course particularly at home in such a context, the second meaning aspect
of countering expectations or assumptions of the addresseemay at first glance bemore
13. See Wakker (1997a) for very similar examples from Attic drama.
14. Denniston (1954) speaks about the ‘assentient’ sense in such cases – although he assigns this
meaning not just to μήν, but to the combinations ἀλλὰ μήν and καὶ μήν as a whole. See section 5.5.1 for
further discussion.
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difficult to uphold. I would contend, however, that this second semantic feature is
present in this type of instances as well and that μήν is more than a marker of mere
assent or affirmation (cf. Wakker 1997a and van Erp Taalman Kip 2009). In these
contexts too, as I take it, μήν is used to explicitly recognize and react upon a possible
divergent stance entertained by the addressee.
Support for this position can indeed be found on closer inspection of the discourse
contexts in which such reactive moves with μήν tend to occur. Quite commonly, these
are initiating moves that consist of a hypothetical conditional clause introduced by εἰ
(‘if ’).15 Such clauses often function as hedging expressions, which imply a lack of full
certainty on the part of the speaker and thus leave room for possible disagreement
or non-compliance. Consider the following examples from Sophocles (see Wakker
1997a: exx. 3–4):
(13) electra. This time you shall not say that I was first to say something painful and then
heard these things from you!
ἀλλ᾿ ἢν ἐφῇς μοι, τοῦ τεθνηκότος θ᾿ ὕπερ
λέξαιμ᾿ ἂν ὀρθῶς τῆς κασιγνήτης θ᾿ ὁμοῦ.
κλ. καὶ μὴν ἐφίημ᾿· εἰ δέ μ᾿ ὧδ᾿ ἀεὶ λόγους
ἐξῆρχες, οὐκ ἂν ἦσθα λυπηρὰ κλύειν.
But if you will allowme, I would speak in a just way on behalf of the deadman and of
my sister also. – klytaemnestra. And in fact (μήν) I do allow you. If you had always
begun your speeches in such a manner, you would not have been painful to listen
to. (S. El. 552–557)
(14) [Antigone and the blind Oedipus have arrived at a place near Athens.]
αν. ἀλλ’ ὅστις ὁ τόπος ἦ μάθω μολοῦσά ποι;
οι. ναί, τέκνον, εἴπερ ἐστί γ’ ἐξοικήσιμος.
αν. ἀλλ’ ἐστὶ μὴν οἰκητός·
antigone. But shall I go along somewhere and discover what place it is? – oidipus.
Yes, child, only if it is inhabited. – ant. But it is in fact (μήν) inhabited.
(S. OC 26–28)
Very similar instances can indeed be found in the genre of Platonic dialogue, as in the
following three examples:
15. See Denniston (1954) on ἀλλὰ μήν (343–344) and καὶ μήν (353) “substantiating a required condi-
tion”.
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(15) hermocrates. Tell us your story, Critias.
κρ. ταῦτα χρὴ δρᾶν, εἰ καὶ τῷ τρίτῳ κοινωνῷ Τιμαίῳ συνδοκεῖ.
τι. δοκεῖ μήν.
critias. I should do this, if our third partner, Timaeus, also agrees. – timaeus. I ac-
tually (μήν) do agree. (Pl. Ti. 20d)
(16) σω. συχνὰ μέν μοι προστάττεις, ὅμως δέ, εἴπερ σοι κεχαρισμένον ἔσται, ἐθέλω.
ερμ. καὶ μὴν χαριεῖ.
socrates. You are imposing a good many tasks upon me, but nevertheless, only if it
will give you pleasure, I am willing. – hermogenes. And in fact (μήν) it will give me
pleasure. (Pl. Cra. 408e)
(17) [Socrates’s friends ask where they can find a new ‘enchanter’ after his death and Socrates
urges them to seek among themselves as well.]
– ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν δή, ἔφη, ὑπάρξει, ὁ Κέβης· ὅθεν δὲ ἀπελίπομεν ἐπανέλθωμεν, εἴ σοι
ἡδομένῳ ἐστίν.
– ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡδομένῳ γε· πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει;
“But that will be done indeed,” said Cebes, “but let’s get back to where we left off, if
that is to your liking.” – “But in fact (μήν) it is to my liking: how could it not be?”
(Pl. Phd. 78a–b)
In (15), for example, the εἰ-clause implies Critias’s lack of full certainty and inherently
leaves room for the possibility of a negative answer on Timaeus’s part. In Timaeus’s
view, however, the approval for further discussion was already implicitly given and,
correspondingly, shouldnothavebeenquestionedbyCritias. Theuseof μήν can thusbe
related to the felicity of the previous speech act. In other words, there is a discrepancy
in perspectives and this allows the use of μήν in Timaeus’s confirmative act. A highly
similar analysis can be given for the other examples given here (cf. alsoWakker 1997a:
214).
In addition, the particle also occurs inmoves that react to directive speech acts, as
in the following two examples:
(18) [The old man gives Creusa many suggestions to take revenge on Apollo, but she rejects
all of them.]
πρ. ὤμοι, κακίζηι· φέρε, σύ νυν βούλευέ τι.
κρ. καὶ μὴν ἔχω γε δόλια καὶ δραστήρια.
oldman. Oh, now you are being a coward! Come, now you think of a plan. – Creusa.
And I have one, in fact (μήν), one that is cunning and effective. (E. Ιon 984–985)
(19) [Cephalus to Socrates:] You don’t often come down to see us in the Piraeus, Socrates.
Yet you ought to. For if I were still strong enough to make the journey up to town
easily, you wouldn’t have to come here; we would come to you instead. But as it is,
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you should come here more often; for I would have you know that, for my part, the
more the physical pleasures wither away, the more my passion for conversation and
pleasure in it increase.
μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποίει, ἀλλὰ τοῖσδέ τε τοῖς νεανίσκοις σύνισθι καὶ δεῦρο παρ’ ἡμᾶς φοίτα ὡς
παρὰ φίλους τε καὶ πάνυ οἰκείους.
– καὶ μήν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὦ Κέφαλε, χαίρω γε διαλεγόμενος τοῖς σφόδρα πρεσβύταις. …
So don’t refuse, but come and get together with these lads here, and make yourself
at home with us: regard us as your dear and very close friends.” – “And as a matter of
fact (μήν), Cephalus,” I said, “I enjoy talking to very old men. [explanation follows]”
(Pl. R. 328c–d)
In these cases, in my opinion, (καὶ) μήν does not just mark mere consent or agree-
ment, as Denniston (1954: 353f.) would have it, but also expresses its usual mean-
ing of counter-expectation. Thus, in (18), the fact that Creusa has thought of a plan
right away may indeed come as unexpected for the old man, in view of the preceding
discourse and the preceding command in particular (‘come on, think of something!’).
In (19), in turn, Socrates is urgently asked to stay at Cephalus’s house and talk with
the oldmen present. In his reaction, Socrates does not only consent, but also indicates
that he actually enjoys talking to oldmen, thus suggesting that he probablywould have
stayed anyway. In other words, he suggests that one of the preparatory conditions of
the preceding directive does not hold (viz. that it is not obvious that the addressee
would perform the requested action of his own accord). It is for this reason, as I take
it, that Socrates here uses μήν: the particle signals that the utterance is in contrast with
a preparatory condition of the preceding directive and, accordingly, that Cephalus’s
command was actually out of place.
In climactic contexts
Μήν also appears to be at home in assertions presenting information that is pragmat-
ically stronger than that in the previous utterance, i.e. ranks higher on some contex-
tually evoked pragmatic scale. In such climactic contexts, the alternative view (not-p)
which μήν reacts to can be analyzed as a scalar implicature of the preceding utterance.
That is, it may be inferred from the preceding discourse that (as far as the speaker is
concerned) a stronger, more informative, utterance does not apply. In this capacity,
indeed, μήν appears to be not unlike English in fact, which has also gained a mean-
ing aspect of scalarity and marks pragmatically stronger utterances (cf. Schwenter &
Traugott 2000; cf. also section 3.2). The following example serves to illustrate this
type of context:
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(20) men’s leader. This here’s a complication we didn’t count on facing: this swarm of
women outside the gates is here to help the others!
χο.γυ. τί βδύλλεθ’ ἡμᾶς; οὔ τί που πολλαὶ δοκοῦμεν εἶναι;
καὶ μὴν μέρος γ’ ἡμῶν ὁρᾶτ’ οὔπω τὸ μυριοστόν.
women’s leader. Fear and trembling, eh? Don’t tell me we seem a lot to handle. In
fact (μήν), you haven’t even (καί) seen the tiniest fraction of our forces yet!
(Ar. Lys. 352–355)
In this example, the second utterance of the women’s leader clearly is a more forceful
and pragmatically stronger statement than the preceding utterance. The particle καί
may here indeed best be taken as a scalar focus modifier (‘even’) rather than a simple
connective (‘and’).
In addition, there are turn-initial examples of μήν that could be well explained
along these lines, as in the following case:
(21) [Argument between Oidipus and Tiresias, who does not want to tell him who killed
Laius.]
τε. οὐκ ἂν πέρα φράσαιμι. πρὸς τάδ’, εἰ θέλεις,
θυμοῦ δι’ ὀργῆς ἥτις ἀγριωτάτη.
oι. καὶ μὴν παρήσω γ’ οὐδέν, ὡς ὀργῆς ἔχω,
ἅπερ ξυνίημ’.
tiresias. – I will explain no further; in the face of that, pray rage with the most fero-
cious anger, if you like. – oedipus. As amatter of fact (μήν), I am even (καί) so angry
that I will leave unsaid nothing of what I understand! (S. OT 343–346)
In (21), Oidipus states he will not just be angry, as Tiresias has allowed him to be in the
preceding move, but even will leave nothing unsaid of what he thinks about Tiresias
– after which he brazenly accuses Tiresias himself of murdering Laius. Again, καὶ μήν
indicates that the assertive is pragmatically stronger than the information presented
in the preceding utterance. Examples like these actually come rather close to the us-
age of μήν as a marker of unexpected discourse transitions, which I will discuss in sec-
tion 5.3.2 below.
The combination ἦ μήν
A final context that needs to bementioned here concerns the combination of μήν with
the prepositive particle ἦ, yielding the particle combination ἦ μήν. The use of this com-
bination of subjective ἦ (‘truly, it is true that’) and intersubjective μήν (‘I assure you,
unlike what you may assume/expect’) results in a particularly forceful assertion or a
strong asseveration, as hasmore often been observed (e.g. Denniston 1954: 350–351,
Sicking 1993: 55–57, Wakker 1997a: 218–223). Consider for example:
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(22) [Trojan herald to Agamemnon:] The treasure that Alexander [sc. Paris] brought to
Troy in his hollow ships – I wish he had perished first! – all this he is minded to give,
and to add to it from his own possessions;
κουριδίην δ’ ἄλοχον Μενελάου κυδαλίμοιο
οὔ φησιν δώσειν· ἦ μὴν Τρῶές γε κέλονται.
but the wedded wife of glorious Menelaus he declares he will not give; I assure you
(μήν), the Trojans really (ἦ) ask him do it. (Il. 7.389–393)
(23) creon. I call on these men, not on you, and also on my friends here, to be witnesses
of your answers; and if I ever catch you …
οι. τίς δ’ ἄν με τῶνδε συμμάχων ἕλοι βίᾳ;
κρ. ἦ μὴν σὺ κἄνευ τοῦδε λυπηθεὶς ἔσῃ.
oedipus. But who could catch me against the will of these allies? – cre. I swear, in
fact, (ἦ μήν) that even without that happening you shall suffer pain!
(S. OC 814–817)
In (22), μήν is added to cancel the possible inference that Agamemnonmay draw from
the speaker’s previous speech acts, viz. that the Trojans did not at all try to persuade
Paris to give up Helen. And the particle is indeed particularly at home in the fierce
dispute between Oidipus and Creon in (23). I thus take it that the meaning aspect of
countering possible assumptions/expectations of the addressee is also present in the
combination with ἦ.
Interestingly, this combination also occurs in indirect speech, i.e. in complement
clauses that are dependent upon a verb (or noun) of swearing such as ὄμνυμι, as in the
following examples (see also (5) above):
(24) [The soldiers want to choose Xenophon as their commander. Xenophon speaks against
this idea, but his speech does not convince them.] And Xenophon, seeing that some-
thing more was needed, came forward and spoke again:
ἀλλ᾿, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔφη, ὡς πάνυ εἰδῆτε, ὀμνύω ὑμῖν θεοὺς πάντας καὶ πάσας, ἦ μὴν ἐγώ, ἐπεὶ
τὴν ὑμετέραν γνώμην ᾐσθανόμην, ἐθυόμην εἰ βέλτιον εἴη ὑμῖν τε ἐμοὶ ἐπιτρέψαι ταύτην τὴν
ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑποστῆναι· καί μοι οἱ θεοὶ οὕτως ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἐσήμηναν ὡς καὶ ἰδιώτην ἂν
γνῶναι ὅτι ταύτης μοναρχίας ἀπέχεσθαί με δεῖ.
“Well, soldiers,” he said, “that you may understand the matter fully, I swear to you by
all the gods and goddesses that in very truth (ἦ μήν), when I became aware of your
intention, I offered sacrifices to learnwhether it was best for you to entrust tome this
command and forme to undertake it; and that the gods gaveme such signs in the sac-
rifices that even a layman could perceive that I must withholdmyself from accepting
this sole command.” (X. An. 6.1.31)
559416-L-bw-Thijs
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 202
188 Chapter 5. The particle μήν
In this particular usage, I believe ἦ μήν is best taken as a routinized and conventional-
ized combination, especially because μήν but rarely occurs in embedded contexts on
its own.
Concluding remarks
To sum up, given the examples discussed here, I believe that μήν in assertives can be
given a uniform analysis. I have argued that the particle does not merely contribute an
affirmative meaning aspect, but also signals that the asserted proposition p stands in
opposition to the possible assumptions or expectations of the addressee(s). Put differ-
ently, the particle always reacts to some possible alternative view, i.e. a contextually
given proposition not-p. Most typically, this proposition takes the form of an implica-
tion drawn from the immediately preceding discourse.
5.2.2 In directives
Although this is not a very frequent use, μήν is also found in imperative clauses ex-
pressing a directive illocutionary force. In such cases, as I noted above, I take it that
the particle functions at the speech act level, indicating that the directive in question
may somehow come as unexpected for the addressee. More technically, μήν could be
elegantly described in terms of the cancellation of the preparatory conditions of direc-
tives (as exemplified in section 2.6.2 above). Put differently, the contextually given q-
proposition that μήν reacts to can bemodeled as the negative counterpart of a prepara-
tory condition of the directive: it is given in the communicative context at hand that
the preparatory condition of the directive does not hold in this particular case. Con-
sider the following examples:
(25) [Conversation between Socrates and the sophist Dionysodorus.] “Tell me, Socrates,” he
said, “and all you others who say you desire this youth here [sc. Clinias] to become
wise, whether you say this in jest or truly and earnestly desire it.” At this I reflected
that previously, as it seemed, they took us to be jesting, when we urged them to con-
verse with the youth, and hence they made a jest of it and did not take it seriously.
This reflection therefore made me insist all the more that we were in deadly earnest.
– καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, σκόπει μήν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅπως μὴ ἔξαρνος ἔσει ἃ νῦν λέγεις.
– ἔσκεμμαι, ἦν δ᾿ ἐγώ· οὐ γὰρ μή ποτ᾿ ἔξαρνος γένωμαι.
And Dionysodorus said: “Do (μήν) take care, Socrates, that you don’t find yourself
denying these words.” – “I have given thought to the matter,” I said, “for I shall never
come to deny them.” (Pl. Euthd. 283c)
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(26) [Achilles]: “But of everything else that is mine by my swift black ships you shall lead
or carry away nothing against my will.
εἰ δ᾿ ἄγε μὴν πείρησαι, ἵνα γνώωσι καὶ οἵδε·
αἶψά τοι αἷμα κελαινὸν ἐρωήσει περὶ δουρί.”
Go ahead anddo (μήν) have a try, so thesemenhere alsomay know: at once your dark
blood will spurt around my spear.” (Il. 1.299–303)
In (25), μήν can be analysed as cancelling the preparatory condition that the addressee
(Socrates) does not already know that the speaker (Dionysodorus) wants him to take
care of something. As such, he assumes that Socrates does already know that he should
not denyhis ownwords. The fact thatDionysodorus still needs tomake this request – in
his viewSocrates is already contradictinghimself – gives it a rather indulgent character.
This analysis would thus corroborate the indulgent and uncooperative character of the
sophist Dionysodorus as portrayed by Plato in the Euthydemus.
Alternatively, it would be possible to analyze μήν as cancelling the ability condi-
tion of a request: (the speaker assumes that) the addressee is able (and willing) to per-
form the requested action. This would result in a rather provocative utterance, where
Dionysodorus implies that Socrates would in fact not be able (or willing) to remain
consistent (‘Go ahead and see that you don’t contradict yourself ’).16 A clear example
of this second interpretation is given in (26), which is spoken by an angry Achilles.
Given Achilles’s preceding words, it is clearly implied here that his addressees (i.e. the
other Greeks in the assembly) are not willing to comply to his request (i.e. to try carry-
ing away Achilles’s belongings). Again, μήν is added to cancel a preparatory condition,
which in turn gives the utterance a provocative and ironical character.
5.2.3 Inwh-questions
I now turn to the use of μήν in wh-questions, starting with those which can only be
felicitously interpreted as genuine requests for further information, i.e. as standard in-
formation seeking questions. After that, I will look into cases in which an interpreta-
tion as a rhetorical question is most natural and I will pay special attention to the fixed
elliptical phrase τί μήν, which is usually taken to mean ‘of course’ or ‘certainly’.
16. Cf. Egg’s (2013: 135–136) view on the German utterance Verklag mich doch (‘Go ahead and sue
me’), which implies that the addressee won’t succeed anyway.
559416-L-bw-Thijs
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 204
190 Chapter 5. The particle μήν
In standard information-seeking questions
The use of μήν in wh-questions that count as genuine requests for further informa-
tion is not a very frequent phenomenon in my corpus. In fact, it is completely ab-
sent in Homeric epic and Attic drama and is only found in the dialogues of Plato and
Xenophon, where I counted about 30 instances of this type.17Moreover, it is quite con-
spicuous that this type of μήν-question seems to be restricted to one particular type of
discourse context: it invariably follows upon a preceding move that counts as a rejec-
tion of some proposition, either directly or by inference (cf. Denniston 1954: 332–
333; Rijksbaron 2007: 143). This discourse pattern generally has the following form:
(i) speaker A rejects a proposition that is entertained by or has been put on the table
by speaker B; (ii) as a reaction, speaker B uses the μήν-question to askwhat proposition
should replace the rejected one according to speaker A (‘if that’s not true, what propo-
sition is?’);18 (iii) speaker A provides an answer to the question. Here are some typical
examples to illustrate this pattern:
(27) terpsion.…and Iwas looking for you in themarket-place andwondering that I could
not find you.
ευ. οὐ γὰρ ἦ κατὰ πόλιν.
τερ. ποῦ μήν;
ευ. εἰς λιμένα καταβαίνων Θεαιτήτῳ ἐνέτυχον …
eucleides. Yes, because I was not in the city. – ter. Where were you then (μήν)? –
euc. As I was going down to the harbor I met Theaetetus … (Pl. Tht. 142a)
(28) “You obviously mean distant appearances,” he said, “and shadow-painting.”
– οὐ πάνυ, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ἔτυχες οὗ λέγω.
– ποῖα μήν, ἔφη, λέγεις;
– τὰ μὲν οὐ παρακαλοῦντα, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὅσα μὴ ἐκβαίνει εἰς ἐναντίαν αἴσθησιν ἅμα.
“You have not quite understoodwhat I mean,” said I. – “What do (μήν) youmean?” he
said. – “The experiences that do not provoke thought”, I said, “are those that do not
at the same time issue in a contradictory perception.” (Pl. R. 523b)
(29) [Diotima unfolds her thoughts about Love:] “This is the source of the great excitement
about beauty that comes to anyone who is pregnant and already teeming with life:
beauty releases them from their great pain.
ἔστιν γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ὁ ἔρως, ὡς σὺ οἴει.
17. It is difficult to give exact numbers here, because the distinction between an interpretation as a
standard question and as a rhetorical question is not always clear-cut (see below).
18. In English, the force of the particle is best rendered by heavy stress on the verb or adding a stressed
then. As suggested by Rijksbaron (2007: 143), wemay also compare the Dutch particle combination dan
wel here (‘als niet x, wat dan wel?’).
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– ἀλλὰ τί μήν;
– τῆς γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ τόκου ἐν τῷ καλῷ.
For Socrates,” she said, “what Lovewants is not beauty, as you think it is.” – “But (ἀλλά)
what does (μήν) it want?” – “Reproduction and birth in beauty.” (Pl. Smp. 206d–e)
(30) [Hystaspas to Cyrus:] “Tellme, then, […] did I ever fail to comewhen you sent forme?”
– “Hush!” said Cyrus. – “Or, obeying, did I ever obey reluctantly?” – “No, nor that.” –
“Or did I ever fail to do your bidding in anything?” – “I make no such accusation,” an-
swered Cyrus. – “And is there anything I did that you foundme doing otherwise than
eagerly or cheerfully?” – “That least of all,” answered Cyrus.
– τίνος μὴν ἕνεκα, ἔφη, πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ὦ Κῦρε, Χρυσάνταν ἔγραψας ὥστε εἰς τὴν τιμιωτέ-
ραν ἐμοῦ χώραν ἱδρυθῆναι;
– ἦ λέγω; ἔφη ὁ Κῦρος.
– “What then (μήν) is the reason, in heaven’s name, Cyrus,” he said, “that you put
Chrysantas down for amore honourable place thanmine?” – “Am I really to tell you?”
asked Cyrus. (X. Cyr. 8.4.9–10)
Note that in each of the examples the precedingmove consists of a negative statement
(cf. the sentential negation οὐ), by means of which the addressee explicitly rejects a
view held by the speaker of the μήν-question (cf. also the explicit ὡς σὺ οἴει ‘as you
think’ in (29)). In (30), there is even a whole series of negative answers in the preced-
ing discourse. After the rejection(s), however, an open proposition still remains in the
common ground, respectively: ‘Terpsionwas at place x’, ‘Socratesmeans x’, ‘Lovewants
x’ and ‘Cyrus favours Chrysantas over Hystaspas for reason x’. With the μήν-question,
the speaker thus asks the addressee to ‘close’ this open proposition by providing the
missing information.
There are also some examples inwhich the rejection of the speaker’s view does not
take the form of a negative statement, but only arises by way of inference. Consider for
example:
(31) [Alcibiades finds politicians uneducated and argues that his own natural powers alone
will give him an easy victory over them.] socrates. Ho, ho, my good sir, what a thing
to say! How unworthy of your looks and your other advantages! – alcibiades. What
is your meaning now, Socrates? What is the connection? – soc. I am grieved for you,
and for my love. – alc. Why then?
σω. εἰ ἠξίωσας τὸν ἀγῶνά σοι εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐνθάδε ἀνθρώπους.
αλ. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τίνας μήν;
σω. ἄξιον τοῦτό γε καὶ ἐρέσθαι ἄνδρα οἰόμενον μεγαλόφρονα εἶναι.
soc. If you would expect your contest to be with the men we have here. – alc. But
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(ἀλλά) with whom is (μήν) it to be? – soc. Is that a worthy question to be asked by a
manwhoconsiders himself high-spirited?–alc.Howdoyoumean? Is notmycontest
with these men? (Pl. Alc. 1 119c–d)
(32) [Two captains of Cyrus tell a fun story about their over-obedient soldiers and make ev-
erybody laugh. Then another captain interrupts:]
– ἦ γὰρ οἴει, ἔφη, ὦ Κῦρε, τούτους ἀληθῆ λέγειν ταῦτα;
– ἀλλὰ τί μὴν βουλόμενοι, ἔφη ὁ Κῦρος, ψεύδονται;
– τί δ’ ἄλλο γ’, ἔφη, εἰ μὴ γέλωτα ποιεῖν ἐθέλοντες ὑπὲρ οὗ λέγουσι ταῦτα καὶ ἀλαζονεύον-
ται;
– “For do you really think, Cyrus,” he said, “what these fellows have been telling is
true?” – “But (ἀλλά),do tellme (μήν), what object did they have,” saidCyrus, “in telling
a lie?” – “What else,” said the other, “except that they wanted to raise a laugh; and so
they tell these stories and try to humbug us.” (X. Cyr. 2.2.11)
In (31), on the one hand, Socrates has made it clear that he would grieve for Alcibi-
ades if he had a certain view (εἰ ἠξίωσας ‘if you would expect that’), a view which he
indeed entertains on the basis of the preceding dialogue. Socrates’s move can thus be
seen as an indirect and somewhat playful form of rejecting an assumption entertained
by Alcibiades. And in (32), in a similar way, the preceding move consists of a rather
incredulous question about the view of Cyrus: ‘do you really think that …?’ Again, such
a move counts as an indirect denial or rejection.19
Now how should we account for the use of μήν in this type of wh-questions? In
my view, it is possible to give a rather straightforward analysis, which closely resem-
bles my analysis of μήν in directives. Thus, I argue that the particle does not target the
propositional content, but rather pertains to the illocution of the interrogative clause
or sentence in its scope.More in particular, I take it that μήν signals that it follows from
the communicative context that one of the preparatory conditions of the wh-question
does not hold.
One possible option, then, is that μήν cancels the second preparatory condition,
viz. that the addressee does not already know that the speaker wants him to provide
particular information (cf. table 2.3 in section 2.6.2). With μήν the speaker would sig-
nal that he assumes that his hearer does already know or should have known this. The
fact that the speaker nevertheless has to ask the question gives the utterance a bit of an
indulgent character (‘please, do tell me’). Such an analysis is well-suited for examples
such as (31), in which the question follows upon a whole series of rejections. In other
cases, the analysis would appear to involve Gricean reasoning on cooperative commu-
19. For the use of ἦ γάρ in such questions, see van Erp Taalman Kip (1997).
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nication (Grice 1975). Since speaker B only rejects an assumption of speaker A and
does not explicitly state which information should be added to the common ground
in its place, his utterance is not very informative – the maxim of quantity is violated –
and thus not very cooperative. On the basis of the cooperative principle – a regularity
present in the cultural common ground between the speakers – speaker B is expected
to unfold his ownviewon thematter now, but he does not complywith this implicit co-
operative principle. Thus, speaker A needs to explicitly request him to do so (with the
μήν-question). The discrepancy in views, then, would this time involve inferences and
assumptions about cooperativeness and informativeness in conversation (the Gricean
maxim of quantity specifically).
An alternative option is that μήν pertains to the ability condition of prototypical
questions, thus indicating that the addressee will not be able to answer the question.
As we have seen for directives, this would lead in a rather provocative utterance: ‘try
and answer this question, youwon’t succeed anyway’. The question in itself can then be
seen as a counter-move against the preceding rejection: ‘but if you reject my view, you
won’t be able to find any other view that holds true’. This appears to be an attractive
option in cases which also feature the discourse connective particle ἀλλά (‘but’), which
marks the move as a rebuttal. Also, such questions appear to come close to rhetorical
questions which do not really expect an answer, which may be the case in (32) for
example (see further below on rhetorical μήν-questions).
To end this section, one additional qualification is in place. One might infer from
the preceding discussion that this type of μήν-questions only occurs within the dialog-
ical text type, when there are two interlocutors involved in a conversation. This is not
completely true, however, since there are some examples which occur in a rhetorical
speech. Consider for example:
(33) [Speech of the Theban ambassador Callistratus in the Lacedaimonean embassy.] As for
the slanderous allegations of certain people who wish to defeat the peace, to the ef-
fect that we have come here not because we desire friendship, but rather because we
fear that Antalcidas may arrive with money from the King, consider how foolishly
they are talking. [explanation follows]
εἶεν. τί μὴν ἥκομεν; ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀποροῦντες, γνοίητε ἄν, εἰ μὲν βούλεσθε, πρὸς τὰ κατὰ
θάλατταν ἰδόντες, εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε, πρὸς τὰ κατὰ γῆν ἐν τῷ παρόντι. †τί μήν ἐστιν; εὔδηλον
ὅτι εἰ τῶν συμμάχων τινὲς οὐκ ἀρεστὰ πράττουσιν ἡμῖν ἢ ὑμῖν ἀρεστά.†
So much for that. Why then (μήν) have we come? That it is not because we are in
straits, you could discover, if you please, by looking at the situation by sea or, if you
please, at the situation by land at the present time. What then (μήν) is the reason?
Manifestly that some of our allies are doing what is not pleasing to us.
(X. HG 6.3.12–13)
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Although we do not have a purely dialogical text type here, an embassy speech is al-
ways directed towards a particular audience and a speaker often uses particular lin-
guistic means that create the involvement of that audience. As such, we should not
be too surprised to find a wh-question containing μήν in a rhetorical speech. In fact,
this example also complies to the schematic pattern given above. Callistratus first re-
jects the possible assumptions of the people in his audience (‘consider how foolishly
they are talking’) about the reason why the Theban ambassadors have come to their
embassy. After this argument, the question is asked what is the reason that they have
come (τί μὴν ἥκομεν;).
Obviously, this question is not a standard question asked to the audience, but
rather to the speaker himself, i.e. as a procedural or expository question introducing
the next topic of discussion. Thus, with this question Callistratus as it were shortly
takes the perspective of his addressees and imagines that they – given his firm rejec-
tion of their earlier assumptions – might have this question in mind now. As such, the
question is a means to create audience involvement: the voice of an addressee is, so to
speak, ‘inserted’ into the speech. Note that this whole process is repeated once more,
since Callistratus’s first answer is again rejective in nature and – although the text has
been disputed here – another procedural μήν-question follows later on (τί μήν ἐστιν;).
In rhetoricalwh-questions
The particle μήν is also well at home in wh-questions that appear to be interpreted as
rhetorical questions, and in the elliptical phrase τί μήν; in particular. Let’s look at some
examples first:
(34) [Choral song of Rhesus’s mother, who tells she had advised her son not to go to Troy, but
that Hector’s ambassadors had convinced him to come. She also unfolds that Rhesus’s
death was the work of Athena and Odysseus.] hector. I knew this: it needed no seer
to tell us that this man was killed by the devices of Odysseus.
ἐγὼ δὲ γῆς ἔφεδρον Ἑλλήνων στρατὸν
λεύσσων, τί μὴν ἔμελλον οὐ πέμψειν φίλοις
κήρυκας, ἐλθεῖν κἀπικουρῆσαι χθονί;
ἔπεμψ᾿· ὀφείλων δ᾿ ἦλθε συμπονεῖν ἐμοί.
As for me, when I saw the Greek army encamped against the land, why μήν would I
not send heralds to my friends, asking them come help the country? I sent them, and
he, being obliged to help me, came. (E. Rh. 952–957)
(35) [The members of the chorus try to figure out who passed their ranks and sentinels at
night.] – Isn’t this Odysseus’s doing? Or who else’s? – If we can judge by his earlier
exploits, it certainly is.
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– δοκεῖς γάρ;
– τί μὴν οὔ;
– θρασὺς γοῦν ἐς ἡμᾶς.
– Do you think so? – How μήν could it not be him? – He was bold against us, at any
rate. (E. Rh. 704–707)
Examples (34) is one of the rare cases of a non-elliptical rhetorical wh-question fea-
turing μήν. Note that this example also shows other typical features of rhetorical ques-
tions, such as the verb ἔμελλον (‘Ι would’) and the negation οὐ. Here, Hector clearly sug-
gests that his sending heralds to his friends (including Rhesus) was the only sensible
thing for him to do, thus defending himself against the possible reproaches of Rhesus’s
mother. Similarly, in (35), the second choral member affirms that the only person who
could have passed their sentinels is Odysseus and that the preceding utterance of the
first chorus member (‘do you think so?’) was in fact out of place.
(36) αθ. ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα, εἴπερ ψυχὴ περιάγει πάντα, ἆρ᾿ οὐ καὶ ἓν ἕκα-
στον;
κλ. τί μήν;
αθ. περὶ ἑνὸς δὴ ποιησώμεθα λόγους, …
– athenian. If, in principle, soul drives round the sun, moon and the other heavenly
bodies, does it not impel each individually? – clinias.Of course! (τί μήν;) – ath. Let’s
take a single example then: … (Pl. Lg. 898d)
(37) [Enumeration of rights concerning ruling and being ruled.]
αθ. … καὶ τρίτον ἔτι τούτοις ξυνέπεται τὸ πρεσβυτέρους μὲν ἄρχειν δεῖν, νεωτέρους δὲ ἄρ-
χεσθαι.
κλ. τί μήν;
αθ. τέταρτον δ ̓ αὖ δούλους μὲν ἄρχεσθαι, δεσπότας δὲ ἄρχειν.
κλ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
athenian. … and then, following on these as a third claim, the right of older peo-
ple to rule and of younger to be ruled. – clinias. Of course! (τί μήν;) – ath. The
fourth right, in turn, is that slaves ought to be ruled, and masters ought to rule. –
clin. Undoubtedly. (Pl. Lg. 690a–b)
These two examples illustrate the idiom – especially common in the later Platonic di-
alogues – of the elliptical phrase τί μήν; as a strongly affirmative means: ‘(if not that,)
what else?’, ‘of course’, ‘to be sure’. Note that an interpretation as a standard informa-
tion seeking question is clearly ruled out in view of the continuation of the discourse
in these examples. In both cases, the nextmove cannot be seen as an answer to a ques-
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tion, but rather consists of a transition to a next point of discussion. In (37), this is also
explicitly signaled by the topicmanagement particles δ’ αὖ (‘in turn, on the other hand’;
cf. Revuelta Puigdollers 2009).
Now in view of the analysis of μήν given so far, the frequent occurrence of μήν
in rhetorical wh-questions indeed need not come as a surprise. As I have suggested
above, the particle cancels preparatory conditions and can thus be said to signal that
the question is indeed not to be interpreted as a prototypical standard question. More
in particular, I believe that the rhetorical interpretation of μήν-questions can be well
explained on the assumption that μήν may also target the first preparatory condition
of questions, viz. that the speaker does not already know the answer to the question
(cf. table 2.3 in section 2.6.2). In my view, μήν can be added to the question to explic-
itly cancel this condition and signal that the speaker does already know the answer.
And this is in fact precisely what gives us the reading as a rhetorical question – which
signals that the answer is evident and already part of the common ground (cf. e.g. Egg
2007). Put differently, the addition of μήν to an interrogative clause helps to make a
rhetorical interpretation more explicit.
I would like to emphasize, however, that this interpretation should certainly not
be pushed too far. In some cases, indeed, the phrase τί μήν; cannot be interpreted as a
rhetorical question, but can only be analyzed along the lines given for standard infor-
mation seeking questions given above. Here are some examples:
(38) socrates. No, Protarchus, for you certainly do not understand about the enemies of
our friend Philebus. – protarchus. Whom do you mean?
σω. καὶ μάλα δεινοὺς λεγομένους τὰ περὶ φύσιν, οἳ τὸ παράπαν ἡδονὰς οὔ φασιν εἶναι.
πρω. τί μήν;
σω. λυπῶν ταύτας εἶναι πάσας ἀποφυγάς, ἃς νῦν οἱ περὶ Φίληβον ἡδονὰς ἐπονομάζουσιν.
soc. Certainmenwho are said to bemaster thinkers about nature, and who deny the
existence of pleasures altogether. – pro.Whatdo (μήν) they say? – soc. That these are
all refuges from pain, the things which Philebus and his school now call pleasures.
(Pl. Phlb. 44b–c)
(39) socrates. And what of the other poets? Do they not treat of the same things?
ιον. ναί, ἀλλ᾿, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ ὁμοίως πεποιήκασι καὶ Ὅμηρος.
σω. τί μήν; κάκιον;
ιον. πολύ γε.
ion. Yes, but, Socrates, they have not done so in the same way as Homer. – soc. Then
(μήν) how? In a worse way? – ion. Far worse. (Pl. Ion 531d)
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(40) When Glaucon had thus spoken, I had a mind to make some reply thereto, but his
brother Adeimantus said:
– οὔ τί που οἴει, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι περὶ τοῦ λόγου;
– ἀλλὰ τί μήν; εἶπον.
– αὐτό, ἦ δ’ ὅς, οὐκ εἴρηται ὃ μάλιστα ἔδει ῥηθῆναι.
– “You don’t suppose, Socrates, I presume, that the statementof the case is complete?”
– “But do tell me (μήν), what else (can there be said)?” I said. – “The very most essen-
tial point,” said he, “has not been mentioned.” (Pl. R. 362d)
In each of these cases, τί μήν is best interpreted as a genuine request for further infor-
mation, which occurs after the rejection of a proposition in the precedingmove (cf. the
underlined negations). And indeed, the subsequent moves all take the form of proper
answers to such questions. Given such cases then, it seems that the dividing line be-
tween rhetorical and non-rhetorical interpretations of τί μήν-questions is not as strict
as might have been suggested so far and that contextual factors play an important role
too. Accordingly, I believe we should not treat the phrase as a completely fixed and
routinized affirmative idiom.
5.2.4 In yes/no-questions
The final major speech act type that I would like to discuss with regard to μήν concerns
yes/no-questions. Here, amajor caveat is in place right from the start. As I have noted in
the general introduction, yes/no-questions inAncientGreekarenot encodedby special
syntactic structures (e.g. by means of a special word order pattern) and are thus in
principle indistinguishable from proper declarative sentences with an assertive force
– as far as we are able to know at least (cf. section 1.4.3). The only exceptions are cases
that are marked by introductory interrogative particles (e.g. ἆρα, ἆρ’ οὐ, μῶν, οὐκοῦν,
ἄλλο τι (ἤ); cf. section 2.3.3) or parenthetical illocutionary expressions like εἰπέ μοι (‘tell
me’) or ἀποκρίνου (‘answer (me)’; cf. Shalev 2001). In other cases, the interpretation
as a yes/no-question would arise only from the surrounding discourse context.
Nowwhen the particle μήν is concerned, it is telling that it does never occur, as far
as I can see, in yes/no-questions that are explicitly marked as such by the expressions
just mentioned. However, it does seem to occur – in Plato even quite regularly – in the
other type of yes/no-questions, i.e. in declarative clauses that in view of the given dis-
course context do not appear to be prototypical assertives but rather yes/no-questions
or rising declaratives. By necessity, our analysis must remain somewhat tentative due
to the caveat mentioned above, but I do think it is interesting to look at some of these
examples and examine how μήν can be analyzed here.
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I will look in particular at Platonic dialogue, in which the particle often occurs in
eliciting moves that prefer a reaction of agreement. Often, such moves consist of the
premises that will lead to a particular conclusion within an argument (cf. Denniston
1954: 337), as in (41):
(41) “Doesn’t someone who opines set his opinion over something? Or is it possible to
opine, yet to opine nothing? – “It’s impossible.” – “But someone who opines opines
some one thing?” – “Yes.”
– ἀλλὰ μὴν μὴ ὄν γε οὐχ ἕν τι ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ὀρθότατ’ ἂν προσαγορεύοιτο;
– πάνυ γε.
– μὴ ὄντι μὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπέδομεν, ὄντι δὲ γνῶσιν;
– ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.
– οὐκ ἄρα ὂν οὐδὲ μὴ ὂν δοξάζει;
– οὐ γάρ.
“But surely (μήν) the most accurate word for that which is not isn’t ‘one thing’ but
‘nothing’?” – “Certainly.” – “Surely (μήν), we have by necessity assigned ignorance to
what is not and knowledge to what is?” – “That’s right.” – “Then apparently (ἄρα),
someoneopinesneitherwhat is norwhat is not.” – “No, you’re right.” (Pl. R. 478b–c)
Given the eliciting nature of thesemoves, it is unnatural, as I take it, to analyse μήν here
in terms of strong commitment to the truth of the proposition expressed. However, an
analysis in termsof countering expectations andassumptions of the addresseemaynot
be very straightforward either. After all, in the present context there are no clues that
the propositional content presented in the μήν-unit is in contrast with the view of the
addressee (Glaucon): rather, Glaucon continually confirms the reasoning by Socrates.
How should we account for instances like these?
Again, I think an analysis in terms of felicity conditions could be helpful. My pro-
posal is that μήν cancels the preparatory conditions of assertions here, i.e. that (the
speaker assumes that) the addresseedoesnot know the information conveyed. In other
words, Socrates assumes that Glaucon does already know the information presented in
these utterances. And indeed, this information is of a very trivial nature (‘not existing is
best called nothing’) or has already been agreed upon earlier in the dialogue (note the
phrase ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπέδομεν ‘we have by necessity assigned’). So with μήν the speaker
checks, so to speak, whether the addressee indeed agrees with him on some very triv-
ial (common ground) information. The reason then for making such an utterance is
that the addressee might not actively entertain the information at the present point
in the conversation. However, this information is relevant as a logical step towards a
particular conclusion (note the consequential particle ἄρα here) and needs to get ac-
tivated and confirmed first. Such a checking function, as we have seen in section 2.6.2
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above, has in fact also been proposed for the modal particles toch and doch in resp.
Dutch and German (cf. Karagjosova 2004, Foolen 2006), and also shows similari-
ties with the meanings contributed by the English adverb surely (cf. Downing 2001,
Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007).
A similar analysis can be given for the following example:
(42) athenian. … You appreciate that each and every assembly and gathering for any pur-
pose whatever should invariably have a leader (ἄρχοντα)? – clinias. Of course.
αθ. καὶ μὴν ἐλέγομεν νύνδη μαχομένων ὡς ἀνδρεῖον δεῖ τὸν ἄρχοντ’ εἶναι.
κλ. πῶς δ᾿ οὔ;
αθ. ὁ μὴν ἀνδρεῖος τῶν δειλῶν ὑπὸ φόβων ἧττον τεθορύβηται.
κλ. καὶ τοῦτο οὕτως.
ath. And surely (μήν) just now we did say that if it is a case of men fighting, their
leader must be brave? – clin. Yes, indeed. – ath. Surely (μήν), a brave man is less
thrown off balance by fears than cowards are? – clin. That too is true enough.
(Pl. Lg. 640a–b)
Here too, the μήν-utterances are building up toward a particular conclusion and
seem to be used to activate particular trivial information from the (cultural) common
ground, which the addressee might not be aware of at this point in the conversation.
We might say that the speaker is checking whether the addressee is aware of the rele-
vant inferences that can be made from the previous statement on the basis of general
knowledge about the world: a leader implies being brave – here it is checked whether
Clinias is still aware of the fact that they accepted this a little earlier (ἐλέγομεν νυνδή
‘we just now said’) – and a brave leader, in turn, implies not being easily thrown off
balance by fears.
To sum up, the essential effect of μήν in these examples is that it turns a neutral
assertive speech act into a strongly biased yes/no-question, by means of which the
speaker checks with the addresseewhether they are indeed still on the same pagewith
regard to some propositional information. In turn, this would explain why the particle
is not found in yes/no-questions marked by other particles. The particle ἆρα, for one
thing, is a neutral question particle, which is not compatible with such a biased read-
ing. And expressions such as μῶν, οὐκοῦν and ἄλλο τι (ἤ), on the other hand, already
express a strong bias in their own right. In general, I believe that this analysis of ‘check-
ing’ μήν can be aligned very well with the strongly inquisitive character of the genre of
Platonic dialogue. The printing of the question marks in example (41) – i.e. an inter-
pretation as a yes/no-question or a rising declarative – corroborates my interpretation
of μήν and, as far as I am concerned, this would be a good thing to do in example (42)
too.
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Incidentally, the analysis of ‘checking’ μήν would have the additional advantage
that we can better explain why μήν sometimes occurs in collocation with the attitudi-
nal-interactional particle που, as in (43). As I have noted before, this particle indicates
a lack of full speaker commitment (‘I suppose, I guess’; cf. section 2.6.4) andwould thus
be completely incompatible with the strongly affirmative meaning of μήν in standard
assertive speech acts. The problem vanishes, however, on the account given here, i.e.
on the assumption that μήν has lost its strong affirmative value and has a ‘checking’
function.
(43) [Hippias argues that the ordinary people – who aren’t knowing (εἰδότες) – would prob-
ably not agree with Socrates that the lawgivers without the good would also miss the
lawful and the law.]
σω. ἀλλὰ μήν που οἵ γ᾿ εἰδότες τὸ ὠφελιμώτερον τοῦ ἀνωφελεστέρου νομιμώτερον ἡγοῦν-
ται τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις· ἢ οὐ συγχωρεῖς;
ιπ. ναί, συγχωρῶ, ὅτι γε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ.
socrates. But (ἀλλά)μήν I suppose (που) peoplewhoknow, at least, believe thatwhat
is more beneficial is more lawful in truth for all men. Or don’t you agree? – hippias.
Yes, I grant that it’s that way in truth. (Pl. Hp.Ma. 284e)
A possible analysis for this example could run as follows, then. The particle που, on
the one hand, has its typical function: indicating lack of full speaker commitment to
the expressed information as to leave room for possible disagreement on the part of
the addressee (cf. also ἢ οὐ συγχωρεῖς; ‘or don’t you agree?’) and to imply a degree of
politeness on the part of the speaker (cf. Sicking 1993: 59). Μήν, on the other hand,
signals that this information, trivial as itmay be, is as yet not activated by the addressee
and not taken into account at the present moment in the conversation, most typically
because it is in some kind of contrast with the view of the addressee as laid out in the
preceding discourse. In other words, μήν pertains to the speech act level here and has
a checking function, while που is used to tone down the force of the utterance and save
the addressee’s face.
5.2.5 Conclusion
To conclude, I believe that the notion of countering expectations or assumptions is
present in all instances of attitudinal-interactional μήν. It always indicates a possible
discrepancy between the assumptions of the speaker and the addressee, either with
respect to the propositional content of the host unit in question or with regard to its
illocutionary force and felicity as such. The possibility of a discrepancy typically arises
out of the previous discourse context (spoken by the addressee) in combination with
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extra-linguistic knowledge about regularities in the world (including communicative
patterns). A strongly affirmativemeaning aspect, however,which appears to bepresent
inmost examples of μήν in assertives, is more difficult to uphold as a general feature of
attitudinal-interactional μήν in view of its presence in non-assertive speech acts such
as directives and questions.
5.3 Μήν as a discourse connective particle
I now turn to the discourse connective usages of μήν, in which the particle marks
contrastive discourse relations between two discourse units. According to the type of
contrastive relation indicated, a further distinction can be made between (i) μήν as a
marker of denial-of-expectation contrast, (ii) μήν as a marker of unexpected discourse
transitions and (iii) μήν as a neutralmarker of thematic discourse boundaries. Of these,
the first use belongs to the first class of connectives discerned in section 2.5.3 above,
i.e. markers of rhetorical relations between (the contents of) discourse acts. The sec-
ond and the third use, on the other hand, belong to the second class and are to be taken
as markers of discourse-structural relations, mostly functioning at a more global level
of discourse (i.e. between moves). I will discuss these three usages one by one.
5.3.1 Marker of denial-of-expectation contrast
In the literature on contrastive relations, it is generally accepted that a relation of
denial-of-expectation contrast essentially involves three elements.20 First, there is a
contextual issue, the question under discussion that needs to be answered. Second,
there is a concession, the information contributed by the first part of the contrastive
pair. This contains a partial answer to the issue and a confirmation of some informa-
tion. Thirdly, there is the correction, the information contributed by the second part.
Crucially, this correction initiates a search process for conflicting implications,
which is typically an implication of the first part, interpreted with respect to the con-
textual issue. That is, it involves the denial of an implication or expectation that the
addressee may have inferred from the first part of the contrastive pair. Typically, this
implication or expectation is derived from generalised (but defeasible) topoiwhich are
20. See e.g. Anscombre & Ducrot (1977, 1983), Foolen (1991), Kroon (1995: ch. 9), Rudolph
(1996), Verhagen (2005: chs. 2 and 4), Mauri (2008) and Spenader & Maier (2009). The terms used
here are taken from the latter article.
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assumed to be present in the common ground of the discourse participants (see sec-
tion 2.5.3 above). In this way, the speaker makes clear that he is aware of a topos, but
that this does not go through in the present case. Let’s look at an example:
(44) (Issue: Will Mary and John get married?)
Mary is in love with John, but she turned down his proposal for marriage.
(Spenader &Maier 2009)
Given the contextual issue in (44), the first part of the utterance might be seen as evi-
dence for the conclusion thatMary and Johnwill getmarried, basedona topos that love
is normally a prerequisite for getting married. However, this implication is denied by
means of the following but-clause. In otherwords, the but-clause cancels the argumen-
tative load of the concessive part. Such a rhetorical relation of denial-of-expectation
contrast tends to be explicitly signaled by a contrastive connective, i.e. by expressions
such as but, however, nevertheless and their equivalents in other languages.
We have seen in the previous sections that in the attitudinal-interactional use of
μήν an element of counter-expectative contrast is already present (i.e. countering pos-
sible expectations or assumptions of the addressee). From here, it is obviously but a
small step to a counter-expectative connective usage, in which the particle explicitly
marks the denial-of-expectation relationship as exemplified above. Such an analysis,
as I take it, is especially attractive in cases inwhich μήν occurs in the interior of a speech
turn and the preceding words are spoken by the same speaker as the μήν-unit. Here is
an example:
(45) [Hector asks the messenger why Rhesus has come to Troy.]
αγ. οὐκ οἶδ’ ἀκριβῶς· εἰκάσαι γε μὴν πάρα.
messenger. I don’t know exactly; it is μήν possible to make a guess. (E. Rh. 284)
In this example, the two discourse acts spoken by the messenger are clearly related by
a denial-of-expectation contrast. The fact that the messenger does not know the exact
answer to his question may lead Hector to expect that he will keep his mouth shut.
In the second part of his move, however, the messenger frustrates this expectation by
saying that he can still make an educated guess – which he indeed continues to do in
the following discourse. The contrastive relation seems to be explicitlymarked here by
μήν, which could for instance be translated by ‘yet’ or ‘however’.
At this point, however, we are confronted with a notorious methodological prob-
lem. Since the contrastive relationship between the two acts would also have been
present without μήν (i.e. on the basis of the contextual issue, the common ground and
the content of the two acts), it is difficult to definitely prove that the particle has an ex-
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plicit connective force in this type of examples. The point is that, due to the absence of
any syntactic differences between attitudinal-interactional and discourse connective
particles in Ancient Greek, μήν could in principle still be analyzed as an attitudinal-in-
teractional particle (e.g. ‘to be sure, in fact’) which happens to occur in an asyndetically
connected clause.Wecannot be completely surehere, in otherwords,whether the con-
trastive coherence relation is indeed explicitly signaled by μήν (i.e. as a distinct, coded
meaning aspect) or merely arises as a contextually established side-effect of μήν. And
it may thus be argued – in line with the principle of methodological minimalism (sec-
tion 3.4) – that the fact that μήν showsup in this type of contrastive contexts should not
be ascribed to the semantics of the particle, but is just a matter of strong compatibility
(cf. Wakker 1997a for this position; see section 5.5.2 below for further discussion).
In my view, however, a number of arguments can be adduced in favour of recog-
nizing a distinct counter-expectative connective usage for μήν. The strongest argument
concerns the distributional fact that μήν occurs inwhat I call the μέν/μήν-pattern.What
is characteristic of this pattern is that the μήν-act is preceded by a discourse act that
contains the discourse particle μέν, which, as we have already seen in section 5.1.1,
generally functions as a ‘forward-linking’ or ‘preparatory’ connective particle: μέν indi-
cates that its host act is incomplete or part of a larger whole, and thus prepares for an
upcoming discourse unit, which is usually introduced by contrastive connective par-
ticles such as δέ or ἀλλά (‘but’; cf. German zwar … aber and Dutch weliswaar … maar).
Typical example of the μέν/μήν-pattern are the following:
(46) [Heracles to Admetus:] You did not tellme yourwifewas laid out for burial but feasted
me in the house, saying that you were busy with a grief not your own. So I garlanded
my head and poured libations to the gods in your house in its hour of misfortune.
καὶ μέμφομαι μέν, μέμφομαι, παθὼν τάδε·
οὐ μήν σε λυπεῖν <γ᾿> ἐν κακοῖσι βούλομαι.
And I do μέν object, yes I object, to this treatment. Yet (μήν) I do not want to cause
you pain in the midst of your trouble. (E. Alc. 1012–1018)
(47) κλ. μόγις μέν πως ἐφέπομαι, λέγε μὴν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα ὡς ἑπομένου.
clinias. I have μέν some difficulty in keeping pace with you, but (μήν) move on to
the next point on the assumption that I do. (Pl. Lg. 644d)
(48) athenian. Suppose that the truth had been different from what the argument has
now shown it to be, […] could a lawgiver have told a more useful lie than this, or one
more effective making everyone practice justice in everything they do, willingly and
without pressure?
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κλ. καλὸν μὲν ἡ ἀλήθεια, ὦ ξένε, καὶ μόνιμον· ἔοικε μὴν οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι πείθειν.
clinias. Truth is μέν a fine thing, Stranger, and sure to prevail, yet/but (μήν) to per-
suade men of it seems no easy task. (Pl. Lg. 663d–e)
(49) ἄκουε δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, λόγου μάλα μὲν ἀτόπου, παντάπασί γε μὴν ἀληθοῦς, …
Listen to a story then, Socrates, a very μέν strange one, yet (μήν) true in all respects,
… (Pl. Ti. 20d)
If we analyze the μέν/μήν-pattern in terms of the terminology introduced above, the
discourse act with μέν functions as the concession and the one with μήν as the correc-
tion or denial. This means that the μήν-act denies a possible implication or expecta-
tion which derives from the μέν-act and is related somehow with the issue at stake. In
(48), for example, there is a contextual issue of the desirability of persuading people
of something that is true. The μέν-act, the concession, confirms some contextual infor-
mation, viz. that truth is something beautiful and prevailing. Then the μήν-act, which
contributes the information that it seems difficult to persuade people of the truth (in
this particular case), corrects a possible implication of the information in the μέν-act.
The implication arises out of a topos that normally if something is beautiful and pre-
vailing, it would be easy to persuade people of it. The μήν-act thus denies or corrects
the implication that is raised by this topos. And in (49), similarly, the μήν-act (παντά-
πασί γε μὴν ἀληθοῦς ‘in all respects true’) counters a possible expectation raised by the
μέν-act (μάλα μὲν ἀτόπου ‘a very strange [story]’), based upon a topos that normally very
strange stories are not regarded as being (completely) true. Similar explanations can
be made for (46) and (47).
Now the fact that μήν occurs in combinationwith preparatory μέν, gives us a rather
strong indication, in my view, that it indeed functions as a contrastive connective par-
ticle, very much like the other particles that can be used in this way (cf. also Allan
2017b). Additional support for this conclusion comes from distributional data on par-
ticle collocations. An interesting fact, in this respect, is the notable absence – already
mentioned above – of the direct collocation of μήν with the discourse connective δέ.21
Furthermore, although the collocation ἀλλὰ μήν is not uncommon in Greek, it only oc-
curs at the start of new moves and does never occur, as far as I can see, in the type of
contexts that are at stake here. If μήν were to be strictly attitudinal-interactional in na-
21. I have found only one example where δέ and μήν take the same postpositive position: Pl. Lg. 782c
τὸ δὲ μὴν θύειν. There are a few other instances, but these all have variae lectiones without δέ. For this
reason, it is probably justified to doubt this particular instance as well, as was in fact already proposed by
Denniston (1954: 341). The same appears to hold true for the few cases in Hellenistic and later Greek,
which are treated in Blomqvist (1969: 60).
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ture, collocation with these contrastive discourse connectives would in principle not
be impossible. The distributional evidence, however, seems to suggest that μήν rather
behaves as a competitor of ἀλλά and δέ in this type of contexts. Indeed, I am even in-
clined to go as far as assigning μήν the status of a syntactic (clausal) conjunction in this
type of examples, i.e. as a proper but-equivalent.
This is further supported by the interesting distributional fact that it is only within
the μέν/μήν-pattern that μήν is found in complements embedded under regular verbs
of speech or thought, as in the following example:22
(50) For I agree that all men commit unjust acts unwillingly.
εἰ καί τις φιλονικίας ἢ φιλοτιμίας ἕνεκα [ἄκοντας μὲν ἀδίκους εἶναί] φησιν, [ἀδικεῖν μὴν
ἑκόντας πολλούς], ὅ γ’ ἐμὸς λόγος ἐκεῖνος ἀλλ’ οὐχ οὗτος.
Even if someone, through contentiousness or arrogance, asserts that there do exist
μέν people who are unjust against their will but (μήν) many people commit unjust
acts voluntarily, my account is the former, but not this latter one. (Pl. Lg. 860e)
This might be taken as further evidence that μήν in this pattern behaves differently
from the strictly attitudinal-interactional usages and has an additional discourse con-
nective feature. In fact, in these embedded examples an analysis of μήν as a proper
syntactic conjunction (rather than a connective adverbial particle) appears to be vir-
tually unassailable.
A final piece of evidence that speaks in favour of the given analysis is concerned
with diachronic evolution. First of all, it should be noted that instances of μήν in the
kind of contexts as exemplified above only start to occur from the late fifth-century on-
ward. The earliest instance of the μέν/μήν-pattern I have found is example (46) above,
taken from Euripides’s tragedy Alcestis, which is dated to 438 bce. In the Platonic cor-
pus, in turn, the construction occurs much more frequently. This particular use of μήν
thus occurs at a significantly later date than its attitudinal-interactional usages and
may as such be taken as a later meaning extension (cf. section 3.4 above). Note, more-
over, that the assumption of a counter-expectative connective usage would also be in
line with the cross-linguistic diachronic tendencies of semantic change that I have
discussed in section 3.2.2. Recall that one of Traugott’s main tendencies of semantic
change was the rise of connective and text-linkingmeanings (tendency 2). This means
that a development from an attitudinal-interactional to a connective particle does cer-
tainly not need to surprise us.
22. Other examples are Leg. 723a, 862a, R. 529e and Sph. 216b. See also Ti. 43b for an example in a
subordinate ὥστε-clause. For the combination ἦ μήν in embedded clauses, see (24) above.
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Now, as I take it, the given analysis can in fact easily be extended to instances in
which we have no preceding μέν-act, but where an analysis of denial-of-expectation
contrast fits the context verywell. Consider the two instances in the following example:
(51) visitor. Now it seems that there are two routes to be seen stretching out in the di-
rection of the part towards which our argument has hurried, one of them (τὴν μέν)
quicker, dividing a small part off against a large one,
τὴν δέ, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ μεσοτομεῖν ὡς μάλιστα, τοῦτ᾿ ἔχουσαν μᾶλλον,
μακροτέραν γε μήν. ἔξεστιν οὖν ὁποτέραν ἂν βουληθῶμεν, ταύτην πορευθῆναι.
νε. σω. τί δέ; ἀμφοτέρας ἀδύνατον;
χε. ἅμα γ᾿, ὦ θαυμαστέ· ἐν μέρει γε μὴν δῆλον ὅτι δυνατόν.
while the other more closely observes the principle we were talking about earlier,
that one should cut in the middle as much as possible, but/yet (μήν) is longer. Now,
we can go down whichever of the two routes we like. – younger socrates. What? Is
it impossible to follow both? – vis. By both at once it is, you strange boy; to take each
in turn, however (μήν), is clearly possible. (Pl. Plt. 265a–b)
In the first occurrence in (51), μήν scopes over an adjective that forms a separate dis-
course act (μακροτέραν γε μήν). Here, the second road is first described as being more
in accord with earlier statements of the Visitor. This might lead Young Socrates to the
conclusion that this is the best path to choose. The μήν-act, however, provides a po-
tential counterargument for this conclusion – the fact that this road will be longer –
and cancels it. In the second part of this example, in turn, the first part of the Visitor’s
reply may trigger Young Socrates to infer that it is indeed impossible to take both ways
(note also the use of the rather offensive vocative ὦ θαυμαστέ ‘you strange boy’). How-
ever, this implication is corrected by the following discourse act with μήν, in which the
possibility of taking both paths is preserved in a modified version.
I end this section with an example from a more narrative – rather than a purely
argumentative – passage, in which (assumed) expectations are cancelled that concern
the development of the narrative and the intended actions of its characters:
(52) Having emptied this great flood of words into our ears all at once like a bath atten-
dant, Thrasymachus intended to leave.
οὐ μὴν εἴασάν γε αὐτὸν οἱ παρόντες, ἀλλ’ ἠνάγκασαν ὑπομεῖναί τε καὶ παρασχεῖν τῶν εἰρη-
μένων λόγον.
Those present, however (μήν), did not let him, but made him stay to give an account
of what he said. (Pl. R. 344d)
In (52), the previous discourse creates the expectation that Thrasymachus would in-
deed leave; at least, this is what he plans to do. However, this possible expectation is
denied in the next discourse unit, which has μήν. Note that in such narrative exam-
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ples in particular, an affirmative meaning aspect appears to be out of place: there does
not seem to be a need for the speaker (Socrates) to explicitly posit a high degree of
commitment or emphasize the force of the assertion.
Note furthermore that after the denial, a clause introduced by corrective ἀλλά fol-
lows, which expresses the things that did happen, i.e. the things that should replace
the denied expectation. I believe that instances like these (οὐ μήν … ἀλλά … ‘however,
not x but y’) have eventually grammaticalized into the ‘compressed’ contrastive com-
bination οὐ μὴν ἀλλά (cf. Denniston 1954: 28–30 and Basset 1997 for discussion).
5.3.2 Marker of unexpected discourse transitions
The next use to be discussed here concerns μήν as a marker of unexpected discourse
transitions. In this case, as I have noted above, the particle performs a connective func-
tion on a more global level of discourse, marking discourse-structural relations be-
tween moves rather than rhetorical relations between the contents of discourse acts.
That is, μήν primarily pertains to the structural and thematic organization of the ongo-
ing conversation. More in particular, the particle indicates that the move made by the
speaker probably comes unexpected for the addressee in the communicative context
at hand. In terms of conversational structure, then, this move can typically be char-
acterized as opening up a side-sequence or an embedded exchange (cf. section 2.5.2
above).
Before we look at some examples, it is useful to note that μήν in this usage is most
typically combined with the discourse connective καί (‘and, also’), yielding the clus-
ter καὶ μήν. In this combination, both particles have a function of their own, I believe:
whereas καί signals that some point is added that ties in with the preceding discourse,
μήν indicates that this addition comes as an unexpected turn in (the structure of)
the conversation. The meaning of the combination can be paraphrased as ‘but wait
a minute, there is more to be said about this’ (cf. van Emde Boas 2017b). I will look at
two examples here.
(53) κο. ἀλλ᾿ οὐ μέλλειν, ἀλλ᾿ ἅπτεσθαι καὶ δὴ χρὴ τῆς διανοίας,
ὡς τὸ ταχύνειν χαρίτων μετέχει πλεῖστον παρὰ τοῖσι θεαταῖς.
πρ. καὶ μὴν ὅτι μὲν χρηστὰ διδάξω πιστεύω· τοὺς δὲ θεατάς,
εἰ καινοτομεῖν ἐθελήσουσιν καὶ μὴ τοῖς ἠθάσι λίαν
τοῖς τ᾿ ἀρχαίοις ἐνδιατρίβειν, τοῦτ᾿ ἔσθ᾿ ὃ μάλιστα δέδοικα.
γε. περὶ μὲν τοίνυν τοῦ καινοτομεῖν μὴ δείσῃς· τοῦτο γὰρ ἡμῖν
δρᾶν ἀντ’ ἄλλης ἀρετῆς ἐστιν, τῶν δ’ ἀρχαίων ἀμελῆσαι.
πρ. μή νυν πρότερον μηδεὶς ὑμῶν ἀντείπῃ μηδ’ ὑποκρούσῃ,
πρὶν ἐπίστασθαι τὴν ἐπίνοιαν καὶ τοῦ φράζοντος ἀκοῦσαι.
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chorus leader. No more delay! Here and now you must put your idea in play: what
spectators most appreciate is speed. – praxagora. But wait a minute (καὶ μήν), I’m
sure my proposals are worthwhile, but I’m awfully worried about the spectators: are
they ready to quarry a new vein and not stick with what’s hoary and conventional?
– neighbour. Now (τοίνυν) don’t you worry about quarrying new veins: for us, in-
difference to precedent takes precedence over any other principle of government. –
pra. Then (νυν) let no one object or interrupt until you’ve heard the speaker out and
understand the plan. [proposal follows] (Ar. Ec. 581–589)
In (53), the chorus leader orders Praxagora to unfold her ideas. However, rather than
directly complying to the directive, which would be the preferred reaction, she starts
an embedded sequence in which she puts forward her doubts about performing the
course of action involved. She explicitly marks this unexpectedmove with καὶ μήν (‘ac-
tually/butwait aminute’). Note that, onceherworries havebeen removedby theneigh-
bour, Praxagora indeed returns to the main sequence, where she now complies to the
given order and unfolds here ideas (cf. the use of the pop-particle νυν).
(54) [Clytaemnestra has asked Agamemnon to step of his chariot onto the purple cloths.
Agamemnon, however, refuses by saying that only gods should be honoured by such ob-
jects.]
ὀλβίσαι δὲ χρὴ
βίον τελευτήσαντ᾿ ἐν εὐεστοῖ φίλῃ.
εἰ πάντα δ᾿ ὣς πράσσοιμ᾿ ἄν, εὐθαρσὴς ἐγώ.
κλ. καὶ μὴν τόδ᾿ εἰπὲ μὴ παρὰ γνώμην ἐμοί.
αγ. γνώμην μὲν ἴσθι μὴ διαφθεροῦντ᾿ ἐμέ.
A man should be called fortunate only when he has finished his life in the prosper-
ity that all desire. If I am one who will act consistently on these principles, I have
nothing to fear. – clytaemnestra. But wait a minute (καὶ μήν), tell me this, without
disguising your opinion. – agamemnon. Be assured that I shall not be false to my
opinion. (A. Ag. 928–932, cf. van Emde Boas 2017b)
In (54), Clytaemnestra’s initial request to step on the purple cloths has been firmly re-
fused by Agamemnon, so that this issue appears to be completely done with. However,
in the next move Clytaemnestra indicates that she does not yet accept this rejection.
That is, unlike what Agamemnon may expect here (μήν), she is not yet prepared to
close the preceding exchange and wishes to further (καί) elaborate on the matter. In
the words of van Emde Boas, Clytaemnestra’s καὶ μήν “is a forceful signal that she is
reopening/continuing the preceding sequence, regardless of Agamemnon’s expecta-
tions” (van Emde Boas 2017b: 420). Here μήν does not somuch interact with the con-
tent or the directive illocution of the speech act made, but rather with (expectations
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about) the organization of the ongoing conversation (‘What are we going to do next?’).
More in particular, it signals that the addressee did probably not expect the present
move.
5.3.3 Neutral marker of thematic discourse boundaries
I now turn to the second discourse-structural usage of μήν, in which it functions as
a rather neutral marker of thematic discourse boundaries (cf. also Allan 2017a).
Here it seems that the particle does no more than signaling the transition to the next
(sub)topic or next point of discussion – without there being an explicit element of
countering the expectations of the addressee. In this respect, μήν in fact comes rather
close to the way in which the contrastive particle δέ is typically used, which is usually
analyzed as a relatively neutral boundary marker (e.g. E. J. Bakker 1993a). I give three
examples here:
(55) [The Athenian tells the story of the Greek defeat of the Persians.] megillus. Yes, sir, you
are quite right, and your remarks reflect credit both on your country and yourself. –
athenian. No doubt,Megillus, and it is only right and proper to tell you of the history
of that period, seeing that you’ve been blessed with your ancestors’ character.
ἐπισκόπει μὴν καὶ σὺ καὶ Κλεινίας εἴ τι πρὸς τὴν νομοθεσίαν προσήκοντα λέγομεν· οὐ γὰρ
μύθων ἕνεκα διεξέρχομαι, οὗ λέγω δ’ ἕνεκα.
But/yet (μήν) consider, both you and Clinias, whether these remarks of ours have any
relevance at all to legislation. For I’m not going through this simply for the story, but
because of the object of our exercise. (Pl. Lg. 699d)
In (55), we find μήν at the start of a new step or move within a speech turn. Whereas
the first part of this turn constitutes a reaction to the previous turn of Megillus, the
second part, starting with μήν, shifts the focus of attention to a new point about the
story just told, viz. its purpose for the present discussion. In this case, this move does
not appear to come unexpected for the addressees.
(56) athenian. … After these remarks, our law (νόμος) on the subject should run like this:
[description of the law, about 16 oct-lines]
δεύτερος μὴν νόμος· …
But (μήν) the second law is: [description of the second law] (Pl. Lg. 919d–920a)
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And in (56), I take it that μήν indeed does no more than signaling the transition to a
following theme (like δέ also does). More specifically, we can assign μήν the function of
a listing marker, marking the subtopics of a more encompassing subject of discussion
(cf. Allan 2017b: 298). Here we may indeed conclude that the notion of countering
expectations or assumptions is not or no longer present.23
(57) [Xenophon lists the Spartan forces.]
αὕτη μὲν δὴ ἡ μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων δύναμις ἦν. ἥ γε μὴν τῶν πολεμίων ἡθροίσθη Ἀθηναίων
μὲν εἰς ἑξακισχιλίους ὁπλίτας, Ἀργείων δ᾿ ἐλέγοντο περὶ ἑπτακισχιλίους, Βοιωτῶν δ᾿, ἐπεὶ
Ὀρχομένιοι οὐ παρῆσαν, περὶ πεντακισχιλίους, Κορινθίων γε μὴν εἰς τρισχιλίους, καὶ μὴν
ἐξ Εὐβοίας ἁπάσης οὐκ ἐλάττους τρισχιλίων.
This, then, was the force on the side of the Lacedaemonians. The force of the enemy,
on the other hand (γε μήν), had gathered together including: of the Athenians μέν
about six thousand hoplites; of the Argives δέ, according to all accounts, about seven
thousand; of the Boeotians δέ – for the Orchomenians were not present – about five
thousand; of the Corinthians, on the other hand (γε μήν) about three thousand, and
in fact from the whole of Euboea no less than three thousand. (X. HG 4.2.17)
A similar analysis applies to the two instances of the particles combination γε μήν in
this excerpt from Xenophon’s Hellenica. In both cases, this combination appears to do
nomore than indicating a transition to the next subtopic. Thus, with the first instance,
Xenophon moves from the discussion of the Spartan forces to that of the total force of
the other party in this battle.Within this second subtopic, in turn, he distinguishes be-
tween a number of different cities of which he successively lists the number of soldiers.
Note thatwe find a particle (combination)with each transition to a next city, including
an instance of γε μήν. Again, we are dealingwith neutral listingmarkers which indicate
the transition to a next subtopic.24
23. My view on this particular example has slightly changed when compared to my 2017-articles, in
which I maintained that the notion of counter-expectation was not fully absent in this example, writing
that the addressee probably did not have expected the transition to another topic. As rightly observed
by Allan (2017b: 298), however, it is already announced earlier in the dialogue (919c) that a number of
different laws are needed on the topic of retail traders, so that the shift to a second law would in fact not
come as a unexpected for the addressee.
24. As we have seen in section 2.7.3, the particle γε can essentially be seen as a marker of contrastive
focus.Μήν, in turn, as I argue here, signals a thematic contrast at the discourse-structural level. It may not
come as a surprise then that these particles often collocate and end up in the same postpositive cluster.
In Xenophon, in fact, γε μήν may well have become a fixed combination in view of the high frequency of
examples such as (57). See also Revuelta Puigdollers (2009).
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Theuse of μήν as amarker of thematic discourse boundaries – inwhich the original
attitudinal-interactional values of the particle are completely bleached away – appears
to be a relatively late development, which does not occur until the works of Plato and
Xenophon. Note that the development of a purely textual discourse-marking function
of μήν is in line with the cross-linguistic tendencies of semantic change as discussed in
section 3.2.2 above. In addition, it nicely shows how the semantic scope of the particle
has gradually increased, eventually evenpertaining to larger segments of discourse (i.e.
moves).
5.3.4 Conclusion
In the present section, I have demonstrated that μήν has three different discourse con-
nective usages. First, it can be used as a marker of the rhetorical relation of denial-of-
expectation contrast (‘yet, however’). Here it is telling that μήν occurs in the μέν/μήν-
pattern, in which itmay in fact even be taken as a genuine clausal coordinator. Second,
it has two discourse-structural usages in which it is oriented towards the thematic or-
ganization of the discourse and takes scope over moves rather than discourse acts. As
a marker of unexpected discourse transitions it signals that the speaker makes a con-
versational move that probably had not been expected by the addressee (‘but wait a
minute, …’). As a neutral marker of discourse boundaries, finally, it merely indicates
the transition to a next theme or (sub)topic.
5.4 Wrapping up
It is time towrapupour discussionof the various usages of μήν andbring them together
in a unified picture. We can now come to the conclusion that we need a number of
different semantic features in order to properly account for all of the usages of this
linguistic item. These are the following: (i) strong affirmation (‘p, I assure you’), (ii)
countering expectations or assumptions of the addressee (i.e. reacting to a possible
alternative view: ‘p, unlikewhat youmayexpect/assume’), (iii) textual connectivity (i.e.
marking discourse relations between two discourse units) and (iv) marking thematic
discourse boundaries. The various usages discussed above can be classified according
to the presence or absence of these features, as illustrated in table 5.2.
In this overview, + indicates the presence of a semantic feature as part of the coded
meaning of that particular usage, whereas ± indicates that a feature ismerely a contex-
tually-induced side-effect, present in some contexts but not in others. What can be
seen in this overview is how the various usages of μήν are related to one another. Note
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purely affirmative + ± - -
counter-expectative in assertives + + ± -
counter-expectative in non-assertives - + ± -
discourse connective
marker of denial-of-expectation contrast - + + -
marker of unexpected discourse transitions - + + ±
neutral marker of thematic boundaries - - + +
Table 5.2:Main usages and semantic features of μήν
that each usage has at least one feature in common with another usage, but that there
is no semantic feature common to all of them. In other words, a monosemic analy-
sis is clearly not possible here and we arrive at a polysemous network of a number of
interrelated usages. In addition, this overview nicely illustrates the diachronic devel-
opment of μήν over time. I have put the oldest usages at the top of the table and the
later developments at the bottom. We can see how the new usages gain new meaning
aspects through the conventionalization of pragmatic inferences, whereas at the same
they lose some of the older semantic features.
As I take it then, the particle originally started out as a strong affirmative marker
in assertions (‘I assure you’). However, given that affirmation is particularly at home in
contexts in which the speaker opposes or contradicts the possible view taken by the
addressee, the particle soon developed an additional counter-expectativemeaning, in-
dicating that the information in the host unit is in contrast to whatmay be assumed or
expected by the addressee(s) given the communicative context at hand. This also al-
lowed the particle to be used in non-assertive speech acts, where the original meaning
of strong affirmation was not or less clearly present.
The feature of counter-expectation in turn paved the way for an additional fea-
ture of textual connectivity – given the fact that a possible alternative view of the ad-
dressee often arises from the immediately preceding discourse. Here we can distin-
guish between two types of connective usages. First, μήν developed a usage as a rhetor-
ical marker of denial-of-expectation contrast, where μήν indicates a contrast between
the contents of two discourse acts. In this usage it has even further grammaticalized as
a true clausal conjunction (i.e. as syntactic connective). Undisputed evidence for this
connective functions comes from the μέν/μήν-pattern. Second, it developed a struc-
tural usage as a marker of unexpected discourse transitions, where μήν rather cancels
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inferences about the proper continuation of the discourse (καὶ μήν: ‘unlike what you
may expect, I also add that’). From this latter usage, finally, μήν further developed into
a neutral marker of thematic discourse boundaries, merely signaling the transition to
a next subtopic. In this particular usage, the notion of counter-expectation does no
longer seem to be present.
The development of μήν can thus be summarized by means of the following cline:
(58) affirmative > affirmative + counter-expectative > counter-expectative + connective
> neutral connective
Note that this rise of connective meanings is further supported by Traugott’s general
tendencies of semantic changeasdiscussed in section3.2 above.Observe, furthermore,
that the semantic scope of the particle has gradually increased (i.e. from propositions
to speech acts to even larger stretches of discourse). Also, the development of con-
trastivemeanings out of purely affirmative ones is a cross-linguisticallymore common
phenomenon. It is reminiscent, for instance, of the development of English in fact, ac-
tually, Latin vero and Dutch echter, all of which started out as affirmative adverbials
meaning ‘true’ or ‘real’.
5.5 Re-examining previous literature
This final section consists of an evaluation of some of the earlier literature on μήν in
the light of the preceding discussion. In doing so, I will focus on what I take to be the
two most influential and most-cited accounts of the particle, viz. the extensive treat-
ment given by Denniston (1954) on the one hand (section 5.5.1), and the modern
discourse-pragmatic analysis as unfoldedbyWakker (1995, 1996, 1997a) on the other
hand (section 5.5.2).25
25. Other more recent studies that pay attention to (some usages of) μήν and deserve mention are
Blomqvist (1969: 48–75, 1995), Sicking (1993: 54–55), Oréal (1997), Cuypers (2005), van Erp Taal-
man Kip (2009), George (2009), van Emde Boas (2017b), Thijs (2017a, 2017b) and Allan (2017b).
For a complete overview of the early scholarship on μήν, I refer to the Online Repository of Particle Studies
as drawn up by Bonifazi, Drummen & de Kreij (2016: vol. 5). Quite surprisingly, however, the latter
authors themselves remain almost completely silent when it comes to the various usages and exact se-
mantics of μήν.
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5.5.1 Denniston
In his seminal particle handbook, Denniston (1954: 329–358) distinguishes between
three major senses of μήν/μάν: (1) emphatic, (2) adversative connecting and (3) pro-
gressive connecting. Of these, he supposes that (1) is the earliest sense, and that the
two connective usages, “widely as they differ from one another, follow when the need
is felt for means of connexion” (329). Let us first look at his description of these three
distinct senses in somewhat more detail.
1. When emphatic μήν is concerned, Denniston lists its usages in different types
of speech act (i.e. in statements, commands, wishes and questions), but as to its
exact semantic contribution he appears to be in the dark, offering little more
than that “it is difficult to grasp the exact difference in sense between μήν and
the far commoner δή” (330) or that it “adds liveliness” (332) to a question. And
accordingly, no possible translation into English are provided.
2. Adversative connecting μήν is described as normally having a ‘balancing’ func-
tion, “denoting that a fact coexistswith another fact opposed to it” (334). English
‘yet’ and ‘however’ are proposed as apt translations of this sense. Here, special
attention is paid to the collocation with οὐ and to the μέν/μήν-pattern.26
3. On progressive connecting μήνDenniston states that it “either adds a fresh point
(‘again’, ‘further’), or marks a fresh stage in the march of thought (‘well’, ‘now’)”
(336). Here a major distinction is made between the use in positive and that in
negative statements (i.e. the collocations οὐ μήν, οὐ μὴν οὐδέ and οὐδὲ μήν). Fur-
thermore, a number of more specific contextual varieties of progressive μήν are
listed, viz. (i) marking the fulfilment of a condition just stipulated, (ii) marking
the transition frommajor to minor premise, and (iii) marking a transition from
the statement of a problem to the discussion of it (so-called ‘inceptive’ μήν).
On a general level of analysis, I believe that this broad threefold distinction of Den-
niston is indeed essentially on the right track. In terms of the framework presented in
this study, his category of ‘emphatic’ μήν roughly corresponds to my attitudinal-inter-
actional μήν, his ‘adversative connective’ μήν equates the use as a marker of denial-of-
26. Denniston also mentions a secondary, less frequent, adversative connecting usage of μήν, in which
it behaves as “a strong adversative, often denoting, not merely contrast with what precedes, but the com-
plete, or almost complete, negation of it” (335). The given examples, however, are very limited in number
and partly concern fragmentary material. And on closer inspection, in fact, they do not appear to be that
different from the cases of ‘balancing’ adversative μήν. In any case, as I have noted in section 5.2 above,
μήν is never used to simply deny a table proposition.
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expectation contrast, and his ‘progressive’ μήν by and large accords with the use as a
discourse-structural marker indicating thematic boundaries. On amore detailed level,
however, Denniston’s treatment is much less clear and convincing, in my opinion. I
will discuss three main (interrelated) points of criticism here (see also section 1.2).
The most important problem, to start with, is Denniston’s discussion – or rather
lack of discussion – of the semantics of ‘emphatic’ μήν. As I have already noted in sec-
tion 3.3, the vague label ‘emphatic’ is not sufficient (i.e. not specific enough) to account
for the textual distribution of the particle or – as indeed acknowledged by Denniston
himself – to distinguish it from other allegedly emphatic particles such as δή.27 In fact,
it never becomes clear what the exact meaning contributions of emphatic μήν are to
the utterance in which it occurs, or how it interacts with different speech act types.
An important consequence of this lack of specificity is that Denniston is also unable
to give a proper account of the interrelations between the three different senses of the
particle. Although I believe Denniston is right in stating that both of the connective
usages are later developments (see above), he cannot explain why it is precisely these
two usages that have developed from the emphatic use. Nor is he very clear on the
relationship between the two divergent connective usages themselves.
My secondmainworry concernsDenniston’s treatment of the category of ‘progres-
sive’ μήν. Again, I believe that his semantic description of this class is not very satisfac-
tory. For one thing, he does not elaborate upon the semantic differences with other al-
legedly ‘progressive’ particles (e.g. οὖν, τοίνυν, δή), which tend to be analyzed bymeans
of the same terms. In fact, paraphrases such as ‘adding a fresh point’ or ‘marking a fresh
stage’ and English translations such as ‘now’ and ‘well’ are much better suited, in my
opinion, to discourse-structural particles such as οὖν and τοίνυν (cf. Sicking 1993, van
Ophuijsen 1993,Wakker 2009a; see also section 2.5.3). Also, as I have noted above, it
is difficult to see, on Denniston’s account, how such meanings could have arisen from
either of the two other senses of μήν in the first place. Put differently, Denniston has
failed to see that μήν in its discourse-structural usages can in fact still be seen as a con-
trastivemarker (i.e. asmarking discourse boundaries), even though it is a different kind
of contrast than, say, a denial-of-expectation contrast. In this respect, a modern dis-
course-pragmatic approach surely improves on Denniston’s handbook.
On closer inspection, moreover, I would further claim that many of Denniston’s
examples of ‘progressive’ μήν are in fact better analyzed as cases of attitudinal-inter-
actional μήν (rather than cases of discourse-structural μήν marking thematic bound-
27. Very similar points of criticism have been formulated by Wakker (1996: 247–249, 1997a: 209–
210).
559416-L-bw-Thijs
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 230
216 Chapter 5. The particle μήν
aries). Instances of the combinations οὐ μὴν οὐδέ and οὐδὲ μήν, for instance, appear to
end up in the class of ‘progressive’ μήν almost by definition. To give but one typical
example:
(59) [Two old women are quarrelling about who may take Epigenes home.] third old
woman. Cut the jokes and followme. – second old woman. Oh no you don’t; come
along this way.
γρ.γ ὡς οὐκ ἀφήσω σ᾿ οὐδέποτ᾿.
γρ.β οὐδὲ μὴν ἐγώ.
επ. διασπάσεσθέ μ’, ὦ κακῶς ἀπολούμεναι.
third old woman. I’ll never let you go. – second old woman. Nor will I, in fact
(μήν). – epigenes. You’re going to rip me in half, you hellbound creatures!
(Ar. Ec. 1074–1076)
Here, οὐδὲ μήν occurs in a reactive move and we are clearly not dealing with a major
discourse transition, let alonewith “a fresh stage in themarch of thought”, asDenniston
would have it. The ‘progression’ to a new idea, if at all present, is here rather due to
the use of the additive particle οὐδέ (‘nor, not … either’). Very similar remarks can be
made about the cases where μήν, καὶ μήν and ἀλλὰ μήν are taken tomark “the fulfilment
of a required condition” (see examples (13) to (17) above). Denniston’s category of
‘progressive’ μήν, in short, turns out to have a much wider application than needed.
My final major problem with Denniston’s account of μήν involves his treatment
of the cases in which the particle occurs in combination with other particles, notably
καὶ μήν, ἀλλὰ μήν and γε μήν. As I have noted in the general introduction, Denniston’s
classification of particle combinations in general leaves a lot to be desired: the point
is that these are usually given separate treatment and that it often remains obscure
what the contributions of the individual particles are.28 The case of μήν is indeed a
particularly clear case in point. Let me shortly illustrate this by taking ἀλλὰ μήν as an
example.
If we look at Denniston’s (1954: 341–347) classification of ἀλλὰ μήν, it is conspicu-
ous, first of all, thatwe again encounter the labels ‘progressive’ and ‘adversative’, though
this time applied to the combination as a whole and without the label ‘connecting’. It
remains unclear, however, what the individual contributions of ἀλλά and μήνwould be,
28. It should also be noted that Denniston is not consequent as to the combinations that deserve dis-
tinct treatment. Thus,whereas cases of καὶ μήν are treated in a distinct section, cases of οὐδὲ μήν are simply
ranged under the heading of (solitary) μήν. Obviously, this totally obscures the complementary nature of
the additive particles καί (‘and, also, even’) and οὐδέ (‘nor, not … either, not even’).
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or whether or not both expressions are to be seen as connectives.29 Next, we also find
the categories ‘substantiating a condition’ and ‘transition between major and minor
premise’, which we recognize from his treatment of solitary μήν (see above). This time,
however, they are listed as distinct usages rather than particular subtypes of the ‘pro-
gressive’ sense – whichmakes us wonder how these usages are actually related to each
other. A final peculiarity is the sudden occurrence of a so-called ‘assentient’ category,
where ἀλλὰ μήν expresses assent, practical consent or “willingness to act as required”
(342); this class was not yet mentioned in the treatment of solitary μήν, though it actu-
ally does occur in Denniston’s treatment of ἀλλά (pp. 16–20). Again, we wonder what
the individual contributions of the particleswould be to the combination as awhole.30
What seems to be the main problem, then, is that Denniston is primarily inter-
ested in listing recurrent contexts of use of these combinations – without paying very
much attention to the exact meaning contributions (i.e. the discourse-pragmatic in-
structions) of each of the items involved. What’s missing is a clear account of μήν’s
syntax and semantics whichwould explain its high compatibility with these other par-
ticles. In my opinion, as I have tried to show in the account presented in the present
chapter, μήν in combinations can generally be attributed one of its usual senses, irre-
spective of whether it is combined with καί (‘and, also, even’), ἀλλά (‘but’), γε (con-
trastive focusmodifier) or ἦ (‘it is true that’). Althoughwe cannot rule out that some of
these combinations may in fact have becomemore or less conventionalized construc-
tions (e.g. ἦ μήν as a subordinator in indirect oaths), I believe we should always try to
explain why and how μήν has ended up as a fixed part of such a construction.31
5.5.2 Wakker
The second influential account of μήν that needs to be addressed here is the account
unfolded by Gerry Wakker during the 1990s. In a number of papers, Wakker (1995,
1996, 1997a) aims to improve on Denniston’s vague notion of ‘emphasis’ by using the
29. An underlying problem is that Denniston does not make any distinction between syntactic and
semantic connectivity (see section 2.5.1). As a result, ‘connective’ and ‘adverbial’ are used as comple-
mentary terms. That is, the possibility of adverbial particles with a discourse connective function is not
recognized in the first place. See also Rijksbaron (1997b) and van Ophuijsen (1993: 77–78) for this
point.
30. Very similar points of criticism can bemadewith regard toDenniston’s classification of γε μήν (347–
350) and καὶ μήν (351–358).
31. Cf. the apt remarks of Sicking in this respect: “the only methodologically correct approach would
seem to take its point of departure from an initial assumption that the proper value of μήν both explains
its affinity with οὐ, with ἀλλά and with ἦ, and is preserved in its collocations with these” (Sicking 1993:
55, emphasis original).
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functionally oriented discourse-pragmatic framework that Kroon (1995) developed
for the description of Latin particles. Her research corpus consists of the dialogues of
classical tragedy (Wakker 1995, 1997a) and the conversations written by Theocritus
in the Hellenistic period (Wakker 1996).32 Wakker’s account, indeed, is a huge step in
the right direction when compared to Denniston’s, and it has strong correspondences
withmy treatment of μήν above. Nevertheless, I believe some points of reconsideration
are in place too, as we will see below. But let us look at her analysis in somewhat more
detail first.
The first central observation made by Wakker is that Denniston’s ‘emphatic’ μήν
belongs to the class of attitudinal or interactional particles (see section 2.6 above). Her
general description of this use of μήν runs as follows:
In using μήν the speaker expresses his positive commitment to the truth of the
proposition; he indicates that he as it were personally guarantees its truth: ‘in
truth’, ‘really’. This insisting on the truth of the proposition is not a mere sign
of ‘emphasis’, rather the speaker in this way anticipates a possible reaction of
disbelief on the part of the addressee. (Wakker 1997a: 213)
Wakker thus recognizes twomeaning aspects for attitudinal-interactional μήν: (i) posi-
tive commitment and (ii) anticipation of possible disbelief. This lattermeaning aspect,
Wakker writes, involves the supposed beliefs and expectations of the addressee: the
speaker assumes that the addressee might not expect the asserted proposition to be
true. And this expectation can be based upon information in the previous conversa-
tion or upon the speech situation in general.33
With this attitudinal-interactional value in mind, Wakker further moves on to a
treatment of the two connective senses that were discussed by Denniston. First, she
looks at a number of turn-initial examples of μήν in which an adversative nuance is
present as well, such as (60):
(60) κρ. οὐ βούλομαι τὸν μάντιν ἀντειπεῖν κακῶς.
τε. καὶ μὴν λέγεις, ψευδῆ με θεσπίζειν λέγων.
32. Cf. also Wakker’s (1994) entry on μάν/μήν in the Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos, in which she
gives an overview of the particle’s usage in early epic.
33. Wakker’s analysis is in turn verymuch in line with the remarks on μήν by Sicking (1986: 132, 1993:
54–55). He argues that with μήν “the speaker shows himself aware that his audience may not be inclined
to accept the statement, and indicates that he will nevertheless uphold it. It thus implies the possibility
of a distance between the two” (1993: 52, emphasis original). Further on he adds that “[t]he particle μήν
seems to be at home in expressing the contrary of what the person addressedmight either (1) suppose or
(2) wish” (54). This view is also followed by Cuypers (2005) and van Erp Taalman Kip (2009).
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creon. I do not wish to reply rudely to the prophet. – tiresias. And truly (μήν) you
do speak rudely, saying that my prophecies are false.
(S. Ant. 1053–1054, transl. Wakker 1997a: 224)
Considering such cases, however, Wakker argues as follows:
It seems unwarranted […] to ascribe in these cases an adversative connecting
function to μήν. The adversativity results from the fact that contrasting assertions
are made and does not as such belong to the meaning of μήν. […] Otherwise
stated, μήν does not itself express the adversative relationship, but by its very
meaning it is very much compatible with such a context.
(Wakker 1997a: 224–225, emphasis original)
Here it should be noted that Wakker does admit that this conclusion is perhaps some-
what too strong for a small number of cases of the combination γε μήν in monological
contexts, the preceding words being spoken by the same speaker, as in the following
example (repeated from above):
(45)’ [Hector asks the messenger why Rhesus has come to Troy.]
αγ. οὐκ οἶδ’ ἀκριβῶς· εἰκάσαι γε μὴν πάρα.
messenger. I don’t know certainly; it is, to be sure (μήν), possible to divine.
(E. Rh. 284, transl. Wakker 1997a: 225)
Wakker suggests that the contrast is here in particular due to γε, but that it cannot be
ruled out that μήν also functions as amarker of the adversative relationship. But at any
rate, Wakker concludes, the particle never loses its primary attitudinal value andmust
never be taken “as just an adversative connector” (Wakker 1997a: 226).34
Finally,Wakker explains that the strongly affirmative value of μήνmakes it suitable
to occur in enumerations and climactic contexts, where it can be used
tomark an itemofwhich the speakermay expect that it will elicit the addressee’s
disbelief or surprise. Anticipating a reaction of disbelief he marks the truth of
what he is presenting with μήν. (Wakker 1997a: 226)
34. In her paper on Theocritus,Wakker (1996: 255–257) also discusses μήν (written μάν in Theocritus)
in the μέν/μήν-pattern. Here, shemaintains that μήν does not lose itsmain attitudinal-interactional value,
but at the same time also functions as a connector.
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From here, Wakker argues, μήν acquires a progressive connective nuance, introducing
a new point in the discourse – which the addressee probably did not expect – or a
sudden turn in the course of events. She concludes that the attitudinal value is not
wholly lost in this type of instance either.35
Now in general, Wakker’s discourse-pragmatic analysis of μήν cannot be underesti-
mated. She offers a rather nuanced picturewhich is able to deal withmost of the short-
comings of Denniston’s account. Her description of the primary attitudinal-interac-
tional value of μήν highly improves upon Denniston’s vague notion of emphasis and in
turn enables her to distinguish μήν from other particles such as ἦ and δή, to account for
someof its striking distributional patterns (e.g. the high co-occurrencewith negations)
and to give a principled explanation of how it may have acquired the two additional
connective usages. On closer inspection, however, I believe that there are still some
important grounds for reconsideration, which is particularly due to the fact that some
usages of the μήν do not occur – or only very infrequently – in Wakker’s research cor-
pora. When compared to the unified account presented here, two main shortcomings
can be mentioned.
First, a number of remarks are in place onWakker’s description of the attitudinal-
interactional value of μήν: (i) positive commitment and (ii) anticipation of disbelief or
counter-expectation. On a terminological level, for one thing, the notion of ‘positive
commitment’ is not a very useful feature to attribute a particle with, in my opinion. I
would rather say that positive commitmentmust in fact be seen as a property of speech
acts in general (see section 2.6.2). The questionwould arise, then, towhat extent an ut-
terance containing μήν would differ in speaker commitment from the same utterance
without the particle. This can be easily solved, however, by assuming – as I have done
above – that the particle indicates strong commitment or reinforces the illocutionary
strength of the speech act made. In fact, this essentially seems to be what Wakker has
in mind in her paper.
Furthermore, I have to admit thatWakker’s papers are not particularly clear on the
question whether the secondary aspect (countering expectations of the addressee) is
to be seen as part of the coded semantics of μήν – in addition to the affirmative mean-
ing aspect – or rather as a frequently occurring side-effect, i.e. as a pragmatic meaning
which ismerely to be ascribed to the (dialogical) contexts inwhich the particle is used.
Although the quote given above seems to suggest the first option, her translations of
35. In her 1996-paper,Wakker (1996: 257–259) argues that the development to a progressive connec-
tive particle has been fully completed, since here examples can be found where the primary attitudinal-
interactional value of μήν is completely absent.
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μήν consistently point in the direction of the second option (‘in truth, truly, really, to be
sure’ and the like; cf. (60) above).36 Although it is obviously difficult to definitely prove
this, I would say that this meaning aspect of countering expectations should indeed
be ascribed to the semantics of attitudinal-interactional μήν itself, being a crucial part
of the knowledge of the language users on how it can be used in discourse. As we will
see, it is especially in this respect that μήν differs from δή (‘according-to-expectations’)
when used in similar contexts. Moreover, there are some indications that the strong
affirmative value is less important than suggested byWakker, witness the possible col-
location of μήνwithmarkers that indicate a lowdegree of commitment (e.g. που, οἶμαι ‘I
suppose’). Thus, I believe that the secondarymeaning aspect is in factmuchmore cen-
tral than appears to be suggested byWakker. My account puts different accents in this
respect, further emphasizing the fundamentally intersubjective nature of the particle.
Finally, it shouldbe emphasized thatWakker’s description is completely tailored to
the use of μήν in assertive speech acts (cf. the quote above: “insisting on the truth of the
proposition” and “anticipation of disbelief”). As such, the description does not cover
the cases of μήν in non-assertive speech acts such as directives, yes/no-questions and
wh-questions (see sections 5.2.2 to 5.2.4 above).37 It is true that μήν predominantly
occurs in assertions, but a general description of its semantic value – which Wakker
aims toprovidehere– should alsobeable todealwith these less prototypical cases. Part
of the problem, inmy opinion, is due to the restricted research corpus used byWakker,
in which these non-assertive cases are very rare. The use of μήν in information seeking
wh-questions, in fact, is even completely absent from tragic dialogue – whereas quite
some instances are to be found in the dialogues of Plato and Xenophon. In this respect,
I believe that the account given in the present chapter provides a more complete and
more nuanced picture.
I now turn to my second main point of criticism, which concerns Wakker’s treat-
ment of the adversative connective use of μήν. As follows from the quotes given above,
Wakker – as opposed to Denniston – is hesitant to recognize an adversative connec-
tive meaning as part of the coded semantics of the particle; and even if it is present,
the particle never loses its primary value of strong affirmation (cf. also her translations
36. Cf. alsoWakker (1997a: 222, emphasis mine): “with the attitudinal particle μήν […] the speaker as
it were personally guarantees the truth of the proposition, often because he supposes his proposition to be
in contrast with what the addressee supposes or wishes”. The last part of this quote suggests that counter-
expectation is not universally present as part of μήν’s meaning, i.e. is not part of its coded semantics.
37. It must be noted that Wakker is clearly not unaware of the use of μήν in non-declarative clauses. In
a footnote, she indeedmakes some sensible comments on the few instances of μήν in drama in rhetorical
wh-questions, yes/no-questions or imperative clauses (Wakker 1997a: 214–215, fn. 13).
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in (60) above). In this way, Wakker adheres to the principle of methodological min-
imalism and does not want to multiply senses when it is not strictly necessary (see
section 3.4). The evidence from Plato and Xenophon, however, as we have seen in sec-
tion 5.3.1 above, clearly shows that such an adversative connective sense must in fact
be recognized for μήν, not only in the μέν/μήν-pattern, but also in cases without a pre-
ceding μέν. And in such cases, moreover, it is not very attractive to maintain a reading
of strong affirmation or ‘personal commitment’ (paceWakker). Incidentally, the rise of
μήν as an undisputed marker of a denial-of-expectation contrast further confirms the
view that countering expectations should indeed be seen as a central meaning aspect
of attitudinal-interactional μήν (see above). The only addedmeaning aspect in this use
is that of textual connectivity (cf. table 5.2 above).
It may further be useful to emphasize that Wakker appears to use the notion of
‘connector’ in the strict syntactic sense of the term – and in this respect I indeed con-
cur with Wakker’s analysis: in tragedy such a syntactically connective function of μήν
appears to be only in embryo.38 However, as we have seen in section 2.5.1 above, par-
ticles may also function as connectives (i.e. may signal relations between two linguis-
tically expressed units) without establishing a relation at the syntactic level. Thus, if
we consider combinations such as καὶ μήν and ἀλλὰ μήν, it is clear that μήν is an adver-
bial particle and cannot function as a syntactic connective (i.e. as a coordinator), but
this does not rule out the possibility that μήν is connective in a semantic sense, further
specifying the intended coherence relation (cf. English and yet, but still, but nonetheless
and the like). Viewed from this perspective, I am inclined to conclude that a counter-
expectative connectivemeaning is indeed present in tragedy aswell, notably in cases of
monological discourse, where μήν relates to some implication of the preceding words
of the same speaker (turn-internal μήν).
Τo sum up, I believe that the reasons for reconsideration of Wakker’s account are
twofold. First, the notion of commitment to the truth of the proposition as part of μήν’s
basic semantics cannot be alignedwith all of the available data inmy corpus, either be-
cause of its occurrence in non-assertive speech acts or because of other incompatible
clues in the co-text. Thus, I believe that the notion of countering expectations or as-
sumptions is to be given amore central place. Second, there is strong evidence that μήν
has an additional use as a connective particle, marking denial-of-expectation contrast.
Here it is useful to tear apart syntactic and semantic connectivity – although, as I have
noted earlier, the distinction in Greek is not always easy to make.
38. Recall that there is only one instance of the μέν/μήν-pattern, in a relatively late play. See example
(46) above.
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5.5.3 Conclusion
To conclude this section, I would like to briefly return to the remarks I have made in
chapter 1 with regard to the current status of the research into Ancient Greek parti-
cles. The present case study on μήν clearly illustrates my point that we can still ad-
vance when combining the discourse-pragmatic approaches of the last three decades
with the use of a large-scale, heterogeneous research corpus à la Denniston. Indeed,
whereas Denniston’s description of μήν falls short due to the lack of a modern linguis-
tic apparatus, the modern analysis by Wakker has a rather limited scope (tragedy and
Theocritus) and therefore provides an incomplete picture of the variety of μήν’s usages.
In the present chapter, I have tried to solve these lacunae by paying special attention to
the use of μήν in non-assertive speech acts and to the μέν/μήν-pattern, both of which
are recurrently found in Plato and Xenophon. The result is a polysemous picture in
which multiple meanings of μήν are recognized that can be related to each other on
both a synchronic and a diachronic level.
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Chapter 6
The particle δή
Entre toutes les particules grecques,
la particule δή est, sans contredit, la
plus complexe, la plus
déconcertante.
Octave Navarre (1932: 679)
In this chapter Iwill present the seconddetailed case study offered in the presentwork,
which is concerned with what is surely one of the most complex and slippery parti-
cles in Ancient Greek, the particle δή. The chapter is structured in a similar fashion as
the previous chapter on μήν, although it is much more elaborate due to the extreme
versatility of δή. I will first set the scene by providing a general overview of the main
distributional properties of δή (section 6.1). In the subsequent sections, I turn tomy ex-
amination of the various different usages of δή. In doing so, I make a broad distinction
between its usages as an attitudinal-interactional marker (section 6.2), its usages as a
discourse connective (section 6.3) and its usages as a phrasal modifier (section 6.4).
After that, I will wrap up the discussion and bring together themain findings into a co-
herent, polysemouspicture (section6.5). Finally, Iwill re-examine someof themost in-
fluential accounts of δή given in the earlier literature, viz. those of Denniston (1954),
Sicking & van Ophuijsen (1993), Wakker (1997a, 1997b) and Bonifazi, Drummen
& de Kreij (2016). And I will show in particular how I believe these earlier accounts
are improved upon by the polysemous picture given here (section 6.6).
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6.1 Setting the scene
In linewith the course of action taken for μήν in theprevious chapter, I startmyanalysis
of δή by giving a general overview of itsmain distributional properties. Aswewill see in
this section, this actually turns out to be a gooddealmore complex andvaried than that
of μήν. In what follows, I will first address the variation in position and syntactic scope
of δή (section 6.1.1), and then make some remarks on the kind of linguistic contexts
in which it recurrently occurs, e.g. in terms of basic speech act types and collocations
with other particles (section 6.1.2).
6.1.1 Position and syntactic scope
One of the most striking distributional properties of δή, in which it clearly stands out
frommost other Greek particles, is its wide variation in the position it takes within the
sentence. I address two important points here.
(i) A first crucial observation is that δή indeed occurs in all of the three positions for
postpositive particles distinguished in chapter 4.Wemay first of all find δή in sentence-
peninitial position, as in the following examples:
(1) ἐπὶ= τοῦτονω δὴ τὸν Ἄμασιν Καμβύσης ὁ Κύρου ἐστρατεύετο, ἄγων καὶ ἄλλους τῶν ἦρχε
καὶ Ἑλλήνων Ἴωνάς τε καὶ Αἰολέας, δι᾿ αἰτίην τοιήνδε· …
Against this δή Amasis Cambyses son of Cyrus was marching, taking other people
that he ruled as well as Ionian and Aeolian Greeks, due to the following reason: …
(Hdt. 3.1.1)
(2) socrates. …We have arts, have we not? – gorgias. Yes.
σω. πασῶνω δή, οἶμαι, τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν μὲν ἐργασία τὸ πολύ ἐστι καὶ λόγου βραχέος δέονται,
ἔνιαι δὲ οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς τέχνης περαίνοιτο ἂν καὶ διὰ σιγῆς …
socrates. Amongst all δή arts, as I take it, some consist mainly of work and require
but brief speech, and some do not require speech at all, but the art’s object may be
achieved also in silence … (Pl. Grg. 450c)
(3) socrates. … My proof comes from a dream that I saw a short while ago this very
night: and maybe it was opportune you didn’t wake me up.
κρ. ἦνω δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνύπνιον;
crito. But (δέ) δήwhat was the dream? (Pl. Cri. 44a)
In these three examples, δή occurs at the start of a new sentence, taking the first
prosodic word as its host (i.e. ἐπὶ= τοῦτο, πασῶν and ἦν respectively). Note that this
includes the cases of δή at the start of a new speech turn in a conversation (turn-initial
usage of δή), as in (2) and (3). As we have seen, sentence-peninitial position generally
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does not provide a solid ground to draw conclusions about the syntactic domain the
particle applies to (see rule (ii) in section 4.4). In (1), for instance, the particle may in
principle be analyzed as taking scope over the full sentence, the main clause (ending
at ἐστρατεύετο) or even just the prepositional phrase ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν Ἄμασιν.
The second option is that δή takes clause-peninitial position, i.e. the peninitial po-
sition in a clause that is not at the start of a new sentence. This may be, for instance,
a main clause after a preposed theme-constituent as in (4), an apodotic main clause
following a subordinate clause as in (5), or a postposed subordinate clause as in (6).
(4) οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι [τάς= τε δὴ Σάρδις ἔσχον καὶ αὐτὸν Κροῖσον ἐζώγρησαν], …
As for the Persians, they δή both took Sardis andmade Croesus himself prisoner, …
(Hdt. 1.86.1)
(5) εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγω, [καλῶςω δὴ ἔχει τὸ πεισθῆναι].
Ifwhat I sayhappens tobe true, it is δήbeautiful to be convincedby it. (Pl. Phd. 91b)
(6) ἐπεὶ τοίνυν οὐ δύναμαί σε πείθειν μὴ ἐκθεῖναι, σὺ δὲ ὧδε ποίησον, [εἰ δὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη ὀφθῆ-
ναι ἐκκείμενον].
Well then, since I cannot move you from your purpose to expose [the child], do you
do as follows, if δή there is absolute necessity that it be seen exposed. (Hdt. 1.112.3)
The clause-peninitial position of δή entails that the particle in these cases scopes below
the sentence and does not, for instance, express meanings of a discourse-structural
kind at the level of the move (cf. rule (iii) in section 4.4). In some cases, this entails
that it has clause scope (e.g. in case the prosodic host is a subordinator as in (6); cf.
rule (i)), but in other cases phrasal scope, too, may in principle still be possible (e.g.
τάς Σάρδις in (4) and καλῶς in (5)).
Thirdly, wemay find δή in clause-internal position, where it occurs, not in the left-
periphery but somewhere in the interior of the clause, as in the following examples:
(7) περὶ γάρ τοι γῆς καὶ αὐτὸς [πολλὰω δὴ] ἀκήκοα, οὐ μέντοι ταῦτα ἃ σὲ πείθει.
For (γάρ) about the earth, you know (τοι), I myself too have heard many δή things,
though not the account that convinces you. (Pl. Phd. 108d)
(8) χρόνου δὲ οὐ πολλοῦ διελθόντος ἡ ἐσύστερον ἐπελθοῦσα γυνὴ τίκτει [τὸν= δὴ Κλεομένεα
τοῦτον].
And (δέ) when not much time had passed, the wife that came later gave birth to this
δή Cleomenes. (Hdt. 5.41.1)
In both of these cases, δή does not take the first prosodic word of the clause as its host,
and so it does not cluster with the other particles used here, i.e. γάρ τοι in (7) and δέ
in (8). The clause-internal position of δή in such examples leads to the conclusion that
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it takes scope over the constituent/phrase (see rule (iv) in section 4.4). In turn, this
strongly suggests an interpretation as a phrasal modifier, e.g. a focus modifying or in-
tensifying particle .
We can thus conclude that the variation in position of δή provides strong evidence
for variation in syntactic scope and, indeed, variation in meanings or discourse func-
tions. This point is even further corroborated by the fact that there are cases in which
multiple instances of δή are used within one and the same clause or sentence, as in the
following two examples:
(9) [Extensive description of the eight major rivers in Scythia.]
τοῖσι μὲν δὴ ὀνομαστοῖσι ποταμοῖσι [οὕτω δή τι] οἱ Σκύθαι ἐσκευάδαται, τοῖσι δὲ κτήνεσι ἡ
ποίη …
With the μέν δή rivers of name the Scythians have been provided in such δή a way;
with regard to cattle, on the other hand (δέ), the grass … (Hdt. 4.58.1)
(10) socrates. … In reality the greatest of blessings come to us through madness, when
sent as a gift of the gods.
ἥ τε γὰρ δὴ ἐν Δελφοῖς προφῆτις αἵ τ᾿ ἐν Δωδώνῃ ἱέρειαι μανεῖσαι μὲν [πολλὰ δὴ καὶ καλὰ]
ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ τὴν Ἑλλάδα εἰργάσαντο, σωφρονοῦσαι δὲ βραχέα ἢ οὐδέν.
For (γάρ) δή both (τε) the prophetess at Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona, when
being mad have μέν conferred many δή and splendid benefits upon Greece in both
private and public affairs, but (δέ) when being in their right minds few or none.
(Pl. Phdr. 244b)
In examples such as these, as I take it, the second instance of δή applies to the phrasal
domain and thus falls within the scope of the first instance that scopes over the clause
or sentence as a whole. Here it is clear that both instances of the particle are quite
different andmust perform different discourse functions. I thus take it that the formal-
syntactic behaviour of δή already points into the direction of a polysemous analysis.
(ii) The second point that needs to be addressed here concerns the peculiarity that
δή in fact does not invariably behave as a postpositive particle. There is a small num-
ber of patterns in which it rather shows the behaviour of prepositive expressions (see
section 4.2). Undisputed evidence for such an analysis comes from epic and lyric po-
etry, where δή occasionally occurs as the very first word of a clause (i.e. in clause-initial
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rather than -peninitial position). Interestingly, this phenomenon is as good as limited
to just two collocational patterns: δὴ (ῥα) τότε and δὴ γάρ.1 Consider the following ex-
amples:
(11) ἀλλ ̓ ὅτε δὴ ὄγδοόν μοι ἐπιπλόμενον ἔτος ἦλθεν,
δὴ τότε Φοῖνιξ ἦλθεν ἀνὴρ ἀπατήλια εἰδώς,
But when δή the eighth circling year had come to me, δή at that time there came a
Phoenician man, well versed in guile, … (Od. 14.287–288)
(12) αὐτὰρ ὁ βῆ κατὰ δῶμα φίλον τετιημένος ἦτορ,
νευστάζων κεφαλῇ· | δὴ γὰρ κακὸν ὄσσετο θυμῷ.
But he [sc. Amphinomus] went through the hall with a heavy heart, bowing his head;
δή for (γάρ) his spirit boded ill. (Od. 18.153–154)
Whereas the first instance of δή in (11) is in regular clause-peninitial position, the sec-
ond occurs both clause- and verse-initially, before the temporal demonstrative τότε (‘at
that time’). In (12), on the other hand, we find the clause-initial combination δὴ γάρ, in
which δή itself functions as the prosodic host for the postpositive discourse connective
γάρ (‘for’). In such cases, then, we cannot but conclude that δή is a prepositive rather
than a postpositive particle. Such instances are in principle ambiguous with respect to
their syntactic scope: theymay have scope over the clause (as an introductive particle)
or they may have scope over the first phrase/constituent (as a prepositive proper), i.e.
τότε and κακόν in the respective examples above.
In addition to these twomajor patterns, there are a number of patterns inwhich δή
appears to behave as a prepositive in clause-internal position. One clear case in point
is the combination δή + αὖτε (‘again’), the close connection betweenwhich is indicated
by the fact that they are also commonlywritten in crasis: δηὖτε.2 Consider the following
examples:
(13) But when he [sc. the Cyclops] had busily performed his tasks,
σὺν δ’ ὅ γε [δὴ= αὖτε] δύω μάρψας ὡπλίσσατο δεῖπνον.
together he seized δή again (αὖτε) two men and made ready his meal.
(Od. 9.310–311)
1. See Denniston (1954: 228), Ruijgh (1990: 221–223), Soulètis (1998: 205–238) and de Kreij
(2016b: sections 3.3 and 5.3.4).
2. A tlg-search showed that the form δηὖτε only occurs in the fragmentary material of iambic and
lyrical poetry (e.g. Alcman, Sappho and Anacreon).
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(14) Ἔρως με δηὖτε Κύπριδος ϝέκατι
γλυκὺς κατείβων καρδίαν ἰαίνει.
Eros δή again (αὖτε), at the command of the Cyprian, pours sweetly down andwarms
my heart. (Alcm. fr. 59, Page)
Other clear examples concern cases in which δή occurs as the very first word after a
metrical boundary, i.e. the first word after a line break, as in (15), or the first word after
the caesura, as in (16):
(15) ἦν γε μὰν ἐπικώμιος ὕμνος
[δὴ= πάλαι] καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι
τὰν Ἀδράστου τάν τε Καδμείων ἔριν.
In fact, the song of victory existed δή long ago, even before the quarrel arose between
Adrastus and the race of Cadmus. (Pi. N. 8.50–51)
(16) με. Ἑλένῃ σ’ ὁμοίαν | δὴ= μάλιστ’ εἶδον, γύναι.
menelaus. I see that you look likeHelen δή to the greatest extent, lady. (E. Hel. 563)
Due to the metrical boundary right before δή, it is not very attractive to treat the parti-
cle as a postpositive that clings to the immediately precedingword. The particle rather
seems to behave as a prepositive with phrasal scope, operating upon πάλαι (‘long ago’)
and μάλιστα (‘to the greatest extent’) respectively. This type of examples occurs in par-
ticular with inherently scalar expressions and temporal adverbs (cf. Denniston 1954:
227–228; see also section 6.4.1 below).
Now how should we account for these instances, which appear to be exceptions
to the general postpositive nature of δή? In my view, a first clue lies in the fact that
these instances all come from metrical texts. I believe that the epic and lyrical poets
used clause-initial δὴ τότε and δὴ γάρ especially for reasons of metrical variation, i.e.
as metrical alternatives for phrases in which δή would take a more common penini-
tial position (τότεω δή and Xω γὰρ δή), which are indeed also quite commonly found
in epic and lyrical poetry.3 But this is not to say that clause-initial δή is to be seen as a
mere metrical innovation of the epic tradition. As far as I am aware, at least, we do not
have any evidence for a similar kind of positional flexibility of other particles in early
Greek. It is farmore plausible, inmy opinion, that the constructions with clause-initial
3. In Homeric epic, the phrase τότε δή (6x) only occurs in a position later in the hexametric verse, as
its scansion (⏑⏑‒) does not fit the verse-initial position. This suggests that δὴ τότε (‒⏑⏑) is used mainly
as a metrical alternative which does fit the verse-initial position. An alternative solution was the addition
of prepositive καί, yielding the phrase καὶ τότε δή (37x), which also fits the verse-initial position (‒⏑⏑‒).
In a similar vein, clause-initial δὴ γάρ has the alternative of clause-peninitial γὰρ δή (39x), where both
particles are postpositive in nature and take the same prosodic host (e.g. τοῦ γὰρ δή, Il. 12.332).
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δή were already part of the language that the poets drew upon. Given the fact that the
phenomenon only occurs in the earliest of our Ancient Greek sources, it is most prob-
ably a remnant of an earlier stage of the language in which δή simply did not yet have
a postpositive character. In other words, the data suggest that there has been a change
in δή’s positional behaviour from prepositive to postpositive, possibly by analogy with
some of the particles that already had a fixed postpositive character at that time (cf.
Ruijgh 1990: 222–223). This implies that δή, as compared to other postpositive parti-
cles, has probably obtained its status as a true postpositive in a relatively late stage: at
least, the older constructions as exemplified above were still acceptable enough to be
felicitously used by the epic and lyrical poets of the early Greek period.4
6.1.2 Distributional patterns
In addition to its variation in position and syntactic scope, a number of interesting
distributional facts about δή should be mentioned in advance (I refer to Appendix
A for a precise quantitative overview). First of all, it might be useful to note that the
particle is indeed quite a common phenomenon in almost all of the authors, genres
and periods that are part of my corpus. More in particular, although there are some
differences in frequency between individual authors and works, the particle is well
at home in both dialogical and monological discourse and in different kinds of text
types. Secondly, when the particle occurs in clause- or sentence initial position, it oc-
curs in various kinds of speech acts, notably in assertives, directives,wh-questions and
yes/no-questions. In section 6.2, the particle will indeed be successively examined in
each of these four major speech act types. Thirdly, I would like to emphasize that δή
quite often clusters with other particles, and in particular with ἀλλά, γε, δέ, γάρ, καί,
μέν, οὖν and που. I will not systematically discuss these clusters (with the exception of
καὶ δή), but will comment on them in the discussion of individual examples. Finally,
in its use as a phrasal modifier in clause-internal position, a number of major distri-
butional patterns can be recognized: (i) with inherently scalar expressions (e.g. πολύς,
πᾶς, μόνος, superlatives), (ii) with demonstrative and deictic expressions (e.g. οὗτος-
forms, personal pronouns, νῦν), (iii) with indefinite expressions (e.g. τις, ὅστις) and (iv)
in combination with καί (e.g. καὶ δή and καὶ δὴ καί). These four groups of examples will
be successively investigated in section 6.4.
4. Pace Denniston (1954: 212). See also de Kreij (2016b: ch. 3, §61) for a discussion of δή’s position
in epic and lyric poetry. I will not go into the complex issue of δή’s position in the metrical dialogues of
classical drama. As I have argued in section 4.4, a systematic analysis in terms of position and scope is
highly problematic in this genre.
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After this preliminary overview of δή’s significant distributional properties, I will now
turn to my investigation of the different usages of the particle, starting with its usages
as an attitudinal-interactional particle.
6.2 Δή as an attitudinal-interactional particle
On a rather general level of analysis, I propose, it is possible to assign an abstract
schematic meaning to attitudinal-interactional δή, which is present in all of its usages.
This first of all involves a more general feature, which δή shares with many other atti-
tudinal-interactionalmarkers, viz. its intersubjective nature. That is, it generally serves
to link the information in its host unit to propositional material which the speaker as-
sumes to be entertained by the addressee(s). In turn, the use of δή implies that this
propositional material is given in the communicative context of the δή-utterance (cf.
section 2.6.3 above). In addition to this class-constitutive feature, δή contributes a par-
ticle-specific value,which, I propose, can be defined in terms of the notion of confirma-
tion. Thus, on a rather general level of analysis, I take it that attitudinal-interactional
δή signals that its host unit, in some way or another, confirms propositional material q
that is entertained by the addressee(s).
In the case of attitudinal-interactional δή then, the contextually given q-
proposition tends to be identical to the semantic target of the particle (p). In this re-
spect, δή can be seen as the functional counterpart of μήν, which, as we have seen in
chapter 5, also signals a link with a proposition entertained by the addressee, butmust
be understood in terms of contrast rather than confirmation. Now, this rather abstract
or schematicmeaning of attitudinal-interactional δή, I argue, comes about in a number
of different ways, which results into a variety of more specific, most probably conven-
tionalized, particle meanings. In order to properly account for all of the more specific
usages of the particle, the same basic parameters will be relevant that I have used in
my description of μήν. At this point, it will be convenient to repeat some of my earlier
discussion and take another good look at these parameters, now concentrating on how
they interact with the meaning of confirmation as expressed by δή. I will discuss them
one by one.
(i) The nature of δή’s semantic target p.
The first parameter concerns the exact element of δή’s host unit that the particle se-
mantically targets (p). As we have seen in section 2.6.4 above, this may either be the
propositional content that is expressed by the host unit or, in case the item pertains to
the level of the illocution, one of the accompanying felicity conditions of the speech
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act made. In line with our analysis of μήν in the previous chapter, this parameter in-
tends to capture the observation that δή is found in a variety of different speech act
types, some of which do not express full propositions.
In case of directives and wh-questions, then, I take it that δή indicates that a
preparatory condition of the speech act in question is contextually accessible, so that
this speech act is explicitly marked as rooted in or motivated by the communicative
context (see sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 below for further discussion). In case of asser-
tions and yes/no-questions, however, it is generally more natural, as I will argue below,
to take the expressed propositional content as δή’s target, rather than the assertive or
interrogative illocution. That is, in this case it is the propositional contentwhich is con-
firmed and marked as contextually accessible – albeit in different ways (cf. parameter
(ii) and (iii) below). The same holds for cases of δή in subordinate clauses, for which an
analysis in terms of illocution and felicity conditions is intuitively much less straight-
forward, if not impossible.
Aswehave seen for μήν before, this first parameter is concernedwith the linguistic vari-
ation that is encoded in the δή-act itself. The two other parameters, on the other hand,
intend to capture the variation that arises from the different kinds of communicative
contexts in which the δή-act is used. In other words, these parameters are concerned
with the q-proposition that resides in the context.
(ii) The type of contextual evidence for the accessibility of q.
The second parameter is concernedwith the different ways inwhich the q-proposition
may be contextually given, i.e. with the different types of evidence which the con-
textual accessibility of q may be based upon. For δή this turns out to be somewhat
more complex than it was for μήν. Ι distinguish between four main types here (cf. sec-
tion 2.6.3 above):
(a) Situational context. The q-proposition is accessiblewithin the immediate extra-
linguistic situation in which the communicative event is set. That is, it is acces-
sible on the basis of direct perception: speaker and addressee(s) may mutually
perceive that q is the case.
(b) Discourse context. The q-proposition is accessible on the basis of (mutual at-
tention to) what has been said in the preceding discourse. That is, it has been
explicitly expressed within the preceding communicative act(s), either by the
speaker himself or by some other speaker. For this type, a further differentiation
must be made in terms of the communicative status of q (cf. parameter (iii) be-
low).
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(c) Commonknowledge. Theq-proposition is apieceof informationwhich is stored
in the body of common knowledge of speaker and addressee(s). In other words,
it is accessible on the basis of their mutual personal history (personal common
ground) or their mutual membership of certain cultural communities (commu-
nal common ground). In this case, δή can be said to retrieve some generally
known fact from the common ground.
(d) Inferential reasoning. The q-proposition follows from the situational or dis-
course context (i.e. from what is perceived or what is said) on the basis of a pro-
cess of inferential reasoning. On the one hand, this involves salient information
from the situational or discourse context (say, a proposition r) which triggers the
inferential process. On the other hand, it involves a common ground topos, i.e.
a default rule which describes what normally is the case (e.g. r > q ‘normally, if r
then q’). Such topoi evoke inferences and create expectations, which comeon ac-
count of both the speaker and the addressee (i.e. arepart of the commonground).
In this case then, δή can be said to activate and confirm a particular topos. Here
it is important to recognize that a topos may also involve the preparatory con-
ditions of speech acts, which is relevant, as I will argue, for the explanation of
δή in directives and wh-questions (see also (i) above). If the topos arises from
the preceding words of the same speaker as the δή-act, it is attractive to assign
to δή a function as a discourse connective particle, in which it explicitly marks a
rhetorical relation of conclusion (see section 6.3.1).
(iii) The communicative status of q.
A final parameter that is relevant to the analysis of δή – as opposed to μήν – is the
communicative status of the q-proposition. As I take it, the q-proposition may be ei-
ther a table-proposition or a proposition that is part of the common ground. This final
parameter is only relevant for the cases in which q is accessible on the basis of what
is said in the preceding discourse: information which is directly perceivable or stored
as common knowledge is part of the common ground by definition. Put differently, a
proposition can only be put onto the table by way of some preceding speech act.
The present distinction mainly intends to capture the difference between in-
stances of δή in confirmative reactive moves in dialogical discourse, and instances in
monological discourse. In the first case, the q-proposition has been made accessible
by what is said by the addressee. Obviously, the main goal of such reactive moves is
to indicate that the speaker confirms and agrees with the view laid down by the ad-
dressee, i.e. to explicitly accept the proposition which the addressee has put on the
table and in this way make it common ground that q is indeed the case. In the latter
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case, by contrast, the q-proposition has been made accessible by what is said by the
speaker himself. That is, by using δή, the speaker signals that he merely recapitulates
or restates information that he has asserted before in the same discourse. This is espe-
cially relevant in narrative or expository discourse, in which there is of course no room
for an addressee/reader to react to (e.g. accept, reject, question) the statements made
by the speaker/writer. As I have already noted in section 2.6.3, the latter will tacitly
assume that each statement is simply accepted – if only for the sake of the story or ar-
gument at stake – and that the common ground is thus continuously updated. In this
case then, the q-proposition is already part of the common ground.
It turns out, then, as I will further demonstrate below, that assertives with δή may
be used both to explicitly establish common ground (i.e. by confirming a proposition
put on the table by the addressee) and to evoke informationwhich is alreadypart of the
common ground at the moment of utterance (i.e. already entertained by both speaker
and addressee). Intuitively, these are two closely related functions: we may say that
both are intended to establish interpersonal consensus. It does not need to surprise
us, then, that one and the same expression may be used for both of these functions. In
fact, such expressions exist in other languages too: an example is German ja, which can
be used – among other things – both as an answer particle (‘yes’) to confirm a table-
proposition and as an attitudinal-interactional particle referring to common ground.
In the following, I will further support and specify the analysis given here by looking
at examples of δή in different types of speech acts and contexts of use.
6.2.1 In assertives
When attitudinal-interactional δή scopes over a clause/sentence with an assertive illo-
cution, I take it that it semantically targets the communicated proposition p. On closer
inspection, however, it turns out that assertives with δή occur in a variety of different
communicative contexts, which allows for distinguishing between anumber of slightly
different usages of δήwith regard to p. Aswewill see, these often correspond to distinct
lexical items in living languages like English, German and Dutch. I will look at these
contexts one by one.
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In confirmatory reactive moves
The general function of attitudinal-interactional δή as a marker of confirmation is
probablymost conspicuouswhen it occurs in reactivemoves of a confirmative nature.5
Such moves constitute the preferred reaction to an initiating move made by a differ-
ent speaker. In such contexts, δή can generally be captured by means of the notions
of ‘confirmation’ and ‘according to expectations’. That is, with δή the speaker explicitly
signals that the asserted proposition p confirms or is in accordance with an attitude or
expectation of the previous speaker (i.e. the addressee). In my discussion of examples,
I make a distinction between (i) reactions to initiating moves that present a propo-
sition, i.e. assertives and yes/no-questions, and (ii) reactions to initiating moves that
prompt the addressee to some course of action, i.e. directives.
In reaction to assertives or yes/no-questions
I first look at confirmativemoveswhich react to assertives or (biased) yes/no-questions.
This conversational pattern is of course very typical for the Socratic dialogue, in which
an argumentation is usually folded into a dialogical structure of question and answer.
It consists of (a) an initiating move spoken by Socrates, in which he puts a proposi-
tion onto the table and invites his addressee to accept it; and (b) a reactive move by
Socrates’s interlocutor, consisting of a short answer formula that indicates assent or ac-
ceptance of this proposition. Now among themany types of different answer formulas
that occur in the Platonic corpus, some also consist of δή, as in the following examples:
(17) [Socrates summarizes preceding discourse:]
ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἤτοι ἐπιστάμενοί γε αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ
βίου πάντες, ἢ ὕστερον, οὕς φαμεν μανθάνειν, οὐδὲν ἀλλ’ ἢ ἀναμιμνῄσκονται οὗτοι, καὶ ἡ
μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἂν εἴη.
– καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Thus – precisely what I claim – one of two things is true: either we were born with a
knowledge of these things [sc. the Ideas] and we all know them throughout our lives,
or later on those who we say are learning are doing nothing other than calling things
tomind, and the learning process would be recollection.” – “And it is indeed (δή) very
much so, Socrates.” (Pl. Phd. 76a)
5. Cf. Denniston (1954: 227) on what he calls the “assentient” use of δή.
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(18) [Socrates claims that what is in the best condition is generally least altered and moved
by something else. He gives concrete examples to support this claim.]
– καὶ μήν που καὶ τά γε σύνθετα πάντα σκεύη τε καὶ οἰκοδομήματα καὶ ἀμφιέσματα κατὰ
τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τὰ εὖ εἰργασμένα καὶ εὖ ἔχοντα ὑπὸ χρόνου τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων
ἥκιστα ἀλλοιοῦται.
– ἔστι δὴ ταῦτα.
“And in fact (καὶ μήν), I suppose (που), for all manufactured goods, buildings and
clothing too, it holds by the same argument that when they are well made and in
good condition, they are least altered by time and other effects.” – “That is indeed
(δή) the case.” (Pl. R. 381a)
(19) [A man in training only pays attention to the encouragement, criticism and opinion of
the person who is his doctor or trainer, rather than to that of the majority.]
σω. οὐκοῦν φοβεῖσθαι χρὴ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐκείνου
ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν;
κρι. δῆλα δή.
socrates. Isn’t it the case then (οὐκοῦν) that hemust fear the criticisms andwelcome
the encouragement of that one person, but not those of themajority? – crito. That’s
clear indeed (δή). (Pl. Cri. 47b)
In these examples, Socrates respectively poses a claim, makes a suggestion and asks a
biased yes/no-question. In doing so, he puts a proposition onto the tablewhich he him-
self supposes to be true. In the reactive move, Socrates’s interlocutor also marks this
proposition as true (‘it is very much so’, ‘that is the case’, ‘that’s clear’) and the particle
δή explicitly signals that this is in accordance with the attitude expressed by Socrates.
It may also happen that the relevant proposition is evoked by way of a conditional
εἰ-clause, as in the following conversation between Apollodorus and Glaucon:
(20) [Apollodorus relates the conversation he recently had with Glaucon.] “But first tell me
this,” he went on, “were you at that party yourself, or not?” To which my answer was:
– παντάπασιν ἔοικέ σοι οὐδὲν διηγεῖσθαι σαφὲς ὁ διηγούμενος, εἰ νεωστὶ ἡγῇ τὴν συνουσίαν
γεγονέναι ταύτην ἣν ἐρωτᾷς, ὥστε καὶ ἐμὲ παραγενέσθαι.
– ἔγωγε δή, ἔφη.
– πόθεν, ἦν δ᾿ ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων; οὐκ οἶσθ᾿ ὅτι …
“Your informant appears to have given you anything but a clear account, if youbelieve
that this party you ask about has been such a recent affair that I was present too.” – “I
did indeed (δή),” he said. – “How so, Glaucon?” said I. “Don’t you know that …”
(Pl. Smp. 172c)
Here, Apollodorus assumes – by inference from the preceding question of Glaucon
(‘Were you present at the party or not?’) – that Glaucon believes that the party in ques-
tion took place only recently (expressed in the conditional εἰ-clause). In the reactive
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move, Glaucon states that he himself indeed has this belief. That is, he confirms that
Apollodorus’s assumption about his own belief holds true. As in the preceding exam-
ples, δή explicitly signals confirmation of an attitude of the addressee.
The particle also occurs within reactive moves in which the speaker in some way
further qualifies the proposition that has been put onto the table. That is, the speaker
does not – as in the previous examples – simply confirm this proposition, but rather
asserts some modified version of it. In such cases too, I take it, δή has a confirmative
meaning: the speaker signals that the answer, though qualified in nature, is in linewith
the attitude of his addressee and the expectations raised by the precedingmove. Thus,
he signals that his qualified reaction does not need to cause any disagreement. Let me
discuss some examples to illustrate this:
(21) σω. … μανθάνεις που παρὰ Θεοδώρου γεωμετρίας ἄττα;
θε. ἔγωγε.
σω. καὶ τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ ἁρμονίας καὶ λογισμούς;
θε. προθυμοῦμαί γε δή.
σω. καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ παῖ, …
socrates. … I suppose you learn some geometry from Theodorus? – theaetetus. I
do. – soc. And some astronomy and harmony and arithmetic? – tht. I am eager to
do so, indeed (δή). – soc. For so am I too, my boy, … (Pl. Tht. 145c–d)
(22) [A foreman must learn to govern workers.]
– ἦ οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, καὶ σὺ ἄρχειν ἱκανοὺς εἶναι παιδεύεις τοὺς ἐπιτρόπους;
– πειρῶμαί γε δή, ἔφη ὁ Ἰσχόμαχος.
“Is it the case then,” I said, “that you too train your foremen to be competent to gov-
ern?” – “I try to indeed (δή),” said Ischomachus. (X. Oec. 13.4)
(23) [Gorgias claims to be a good rhetorician.]
σω. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλους σε φῶμεν δυνατὸν εἶναι ποιεῖν;
γορ. ἐπαγγέλλομαί γε δὴ ταῦτα οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοθι.
socrates. Should we not say then that you are able tomake others good rhetoricians
too? – gorgias. It’s indeed (δή) my profession (γε) to do that, not only here, but else-
where also. (Pl. Grg. 449b)
In (21), Socrates supposes that Theaetetus learns astronomy, harmony and arithmetic.
In the reactive move, Theaetetus is somewhat hesitant to confirm this assumption,
but does accept a slightly qualified version of it, viz. that he is at any rate eager to learn
about these subjects. In doing so, he gives the expected confirmatory answer, but also
suggests that the phrase ‘learn’may actually be too strong in this context, thus implying
that he finds these subjects rather difficult. A very similar analysis applies to example
(22): Ischomachus does not want to give the impression that he actually succeeds in
559416-L-bw-Thijs
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 253
6.2. Δή as an attitudinal-interactional particle 239
training his men and only accepts that he is trying to train them. In both cases then,
a pragmatically weaker variant of the proposition on the table is accepted. Example
(23), on the other hand, involves a pragmatically stronger variant: Gorgias stresses that
he is not just able to make others good rhetoricians, but even professes to do so. In
other words, his reaction consists of a more specific and more informative expression
(i.e. ‘profess’ instead of ‘be able’). With δή, the speaker still marks the reaction as the
expected, confirmatory answer, rather than as, say, a blatant correction of Socrates’s
view.
Another typical kind of qualified reaction within the Socratic dialogue consists of
a verb of speech or thought, as in the following examples:
(24) [Socrates interrogates Protagoras about the nature of courage.] “Towards what do you
mean the brave men are impetuous? Towards the same things as cowards?” – “No,”
he said. – “Then towards other things?” – “Yes,” he said.
– πότερον οἱ μὲν δειλοὶ ἐπὶ τὰ θαρραλέα ἔρχονται, οἱ δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι ἐπὶ τὰ δεινά;
– λέγεται δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
– ἀληθῆ, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγεις· ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλὰ σὺ ἐπὶ τί φῂς ἴτας εἶναι τοὺς ἀνδρεί-
ους.
– “Is it by any chance the case that cowards go after things that allow confidence, but
the brave after dreadful things?” – “It is indeed (δή) said so by the people, Socrates.”
– “You are right,” I said. “But that I don’t ask, but rather towards what you say that the
brave are impetuous. …” (Pl. Prt. 359c)
(25) [Phaedrus has recited a speech of Lysias and in turn made Socrates deliver a speech of
his own. Both speeches conclude that a non-lover is to be preferred over a lover. Then,
Socrates realizes that he has made a terrible mistake.]
σω. τί οὖν τὸν Ἔρωτα; οὐκ Ἀφροδίτης καὶ θεόν τινα ἡγεῖ;
φαι. λέγεταί γε δή.
σω. oὔ τι ὑπό γε Λυσίου, οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ σοῦ λόγου, ὃς διὰ τοῦ ἐμοῦ στόματος καταφαρμα-
κευθέντος ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐλέχθη.
socrates. Now what about Love? Don’t you regard him as the son of Aphrodite
and as some god? – phaedrus. He is said to be indeed (δή). – socrates. Yes, but
not by Lysias, nor by your speech, which was spoken by you through my bewitched
mouth. (Pl. Phdr. 242d)
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In (24), aswehave seenbefore, Socrates puts a proposition onto the table bymeans of a
biased yes/no-question.6 In this case, his interlocutor Protagoras does not himself con-
firm the proposition, but only states that it is generally said so by others. In doing so, he
gives the expected positive answer – explicitly marked as such by δή – but at the same
time refrains frombeing explicit about his own view of thematter. In fact, Protagoras is
criticized by Socrates on this very point: what matters for Socrates is Protagoras’s own
view on courage, not that which is commonly held by the people. Example (25) also
features the passive form λέγεται and can be analyzed along similar lines: Phaedrus
accepts that it is generally said that Eros is a god, but is hesitant to explicitly confirm
that he himself believes that.
(26) [Socrates talks to Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, who claim to be teachers of virtue.]
– ὑμεῖς ἄρα, ἦν δ᾿ ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων κάλλιστ᾿ ἂν προτρέψαιτε εἰς
φιλοσοφίαν καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν;
– οἰόμεθά γε δή, ὦ Σώκρατες.
“So apparently you two, Dionysodorus,” I said, “would be the best persons now on
earth to incite one to the pursuit of knowledge and the practice of virtue?” – “We
think so indeed, Socrates.” (Pl. Euthd. 275a)
In (26), finally, Socrates presents a conclusion,7 which is confirmed by Dionysodorus.
In this case, the qualification involves the type of attitude involved: Dionysodorus
stresses that he and his brother think that the proposition is true, implying that they
are not fully certain whether or not it is an actual fact. In all of these cases of qualified
reactions, I take it that δή explicitly signals that the answer is of a confirmatory nature:
it is in linewith the expectations that are raised by the initiatingmove of the addressee
and thus signals agreement.8
At this point, some tentative remarks are in place about the particle γε, which is
present in many examples of this type, yielding the particle cluster γε δή. I would like
to emphasize that I do not regard this cluster as a fixed particle collocation: both parti-
cles seem to have their own individual contribution. Inmy view, γε – a focus-modifying
particle – can be nicely explained by the common assumption that it has a function
similar to that of contrastive stress inmodern languages: it signals that the constituent
6. In example (24), we are dealing with a question marked by πότερον, which usually introduces the
first part of an alternative question (type: πότερον … ἤ… ‘(either) …or …?’). However, the second part may
be left implicit, as is the case in (24) too.
7. This is indicated by the particle ἄρα. See e.g. van Ophuijsen (1993) and Van Rooy (2016) for discus-
sion of ἄρα in Plato.
8. In terms of argumentation theory, we can conclude that δή signals that the reactive move is of the
same argumentative orientation as the initiating move. See especially Verhagen (2005).
559416-L-bw-Thijs
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 255
6.2. Δή as an attitudinal-interactional particle 241
in its scope stands in marked contrast with some salient alternative (cf. the empha-
sized expressions in my English translations above; see also section 2.7). In (21), for
instance, a contrast is evoked between ‘learning’ and ‘being eager to learn’, in (23) be-
tween ‘being able’ and ‘professing’ and in (25) betweenwhat Phaedrus himself believes
and what is generally said to be the case. We might conclude then that γε is used here
to explicitly signal the qualified nature of the reaction. This results in a nice division
of labour between the two particles: whereas focus-modifying γε marks qualification,
attitudinal-interactional δή signals confirmation. I will return to the puzzling particle
cluster γε δή in section 6.4.1 below.
To round of this section, I would like to draw attention to the special case in which
the agreement between speaker and addressee is not just marked by δή, but is also
explicitly asserted, as in the following two examples from drama:
(27) tecmessa. That man [sc. Ajax], while he was sick, took pleasure in the troubles that
possessed him, but to us who were sane caused grief by his proximity. But now that
he has been relieved and has respite from his sickness, he is wholly racked by every
kind of pain, and we are equally afflicted, no less than before.
ἆρ᾿ ἐστὶ ταῦτα δὶς τόσ᾿ ἐξ ἁπλῶν κακά;
χο. ξύμφημι δή σοι καὶ δέδοικα μὴ ᾿κ θεοῦ
πληγή τις ἥκει.
Isn’t this a double in place of a single sorrow? – chorus. I indeed (δή) agreewith you,
and I am afraid some blow from a god has struck him. (S. Aj. 277–279)
(28) [Orestes gives his interpretation of Clytaemnestra’s dream, in which she bears a snake
that sucks blood from her breast.]
ἐκδρακοντωθεὶς δ᾿ ἐγὼ
κτείνω νιν, ὡς τοὔνειρον ἐννέπει τόδε.
χο. τερασκόπον δὴ τῶνδέ σ᾿ αἱροῦμαι πέρι,
γένοιτο δ᾿ οὕτως.
And I become the serpent and kill her, such as this dream declares. – chorus. I in-
deed (δή) choose you as my diviner in this matter: may it happen in this way!
(A. Ch. 549–552)
In (27), Tecmessa presents the conclusion of her argument bymeans of a yes/no-ques-
tion, thus asking for the assent of the chorus. In the reactivemove, the chorus explicitly
asserts that it agreeswith Tecmessa’s conclusion (ξύμφημι… σοι ‘I agreewith you’). And
in (28), Orestes puts his interpretation of Clytaemnestra’s dream onto the table. In the
reaction, the chorus explicitly asserts that it chooses for Orestes’s interpretation (τερα-
σκόπον … σ’ αἱροῦμαι ‘I choose you as diviner’). In both cases then, the content of the
asserted proposition targeted by δή explicitly comprises agreement between speaker
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and addressee. Inmy view, δή is added by the speaker here to emphasize that the agree-
ment in itself is in line with the supposed expectations of his addressee (‘as you may
expect, I agree with you’).
In reaction to directives
I now turn to confirmativemoves with δή in reaction to directives. This conversational
pattern is especially at home in the genre of Attic drama, in which the non-verbal ac-
tions of characters on stage are obviously an important component. It consists of (a)
an initiatingmove by speaker Awhich consists of an order or a request to execute some
course of action, and (b) a reactivemove by speaker Bwhich signals compliance to this
order or request. In many cases, this verbal reaction of compliance also coincides with
the immediate performance of the requested action on stage. In otherwords, speaker B
asserts that he is actually performing this action at the moment of utterance. With δή,
I argue, the speaker explicitly signals that the performance of this action confirms the
positive expectations that were raised by the initiating move by speaker A. Generally,
if a speakermakes a (neutral) request or order, he will expect that the requested action
will indeed be performed by the addressee. So by using δή, the speaker signals that his
action is in line with the expectations of the addressee and that speaker and addressee
are on common ground as far as the coordination of their actions is concerned. Let us
look at some examples:
(29) [Power and Violence are preparing the punishment of Prometheus. Hephaestus assists
them by chaining Prometheus to a rock.]
κρ. βαλών νυν ἀμφὶ χερσὶν ἐγκρατεῖ σθένει
ῥαιστῆρι θεῖνε, πασσάλευε πρὸς πέτραις.
ηφ. περαίνεται δὴ κοὐ ματᾷ τοὔργον τόδε.
power. Now put it [sc. the chain] around his arms and, with all your strength, strike
it with your hammer, nail it to the rock. – hephaestus. This job is indeed (δή) being
completed, and with no dallying. (A. Pr. 55–57)
(30) euripides.…As soon as you get loose, you’d better run like aman away fromhere and
head back home to your wife and kids. – kinsman. I’ll do that, as soon as I’m loose.
ευ. λέλυσο. σὸν ἔργον, φεῦγε πρὶν τὸν τοξότην
ἥκοντα καταλαβεῖν.
κη. ἐγὼ δὴ τοῦτο δρῶ.
eur. Go free! Your task: escape before the archer comes back and arrests you. – kin.
I’ll indeed (δή) do that. (Ar. Th. 1208–1209)
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Example (29) is instructive in as far as one of the characters is clearly performing some
non-verbal action on stage:Hephaestus is chaining Prometheus to a rockwith his tools.
Power gives the orders, while his assistantHephaestus complies and is doing the actual
work. In example (30), the Kinsman is set free and exhorted by Euripides to escape as
fast as he can. In the reactive move, he asserts that he’ll indeed do that. In fact, while
making his utterance he is most probably actually leaving the stage already.
(31) δι. ὠνήσομαί σοι· περίμεν᾿ αὐτοῦ.
με. ταῦτα δή.
dicaeopolis. I’ll buy them [sc. the piggies] from you. Wait there. – megarian. All
right then (δή). (Ar. Ach. 815)
In (31), finally, Dicaeopolis requests the Megarian trader to wait outside the house
while he goes inside to get garlic and salt. In the reaction, the Megarian agrees with
this procedure and indeed waits for Dicaeopolis to return (while talking to himself).
Possibly, the elliptical phrase ταῦτα δή (literally ‘that indeed’) was a conventionalized,
standard way of giving such a short reaction of compliance (comparable with such ex-
pressions as ‘all right’ or ‘okay’ in modern English). In all of the examples, as I take it,
δή signals that the reaction of compliance accords with the expectations raised by the
preceding request or order.
Further evidence of this interpretation of δή comes from examples in which the
reactive move even contains the very same phrasing as the request or order, as in the
following three examples:
(32) [The chorus of Danaids, who have come as suppliants to a shrine near the city of Argos,
ask king Pelasgus what to do.]
βα. κλάδους μὲν αὐτοῦ λεῖπε, σημεῖον πόνου.
χο. καὶ δή σφε λείπω, χειρία λόγοις σέθεν.
king. Leave your branches here, as a symbol of your distress. – chorus. And I indeed
(δή) leave them, obedient to your words. [Laying their branches on the altar]
(A. Supp. 506–507)
(33) [Heracles brings Admetus a new wife, who he is reluctant to accept.] admetus. I will
not touch her. She may go into the house. – heracles. I trust only your right hand. –
adm. My lord, you compel me to do this against my will.
ηρ. τόλμα προτεῖναι χεῖρα καὶ θιγεῖν ξένης.
αδ. καὶ δὴ προτείνω, Γοργόν᾿ ὡς καρατομῶν.
her. Have the courage to stretch out your hand and touch the stranger. – adm. And I
am indeed (δή) stretching it out, as if I were cutting off a Gorgon’s head [i.e. he turns
his head away]. … (E. Alc. 1117–1118)
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(34) [Discussion between Worse Argument and Better Argument. The former argues that the
majority of people are filthy and immoral.]
ητ. ἆρα δῆτ᾿
ἔγνωκας ὡς οὐδὲν λέγεις;
καὶ τῶν θεατῶν ὁπότεροι
πλείους σκόπει.
κρ. καὶ δὴ σκοπῶ.
worse argument. Do you understand then that you have no case? Also, look and see
whichmake up themajority of the spectators. – better argument. And I am looking
indeed (δή). (Ar. Nu. 1094–1097)
In all of these examples, an imperative verb phrase in the initiating move is echoed by
a first person present tense form in the reactive move: λεῖπε – λείπω, (τόλμα) προτεῖναι
– προτείνω and σκόπει – σκοπῶ respectively. The requested action is thus immediately
executed on the stage. With δή, the speaker further emphasizes that his current action
is in accordance with the preceding request (see above).9
Finally, I would like to pay some attention to the special case in which the re-
quested course of action is an act of speech, rather than a non-verbal action such as
we have seen so far. Speaker A may request speaker B, for instance, to deliver a mes-
sage, tell a story, make an argument or ask a question. In the reaction of speaker B, the
performance of the requested speech act may be preceded by an explicit statement
of compliance, featuring a first person present tense form such as λέγω (‘I tell you’)
or ἐρωτῶ (‘I ask you’). In itself, such phrases can be seen as procedural or meta-com-
municative discourse acts which announce the speech act that is about to follow (see
section 2.4). Let us look at some examples:
(35) [A guard has come to king Creon with a message, but does not tell him right away.]
creon. You are skilfully setting fences and palisades around thematter, and it is clear
that you have some news to tell us. – guard. Yes, serious matters make one very ner-
vous.
κρ. οὔκουν ἐρεῖς ποτ᾿, εἶτ᾿ ἀπαλλαχθεὶς ἄπει;
φυ. καὶ δὴ λέγω σοι.
cre. Won’t you then tell me at last? And then take yourself away? – guard. And I’ll
tell you indeed (δή): [message follows] (S. Ant. 244–245)
9. Cf. also van Erp Taalman Kip (2009) on this type of instances of καὶ δή in drama. I will return to the
combination καὶ δή in section 6.4.4 below.
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(36) [Electra tells the chorus that Aegisthus has gone away to the country.] chorus. To be
sure I would converse with you with more confidence, if indeed this is so.
ελ. ὡς νῦν ἀπόντος ἱστόρει· τί σοι φίλον;
χο. καὶ δή σ᾿ ἐρωτῶ, τοῦ κασιγνήτου τί φής,
ἥξοντος, ἢ μέλλοντος; εἰδέναι θέλω.
electra. Know that he is away now and ask your question; what is it that’s so dear
to you? – chorus. And I’ll ask you indeed (δή): what do you say about your brother?
Will he come, or will he put off coming? I would like to know. (S. El. 316–318)
(37) epigenes. And I just hate sleeping with women your age! I’ll never consent. – old
woman. But this here will force you [producing a scroll]. – epi. But what’s that? – old
w. A decree that says you’ve got to come to my house.
επ. λέγ᾿ αὐτὸ τί ποτε κἄστι.
γρ. καὶ δή σοι λέγω.
epi. Read it out, whatever it is. – old w. And I’ll read it to you indeed (δή): [reading
of the decree follows] (Ar. Ec. 1014)
In (35), Creon impatiently orders the guard to finally deliver his message.10 The guard
first explicitly complies (καὶ δὴ λέγω σοι) and then indeed starts to tell his story. In (36),
Electra assures the chorus that it can speak out freely – Aegisthus is away – and orders
them to ask about the issue that they hold so dear (note the imperative ἱστóρει). In the
reaction, the chorus first produces an act of compliance (καὶ δή σ’ ἐρωτῶ) and then in-
deed asks its question. In (37), finally, the speech act in question is an act of reading
out loud: the old woman brings a decree onstage and Epigenes orders her to read it to
him (imperative λέγε). Thewoman explicitly complies (καὶ δή σοι λέγω) and then starts
to read the text of the decree.Very similar instances can in fact be found in Platonic di-
alogue, in which the actual discussion of philosophical arguments is often interrupted
by meta-communicative, procedural matters. The interlocutors must coordinate, for
instance, who will pose the questions and who will give answers, as in (38), or at what
point a transition to a new step in the argument can be made, as in (39):
(38) chaerephon. … But since it is your wish, answer.
πωλ. ἐρώτα.
χαιρ. ἐρωτῶ δή. …
polus. Ask. – chaer. I ask you then (δή): [yes/no-question follows] (Pl. Grg. 448b)
10. For questions with οὐ + 2nd person future (‘won’t you …?’) as an impolite and impatient order, see
Denizot (2012). This interpretation is even strengthened here by the indefinite adverb ποτε (‘ever’).
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(39) socrates. …But if you stand by what you said before, then listen to the next point.
κρι. ἀλλ’ ἐμμένω τε καὶ συνδοκεῖ μοι· ἀλλὰ λέγε.
σω. λέγω δὴ αὖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, μᾶλλον δ’ ἐρωτῶ· …
crito. But I do stand by it and think it’s right. But tell me. – socrates. I’ll indeed (δή)
tell you the next point, or rather, ask you a question: [yes/no-question follows]
(Pl. Cri. 49e) 11
As in the previous examples from drama, we are dealing here with reactions to direc-
tives (note the imperatives ἐρώτα and λέγε respectively) which consist of (a) a prelim-
inary act of compliance with δή and (b) the performance of the requested speech act
itself.
The function of δή in all of such cases, inmy view, is the same as in the cases of non-
verbal actions discussed above: it is used to signal that the course of action – in this
case an act of verbal communication – is in accordance with the expectations raised
by the directive of the preceding speaker. Thus, it marks that speaker and addressee
are in accordance when the coordination of their actions is concerned, including acts
of speech.
Rhetorical strengthening
In monological discourse, especially when it is of a more argumentative nature, the
meaning of confirmation coded by δή may give rise to a further meaning, which I will
call ‘rhetorical strengthening’. In this case, I argue, δή signals that the asserted propo-
sition p confirms or is in accordance with a preceding statement of the same speaker
(rather than a different speaker, as we have seen above). In other words, the speaker
gives further support for the same conclusion. Typically, it is the case that p is also
more informative, i.e. pragmatically stronger, than the preceding proposition. That is,
p takes a higher value on a contextually constructed pragmatic scale (see section 2.7.2;
cf. also examples (20) and (21) in section 5.2.1 on μήν).
In this use, δήmost typically co-occurs with the coordinator καί ‘and’, whichmarks
the formal connection of the two sentences involved. There is a strong parallel here
in my opinion with the English construction and indeed, a similar combination of a
coordinator and a confirmative adverb which can be used as a means for rhetorical
strengthening.12 Clear examples of this use can already be found in direct speech in
Homeric epic:
11. The particle αὖ, left untranslated here, pertains to the domain of topic management, most typically
signaling that the speaker turns to thenext topicwithin a topic chain. SeeRevueltaPuigdollers (2009).
12. See Traugott & Dasher (2002: 164f.) and Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer (2007: 119–120).
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(40) [Achilles rebuking Agamemnon:] But you, shameless one, we followed here in order
to please you, seeking to win recompense for Menelaus and for you, dogface, from
the Trojans.
τῶν οὔ τι μετατρέπῃ οὐδ᾿ ἀλεγίζεις·
καὶ δή μοι γέρας αὐτὸς ἀφαιρήσεσθαι ἀπειλεῖς,
ᾧ ἔπι πολλὰ μόγησα, δόσαν δέ μοι υἷες Ἀχαιῶν.
This you do not regard or take thought of; and indeed (δή) you threaten that you will
yourself take fromme the prize for which I toiledmuch, and the sons of the Achaeans
gave it to me. (Il. 1.160–162)
(41) [Apollo asks Hector why he is not fighting. Hector answers:] “Who of the gods are you,
mightiest one,whomake question ofme tomy face?Did younot see that at the sterns
of the Achaeans’ ships, as I was destroying his comrades, Aias, good at the war cry,
struck me on the chest with a rock, and made me cease frommy furious might?
καὶ δὴ ἐγώ γ᾿ ἐφάμην νέκυας καὶ δῶμ᾿ Ἀίδαο
ἤματι τῷδ᾿ ὄψεσθαι, ἐπεὶ φίλον ἄιον ἦτορ.
And indeed (δή), I thought that on this day I should look on the dead and the house
of Hades, when I gasped out my life.” (Il. 15.251–252)
In (40), Achilles rebukes Agamemnon for his selfishness. He argues that Agamamenon
has forgotten that it is primarily for him and his brother that all the Greeks have come
to Troy. Further support is given by the fact that Agamemnon now wishes to take
Achilles’s prize fromhim. This latter statement thus accordswith and confirms his ear-
lier statement – which is explicitly marked by δή inmy opinion. In addition, it can also
be seen as pragmatically stronger argument for Agamemnon’s selfishness: he does not
only disregard the Greeks, but even takes their prizes from them. And in (41), Hector
explains toApollowhyhe is no longer fighting: being struck byAias, he lost his strength
and even thought he was about to die. Again, the statement marked by καὶ δή can be
seen asmore informative and pragmatically stronger thanwhat precedes: on a scale of
adversity in battle, dying takes a higher position than losing one’s strength. Note that
in this latter case, a reading in terms of common ground (‘as you know’, ‘as you might
expect’) is clearly out of place.
Highly similar examples can also be found in non-narrative sections in Herodotus:
(42) [The Ionians prepare for battle against Persia under the lead of the Phocaean general
Dionysius. Many Ionians are complaining about the hard work he makes them do.] We
have gone crazy and launched out into folly, committing ourselves into the hands of
this Phocaean braggart, who brings but three ships;
ὃ δὲ παραλαβὼν ἡμέας λυμαίνεται λύμῃσι ἀνηκέστοισι, καὶ δὴπολλοὶ μὲν ἡμέων ἐς νούσους
πεπτώκασι, πολλοὶ δὲ ἐπίδοξοι τὠυτὸ τοῦτο πείσεσθαι εἰσί, …
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and he, having got us, treats us with incurable afflictions; and indeed (δή), many of
us have fallen sick, many are in danger of suffering the same; instead of these ills, any
other fate whatsoever would be better for us to endure, … (Hdt. 6.12.3)
(43) The Athenians say that a great snake, a guard of the Acropolis, lives in the temple.
λέγουσί τε ταῦτα καὶ δὴ ὡς ἐόντι ἐπιμήνια ἐπιτελέουσι προτιθέντες· τὰ δ᾿ ἐπιμήνια μελι-
τόεσσα ἐστί.
Τhey say these things and indeed/even (δή), as if it really exists, put out a monthly
offering for it. Τhe offering is a honey-cake. (Hdt. 8.41.2)
In (42), the Ionians claim that they are very badly treated by Dionysius. This is con-
firmed by the fact thatmany have fallen sick or are about to get sick. This can be seen as
a more specific or stronger argument for the same conclusion: we are not only treated
badly, but we even get sick. And in (43), Herodotus describes how the Athenians not
just tell some story (i.e. that a snake is living in their temple), but even act upon it.
Again, the καὶ δή-act is more informative and pragmatically stronger than the preced-
ing statement.
Finally, I would like to emphasize that this meaning of rhetorical strengthening
is not necessarily restricted to discourse of a primarily argumentative nature. That is,
pragmatic scales may just as well be evoked in narrative passages. Consider for in-
stance:
(44) [Odysseus:] For nine days we sailed, night and day alike,
τῇ δεκάτῃ δ᾿ ἤδη ἀνεφαίνετο πατρὶς ἄρουρα,
καὶ δὴ πυρπολέοντας ἐλεύσσομεν ἐγγὺς ἐόντες·
but on the tenth at last our native land came in sight, and we were indeed/even (δή)
so near that we sawmen tending their fires. (Od. 10.28–30)
In (44), Odysseus tells that his ship was near his homeland. In this case, we may con-
struct a pragmatic scale of closeness, on which the second statement (‘we saw men
tending fires’) is pragmatically stronger than the first one (‘the land came in sight’).
Note again that an interpretation in terms of common ground is clearly ruled out here:
Odysseus’s audience (i.e. the Phaeacians) can in no way be taken to know, expect or
infer the information presented in the δή-clause.
To sum up, in all of these examples the asserted proposition p in δή’s scope is (i) a
confirmation of some point the speaker has made in the preceding discourse, and (ii)
is pragmatically/rhetorically stronger than the preceding proposition. As a confirma-
tory particle then, δή may give rise to a further meaning of rhetorical strengthening.
Crucially, this evokes the notion of scalarity, which will also play an crucial role in my
discussion of the usages of δή as a scalar focus modifier (see section 6.4.1 below).
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Common ground: recapitulation
In monological discourse, δή is at home in clauses which recapitulate propositional
information that the speaker/narrator has already presented at an earlier stage of the
preceding discourse. By using δή, the speaker signals that s/he re-activates, i.e. refo-
cuses the attention upon, a proposition that s/he has asserted before and is thus taken
for granted as part of the common ground. In terms of information status then, this
proposition is accessible on the basis of the preceding discourse context.Wemay com-
pare suchmodern expressions as English epistemic then, Frenchdonc andDutchdus.13
In general, such re-activating and recapitulating clauses are especially at home in
spoken language, where it is more difficult for an addressee – due to the cognitive re-
strictions of short-termmemory (see section 2.6.3 above) – to keep track of the overall
discourse structure of a narrative or argument, or even the grammatical structure of a
complex and informationally ‘heavy’ sentence. By recapitulating and summarizing in-
formation, the speaker thus aids the hearer to keep track of this structure and tomain-
tain a coherent picture of the unfolding discourse. In other words, such recapitulating
clauses may function as cohesive links between two pieces of discourse. This explains,
in turn, why we find this recapitulating use of δή especially (i) in Ancient Greek texts
which we know to have an oral character, such as Homeric epic, Herodotus’s Histories
and Platonic dialogue (cf. section 1.4.1); and (ii) in the proximity of discourse bound-
aries. Let us take a closer look at some typical contexts and examples.
First of all, δή is regularly found in recapitulation clauses that explicitly round off a
particular discourse topic before the speakermoves on to a new one. In such cases, the
particle typically co-occurs with the discourse connective μέν, which is preparatory
in nature and is usually answered by the contrastive discourse connective δέ. Some
examples:
(45) [Elaborate description of the Babylonian boats.]
τὰ μὲν δὴ πλοῖα αὐτοῖσι ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα· ἐσθῆτι δὲ τοιῇδε χρέωνται, …
Their boats μέν are of such a nature then (δή); as to their clothing, on the other hand
(δέ), they wear the following: … (Hdt. 1.195.1)
(46) [Socrates elaborates upon his ‘maieutic’ method of inquiry.] And so those who asso-
ciate with me are in this matter also like women in childbirth; they are in pain and
are full of trouble night and day, much more than are the women; and my art can
arouse this pain and cause it to cease.
13. See e.g. Schiffrin (1992), Hansen (1998a: ch. 13) and Evers-Vermeul (2005).
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καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ οὕτως. ἐνίοις δέ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οἳ ἄν μοι μὴ δόξωσί πως ἐγκύμονες εἶναι …
And (καί) these people μέν fare in this way then (δή). But (δέ) for some people,
Theaetetus, who do not seem to me to be pregnant in any way … (Pl. Tht. 151b)
(47) [The Persian queen relates a dream she had about Xerxes.]
καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ νυκτὸς εἰσιδεῖν λέγω·
ἐπεὶ δ᾿ ἀνέστην καὶ χεροῖν καλλιρρόου
ἔψαυσα πηγῆς, σὺν θυηπόλῳ χερὶ
βωμὸν προσέστην, …
And (καί) this μέν I say to have seen in the night then (δή); but (δέ) when I had risen
and washed my hands in a fair-flowing spring, I approached the altar with offerings
in my hand … (A. Pers. 200–203)
Example (45) is from the historiographic work of Herodotus, where this type of dis-
course transition is particularly common. In the present case, he describes some as-
pects of Babylonian culture and at this point he rounds off the topic of Babylonian
boats andmoves to the description of their clothing. Example (46), in turn, comes from
Platonic dialogue: here, Socrates shifts the discourse topic fromhis close associates and
their experienceof themaieuticmethod toother peoplewhoarenot susceptible to this
method. Finally, in (47), taken fromAeschylus’s Persians, the Persian queen rounds off
her description of the ominous dream she had in the night and moves on to the bad
omen she has seen at daytime.
Second, recapitulation clauses with δή regularly occur after a stretch of direct or
indirect speech. Here, they summarize the preceding speech turn and at the same time
signal the return to the discourse of the current speaker/narrator, i.e. the discourse
that frames the (in)direct speech of some other mental agent (e.g. a story character).
Consider the following examples:
(48) ὃ μὲν δὴ ταῦτα ἐπειρώτα, ὃ δ᾿ ἀμείβετο τοῖσιδε· …
He μέν said these things then (δή), but (δέ) the other answered with the following
words: … (Hdt. 3.14)
(49) [Direct speech of Corinthian messengers.]
οἱ μὲν δὴ τοιαῦτα εἶπον· τῶν δὲ Κερκυραίων τὸ μὲν στρατόπεδον ὅσον ἐπήκουσεν ἀνεβόησεν
εὐθὺς λαβεῖν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι, …
They μέν said such things then (δή); but (δέ) among the Corcyraeans all the host that
was within hearing immediately shouted to take and kill them, … (Th. 1.53.3)
(50) [Socrates paraphrases the accusation of Meletus.]
It claims that Socrates is guilty of corrupting the young and does not acknowledge
the gods that the city acknowledges, but other newfangled divinities.
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τὸ μὲν δὴ ἔγκλημα τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν· τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἓν ἕκαστον ἐξετάσωμεν.
Τhe μέν accusation is of such a nature then (δή); but (δέ) let’s examine each item of
the accusation separately. (Pl. Ap. 24c)
Examples (48) and (49), on the one hand, are typical framing constructions used in
historiographic narrative. Τhese sentences signal a change of speaker within the story
world: the first clause (μέν + δή) rounds off the speech of one character, the second (δέ)
introduces that of another. Example (50), on the other hand, occurs within an argu-
mentative piece of discourse: Socrates gives a paraphrase of the accusation of Meletus
by means of indirect speech. A recapitulating clause with δή is then used to round off
this speech and to return to the perspective of the main speaker.
Finally, recapitulating δή-clausesmay also occurwithin syntactically complex sen-
tences, i.e. sentences which consist of a number of subordinate clauses and have a
high informational load. In spoken language, it is cognitivelymore difficult for speaker
and addressee to felicitously process the information in such complex sentences and
keep track of its internal grammatical structure. Such difficulty is reflected in Greek
texts of an essentially oral nature (e.g. Herodotean narrative and Platonic dialogue),
where such complex and informationally ‘heavy’ sentences are sometimes broken off
and given a new start, resulting in what is traditionally called ‘anacoluthon’. It is telling
that such a new start regularly involves a δή-clause that recapitulates preceding infor-
mation before moving on. In some cases the recapitulating clause puts the original
construction of the sentence back on track, so the speak, as in (51), but in other cases
it is completely abandoned in favour of a new and less complex main clause, as in ex-
amples (52) and (53) below.14
(51) [Phraortes became king of the Medes and subdued the Persians.]
μετὰ δὲ ἔχων δύο ταῦτα ἔθνεα καὶ ἀμφότερα ἰσχυρά, κατεστρέφετο τὴν Ἀσίην ἀπ᾿ ἄλ-
λου ἐπ᾿ ἄλλο ἰὼν ἔθνος, ἐς ὃ στρατευσάμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀσσυρίους – καὶ Ἀσσυρίων τού-
τους οἳ Νίνον εἶχον καὶ ἦρχον πρότερον πάντων, τότε δὲ ἦσαν μεμουνωμένοι μὲν συμμά-
χων ἅτε ἀπεστεώτων, ἄλλως μέντοι ἑωυτῶν εὖ ἥκοντες, [ἐπὶ τούτους δὴ στρατευσάμενος
ὁ Φραόρτης]ptcp αὐτός τε διεφθάρη, ἄρξας δύο καὶ εἴκοσι ἔτεα, καὶ ὁ στρατὸς αὐτοῦ ὁ πολ-
λός.
And then, with these two strong nations at his back, he subdued one nation of Asia
after another, until, while marching against the Assyrians – viz. those of the Assyr-
ians who held Ninus and had formerly been rulers of all, but at that time were left
alone by their allies as these had dropped from them, yet were in themselves a pros-
14. For such features of oral grammar in Plato and Herodotus, I refer to the discussion in Slings (1996,
2002).
559416-L-bw-Thijs
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 266
252 Chapter 6. The particle δή
perous people – while Phraortes was marching against these people then (δή), he
himself perished, having reigned twenty-two years, as well as the greater part of his
army. (Hdt. 1.102)
In (51), the narrator starts an embedded temporal clause (ἐς ὅ ‘until’) in order to inform
the addressee about thedeathof kingPhraortes duringhismarchagainst theAssyrians.
However, this clause is interrupted by an extensive elaboration on the exact kind of
Assyrians involved. After this elaboration, the narrator uses a participle clause with
δή to recapitulate this cognitively ‘heavy’ information; at the same time, this clause is
a means to return to and refocus upon the original grammatical construction of the
temporal ἐς ὅ-clause (note the similarity with the original participle clause).
(52) [The Carians claim that they are mainland dwellers by origin, rather than islanders.]
ἀποδεικνῦσι δὲ ἐν Μυλάσοισι Διὸς Καρίου ἱρὸν ἀρχαῖον, τοῦΜυσοῖσι μὲν καὶ Λυδοῖσι μέτε-
στι ὡς κασιγνήτοισι ἐοῦσι τοῖσι Καρσί· τὸν γὰρ Λυδὸν καὶ τὸν Μυσὸν λέγουσι εἶναι Καρὸς
ἀδελφεούς. τούτοισι μὲν δὴ μέτεστι, ὅσοι δὲ ἐόντες ἄλλου ἔθνεος ὁμόγλωσσοι τοῖσι Καρσὶ
ἐγένοντο, τούτοισι δὲ οὐ μέτα.
They point to an ancient shrine of Carian Zeus at Mylasa, wheretoMysians and Lydi-
ans are admitted, as they are brothers of the Carians; for (γάρ) they say that Lydus and
Mysus are brothers of Car. These people μέν are admitted then (δή), but (δέ) all peo-
ple of another descent that have learned to speak the same language as the Carians,
these are not admitted. (Hdt. 1.171.6)
In (52), a relative clause is started which aims to inform the addressee of an opposi-
tive contrast between two groups of people: the Mysians and Lydians are admitted to
enter the temple in Mylasa, but other people are not. However, after the first part of
the contrastive pair (explicitly marked by μέν), the construction is interrupted by an
explanatory main clause marked by γάρ. After this interruption, the narrator has ap-
parently lost track of the original relative clause construction and starts a new sentence
instead, in which he refocuses upon the contrastive relation: in doing so, he first reca-
pitulates the first part of the contrastive pair (againmarked by μέν) from the preceding
discourse, and then introduces the second part (marked by δέ). Again, δή is added here,
as I take it, to explicitly mark that the information in the μέν-clause is accessible from
what has been said before in the preceding discourse.
(53) ἐὰν δέ γε, οἶμαι, μεμιασμένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλάττηται, ἅτε τῷ σώματι ἀεὶ
ξυνοῦσα καὶ τοῦτο θεραπεύουσα καὶ ἐρῶσα καὶ γεγοητευμένη ὑπ᾿ αὐτοῦ ὑπό τε τῶν ἐπι-
θυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν, ὥστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἀλλ᾿ ἢ τὸ σωματοειδές, οὗ τις ἂν
ἅψαιτο καὶ ἴδοι καὶ πίοι καὶ φάγοι καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀφροδίσια χρήσαιτο, τὸ δὲ τοῖς ὄμμασι σκο-
τῶδες καὶ ἀειδές, νοητὸν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ αἱρετόν, τοῦτο δὲ εἰθισμένη μισεῖν τε καὶ τρέμειν
καὶ φεύγειν, [οὕτω δὴ ἔχουσαν]ptcp οἴει ψυχὴν αὐτὴν καθ᾿ αὑτὴν εἰλικρινῆ ἀπαλλάξεσθαι;
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But, I think, if it [sc. the soul] departs from the body being defiled and impure, be-
cause it was always with the body and cared for it and loved it and was fascinated
by itself as well as its desires and pleasures – so that it thought nothing was true
except the corporeal, which one can touch and see and drink and eat and employ
in the pleasures of love – but what is shadowy and invisible to the eyes, and in-
telligible and tangible to philosophy, this it was accustomed to hate and fear and
avoid – being in such a condition then (δή), do you think a soul will depart pure and
uncontaminated? (Pl. Phd. 81b–c)
This final example clearly shows how in the course of a complex and informationally
heavy sentence the initial grammatical structuremay be lost track off and abandoned.
This move starts out as a conditional sentence with an assertive illocutionary force
(note οἶμαι ‘I think’). The antecedent εἰ-clause, however, is extensively modified by
means of a complex causal clause (ἅτε ‘because’), which in turn consists of a complex
consecutive clause (ὥστε ‘so that’). At this point, the original conditional construction
has been lost track off and the speaker does not move to the consequent main clause.
Rather, he restarts the sentence in the form of a yes/no-question, requesting the ad-
dressee for confirmation of the complex antecedent proposition. Again, a participle
clause with δή is present (οὕτω δὴ ἔχουσαν) in order to recapitulate the preceding sub-
ordinate clauses and thus function as a cohesive link.
More generally, recapitulating and summarizing clauses typically imply a return
to the main line of a story or argument after a digression or excursus. Consider for
example:
(54) [Achievements of queen Nitocris of Babylon]. First she dealt with the river Euphrates,
which flows through the middle of her city; this had before been straight, but by dig-
ging canals higher up she made the river so crooked that its course passes thrice by
oneof theAssyrian villages. Thenameof the villagewhich is so approachedby theEu-
phrates is Ardericca. At present too, those who travel from our seas to Babylon must,
as they float down the Euphrates, spend three days in coming thrice to the same vil-
lage.
τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τοιοῦτον ἐποίησε, χῶμα δὲ παρέχωσε παρ᾿ ἑκάτερον τοῦ ποταμοῦ τὸ χεῖλος
…
This μέν she made in such a way then (δή); and (δέ) she built an embankment along
either shore of the river, … (Hdt. 1.185.3)
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In (54), Herodotus exposes how queen Nitocris dealt with the river Euphrates. While
doing so, he also gives us some background information about the situation at his own
time (note ‘at present too’). That is, he makes a temporary shift from the story world to
his own hic et nunc. After this short excursus, he returns to the main line of his exposi-
tion by using a recapitulating clause with δή.
(55) [Extensive excursus about Egypt and king Amasis, covering the whole of book 2.]
ἐπὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν Ἄμασιν Καμβύσης ὁ Κύρου ἐστρατεύετο, ἄγων καὶ ἄλλους τῶν ἦρχε καὶ
Ἑλλήνων Ἴωνάς τε καὶ Αἰολέας, δι᾿ αἰτίην τοιήνδε· …
Itwas against this Amasis then (δή) that Cambyses son of Cyruswasmarching, taking
other people that he ruled as well as Ionian and Aeolian Greeks, due to the following
reason: … (Hdt. 3.1.1)
(56) [Phaedo states that he had strange emotions when he was present at Socrates’s final
day in prison.] For I was not filled with pity as I might naturally be when present at
the death of a friend; for (= γάρ) he seemed to me to be happy, Echecrates, both in
his bearing and his words, as he was meeting death so fearlessly and nobly. And so
I thought that even in going to the abode of the dead he was not going without the
protection of the gods, but when he arrived there it would be well with him, if it ever
was well with anyone.
διὰ δὴ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάνυ μοι ἐλεεινὸν εἰσῄει, ὡς εἰκὸς ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι παρόντι πένθει, οὔτε
αὖ ἡδονὴ …
For this reason then (δή) I was not at all filled with pity, as would seem to be natural
for someone present at a scene of mourning, nor yet was I filled with pleasure …
(Pl. Phd. 59a)
Example (55) is the start of the third book of the Histories, where Herodotus returns
to the narrative of Cambyses’s campaign against Egypt, started at the beginning of the
second book. The rest of the second book can in fact be seen as a large excursus on the
nature and history of Egypt. And in example (56), finally, Phaedo has given an expla-
nation (introduced by γάρ) for the fact that he did not pity Socrates when he had to
die. In the sentence with δή he recapitulates the preceding discourse and at the same
time returns to the main issue at stake here, viz. his strange emotions at that day.
Observe that the clauses that are modified by ‘recapitulating’ δή often contain
demonstrative expressions. In itself, this distributional fact does not need to surprise
us, since demonstratives, too, establish some link with contextually accessible mate-
rial. Demonstratives and ‘recapitulating’ δή are thus by definition highly compatible
expressions. In my discussion of ‘phrasal’ δή with demonstratives expressions (sec-
tion 6.4.2), I will come back to a number of the examples discussed here.
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Common ground: topos-based inference
Closely related to contexts ofmere recapitulation of information are those inwhich the
asserted proposition p is marked as accessible or expected on the basis of a process of
inferential reasoning. In such cases, δή signals that pnaturally follows from some other,
contextually salient, proposition q. The crucial notion in this respect, as we have seen
before, is the notion of topos, a defeasible inference which is present in the communal
common ground of speaker and addressee(s): q > p, i.e. ‘normally, if q then p’ (see sec-
tion 2.6.3 above). By using δή then, the speaker not only instructs the addressee that
the asserted proposition p is inferrable or expected information, but also activates and
confirms a topos in their common ground. here we may compare expressions such as
English so, then, Dutch dus, French donc and Latin ergo.15
Clearly, these processes of topos-based reasoning are most straightforward in ar-
gumentative discourse, which by its very nature concerns reasoning over propositions
that count as arguments or conclusions. Thus, the most illustrative examples of this
use of δή can be found in Platonic dialogue and rhetorical speech. However, I would
like to emphasize that topoi may also be relevant within narrative-oriented discourse,
in which they do not so much pertain to inferential reasoning over arguments and
conclusions, but rather to the management of narrative expectations. In this case, the
speaker (i.e. narrator) uses δή to confirm that some narrated event happened in ac-
cordance with the expectations that the preceding discourse has given rise to. In the
following, I will support this view by discussing some typical examples from argumen-
tative and narrative discourse.
Argumentative discourse
In argumentative discourse, δή marks p as a conclusion which is inferrable from some
other, contextually salient, proposition q. Themost straightforward examples are those
in which the q-proposition is explicitly asserted in the preceding clause, as in the fol-
lowing examples:
(57) [Socrates introduces Cleinias into the conversation.]
ἔστι δὲ νέος· φοβούμεθα δὴ περὶ αὐτῷ, οἷον εἰκὸς περὶ νέῳ, μή τις φθῇ ἡμᾶς ἐπ᾿ ἄλλο τι
ἐπιτήδευμα τρέψας τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ διαφθείρῃ.
He is young; so (δή) we are concerned about him, as is likely with regard to a young
man, lest someone forestall us by turning his inclination to some other course of life
and corrupt him. (Pl. Euthd. 275b)
15. Cf. e.g. Schiffrin (1987, 1992), Pander Maat & Degand (2001), Evers-Vermeul (2005), Kroon
(1989) and Krylová (2006) for further discussion.
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(58) [About the nature of the soul and the body.]
ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι
καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ᾿ ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ ο
ῥᾴδιος διιδεῖν·
Now the doctrine that is taught in secret about this matter, that wemen are in a kind
of prison and so (δή) must not free ourselves or run away from it, seems to me to be
rather weighty and not easy to understand. (Pl. Phd. 62b)
In example (57), a topos of the following kind is evoked by Socrates: normally, if some-
one is young (q), one is concerned about his future (p). Thus, δή confirms the conclu-
sion p, which is accessible via inference. Note that the topos is not only evoked by δή
in this case, but also explicitly expressed by the parenthetical clause οἷον εἰκὸς περὶ νέ-
ῳ (‘as is likely with regard to a young man’). In example (58), too, it is clear that the
propositional information in the δή-clause naturally follows from the previous clause:
the concept of a prison normally implies that one must not escape from it. Again, δή
marks the asserted proposition as a conclusion which is accessible via inferential rea-
soning on the basis of a topos in the common ground.
Closely related are cases in which the q-proposition is not realized by way of a
distinct main clause, but by a conditional subordinate clause within a syntactically
complex sentence. In such cases, δή occurs in – and scopes over – the main clause
that follows upon the conditional clause and is traditionally labeled ‘apodotic δή’ (e.g.
Denniston 1954: 224–225). In such apodotic instances too, δή is used to confirm a
conclusion which is accessible by virtue of a common ground topos, as is illustrated by
the following two examples:
(59) [King Astyages summons Harpagus to take his new-born son and kill him.] “King,”
Harpagus answered, “never yet have you seenme do anything unpleasing to you; and
I will ever be careful not to offend against you.
ἀλλ᾿ εἴ τοι φίλον τοῦτο οὕτω γίνεσθαι, χρὴ δὴ τό γε ἐμὸν ὑπηρετέεσθαι ἐπιτηδέως.
But if it pleases you that this happens in this way, it is necessary, then (δή), that my
service is carefully rendered.” (Hdt. 1.108.5)
(60) [In the final moments of his life, Socrates has told his friends about life after death.] I
shall not be concerned how what I say will appear to be true to those who are here,
except incidentally, but how above all else the situation will appear to me myself.
λογίζομαι γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε … εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγω, καλῶς δὴ ἔχει τὸ πει-
σθῆναι. εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστι τελευτήσαντι, …
For I reckon, my good friend, … if what I say turns out to be true, it’s indeed (δή) good
to be persuaded by it. But if there is nothing formewhen I’m dead, … (Pl. Phd. 91b)
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In (59), it is commonknowledge betweenHarpagus andAstyages that if the latter gives
an order (q), the former generally renders his service (p). This is even explicitly ac-
tivated in the preceding words of Harpagus, where he emphasizes his obedience to
Astyages. With δή, Harpagus explicitly confirms that this topos holds for the present
case too. And in (60), the topos activated by Socrates’s line of reasoning involves the
relation between truth and persuasion: if something is true (q), it is good to be per-
suaded by it (p) – which arguably is a rather straightforward assumption, especially
for Socrates and his close friends. Socrates explicitly confirms this accessible conclu-
sion by using δή.
Finally, it is also possible that the q-proposition is evoked not byway of the preced-
ing discourse, as in the previous examples, but rather by means of the communicative
situation at large. Consider the following examples:
(61) [Phaedo tells about the day of Socrates’s death in prison, where he converses one final
time with his dearest friends.]
καταψήσας οὖν μου τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ συμπιέσας τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ αὐχένι τρίχας – εἰώθει γάρ, ὁ-
πότε τύχοι, παίζειν μου εἰς τὰς τρίχας – αὔριον δή, ἔφη, ἴσως, ὦ Φαίδων, τὰς καλὰς κόμας
ἀποκερεῖ.
– ἔοικεν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Now, he [sc. Socrates] strokedmy head and gathered the hair on the back of my neck
into his hand – for he had a habit of playing withmy hair on occasion – and said: “To-
morrow then (δή), Phaedo, you will perhaps cut off this beautiful hair.” – “I suppose
so, Socrates,” said I. (Pl. Phd. 89b)
(62) [Socrates interrogates Meletus during his defense in court.]
εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δήπου πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομίζειν μέ ἐστιν· οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;
ἔχει δή· τίθημι γάρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀποκρίνει.
But if I believe in spiritual beings, there is a great necessity, I presume, that I believe
also in spirits, is it not so? Ιt is then (δή); for I take it that you agree, since you do not
answer. (Pl. Ap. 27c)
In example (61), the relevant topos can be spelled out as follows: normally, if a good
friend dies (q), one performs acts of mourning in the days after his death (p). Given
the fact that one of the customary acts ofmourning in Ancient Greekwas cutting one’s
hair, the assumption that Phaedo might cut his hair the next day (p) is inferrable from
the fact that Socrates is about to die (q). Although this information is not explicitly
expressed in the preceding discourse, it is clearly highly salient within the situational
context: all of Socrates’s friends are of course well aware of his upcoming death. And
in example (62), the q-proposition is the fact that the addressee remains silent and
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does not answer Socrates’s question. Based upon the topos ‘silence implies consent’
(explicitly spelt out as such in the following discourse), Socrates concludes that his
addressee agrees with him that it is true that Socrates believes in spirits.
Narrative discourse
As noted above, in narrative-oriented passages the notion of topos comes about in a
slightly different way than in argumentative discourse. Obviously, a narrative passage
does not involve reasoning over propositions that count as arguments or conclusions,
but rather consists of a temporal sequence of narrative events and certain actions of
characters in the story. Here, I argue, δή does not signal an accessible conclusion based
on inferential reasoning, but rather that somenarrated event (p) naturally follows from
what has been told in the preceding discourse (q). In this case then, δή pertains to
the management of narrative expectations. That is, the speaker (i.e. the narrator) uses
δή to confirm that some event in the story world happened in accordance with the
expectations that the preceding discourse has given rise to (‘as you would expect’).
The correspondence with the preceding examples is that such expectations also arise
on the basis of topoi which are part of the common ground of speaker (narrator) and
addressee (narratee). Let me illustrate this with some examples from Herodotus.
A typical context in which we find this use of δή is when the narrator has given a
description of some order, plan, idea or some intention of a character in the story. The
question then arises whether or not this order, plan or intentionwas also carried out in
actual fact and actually happened. Generally, the expectation will be that it indeed did
(relevant topoi: ‘normally, people carry out their intentions/plans’, ‘normally, orders
will be carried out’ etc.). By using δή, the narrator confirms this expectation and at the
same time signals that the narrated events are in accordance with the attitude (belief,
intention etc.) of the character(s) in question. I’ll discuss three examples here:
(63) [The Medes decide to be ruled by a king.] Then every man was loud in putting Deioces
forward and praising Deioces, till they agreed that he should be their king.
ὃ δ᾿ ἐκέλευε αὐτοὺς οἰκία τε ἑωυτῷ ἄξια τῆς βασιληίης οἰκοδομῆσαι καὶ κρατῦναι αὐτὸν
δορυφόροισι· ποιεῦσι δὴ ταῦτα οἱ Μῆδοι· οἰκοδομέουσί τε γὰρ αὐτῷ οἰκία μεγάλα τε καὶ
ἰσχυρά, ἵνα αὐτὸς ἔφρασε τῆς χώρης, καὶ δορυφόρους αὐτῷ ἐπιτράπουσι ἐκ πάντωνΜήδων
καταλέξασθαι.
And he ordered them to build him houses worthy of his royal power and arm him
with a bodyguard; the Medes indeed (δή) did these things; for they built him great
and strong houses, at places in the country which he himself showed them, and let
him choose a bodyguard out of all their people. (Hdt. 1.98.2)
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(64) [The Pelasgians carry of a group of Attic women as their concubines. Later on, the sons
of these women turn out to be much stronger than those of their own Pelasgian women.]
ἐνθαῦτα ἔδοξέ σφι κτείνειν τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς ἐκ τῶν Ἀττικέων γυναικῶν. ποιεῦσι δὴ ταῦτα,
προσαπολλύουσι δὲ σφέων καὶ τὰς μητέρας.
Thereupon they judged it best to kill the sons of the Attic women; they indeed (δή)
did this, and they slew the boys’ mothers likewise. (Hdt. 6.138.4)
(65) [War between the Milesians and the Lydians of king Alyattes. Thrasybulus devises a plan
to disguise the fact that Miletus is almost out of resources.] He brought together into
the market place all the food in the city, from private stores and his own, and bade
the men of Miletus all drink and revel together when he should give the word.
ταῦτα δὲ ἐποίεέ τε καὶ προηγόρευε Θρασύβουλος τῶνδε εἵνεκεν, ὅκως ἂν δὴ ὁ κῆρυξ ὁ Σαρ-
διηνὸς ἰδών τε σωρὸν μέγαν σίτου κεχυμένον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν εὐπαθείῃσι ἐόντας ἀγ-
γείλῃ Ἀλυάττῃ· τὰ δὴ καὶ ἐγένετο.
And Thrasybulus did and ordered those things for the following reason: in order that
the herald from Sardis, when he would see a great heap of food piled up and the cit-
izens making merry, he would bring word of it to Alyattes – which indeed (δή) also
(καί) happened. (Hdt. 1.22.1–2)
In (63), the narrator first describes the orders given by Deioces, the new king of the
Medes (note the verb ἐκέλευε ‘he ordered’). In the next clause, he explicitly asserts that
these orders were indeed carried out by the Medes: δή signals that this event is in ac-
cordance with the expectations raised by Deioces’s orders, especially since the Medes
have just chosen him as their new king. In (64), the narrator describes the intention
of the Pelasgians (ἔδοξε σφι ‘it seemed to them, they judged it best’) to kill the sons of
the Attic women. This raises the expectation that this intention was also carried out in
actual fact, an expectation which is explicitly confirmed by the use of δή in the follow-
ing clause. Finally, in (65), we see that the narrator first unfolds the underlying reasons
and motivations of Thrasybulus’s plan: he describes what Thrasybulus expected that
would happen. Then he asserts that the actual events indeed corresponded to the plan.
Again, δή confirms an expectation that has been raised fromwhat is told about the per-
spective of a character.
We may also compare instances in which it is told that messengers or ships are
sent to some place, which generally raises the expectation that these also arrive there
(based upon a topos like: ‘normally, a messenger arrives at his destination and delivers
his message’). Consider for example:
(66) With these motives the Athenians received the Corcyraeans into alliance,
καὶ τῶνΚορινθίων ἀπελθόντων οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον δέκα ναῦς αὐτοῖς ἀπέστειλαν βοηθούς· […]
αἱ μὲν δὴ νῆες ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν. οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι …
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and, soon after the departure of the Corinthians, sent ten ships to their aid. [Informa-
tion about the commanders and their orders.] So (δή) the ships arrived at Corcyra. But
(δέ) the Corinthians, … (Th. 1.45–46.1)
In this example, it is told that the Athenians sent ten ships to Corcyra. After that, quite
some space is used to describe the commanders of this fleet as well as their exact or-
ders. Based upon this preceding discourse, it is expected that the ships did indeed ar-
rive at Corcyra and had some part in the upcoming sea-battle.
In other cases, it is attractive, in my view, to take δή as a marker of what in the
literature has been called a volitional causal relation: it signals that some action of a
mental agent (i.e. a character in the story world) is naturallymotivated by his attitudes
or the situation he finds himself to be in. The relevant topos in this case can gener-
ally be spelled out as follows: ‘normally, if a mental agent is involved in a situation x
and/or believes q, he performs an action like p.’ What happens in this case, then, is
that the speaker/narrator shortly identifies with the perspective of the character in his
story.16 That is, he identifies with the character’s motivation in performing the action
described and supposes that his addressee/narratee will do the same. Consider the fol-
lowing examples:
(67) [Gyges realizes that the queen has really forced him either to kill king Candaules or to
be killed himself.]
αἱρέεται αὐτὸς περιεῖναι. ἐπειρώτα δὴ λέγων τάδε. “ἐπεί με ἀναγκάζεις δεσπότεα τὸν ἐμὸν
κτείνειν οὐκ ἐθέλοντα, φέρε ἀκούσω τέῳ καὶ τρόπῳ ἐπιχειρήσομεν αὐτῷ.”
He chose to stay alive himself. So (δή) he asked the queen, saying the following: “Since
you forceme to kill mymaster againstmywill, come, let me also hear in what waywe
will attack him.” (Hdt. 1.11.4)
(68) [Ionian envoys in Sparta to ask for help in their fight against king Cyrus.]
Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ οὔ κως ἐσήκουον, ἀλλ᾿ ἀπέδοξέ σφι μὴ τιμωρέειν Ἴωσι. οἳ μὲν δὴ ἀπαλ-
λάσσοντο, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ἀπωσάμενοι τῶν Ἰώνων τοὺς ἀγγέλους ὅμως ἀπέστειλαν πεν-
τηκοντέρῳ ἄνδρας, …
The Lacedaemonians did not in any way listen, but decided not to aid the Ionians.
They departed then (δή), but the Lacedaemonians, though they had rejected the en-
voys of the Ionians, did nevertheless send men in a ship of fifty oars, …
(Hdt. 1.152.2)
16. See e.g. PanderMaat&Degand (2001) for further discussion of this type of discourse relation and
the causal connectives that indicate it.
559416-L-bw-Thijs
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 275
6.2. Δή as an attitudinal-interactional particle 261
In (67), the decision of Gyges to stay alive himself (q) is the motivation for his per-
formance of the action marked by δή, i.e. asking the queen how they are going to kill
Candaules (p). By using δή in this case, thenarrator explicitly signals thatGyges’s action
follows from his decision in a natural and expected way. In (68), the Lacedaemonians
decide not to help the Ionians (q); the action which is consequently performed by the
Ionians, i.e. leaving (p), naturally follows from this decision. The specific topos acti-
vated by δή may be spelled out as as follows: ‘normally, if someone is not listened to
or has come somewhere to no avail, s/he leaves’. With δή, the speaker marks the de-
scribed action as a natural consequence of the preceding events and decisions in the
story world. The narrator thus identifies with the line of reasoning of his character(s)
which has resulted in the action described. Crucially, δή again activates a topos in the
common ground, implying the involvement of the addressee as well.
Very similar examples of δή can be found when it is used apodotically within a
complex sentence. In such cases, δή occurs in – and scopes over – themain clause that
follows a temporal subordinate clause. Consider for example:
(69) [Croesus has been put to death by Cyrus. Standing on the pyre, he thinks back of what
Solon once said to him and thrice groans his name. Cyrus and his interpreters ask him
about this man.]
ὡς δέ σφι ἄσημα ἔφραζε, πάλιν ἐπειρώτων τὰ λεγόμενα. λιπαρεόντων δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ὄχλον
παρεχόντων, ἔλεγε δὴ ὡς ἦλθε ἀρχὴν ὁ Σόλων ἐὼν Ἀθηναῖος, καὶ θεησάμενος πάντα τὸν
ἑωυτοῦ ὄλβον ἀποφλαυρίσειε …
But since his words were unclear to them, they again questioned him of the words
which he spoke. As they were being persistent and troubled him, he indeed (δή) told
them how Solon, an Athenian, had first come, and how he had seen all his royal state
and made light of it, … (Hdt. 1.86.5)
(70) [Croesus withdraws from the battle against the Persians, leaving his Assyrian allies be-
hind. Then, the Assyrian army is suddenly attacked by the Persians and rushes into
flight.] And Croesus … had his women sent on by night in carriages, that they might
proceedmore comfortably in the cool of the night, and he himself was following after
with his cavalry. […]
ὡς δὲ παρῄσθοντο τῶν φευγόντων καὶ καταλαμβανόντων αὐτούς, πυθόμενοι τὸ γιγνόμενον
ἔφευγον δὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀνὰ κράτος.
Andwhen they had seen thosewhowere fleeing andovertaking them, having learned
whatwas happening, they indeed (δή) took flight themselves too, as fast as they could
go. (X. Cyr. 4.2.30)
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In (69), it can be expected that Croesus will tell the story about Solon (p) – which has
been narrated earlier on in the Histories – given the fact that the Persians were being
insistent and troubling him somuch (q), which is expressed in the preceding particip-
ial clause. Similarly, in (70), given the fact that the Assyrians are being chased by the
Persians and are fleeing as fast as they can (q), it is very much expected that Croesus
and his company will do the same (p) at this point in the story.
Common ground: common knowledge
As we have seen above, the final type of common ground that I argue to be relevant
for the analysis of δή in assertive speech acts is common knowledge. In this case, the
speaker signals that s/he activates, i.e. focuses the attention upon, some proposition p,
which is taken to be stored in the body of common background knowledge of speaker
and addressee (personal or communal common ground). In terms of information sta-
tus, this proposition is inactive at the present point in discourse and needs to be re-
trieved from long-term memory. In this case then, it is not so much a regularity (i.e. a
topos q > p) that is retrieved from the common ground, but rather the fact itself: ‘p, as
we both know’.
In this sense, δή is particularly at home in subsidiary discourse acts – typically
marked as such by the push-particle γάρ – which serve as justification or further sup-
port for some preceding act of the same speaker (cf. section 2.5.3. The speaker, for
instance, provides the background assumptions uponwhich a preceding claim or con-
clusion is based, or motivates why the preceding utterance has been made. With δή,
the speaker may indicate that this background assumption or motivation is part of
their common knowledge. In such cases, δή can be compared with such expressions as
English after all, German ja and Dutch immers. Let me give some examples:
(71) socrates. Let us turn aside here and go along the Ilissus; thenwe can sit downquietly
wherever we please.
φαι. εἰς καιρόν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνυπόδητος ὢν ἔτυχον· σὺ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἀεί. ῥᾷστον οὖν ἡμῖν κατὰ
τὸ ὑδάτιον βρέχουσι τοὺς πόδας ἰέναι, …
phaedrus. I happen to be fortunate, it seems, in being barefoot; for (γάρ) you are
always after all (δή). Anyway, it is easiest for us to go along the brook with our feet in
the water, … (Pl. Phdr. 229a)
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In the γάρ-act in (71), Phaedrus motivates his preceding utterance (‘I happen to be
fortunate in being barefoot’) and in particular why he did not include Socrates in it
(‘we are fortunate’). That Socrates always walks barefoot is most plausibly a generally
known fact in 5th-century Athens and at least part of the personal common ground of
Phaedrus and Socrates.
(72) “Then, Simmias, the souls existed previously, before they were in human form, apart
from bodies, and they had intelligence.” – “Unless, Socrates, we acquire these ideas at
the moment of birth; for that time still remains.” – “Very well, my friend. But at what
other time do we lose them?
οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔχοντές γε αὐτὰς γιγνόμεθα, ὡς ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν· ἢ ἐν τούτῳ ἀπόλλυμεν, ἐν
ᾧπερ καὶ λαμβάνομεν;
For (γάρ) after all (δή) we are not born with them, as we just now agreed. Or do we
lose them at the very moment when we receive them?” (Pl. Phd. 76d)
And in (72), Socrates counters a suggestion made by Simmias. As support he retrieves
some fact that has been agreed upon a bit earlier in the same dialogue (note ὡς ἄρτι
ὡμολογήσαμεν ‘as we agreed just now’), but at this point in the conversation is appar-
ently no longer taken into account by Simmias (i.e. has become inactive). In both of
these cases then, δή signals that p is retrieved from the general common knowledge of
speaker and hearer.
As it turns out, however, this analysis cannot hold for all cases of the collocation
γὰρ δή in justifying or explanatory discourse acts. That is, there are cases in which
it would be highly unnatural to assume that p is retrieved from the common knowl-
edge between speaker and hearer in the given communicative context. In such cases,
p rather appears to be information which in itself is unknown and completely new to
the addressee, as in the following examples:
(73) φαι. καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, προσήκουσά γέ σοι ἡ ἀκοή. ὁ γάρ τοι λόγος ἦν, περὶ ὃν διετρίβο-
μεν οὐκ οἶδ᾿ ὅντινα τρόπον ἐρωτικός. γέγραφε γὰρ δὴ ὁ Λυσίας πειρώμενόν τινα τῶν καλῶν,
οὐχ ὑπ᾿ ἐραστοῦ δέ, ἀλλ᾿ αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ κεκόμψευται· λέγει γὰρ ὡς χαριστέον μὴ ἐρῶντι
μᾶλλον ἢ ἐρῶντι.
phaedrus. Actually, Socrates, you are just the man to hear it. For, you know, the
speech about which we conversed, was, in some way or other, a love-speech. For
(γάρ), you see (δή), Lysias has written that one of the beauties is being tempted, but
not by a lover; but it is just this that is the clever thing about it; for he says that favours
should be granted rather to the one who is not in love than to the lover.
(Pl. Phdr. 227c)
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(74) [On the tomb of the Lydian king Alyattes.] It was built by the men of the market and
the artificers and the prostitutes. There remained till my time five corner-stones set
on the top of the tomb, and on these was graven the record of the work done by each
kind,
καὶ ἐφαίνετο μετρεόμενον τὸ τῶν παιδισκέων ἔργον ἐὸν μέγιστον. τοῦ γὰρ δὴ Λυδῶν δήμου
αἱ θυγατέρες πορνεύονται πᾶσαι, συλλέγουσαι σφίσι φερνάς, ἐς ὃ ἂν συνοικήσωσι τοῦτο
ποιέουσαι· ἐκδιδοῦσι δὲ αὐταὶ ἑωυτάς.
and measurement showed that the prostitutes’ share of the work was the greatest.
For (γάρ), you see (δή), with regard to the people of Lydia, all their daughters ply the
trade of prostitutes, to collect dowries, until they can get themselves husbands; they
offer themselves in marriage. (Hdt. 1.93.3–4)
(75) [Herodotus describes the boats in Babylonia, which come from Armenia and are made
of reeds and hides.] Now when they have floated down to Babylon and disposed of
their cargo, they sell the framework of the boat and all the reeds; the hides are set on
the backs of asses, which are then driven back to Armenia.
ἀνὰ τὸν ποταμὸν γὰρ δὴ οὐκ οἷά τε ἐστὶ πλέειν οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ ὑπὸ τάχεος τοῦ ποταμοῦ· διὰ
γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ οὐκ ἐκ ξύλων ποιεῦνται τὰ πλοῖα ἀλλ᾿ ἐκ διφθερέων.
For (γάρ), you see (δή), it is not by any means possible to go up stream by water, by
reason of the swiftness of the current; it is also for this reason that they make their
boats not of wood, but of hides. (Hdt. 1.194.5)
In example (73), Socrates wants to knowmore about the speech by Lysias which Phae-
drus has just told him about. It follows that he does not yet know anything about this
speech. As such, it would be unnatural for Phaedrus tomark the content of this speech
(‘Lysias has written that …’) as common knowledge between himself and Socrates.
Examples (74) and (75), moreover, are typical instances of ethnographic passages in
Herodotus’s Histories, in which he describes the customs and traditions of the people
which he has met on his journeys (e.g. Lydians or Babylonians). Obviously, the main
point of such sections is to inform his addressees about these unknown customs and
foreign cultures, which are – by definition – no part of the cultural common ground
between Herodotus and his Greek audience.
As noted above, this type of instances is clearly problematic for an interpretation
of δή as marking p as common knowledge (‘as we both know’). In all of the given ex-
amples, p rather appears to be unknown and completely new to the addressee. Here I
propose two alternative explanations:
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(i) One possible solution is to abandon a description in terms of common ground
for such instances. It might be possible, for instance, to take δή as having amore
general evidential value, indicating that p is based upon personal evidence or
experience of the speaker, so that the addressee can easily accept it (‘you can
take it fromme that’).
(ii) As noted above, statements introduced by the push-particle γάρ can typically
be seen as a motivation, explanation or justification for what has been said in
the preceding discourse. The second option would be to say that δή marks this
relation as being natural or expected in kind. In other words, the particle does
not mark p itself as common knowledge, but rather the topos p > q, i.e. the re-
lation between p and a preceding proposition q. In such cases, p may in fact
be available via abductive reasoning (‘normally, a phenomenon like q is caused
or justified by a phenomenon like p’). Thus, the speaker suggests that the ad-
dressee can easily accept p, as it provides a natural explanation/motivation for
q. The meaning of δή may in such cases be compared to that of Dutch immers,
namelijk, German nämlich and English you see, the fact is that.
Here I am strongly inclined to opt for the second of these two options: in this case we
can keep the value of ‘according-to-expectation’ and the particle can still be taken as
a marker of common ground, which is in line with the other instances of attitudinal-
interactional δή. In view of the general principle of methodological minimalism, I take
this option to be the more attractive solution.
Concluding remarks
Letme recapitulate themain pointsmade in this section on δή in assertive speech acts.
First of all, the particle can be used as a purely confirmative marker, viz. in its use in
reactive moves. Here it signals (expected) confirmation of a table-proposition or (ex-
pected) compliance to a preceding directive speech act. Second, it may be used as a
marker of rhetorical strengthening, confirming a point made by the speaker himself
in the preceding discourse. Here the particle seems to have an additional meaning of
scalarity. Finally, there are tree common ground related usages, which can be distin-
guished according to the type of common ground that is activated. Information may
be recapitulated from the preceding discourse (‘as I said’), it may be activated via infer-
ential reasoning on the basis of a topos (‘then, so’) or it may be directly retrieved from
common knowledge (‘as you know, after all’). In the following section, I will further
look into the function of δή in directive speech acts.
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6.2.2 In directives
Whenattitudinal-interactional δή scopes over a clause or sentencewith a directive illo-
cution, I argue that it pertains to the illocution, rather than the propositional content,
of this clause or sentence. In this respect, I follow the analyses of particles in living
languages (section 2.6.2) and assume that δή targets the preparatory conditions of di-
rective speech acts.
As for attitudinal-interactional δή in particular, I propose that its general meaning
of confirmation or common ground comes about as follows. Δή generally indicates that
there is consensus between the interlocutors about the appropriateness of the course
of action to be performed. Another way of saying this is that the speaker takes it for
granted that the addressee is prepared to perform this action and that the directive
speech act will be complied to without any objections. In terms of preparatory condi-
tions, then, δή can be seen as targeting the ability condition of the directive speech act:
(the speaker assumes that) the addressee is able, prepared and ready to perform the
course of action referred to (cf. table 2.3 in section 2.6.2). In short, δή signals that the
ability and readiness of the addressee toperform this action are contextually accessible
and already part of the common ground.
I further argue that the common ground status of the ability condition is generally
reached via inferential reasoning on the basis of topoi. In other words, the assumption
that the addressee is able and prepared to perform the action referred to naturally fol-
lows from the communicative context (i.e. the preceding discourse or the situational
context). On a theoretical level, I believe, such an analysis is attractive in view of its
resemblance with that of inferential δή in assertions (see section 6.2.1): in both cases
δή marks a link with the communicative context by activating a topos in the common
ground. The only difference concerns the nature of p: in assertives p is the proposition
asserted by the speaker, whereas in directives p is modeled as the directive’s ability
condition.
Linguistic support for my analysis comes from the kind of conversational contexts
in which directives with δή most typically occur. In the rest of this section, I will fur-
ther discuss and exemplify these contexts, looking at both dialogical and monological
discourse.
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Preceding discourse: explicitly agreed upon
The analysis given above is first of all supported by cases in which a preparatory condi-
tion of the directive with δή has been explicitly dealt with in the immediately preced-
ing discourse. That is, it is explicitly stated and agreed upon that this condition applies.
This is illustrated by the following three examples:
(76) [Start of a conversation between Alcibiades and Pericles:]
– εἰπέ μοι, φάναι, ὦ Περίκλεις, ἔχοις ἄν με διδάξαι, τί ἐστι νόμος;
– πάντως δήπου, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα.
– δίδαξον δὴ πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, φάναι τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην·
“Tellme, Pericles,” he said, “would yoube able to teachmewhat a law is?” – “Of course,
by all means,” said Pericles. – “Teach me then (δή), please,” said Alcibiades.
(X. Mem. 1.2.41)
(77) [Socrates tries to teach his student Strepsiades some rules of grammar.] socrates. But
you still must learn about names, which of them are masculine and which feminine.
στ. ἀλλ᾿ οἶδ᾿ ἔγωγ᾿ ἃ θήλε᾿ ἐστίν.
σω. εἰπὲ δή.
στ. Λύσιλλα, Φίλιννα, Κλειταγόρα, Δημητρία.
strepsiades. But I know which are feminine. – soc. Tell me then (δή). – str. Lysilla,
Philinna, Cleitagora, Demetria. (Ar. Nu. 683–684)
(78) [Gorgias presents his view of rhetoric and is questioned about it by Socrates.] socrates.
… Of what kind of persuasion then … is rhetoric the art? Or do you not consider that
such a further question would be justified? – gorgias. Yes, I do.
σω. ἀπόκριναι δή, ὦ Γοργία, ἐπειδή γε καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ οὕτως. γορ. ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς πειθοῦς
λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῆς …
soc. Answer me then (δή), Gorgias, given that you think in this way too. – gor. Well,
I mean that kind of persuasion, Socrates, which … (Pl. Grg. 454b)
In (76), Pericles’s ability to teachAlcibiades about law (ἔχοις ἄν με διδάξαι ‘would you be
able to teach me’) has been the explicit object of the preceding question-answer pair.
Alcibiades first wishes to settle this preliminary issue before he utters hismain request.
Given the affirmative answer of Pericles, it is clear that the ability condition of the re-
quest is part of the common ground. In other words, the request has been prepared
for and thus naturally follows from the communicative context. A similar analysis ap-
plies to example (77). Here, it is common ground that Strepsiades is able to tell (i.e.
knows) which proper names are feminine in gender. Again, the ability condition is ex-
plicitly asserted in the precedingmove of the addressee (‘I knowwhich are feminine’).
In (78), finally, the relevant preparatory condition is not so much the addressee’s abil-
ity to perform the action referred to (i.e. that Gorgias knows the answer), but rather the
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appropriateness of performing the action as such. In the preceding sequence, Gorgias
and Socrates have agreed that the question asked by Socrates is justified at this point in
the argument. Thus, Socrates’s request to answer this question naturally follows from
this agreement, which is explicitly signaled by δή. Note that this is also corroborated by
the subsequent ἐπειδή-clause (‘given that you think in this way too’), which explicitly
justifies the request.
Preceding discourse: inferential reasoning
Further support for the analysis proposed above comes from cases in which it is clear
that the preparatory conditions of the directive, rather than having been asserted or
agreed upon explicitly, follow from the preceding discourse by inference, i.e. by virtue
of a common ground topos. Examples can be found both in dialogical discourse, in
which the preceding discourse is spoken by a different speaker (turn-initial δή), and
in monological discourse, in which it is spoken by the speaker of the directive himself
(turn-internal δή).
In dialogical discourse, to start with, directives with δή regularly constitute a reac-
tive move, i.e. a move which reacts upon a preceding, initiating move spoken by the
addressee. More in particular, they tend to occur in reaction to a move which itself is
directive in nature. In such cases, I argue, the preparatory conditions of the directive
are inferrable from this preceding directive and the commitments connected with it.
Consider the following examples:
(79) [Two slaves have stolen wine and decide to get drunk in order to get some inspiration.]
οι.α. ἴθι νυν, ἄκρατον ἐγκάναξόν μοι πολὺν
σπονδήν.
οι.β. λαβὲ δὴ καὶ σπεῖσον ἀγαθοῦ δαίμονος.
first slave. Come now, pour me the wine neat, a double libation. – second slave.
Take it then (δή) and pour one for the Good Genie. (Ar. Eq. 105–106)
(80) [Socrates and Phaedrus decide to walk along the river Ilissus.]
φαι. … ῥᾷστον οὖν ἡμῖν κατὰ τὸ ὑδάτιον βρέχουσι τοὺς πόδας ἰέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἀηδές, ἄλλως
τε καὶ τήνδε τὴν ὥραν τοῦ ἔτους τε καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας.
σω. πρόαγε δή, καὶ σκόπει ἅμα ὅπου καθιζησόμεθα.
phaedrus. … Now it is easiest for us to go along the brook with our feet in the water,
and it is not unpleasant, especially at this time of the year and the day. – socrates.
Lead on then (δή), and look out for a good place where we will sit. (Pl. Phdr. 229a)
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In (79), a command with δή (λάβε ‘take it’) is used as a reaction to a preceding com-
mand spoken by the addressee (ἐγκάναξόν μοι ‘pourme in’). By uttering this command,
the first slave explicitly commits himself to his desire that the second slave pours him
in some wine for a libation. It follows, obviously, that he is also willing to take the cup
of wine from the second slave, the action expressed by the reactive directive with δή.
In example (80), Phaedrus makes the proposal – note the phrases ῥᾷστον ἡμῖν (‘it is
easiest for us to’) and οὐκ ἀηδές (‘it is not unpleasant’) – to walk along the brook with
their feet in the water. In the reaction, Socrates complies by telling Phaedrus to lead
on (imperative πρόαγε). Again, this command is clearly prepared for by the preceding
words of the addressee: since Phaedrus has committed himself to a desire of walking
along the brook, Socrates can be sure that he is willing to lead him the way.
(81) [Trygaeus and his slave are preparing a prayer to the goddess Peace.]
τρ. ἀλλ᾿ ὡς τάχιστ᾿ εὐχώμεθ᾿.
οι. εὐχώμεσθα δή.
trygaeus. But let’s get to the prayer as soon as possible. – slave. Let us pray indeed
(δή). [Trygaeus starts the prayer.] (Ar. Pax 973)
And in (81), finally, a proposal with δή (εὐχώμεσθα ‘let’s pray’) is in fact used as a con-
firmatory reaction to a highly similar proposal made by the addressee in the preceding
move (‘let’s pray as soon as possible’). In this case then, the addressee has already un-
dertaken a commitment to the performance of the action proposed by the speaker (i.e.
praying), which implies that the willingness condition of the proposal with δή is con-
textually given.
This group of ‘reactive’ directives with δή, I conclude, provides strong support for
the analysis of δή given above: the particle explicitly marks the directive as motivated
by or naturally following from the preceding discourse spoken by the addressee. Fur-
ther support comes fromdirectiveswith δήwhichoccurwithin (argumentative)mono-
logical discourse, i.e. within a longer stretch of discourse spoken by one and the same
speaker. In these cases, I take it, δή signals that the directive follows from the imme-
diately preceding discourse of the speaker himself. This is first of all illustrated by the
following Homeric instance in which the directive with δή constitutes the apodosis of
a conditional sentence (apodotic δή):
(82) [Priam – who is on his way to ask for the corpse of Hector – speaks to a Greek, who is
favourably disposed to him and has just revealed to be an attendant of Achilles:]
“εἰ μὲν δὴ θεράπων Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος
εἶς, ἄγε δή μοι πᾶσαν ἀληθείην κατάλεξον,
ἢ ἔτι πὰρ νήεσσιν ἐμὸς πάϊς, ἦέ μιν ἤδη
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ᾗσι κυσὶν μελεϊστὶ ταμὼν προύθηκεν Ἀχιλλεύς.
“If you are indeed one of the attendants of Peleus’s son Achilles, come tell me the
complete truth then (δή), whethermy son is still by the ships, orwhether Achilles has
already hewn him limb from limb and cast him before his dogs.” (Il. 24.406–409)
In this example, the ability of the Greek attendant to perform the commanded action
(i.e. to tell Priamabout the status ofHector’s body inAchilles’s camp) is inferrable from
the fact that he is an attendant fromAchilles, a fact which is explicitly presented in the
antecedent εἰ-clause. In fact, this information has just been asserted by the addressee
in the precedingmove and the speakermerely recapitulates or summarizes it. Wemay
conclude, in otherwords, that this example still comes close to the preceding examples
of dialogical discourse.
In other cases, however, the directive with δή rather constitutes a concluding pro-
posal or pieceof advice,which is prepared for by the arguments unfolded in thepreced-
ing discourse. This use can in fact already be found inHomeric epic, as in the following
two examples:
(83) [Achilles to Agamemnon:] Son of Atreus, now I think we shall be driven back and
return home, our plans thwarted … if indeed war and pestilence alike are to subdue
the Achaeans.
ἀλλ᾿ ἄγε δή τινα μάντιν ἐρείομεν ἢ ἱερῆα,
ἢ καὶ ὀνειροπόλον, καὶ γάρ τ᾿ ὄναρ ἐκ Διός ἐστιν,
ὅς κ᾿ εἴποι ὅ τι τόσσον ἐχώσατο Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων, …
But come let us ask some seer or priest then (δή), or even some reader of dreams –
for a dream too is from Zeus – who might tell us why Phoebus Apollo has conceived
such anger, … (Il. 1.59–64)
(84) [Thetis to Achilles:] But quickly obey me, for I am a messenger to you from Zeus. He
says that the gods are angered with you, and that he himself above all immortals is
filled with wrath, because in the fury of your heart you keep Hector at the beaked
ships, and did not give him back.
ἀλλ᾿ ἄγε δὴ λῦσον, νεκροῖο δὲ δέξαι ἄποινα.”
But come let him loose then (δή), and take ransom for the dead.” (Il. 24.133–137)
In (83), the performance of the action proposed by Achilles (i.e. to consult someone
who can explain Apollo’s anger) is justified by his preceding argument (i.e. that the
Greeks cannot handle war and pestilence alike). That is, this action is the natural thing
to do for the Greeks in the present situation. The relevant background topos involves
the cultural regularity that theGreeks normally consult a god, if something goeswrong.
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In (84), in a similar vein, Thetis’s advice to Achilles to let Hector go (imperative λῦσον)
naturally follows from her argument that Zeus is angered with Achilles because he
refuses to do so (topos: ‘normally, if Zeus is angry, one tries to reconcile with him’).
This same use of δή can be found in rhetorical speeches in Attic Greek, as exem-
plified by the following example from Thucydides:
(85) [Speech of the Athenian general Phormio, who encourages his men before a sea-battle.
He argues at length why his party will have the advantage.]
μὴ δὴ αὐτῶν τὴν τόλμαν δείσητε. πολὺ δὲ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνοις πλείω φόβον παρέχετε καὶ πιστό-
τερον …
Do not fear their daring then (δή). You inspire in them a dread far greater and better
justified … (Th. 2.89.5)
In (85), Phormio encourages hismenbefore battle by givingmany argumentswhy they
will have the advantage over their enemies. He then concludes with a directive speech
act (prohibitive subjunctive clause μή … δείσητε ‘do not fear’). Phormio thus assumes
that it is common ground – given his preceding arguments – that there is no need
to fear the enemy. Observe that instances such as (85) in fact come rather close to
the cases in which δή marks conclusions in assertive speech acts, which have been
discussed in section 6.2.1 above. In turn, this supports the close resemblance of my
analysis of δή in these types of speech act, in both of which the meaning of common
ground involves topos-based reasoning.
Motivated by communicative setting at large
So far, we have seen directives in which δή signals a link to the immediately preceding
discourse context, i.e. to precedingdiscourse act(s) spoken either by adifferent speaker
or by the speaker of the directive him-/herself. In quite a number of cases, however,
such an interpretation appears to be impossible or highly unnatural. In such cases, I
propose, the directive speech act is rather motivated by or following from the situa-
tional or communicative context at large (e.g. time, place and other circumstances of
the utterance). We need to assume here, in other words, that the performance of the
action involved has been prepared for by some non-verbal action or behaviour of the
interlocutors and/or their mutually shared assumptions about the goals of their cur-
rent interaction. Although it is of course impossible to definitely prove this in a dead
language like Ancient Greek, there are some typical contexts, I contend, in which such
an explanation is highly plausible.
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First of all, there are cases in which the directive with δή occurs at the start of a
speech, to ask the audience for attention.Consider the following formulaic phrase from
Homeric epic:
(86) [At the start of a speech in the assembly at Ithaca:]
κέκλυτε δὴ νῦν μευ, Ἰθακήσιοι, ὅττι κεν εἴπω·
Now (νῦν) listen to me then (δή), men of Ithaca, what I have to say: …
(Od. 2.25, 161, 229, 24.450)
In this example, it is attractive, in my view, to assume that the act of listening is justi-
fied or prepared for by the communicative setting at large. The very fact that the men
of Ithaca have all come together at the assembly implies that they are willing to pay
attention and listen to those who intend to speak. This is based upon common knowl-
edge about the goals and conventions of such assemblymeetings (communal common
ground). In otherwords, given the communicative setting at hand, the speaker can take
it for granted that his addressee(s) will comply, which is made explicit by δή here. Fur-
ther below, I will pay closer attention to the category of directives which essentially
involve communicative actions such as listening.
Second, there is the genre of Attic drama, inwhich spokenwords aremost typically
also accompanied by the performance of non-verbal actions by the characters on stage.
Thus, as I take it, directives speech acts may be motivated by such non-verbal actions,
notably the very fact that a character enters or leaves the stage, as in the following two
examples:
(87) [Two Greek ambassadors have come back from Persia, bringing with them Pseudo-
Artabas, a messenger of the Persian king. The latter has just entered the stage, having
been introduced by one of his own heralts.]
πρ. ἄγε δὴ σὺ βασιλεὺς ἅττα σ᾿ ἀπέπεμψεν φράσον
λέξοντ᾿ Ἀθηναίοισιν, ὦ Ψευδαρτάβα.
ambassador. Come then (δή), you tellwhat theKing sent you to say to theAthenians,
Pseudo-Artabas. (Ar. Ach. 98–99)
(88) [Together with the chorus of satyrs, Odysseus has devised a plan to make the Cyclops
blind in his sleep. At the present point, the Cyclops has just become drunk and entered
his cave.]
οδ. ἄγε δή, Διονύσου παῖδες, εὐγενῆ τέκνα,
ἔνδον μὲν ἁνήρ· τῷ δ᾿ ὕπνῳ παρειμένος
τάχ᾿ ἐξ ἀναιδοῦς φάρυγος ὠθήσει κρέα.
δαλὸς δ᾿ ἔσωθεν αὐλίων πνέων καπνὸν
παρηυτρέπισται, κοὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν πυροῦν
Κύκλωπος ὄψιν· ἀλλ᾿ ὅπως ἀνὴρ ἔσῃ.
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odysseus. Come on then (δή), Dionysus’ children [i.e. the satyrs], noble offspring: the
man’s inside and, relaxed in sleep, he’ll soon belch his meat out from his shameless
maw. Inside the hall the firebrand is ready, sending forth smoke, and there is noth-
ing left to do but to burn out the Cyclops’s eye. But take care that you show your
manhood. (E. Cyc. 590–595)
In (87), on the one hand, a character has just entered the stage, viz. Pseudo-Artabas,
an attendant of the Persian king. He is then requested by one of the Greek ambas-
sadors who accompanied him to deliver his message (imperative φράσον ‘tell’). In this
case, in my opinion, it is the very presence of Pseudo-Artabas – the fact that he has
come toAthens – that justifies the performance of this action in the present context. In
turn, this is based upon the common knowledge between the ambassador and Pseudo-
Artabas that delivering this message is the main goal of his coming to Athens. In (88),
on the other hand, a character has just gone offstage: the drunken Cyclops has gone
into his cave. It is this fact, in my view, which justifies Odysseus’s general call to action
here (ἄγε ‘come on’). In doing so, he urges the satyrs to start carrying out their plan
to blind the Cyclops in his sleep, a plan which they agreed upon a bit earlier in the
play and is part of their common ground. In short, given their mutually shared inten-
tions and the favourable circumstances at hand – explicitly mentioned by Odysseus in
subsequent discourse – this call to action is clearly prepared for and the satyrs can be
expected to comply without objections.
In these and similar cases, I conclude, the performance of the action involved in
the directive speech act is justified by the extra-linguistic, situational context in com-
bination with common knowledge about the goals and/or conventions of the commu-
nicative event at stake (personal/communal common ground). As such, it also follows
that the addressee is willing to comply.
On δή with meta-directive expressions
It should here be noted that a great part of directives with δή in my corpus in fact in-
volves directives of a meta-communicative nature, i.e. directives which refer to an ac-
tion that is itself essentially communicative in nature or pertains to the immediate in-
teractional situation at hand. I will generally speak aboutmeta-directives in such cases,
a term which has been coined by Risselada (1993) in her study on directive expres-
sions in Latin. Let me explain this in some more detail first.17
17. Here I essentially follow thediscussion inRisselada (1993: 44–45, 258–278), inwhichmoredetails
and further references can be found. Cf. also sections 2.4 and 2.6.2.
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With regard to meta-directives, it is first of all important to note that every type
of speech act is more or less conventionally connected to certain perlocutionary ef-
fects. That is, the performance of a speech act inherently exerts a certain influence,
or puts a certain interactional claim, upon the addressee. An assertive speech act, for
instance, has the inherent perlocutionary effect that the addressee comes to know or
believes the communicated content, and a question that the addressee provides some
sort of an answer. Whereas such effects typically remain implicit, speakers also tend
to make them explicit by means of a meta-directive expression (mostly an imperative
form). Examples are such verbal phrases as believe me, know that, do not think that for
assertives and tell me (how), answer me (whether) for questions. Such meta-directive
expressions then, constitute particular expression forms for speech acts, which can be
seen as the counterparts of performative expressions such as I tell you (that), I ask you
(whether) and I promise (to). Whereas performatives are speaker-oriented and explic-
ity express the illocutionary act, meta-directives are addressee-oriented and explicitly
express the perlocutionary act.
In addition, the category of meta-directives includes expressions by means of
which the speaker more generally directs the addressee’s behaviour within the imme-
diate communicative situationat hand.Rather thanexpressing the effects of individual
speech act types, these meta-directives address the behaviour that is instrumental for
co-operative communication in general, such as listening, paying attention and tak-
ing what is said into consideration, or certain procedural matters of the conversation
at hand, such as turn-taking (who may take or hold the floor?) and the proper transi-
tion to a next point of discussion. Examples are listen carefully, pay attention to the next
point, please consider the following question and the like.
Now if we return to our analysis of δή, it is conspicuous that the particle is highly
compatible with such meta-directive expressions. Thus, we regularly find δή within
discourse acts that consist of either an imperative or hortatory subjunctive form of
one of the following types of verbs (actual examples will be given below):
• verbs of speech:
λέγω/εἶπον ‘to tell, say’, φράζω ‘to tell’, ἀφικνέομαι ‘to answer’, ἐρωτάω ‘to ask’ and εὔχομαι
‘pray’
• verbs of listening:
ἀκούω ‘to listen’, ἀκροάομαι ‘to listen’ and κλύω ‘to hear, listen’
• verbs of consideration, thought and knowledge:
σκόπεω/σκέπτομαι ‘to look, consider’, ὁράω/εἶδον ‘to see, understand’, ἀθρέω ‘to look, ob-
serve’, (ἐν)νοέω ‘to observe, notice’, θεάομαι ‘to see, observe’, προσέχω τὸν νοῦν ‘to set the
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mind upon, to pay attention’, φραζέομαι ‘to think about, consider’, ἐνθυμέομαι ‘to con-
sider, reflect’, λογίζομαι ‘to reckon, consider’, γιγνώσκω ‘to know, recognize’ and ἀναμι-
μνήσκομαι ‘to remember’
Anumber of further remarks about this use of δή in collocationwith these verbs can be
made. First of all, I would like to address the strong compatibility of δή with meta-di-
rective expressions as such. Froma theoretical perspective, I suggest, thismay be taken
as further support for δή’s general function as a marker of common ground or consen-
sus. As we have seen above, most meta-directives can primarily be regarded as explicit
requests for co-operative behaviour of the addressee(s) in the communicative event
at hand (i.e. listening to the speaker, taking his words into consideration, answering a
questionwhenasked, and soon). This involves certain general principles or regularities
of co-operative behaviour in communicationwhich are part of the common ground by
definition, being an essential ingredient of human communication in general. Thus, in
case of most meta-directives, the very fact that speaker and addressee(s) are involved
in a communicative eventnormally implies that they are on commongroundabout the
appropriateness and the addressee’s willingness to perform the action involved, i.e. to
perform co-operative communicative behaviour. As such, this makes meta-directives
by definition a particularly suitable host for markers of common ground.
Second, with respect to δή in particular, I claim that the particle’s analysis is gen-
erally not fundamentally different from the one provided above. That is, δή signals
that the meta-directive naturally follows from the immediate communicative context
by activating a topos, in this case a regularity which concerns co-operative commu-
nication (see above). In some instances then, the communicative action/behaviour
required from the addressee is clearly prepared for by the preceding discourse, for in-
stance by a preceding speech act of the addressee, as in the following examples:
(89) [Creusa meets Ion, who is a servant in the temple of Apollo.] ion. What is your errand?
I shall help you, lady. – creusa. I want to receive a secret oracle from Phoebus.
ιο. λέγοις ἄν· ἡμεῖς τἄλλα προξενήσομεν.
κρ. ἄκουε δὴ τὸν μῦθον· …
ion. You may tell me: we shall do all else for you. – creusa. Hear the story then (δή).
… (E. Ion 333–336)
(90) [In a meeting of women, Lysistrata produces a scroll with an oracular text.]
γυ. λέγ᾿ αὐτὸν ἡμῖν ὅ τι λέγει.
λυ. σιγᾶτε δή.
thirdwife. Read out to us what it says. – lysistrata. Be quiet then (δή). [Reading of
the text follows.] (Ar. Lys. 769)
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In these cases, the meta-directive clearly follows from the preceding words spoken by
the addressee. In (89), Creusa’s request to listen to her story follows from a preceding
allowance by the addressee (Ion) to tell this to him (λέγοις ἄν ‘you may tell’). And in
(90), similarly, Lysistrata’s command to the other women to be silent arises out of the
preceding request to read out the oracular text (imperative λέγε ‘read out’). In both of
these cases then, the speaker confirms the topos that telling a story or reading some-
thing out aloud generally works best when the audience co-operates, i.e. is silent and
actually listens.
In other cases, the meta-directive is motivated by the immediately preceding
words of the speaker himself, as in the following examples:
(91) [Socrates’s defense speech.]
… κἀγὼ ὑμῖν πειράσομαι ἀποδεῖξαι τί ποτ’ ἐστὶν τοῦτο ὃ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκεν τό τε ὄνομα καὶ
τὴν διαβολήν. ἀκούετε δή. καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξω τισὶν ὑμῶν παίζειν· εὖ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν
τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ.
… and I shall try to explain to youwhat it is that has created forme the reputation and
prejudice. You listen then (δή). Andperhaps someof youmay think I’mplaying about,
yet be well assured that I shall tell you the whole truth. [The explanation follows.]
(Pl. Ap. 20d)
(92) [Socrates concludes that some opinions ought to be highly esteemed and others not.] In
God’s name, Crito, do you not think this is correct?
σὺ γάρ, ὅσα γε τἀνθρώπεια, ἐκτὸς εἶ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνῄσκειν αὔριον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν σὲ παρα-
κρούοι ἡ παροῦσα συμφορά· σκόπει δή· οὐχ ἱκανῶς δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρὴ τὰς
δόξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾶν ἀλλὰ …
For you, humanly speaking, are not involved in the necessity of dying tomorrow, and
present conditions would not bias your judgment. Think about it then (δή): don’t
you think it is correctly said that we ought not to esteem all the opinions of men, but
rather …? (Pl. Cri. 47a)
In example (91), Socrates’s appeal to listen to him (imperative ἀκούετε) naturally fol-
lows from his own preceding commissive speech act, in which he announces that he
will try to explain (πειράσομαι ἀποδεῖξαι) why he has such a bad reputation in Athens.
And in (92), the ability of Crito to consider (imperative σκόπει) and answer Socrates’s
question follows from Socrates’s previous statement that Crito’s judgment in this mat-
ter is not biased like his own.
Finally, there are some cases in which it is attractive to assume that a meta-di-
rectives with δή is motivated by the extra-linguistic discourse situation. This may for
instance happen at the start of a speech, as has been argued for with regard to example
(86) above (p. 272).
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One important qualification to this analysis of δή in meta-directives is in place here,
however. In view of the fact that certain meta-directives can be seen as expression
forms of other speech acts, in some cases, I feel, the particle may in fact better be an-
alyzed in terms of the assertive or interrogative speech act that is expressed by means
of the meta-directive. Consider for instance the following examples:
(93) [As a summary of an argument in a speech:]
τὸ ξύμπαν τε δὴ γνῶμεν πιθόμενοι μὲν ἐμοὶ πόλιν ἕξοντες ἕκαστος ἐλευθέραν, …
And (τε) let us then (δή) altogether recognize that, if we follow my advice, we shall
each keep our city free, … (Th. 4.63.2)
(94) strepsiades. Reverse your way of life as soon as possible, and go learn what I will
recommend.
φε. λέγε δή, τί κελεύεις;
phidippides. Tell me then (δή), what are you asking me to learn? (Ar. Nu. 88–90)
(95) [Socrates and Euthyphro agree: the art which serves shipbuilders serves to produce ships
and the art which serves housebuilders serves to produce houses.]
σω. εἰπὲ δή, ὦ ἄριστε· ἡ δὲ θεοῖς ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετικὴ ἂν εἴη;
δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι σὺ οἶσθα, ἐπειδήπερ τά γε θεῖα κάλλιστά γε φῂς εἰδέναι ἀνθρώπων.
socrates. Τell me then (δή), my friend: what would the art which serves the gods
serve to accomplish? For it is evident that you know, precisely because you say you
knowmore than any other man about matters which have to do with the gods.
(Pl. Euthphr. 13e)
In example (93), the hortatory subjunctive γνῶμεν (‘let us recognize that’) is a meta-
directive expression for an assertive speech act. In such a case, we could in fact ana-
lyze δή as pertaining to the (embedded) asserted proposition, which is presented as a
conclusion inferrable from the preceding argument (see also τὸ ξύμπαν ‘altogether, all
in all’). In (94) and (95), in a similar vein, the meta-directive expressions λέγε and εἰπέ
(‘tell, say’) bear upon the following interrogative speech act. In such cases, δή may in
fact better be related to the felicity conditions of this question, notably the assumption
that the addressee knows the answer to it (see section 6.2.3 below). Note, indeed, that
in (95) this condition is explicitly asserted in the following discourse: δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι σὺ
οἶσθα (‘for it is evident that you know’).
Concluding remarks
I conclude that attitudinal-interactional δή in directives (i.e. δή scoping over clauses/
sentences with a directive illocution) can be analyzed in a fairly univocal way. It indi-
cates that the ability condition of the directive in question is already part of the com-
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mon ground. With δή then, the speaker explicitly signals that s/he assumes that the
addressee is able, prepared and ready to perform the course of action that is referred
to in the directive. Most typically, it is inferrable on the basis of a topos from the pre-
ceding discourse, which can be spoken either by the addressee (dialogical discourse,
turn-initial δή) or by the same speaker (monological discourse, turn-internal δή).
6.2.3 Inwh-questions
The use of δή inwh-questions constitutes a very common pattern in the corpus of early
and classical Greek. It is possible to give a rather straightforward analysis of this pat-
tern, which closely resembles my analysis of δή in directives given in the previous sec-
tion. That is, I argue that δή does not target the propositional content, but rather per-
tains to the illocution of the interrogative clause or sentence in its scope. The general
contribution of δή to a wh-question, I argue, is to indicate that this question is mo-
tivated by or naturally follows from the communicative context, either from the pre-
ceding discourse context (verbal actions) or from the situational context (non-verbal
actions). Again, I propose, this can be made more explicit by assuming that δή tar-
gets one of the felicity conditions of a wh-question. That is, it marks this condition as
inferrable on the basis of a topos and, consequently, as part of the common ground be-
tween speaker and addressee(s). In my view, two of these conditions are particularly
relevant for δή in wh-questions, which in turn leads to two more specific interpreta-
tions of the particle. They are the following (see also table 2.3 in section 2.6.2 above):
(i) δή targets the ability condition of awh-question: (the speaker assumes that) the
addressee is able and willing to provide the answer to thewh-question. Another
way of saying this is that the addressee knows this answer. In this case then, it is
this knowledge of the addressee that naturally follows from the communicative
context and is taken for granted as part of the common ground.
(ii) δή pertains to the condition that the speaker does not know and wants to
learn the information asked for. In this case then, δή explicitly signals that the
speaker’s desire to know the answer to the question askednaturally follows from
the communicative context. This amounts to saying that the very utterance of
the wh-question comes as expected for the addressee at the given point in the
conversation. The particle could be paraphrased as ‘we both can see why I ask
this question’. This second analysis is in line with the analysis of δή in questions
as given by Sicking (1993, 1997) and Drummen (2016b).
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I would like to emphasize here that these interpretations are closely related and often
go hand in hand. Indeed, as the examples below will illustrate, in most instances we
lack the necessary contextual evidence tomake a deliberated choice in favour of one of
the two analyses and both of them could in principle be defended. However, in other
cases, I will argue, the surrounding discourse contains some explicit clues in favour of
the first and against the second interpretation or vice versa. In turn, such cases justify
the need for distinguishing between the two more specific interpretations given here.
In what follows I will provide further support for the given analysis by discussing
and exemplifying the main types of communicative contexts in which wh-questions
with δή typically occur. Imake a broad distinction in this respect between (i) questions
which are primarily reactive in nature and (ii) questions which proceed to a next point
of discussion. I will end the section with some remarks on (iii) expository questions
with δή in rhetorical speeches.
Reactivewh-questions
The main support for the given analysis comes from the fact that a majority of wh-
questions with δή in the corpus of Greek dialogue are primarily reactive in nature.
These questions can be characterized as requests for explanation, clarification or fur-
ther specification. That is, the speaker asks the addressee to further clarify, specify or
explain (part of) the meaning of his preceding speech act, or to motivate why s/he has
performed some verbal or non-verbal act. In discourse-structural terms, such ques-
tions can typically be analyzed as the first pair part of an embedded exchange (cf. sec-
tion 2.5.2). That is, clarification is requested before the (preferred) second pair part
can be provided (i.e. an assertion can be acknowledged or accepted, a question can
be answered or a directive can be complied to), or before an exchange and its nego-
tiation process can be rounded off felicitously. Such requests, then, are rooted in the
communicative context by definition: they tie in with and are motivated by some pre-
ceding action of the addressee, most typically a speech act. As explained above, it is δή
that makes this contextual link explicit in my view. In the following, I first turn to the
discussion of some typical examples of δή in such reactive questions. After that, I will
go into the issue of the two more specific interpretations given above and give some
further arguments why I favour the first one.
Most straightforward are cases inwhich thewh-question follows upon an assertion
or biased yes/no-question, i.e. a speech act by means of which the preceding speaker
(i.e. the addressee) has presented and committed him-/herself to a proposition. Rather
than straightaway acknowledging or accepting this proposition, the speaker requests
the addressee, for instance, to clarify something s/he did not immediately understand,
559416-L-bw-Thijs
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 294
280 Chapter 6. The particle δή
to provide the grounds upon which the addressee’s commitment is based, or just to
provide some more specific information on the subject. It need not surprise us that
this pattern is particularly at home in the Socratic dialogue, where such requests for
clarification are typically spoken by Socrates’s interlocutors. For example:
(96) socrates. … For all along, while I was making my speech, something troubled me …
But now I have seen the error.
φαι. λέγεις δὲ δὴ τί;
σω. δεινόν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, δεινὸν λόγον αὐτός τε ἐκόμισας ἐμέ τε ἠνάγκασας εἰπεῖν.
φαι. πῶς δή;
σω. εὐήθη καὶ ὑπό τι ἀσεβῆ· …
phaedrus. But (δέ) what do youmean then (δή)? – soc. Dreadful, Phaedrus, a dread-
ful speech itwas, both the one youbroughtwith you, and the one youmademe speak.
– phae. How so then (δή)? – soc. It was foolish, and somewhat impious. …
(Pl. Phdr. 242d)
(97) [At issue is the question how the truly rhetorical art is to be acquired.]
σω. … ὅσον δὲ αὐτοῦ τέχνη, οὐχ ᾗ Λυσίας τε καὶ Θρασύμαχος πορεύεται, δοκεῖ μοι φαίνε-
σθαι ἡ μέθοδος.
φαι. ἀλλὰ πῇ δή;
σω. κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰκότως ὁ Περικλῆς πάντων τελεώτατος εἰς τὴν ῥητορικὴν γενέ-
σθαι.
socrates. … But so far as the art is concerned, it is not along the path of Lysias and
Thrasymachus that I think the quest of it lies. – phaedrus. But (ἀλλά) where then
(δή)? – socrates. It seems reasonable, my friend, that Pericles is the most perfect
orator in existence. (Pl. Phdr. 269d–e)
(98) [Socrates in prison. He and Crito talk about the arrival of the ship from Delos, which will
indicate the time of his death.] socrates.Well, I don’t think it’ll arrive on the day com-
ing, but on the one after.
τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἔκ τινος ἐνυπνίου ὃ ἑώρακα ὀλίγον πρότερον ταύτης τῆς νυκτός· καὶ κινδυ-
νεύεις ἐν καιρῷ τινι οὐκ ἐγεῖραί με.
κρι. ἦν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνύπνιον;
My proof comes from a dream that I saw a short while ago this very night: andmaybe
it was opportune you didn’t wake me up. – crito. But (δέ) what was the dream then
(δή)? [Description of the dream follows.] (Pl. Cri. 44a)
In (96), Phaedrus clearly does not understand what Socrates means when he speaks
about the error hehasmade inhis previous speech, and sohe asks for clarification (‘But
what do youmean then?’). Socrates’s answer that the speeches have been dreadful is of
course still insufficient and so Phaedrus also asks for an explanation of this judgement
(‘How so then?’). It is clear that Socrates knows the answers to these questions and is
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able to answer them. In (97), awh-questionwith δή follows upon a negative statement:
Socrates rejects an assumption (‘not A’) and can thus be expected to come up with an
alternative, positive counterpart (‘but B’). His ability to do so is marked as common
ground information.And in (98), Crito asks formore specific informationon thedream
that has just beenmentioned and introduced into the discourse by Socrates (indefinite
ἔκ τινος ἐνυπνίου ‘from a dream’). Of course, Socrates can reasonibly be expected to
know his own dream and indeed provide this information.
The pattern is actually rather common in all varieties of Greek dialogue. Similar ex-
amples can for instance be found in the dialogues of Attic drama, as in (99) and (100).
(99) [Menelaos asks the Egyptian king Theoclymenus for a ship to perform a Greek burial rit-
ual at sea.] theoclymenus. To take the ship how far out from the land? –menelaus.
To where you can barely see the waves beating on the shore.
θε. τί δή; τόδ᾿ Ἑλλὰς νόμιμον ἐκ τίνος σέβει;
με. ὡς μὴ πάλιν γῇ λύματ᾿ ἐκβάλῃ κλύδων.
θε. Φοίνισσα κώπη ταχύπορος γενήσεται.
the. How so then (δή)? For what reason does Greece observe this custom? –men. So
that the tide may not wash pollution back to the land. – the. A speedy Phoenician
ship will be provided. (E. Hel. 1268–1272)
(100) [Lysistrata compares ending the war to unraveling a ball of yarn.] magistrate. So you
think your way with wool and yarnballs and spindles can stop a terrible crisis? How
brainless!
λυ. κἂν ὑμῖν γ᾿ εἴ τις ἐνῆν νοῦς,
ἐκ τῶν ἐρίων τῶν ἡμετέρων ἐπολιτεύεσθ᾿ ἂν ἅπαντα.
πρ. πῶς δή; φέρ᾿ ἴδω.
λυ. πρῶτον μὲν ἐχρῆν, ὥσπερ πόκον, ἐν βαλανείῳ
ἐκπλύναντας τὴν οἰσπώτην ἐκ τῆς πόλεως,
lysistrata. And if you had any brains, you’d handle all the polis’s business the way
we handle our wool! – mag. How then (δή)? Come let me see. – lys. First, just like a
fleece just shorn, put the polis in a bath and wash out all the sheep dung, …
(Ar. Lys. 571–575)
In (99), Theoclymenos does not understand why Menelaos needs to take a ship so far
out of land and asks for further explanation about the Greek ritual which Menelaos
is planning. Note that after Menelaos’s answer the side sequence is closed and Theo-
clymenus indeed promises the requested ship. And example (100), finally, exemplifies
thatwh-questions with δήmay also occur in conversations of a less cooperative nature,
such as this heated discussion between Lysistrata and a magistrate. In such a case, a
request for clarification may easily have an ironic ring to it: whereas δή marks that it
naturally follows from the preceding discourse that the addressee (Lysistrata) is able to
559416-L-bw-Thijs
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 296
282 Chapter 6. The particle δή
give further explanation, the speaker (themagistrate) rather appears to imply that s/he
is not able to do so. To be sure, δή itself still has essentially the samemeaning as in the
preceding, non-ironic, examples (i.e. indicating that the ability condition follows from
the preceding discourse). The possible ironic interpretation primarily arises through
contextual factors (e.g. to the fact that the δή-question is uttered within a context in
which the interlocutors clearly take opposite stances).
In some cases, a wh-question with δή rather follows upon a preceding directive
or commissive speech act, i.e. speech acts which are concerned with future actions
rather than propositions. In such a case, it follows from this preceding speech act and
the commitments connected with it that the addressee is able and prepared to answer
the wh-question. Consider for example:
(101) σω. τόδε τοίνυν αὐτόθεν λάβωμεν, ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ψέγειν πρὸς τὸ ἐπαινεῖν ἔσχεν ὁ λόγος μετα-
βῆναι.
φαι. πῶς δὴ οὖν αὐτὸ λέγεις;
socrates. Well then, from here let us take up the following point: how the discourse
succeeded in changing from blame to praise. – phaedrus.Well (οὖν), how do you say
it did then (δή)? [explanation by Socrates follows] (Pl. Phdr. 265c)
(102) phaedrus. The fair Isocrates. What message will you give him? What shall we say
that he is?
σω. νέος ἔτι, ὦ Φαῖδρε, Ἰσοκράτης· ὃ μέντοι μαντεύομαι κατ᾿ αὐτοῦ, λέγειν ἐθέλω.
φαι. τὸ ποῖον δή;
σω. δοκεῖ μοι ἀμείνων ἢ κατὰ τοὺς περὶ Λυσίαν εἶναι λόγους τὰ τῆς φύσεως, ἔτι τε ἤθει
γεννικωτέρῳ κεκρᾶσθαι.
socrates. Isocrates is still young, Phaedrus. Ηowever, I am willing to say what I
prophesy for him. – phaedrus. What is it then (δή)? – socrates. I think he has a na-
ture above the speeches of Lysias and possesses a nobler character. (Pl. Phdr. 279a)
In (101), Socrates makes a proposal to proceed to a next topic of discussion (hortative
subjunctive λάβωμεν ‘let us take’), viz. to give an explanation of the fact that a change
from praising to blaming has taken place in the current conversation. In the reaction,
by asking the wh-question, Phaedrus accepts the proposal and at the same time starts
the discussion by asking Socrates for the explanation right away (‘Howdo you say it did
then?’). Obviously, given the preceding proposal, Socrates is clearly able and ready to
answer this question. And in example (102), Socrates’s willingness to give the answer
is even explicitly expressed in the preceding discourse (λέγειν ἐθέλω ‘I am willing to
say’). Thus, by asking the wh-question, Phaedrus directly acts upon the commitment
undertaken by Socrates in the preceding move.
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(103) [Socrates wants to deliver a new speech that contradicts the two earlier ones.]
φαι. λέγε τοίνυν θαρρῶν.
σω. ποῦ δή μοι ὁ παῖς πρὸς ὃν ἔλεγον; ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο ἀκούσῃ, καὶ μὴ ἀνήκοος ὢν φθάσῃ
χαρισάμενος τῷ μὴ ἐρῶντι.
φαι. οὗτος παρά σοι μάλα πλησίον ἀεὶ πάρεστιν, ὅταν σὺ βούλῃ.
σω. οὑτωσὶ τοίνυν, ὦ παῖ καλέ, ἐννόησον, ὡς …
phaedrus. Well, speak without fear. – socrates. Where then (δή) is the youth to
whom I was speaking? In order that he hears this speech as well and does not accept,
if he does not hear it, a non-lover before we can stop him. – phaedrus. Here he is,
always very close at hand whenever you want him. – socrates. Well then, fair youth,
you must understand it as follows, that … (Pl. Phdr. 243e)
This final example is a somewhat special case. Here the wh-question again follows
upon a directive speech act of the addressee: Phaedrus urges Socrates to start his
speech (imperative λέγε θαρρῶν ‘speak without fear’). Rather than directly complying
to the directive, however, Socrates first asks about a pre-condition that needs to be ful-
filled in order to comply to the directive (i.e. thewh-question starts an embedded side-
sequence). More specifically, he asks where is the intended addressee of his upcom-
ing speech, i.e. an imaginary young boy. Given the preceding directive, Phaedrus can
reasonably be expected to know the answer to this question, because he himself will
perform the role of the young boy, as he did earlier in the same dialogue. Thus, the wh-
question is clearly motivated by the preceding discourse and δή can again be analyzed
as targeting the ability condition of the wh-question.
Finally, I would like to emphasize that it is also possible that a request for further
clarification ismotivatedby someaspect of the situational and communicative context
at large, rather than by the preceding discourse context (cf. examples (86) to (88) of δή
in directives above). In such cases, I argue, it is not a verbal, but a non-verbal action of
the addresseewhichmotivates thewh-question of the speaker. An interesting example
from Platonic dialogue is the following:
(104) [Beginning of the dialogue.]
σω. ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε, ποῖ δὴ καὶ πόθεν;
φαι. παρὰ Λυσίου, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦ Κεφάλου· πορεύομαι δὲ πρὸς περίπατον ἔξω τείχους.
socrates. Dear Phaedrus, where are you going to then (δή), and from where are you
coming? – phaedrus. From Lysias, Socrates, the son of Cephalus; and I am going for
a walk outside the wall. (Pl. Phdr. 227a)
The example consists of the very first moves of a conversation between Socrates and
Phaedrus, so that there cannot be a link between δή and a preceding speech act. In
my view, the presence of δή rather suggests here that there is something in Phaedrus’s
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present behaviour or outer appearance (e.g. that Phaedrus is clearly going somewhere
or is in a hurry) which has made Socrates summon him and ask the wh-question at
stake. Of course, Phaedrus can also be expected to know where he is going and thus
answer Socrates’s question. Examples such as these, as I will argue below, are an im-
portant reason not to take δή as a discourse connective particle.
Now, up to this point my discussion has mainly focused upon the first interpreta-
tion of δή given above, in which the particle associates with the ability condition of
the wh-question. In general, speakers can naturally be expected to be able to further
specify (part of) their intended meaning or to motivate why s/he performed a preced-
ing speech act or non-verbal action. This analysis gives us a nice resemblance between
the analysis of δή inwh-questions and that of δή in directives (see section 6.2.2 above).
Furthermore, it also closely alignswith current analyses of theGermandiscourse parti-
cle denn, which also occurs mostly in requests for clarification and further motivation
(e.g. König 1977, Thurmair 1989, Diewald 2007).
But what about the second interpretation then? So far, I must admit, we have
mainly seen examples in which this second interpretation could also be defended: the
request for clarification could be taken as a speech actwhich comes as expected for the
addressee at the given point in the conversation (‘we both can see why I ask this ques-
tion’). Especially in the Socratic dialogue, it is generally quite reasonable to assume
that Socrates (the addressee of the wh-question) already expects that his interlocutor
(the speaker) wants him to be more specific or further explain his argument. Indeed,
we sometimes even get the impression that the wh-question with δή is somewhat su-
perfluous in nature.
However, I believe that there are at least two types of instances in which linguistic
evidence points against this interpretation, or at least shows that it is rather unnatural.
In such cases then, the wh-question rather appears to come as completely unexpected
for the addressee. First, consider the following two instances:
(105) σω. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ θεοφιλὲς ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, οὐδὲ τὸ ὅσιον θεοφιλές, ὡς σὺ λέγεις,
ἀλλ’ ἕτερον τοῦτο τούτου.
ευθ. πῶς δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;
σω. ὅτι ὁμολογοῦμεν …
socrates. Apparently then (ἄρα), that which is dear to the gods is not holy, Euthy-
phro, and neither is that which is holy dear to the gods, as you say, but this one thing
differs from the other. – euthyphro. How so then (δή), Socrates? – soc. Because we
are agreed that … (Pl. Euthphr. 10e)
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(106) – οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει μάλιστα καταδεῖται ψυχὴ ὑπὸ σώματος;
– πῶς δή;
– ὅτι ἑκάστη ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ὥσπερ ἧλον ἔχουσα προσηλοῖ αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ προσ-
περονᾷ καὶ ποιεῖ σωματοειδῆ, …
– “Isn’t it (οὐκοῦν) in this experience [sc. pain and pleasure] that the soul is especially
bound fast by the body?” – “How so then (δή)?” – “Because each pleasure and pain, as
if with a nail, fixes and pins it to the body and makes it body-like, … (Pl. Phd. 83d)
In both of these examples, Socrates commits himself to a proposition, which his in-
terlocutor (Euthyphro and Cebes respectively) does not immediately understand: the
latter cannot keep pace with the argumentative step made by Socrates and asks for
explanation. In such cases, it is less natural to assume that the question comes as ex-
pected for Socrates, which is supported by the kind of particles in the preceding move
by Socrates. In (105), we have the particle ἄρα, which marks a necessary conclusion
(‘we cannot but conclude that’). That is, a logical conclusion is reached on the basis
of the premises which have been accepted by the interlocutors in the preceding dis-
course.18 And in (106), Socrates asks a biased οὐκοῦν-question (‘isn’t it the case that’),
which is directed towards a positive answer of acceptance. In other words, Socrates
presents information which he takes as easily acceptable by the addressee (given the
preceding discourse), i.e. information which does not need further explanation.19
Second, and more importantly, there is a group of reactive wh-questions with δή
which donot react towhat has been asserted, but rather towhat has been presupposed
by the addressee. In other words, by using an expression which triggers some presup-
position (e.g. a definite description) the previous speaker has taken for grantedmutual
knowledge of a particular referent. As it turns out, however, the speaker of thewh-ques-
tion is not yet familiar with it and asks for further clarification. This is illustrated by the
following examples from Plato:
(107) [Socrates states that the locusts would laugh if he and Phaedrus would spend the after-
noon sleeping.]
ἐὰν δὲ ὁρῶσι διαλεγομένους καὶ παραπλέοντάς σφας ὥσπερ Σειρῆνας ἀκηλήτους, ὃ γέρας
παρὰ θεῶν ἔχουσιν ἀνθρώποις διδόναι, τάχ᾿ ἂν δοῖεν ἀγασθέντες.
φαι. ἔχουσι δὲ δὴ τί τοῦτο; ἀνήκοος γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τυγχάνω ὤν.
σω. οὐ μὲν δὴ πρέπει γε φιλόμουσον ἄνδρα τῶν τοιούτων ἀνήκοον εἶναι.
But if they see us conversing and sailing past them unmoved by the charm of their
Siren voices, perhaps they will be pleased and give us the gift which they have from
18. For ἄρα in Plato, see van Ophuijsen (1993), Sicking (1997) and Van Rooy (2016).
19. For οὐκοῦν-questions, see e.g. Sicking (1997) and Rijksbaron (2009, 2012).
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the gods to give tomen. – phaedrus. Butwhat is this gift they have then (δή)? For as it
seems, I do not happen to have heard of it. – socrates. Though, as you know, it does
not fit a lover of the Muses never to have heard of such things. (Pl. Phdr. 259a–b)
(108) [Echecrates asks why Socrates was put to death so much later than his trial.]
φαιδ. τύχη τις αὐτῷ, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, συνέβη· ἔτυχεν γὰρ τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης ἡ πρύμνα
ἐστεμμένη τοῦ πλοίου ὃ εἰς Δῆλον Ἀθηναῖοι πέμπουσιν.
εχ. τοῦτο δὲ δὴ τί ἐστιν;
φαιδ. τοῦτ’ ἔστι τὸ πλοῖον, ὥς φασιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ᾧ Θησεύς ποτε εἰς Κρήτην …
phaedo. He had a bit of luck as it turned out, Echecrates; for it so happened that on
the day before the trial the stern of the ship that the Athenians send to Delos was
being garlanded. – echecrates. But (δέ) what is this then (δή)? – phaedo. This is
the ship, according to the Athenians, in which Theseus once sailed to Crete …
(Pl. Phd. 58a)
In (107), Socrates speaks about the gift that the locusts give from the gods to men.
He clearly presupposes that his addressee, Phaedrus, also knows about this gift, i.e.
that it is part of their common ground (definite description ὃ γέρας … διδόναι). It turns
out, however, that Phaedrus does not know about this gift and thus needs to ask for
clarification. In (108), in similar way, Phaedo presupposes knowledge of the ship that
the Athenians send to Delos (τοῦ πλοίου … πέμπουσιν), which is part of a yearly ritual
during which no prisoners may be executed. It appears that Echecrates does not know
about the ritual and the ship and he asks for clarification.
In such examples, I contend, it is by no means clear that the addressee of the wh-
question would expect the request for clarification. On the contrary, given the use of a
presupposition triggering expression in his own preceding move, he has rather taken
the knowledge of his interlocutor for granted, so that the request for further clarifica-
tion rather comes unexpected. Otherwise, it would not be very cooperative to use a
presupposition triggering expression. Note, in addition, that in (107) the unexpected
nature of the wh-question is also made explicit in Socrates’s next move, in which he
ridicules Phaedrus’s lack of knowledge about the locusts’ gift. I conclude then, that the
second analysis of δή is ruled out in such cases.
To sum up, although in most cases of δή in reactive wh-questions both of the more
specific analyses could in principle be defended, there is some evidence against the
second and in favour of the first interpretation. Although the second interpretation –
i.e. the account given by Sicking (1993, 1997) and Drummen (2016b) – should per-
haps not be completely discarded, I do argue that it is not sufficient to account for all of
the instances of δή in reactivewh-questions. Counter-examples can be found forwhich
the first interpretation is the only possible analysis.
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Questions which proceed to a next point of discussion
The second major type of wh-question in which δή is commonly found concerns wh-
questions which somehow steer the conversation into a new direction. That is, rather
than reacting to a preceding move and elaborating upon a previous point, these ques-
tions rather proceed to the next point of discussion. In terms of conversational struc-
ture then, they do not start an embedded exchange, but a new exchange at the same,
or higher, hierarchical level as the preceding discourse (see section 2.5.2 for further
discussion).
Although δή appears to come close to a discourse connective particle in such cases
(see section 6.3 below), I think it is possible to give an analysis that corresponds to the
one given so far: δή is an attitudinal-interactional particle which pertains to the illo-
cutionary level, targets a felicity condition of a wh-question and marks it as naturally
following from the communicative context. I did not find any solid arguments, how-
ever, to make a principled distinction here between the two more specific analyses of
δή given above. Let us look at some typical examples from Socratic dialogue:
(109) echecrates.Were youwith Socrates yourself, Phaedo, on the daywhen he drank the
poison in prison, or did you hear about it from someone else? – phaedo. I was there
myself, Echecrates.
εχ. τί οὖν δή ἐστιν ἅττα εἶπεν ὁ ἀνὴρ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου; καὶ πῶς ἐτελεύτα; ἡδέως γὰρ ἂν
ἐγὼ ἀκούσαιμι.
ech. Well (οὖν), what is it then (δή) that the man said before his death? And how did
he die? For I should like to hear. (Pl. Phd. 57a)
(110) [Socrates tells Euthyphro about Meletus, the man who accuses him.]
ευθ. οὐκ ἐννοῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ δὴ τίνα γραφήν σε γέγραπται;
σω. ἥντινα; οὐκ ἀγεννῆ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ· …
euth. I don’t remember him, Socrates. But (ἀλλά) what sort of indictment has he
brought against you then (δή)? – soc. What sort? No mean one, it seems to me; [an
elaboration on the indictment follows] (Pl. Euthphr. 2b)
Example (109) consists of the opening of the dialogue Phaedo, in which Echecrates
asks Phaedo to tell him about the conversation Socrates had before he died. The ability
condition of his question, i.e. the assumption that Phaedo knows this conversation,
clearly follows from the preceding discourse, in which Phaedo explicitly states that
he was present at this conversation himself. Alternatively, we could state that Phaedo,
given the fact that Echecrates has started to talk about this topic in the first place, could
indeed expect the present question.
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In (110), Euthyphro first asks about the accuser of Socrates’s case in court, and
then about the kind of indictment. In this case, the assumption that Socrates knows
and is ready to answer the question about the indictment could be taken as following
from the fact that he has just answered the question about his accuser. That is, in the
preceding discourse Socrates has demonstrated that he has knowledge about his own
legal case, so that Euthyphro’s next question is also justified. Alternatively,wemay state
that Socrates could also expect this further question about the indictment: if you tell
someone about a legal case, it is natural that s/hewants to know about the indictment.
(111) socrates. Tell me then, in the name of Zeus, what is that glorious result which the
gods accomplish by using us as servants? – euthyphro. They accomplish many fine
results, Socrates. – soc. Yes, and so do generals,my friend; but nevertheless, you could
easily tell the chief of them, namely, that they bring about victory in war. Is that not
the case? – euth. Of course. – soc. And farmers also, I think, accomplish many fine
results; but still the chief result of their work is food from the land? – euth. Certainly.
σω. τί δὲ δή τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν, ἃ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται; τί τὸ κεφάλαιόν ἐστι τῆς ἐρ-
γασίας;
soc. But (δέ) then (δή) how about the many fine results the gods accomplish? What
is the chief result of their work? (Pl. Euthphr. 13e–14a)
In (111), finally, another example fromPlato’s Euthyphro, Socrates wants to know from
Euthyphro what the chief result of the gods’ work is. In line with the examples of δή in
directives given above in section 6.2.2, we could say that the wh-question and Euthy-
phro’s ability to answer it follows from the agreement that Socrates and Euthyphro
have reached in the preceding discourse, in which the same question is answered with
regard to generals and farmers respectively. Socrates thus appears to suggest the fol-
lowing: ‘If you can answer this question with regard to generals and farmers, you can
also answer itwith regard to gods.’ Alternatively, it is quite clear that the question about
the gods is expected in view of the fact that almost the same question was asked a bit
earlier.
Again, similar examples also occur outside of Platonic dialogue, such as in Attic
drama:
(112) slave. … Euripides says he’s going to examine the tragedies word for word. – xan-
thias. I’d guess that Aeschylus is pretty sore about that. – slave. He did put his head
down and glowered like a bull.
ξα. κρινεῖ δὲ δὴ τίς ταῦτα;
οι. τοῦτ᾿ ἦν δύσκολον·
σοφῶν γὰρ ἀνδρῶν ἀπορίαν ηὑρισκέτην.
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xan. But (δέ) who will judge the matter then (δή)? – slave. That was a tough one; for
both discovered a shortage of competent people. (Ar. Ra. 801–806)
(113) orestes. Foreign ladies, is it true that this is the house of Achilles’s son and his royal
residence?
χο. ἔγνως· ἀτὰρ δὴ πυνθάνῃ τίς ὢν τάδε;
ορ. Ἀγαμέμνονός τε καὶ Κλυταιμήστρας τόκος,
ὄνομα δ’ Ὀρέστης·
chorus leader. You know it. But (ἀτάρ) who are you that asks this then (δή)? – or.
I am the son of Agamemnon and Clytaemnestra, and my name is Orestes.
(E. Andr. 881–885)
In (112), a slave tells Xanthias about the contest between Euripides and Aeschylus on
who is the best tragic poet in the underworld. In the preceding discourse he has an-
swered all of Xanthias’s questions and has shown that he knows all about it. It naturally
follows that he is also able to give the information about the judge of the contest. At
the same time, we may also say that Xanthias’s question could have been anticipated
by the slave: contests generally have a judge. In (113), finally, it is rather obvious that
Orestes knows his own identity. In this case, I feel, the second analysis appears tomore
natural: Orestes can reasonably expect that the chorus leader wants to know who he
is in the present communicative context (‘we can both see why I ask this question’):
generally, when strangers meet each other, they introduce themselves to each other.
But at any rate, whichever of the two specific analyses of δή we choose, it is clear
that my general analysis of attitudinal-interactional δή in wh-questions also holds for
the secondmajor type of wh-questions discussed here. In all cases, the particle signals
that the question naturally follows from the preceding discourse on the basis of some
topos in the common ground.
Now in this second type of wh-questions, I have to admit, it would in principle not be
impossible to analyse δή as a discourse-connective particle which in itself encodes a
next relevant move or a shift in discourse topic (see section 6.3.2 below). Indeed, as I
have argued before, the difference between an attitudinal-interactional and discourse-
connective interpretation is not always easy to see in Ancient Greek and it is difficult
to come upwith conclusive evidence (see sections 2.3.3, 2.10 and 4.3.2). Nevertheless,
there is a number of reasons why I am not inclined to regard δή as a discourse-connec-
tive here, but prefer the interpretation as an attitudinal-interactional particle which
has been given above.
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First of all, we would loose the similarity with the use of δή in the first type of wh-
questions, which are primarily reactive in nature (e.g. requests for further clarifica-
tion). In these questions, a discourse-connective reading of δή is clearly not an option:
here the wh-question rather starts an embedded sequence, in which one elaborates
upon the same discourse topic. Second, there are examples of wh-questions with δή
whichoccur at the very start of a conversation (cf. example (104), p. 283). In such cases,
δή marks some link with the conversational context at large, but cannot of course be
taken as marking a (textual) connection between two discourse units. Third, in some
cases δή occurs in collocationwith a discourse particle which precisely contributes the
discourse-connectivemeanings referred to, viz. the discourse-connective οὖν (as in ex-
ample (109), p. 287). This particle is commonly taken as the prototypical pop-particle
in Ancient Greek, indicating a transition to a new, more relevant point in the conver-
sation (see section 2.5.3 for this notion).
In view of these arguments then, it ismore attractive to take δή in both types ofwh-
questions as an attitudinal-interactional, rather than as a true discourse-connective
particle.
Expository questions
I would like to end this section with some remarks about the use of wh-questions with
δή within monological discourse, notably in rhetorical speeches. As we have seen ear-
lier, such expository questions are non-prototypical in the sense that the speaker does
not really want to elicit some information from his addressee(s), but rather intends to
provide this informationhimself (cf. example (33) in section5.2.3). In fact, theymainly
serve to prepare the addressee for the next issue or topic of discussion, which is then
indeed treated in subsequent discourse. Three examples with δή are the following:
(114) [In his defense speech, Socrates explains why he has obtained such a bad reputation.]
ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι’ οὐδὲν ἀλλ’ ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα. ποίαν
δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία·
For I, my fellowAthenians, have acquired this reputation through nothing else than a
certain kind of wisdom.What kind of wisdom is this then (δή)? It is perhaps a human
type of wisdom. (Pl. Ap. 20d)
(115) [Demosthenes argues that those who have convinced the Athenians to vote in favour of
the peace with Philip ii should now be called upon.] And the crowning disgrace is that
your posterity also is bound by the same peace which these hopes prompted you to
conclude; so completely were you led astray.
τί δὴ ταῦτα νῦν λέγω καὶ καλεῖν φημὶ δεῖν τούτους; ἐγὼ νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς τἀληθῆ μετὰ παρρη-
σίας ἐρῶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρύψομαι.
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Why then (δή) do I mention this now and state that these men ought to be called
upon? I vow that I will boldly tell you the whole truth and keep nothing back. [expla-
nation follows] (D. 6.31–32)
(116) [After Gorgias has given his view on the art of rhetoric, Socrates argues that discussions
in which people have a difference of opinion are generally held in a spirit of contention,
rather than mutual inquiry.] Some people even end by making a most disgraceful
scene, with such abusive expressions on each side that the rest of the company are
vexed on their own account that they allowed themselves to listen to such fellows.
τοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα λέγω ταῦτα; ὅτι νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς σὺ οὐ πάνυ ἀκόλουθα λέγειν οὐδὲ σύμφωνα
οἷς τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγες περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς.
What then (δή) is my reason for saying this? Because your present remarks do not
seem to me quite in keeping or accord with what you said at first about rhetoric.
(Pl. Grg. 457e)
As we have already seen in my analysis of μήν, what appears to happen in such exposi-
tory questions is that the speaker temporarily takes the perspective of the addressee(s)
and formulates a reactive question which the addressee(s) could have asked him at
this particular point in the discourse. That is, the speaker as it were anticipates a pos-
sible request for further clarification by his addressee. In example (114), for instance,
Socrates anticipates that his audience wants him to be more specific about the kind
of wisdom he just mentioned: he acts as if his audience would have asked this reactive
question at thepresent point inhis speech.And in theother twoexamples – taken from
a rhetorical speech of Demosthenes and from Plato’s Gorgias – the speaker imagines
that the addressee/audience wants to know his motivation for making the preceding
statements. Now, given this shifted perspective, I believe δή can be explained in essen-
tially the same way as in reactive questions in dialogue, indicating that the question is
motivated by and naturally follows from the preceding discourse. The only difference
is that the particle is shifted to the perspective of the addressee. It also follows that
I prefer to take δή as an attitudinal-interactional, rather than a discourse connective
particle in this type of instances, even though there is strictly speaking no change of
speaker.
I conclude that the use of δή inwh-questions allows for a fairly straightforward analysis,
quite independent of the exact type of question involved (reactive, proceeding to a
next point of discussion, or expository). It signals that the question is motivated by
or naturally follows from the communicative context at hand. More in particular, it
signals that a preparatory condition of the question is already communicatively given.
In the following section, I will go into the use of δή in yes/no-questions.
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6.2.4 In yes/no-questions
As opposed to δή in wh-questions, it is much more difficult, in my opinion, to give a
precise account of the meaning(s) of δή in yes/no-questions. Such an account is trou-
bled by at least three issues. First of all, there is the vexed issue of recognizing a yes/no-
question as such. As I have pointed out earlier in my analysis of μήν (cf. section 5.2.4),
yes/no-questions that are not formallymarked as such by the presence of interrogative
particles, are in principle indistinguishable from assertive speech acts by any formal
linguistic means.
Second, even when the previous caveat is taken into account, yes/no-questions
with δή are not a very commonphenomenon, especially when comparedwith the high
frequency of wh-questions with δή. In yes/no-questions that are marked by interroga-
tive particles, δή is even almost completely absent: it is never found in questions initi-
ated by ἆρα and μῶν, and only a very few times in those initiated by οὐκοῦν. Although
more instances can be found of δή in other yes/no-questions (but see the first issue
mentioned above), it is clear that this relative infrequency does not help us in drawing
general conclusions about the use of δή in yes/no-questions.
Third, we have seen that yes/no-questions – as opposed to wh-questions – do ex-
press full propositions. It follows that δή could in principle be analyzed as targeting
either the proposition or one of the felicity conditions of the yes/no-question. This
yields a complex situation in which more analyses are in principle possible. We have
also seen that it is often difficult to make reasoned decisions between such possibili-
ties in Ancient Greek, due to the lack of necessary (linguistic) evidence and/or speaker
intuitions.
It follows from these difficulties that an analysis of δή in yes/no-questions by ne-
cessity remains tentative and somewhat speculative. Still, I would like to give some
suggestions for possible analyses and to look at some examples. From a theoretical
perspective, as I have stated above, more than one analysis is in principle possible for
attitudinal-interactional δή in yes/no-questions. Let me summarize these one by one:
(i) In the first possible analysis, δή targets thepropositionp expressedby the yes/no-
question in its scope. In this case then, the analysis ties in with the analysis of δή
in assertive speech acts (cf. section 6.2.1 above). That is, δή could be analyzed as
a confirmatory particle (‘indeed’) or a marker of common ground information.
At first sight, such meanings might appear to be in contrast with the interrog-
ative illocution of the yes/no-question: it seems odd that a proposition is con-
firmed or marked as common ground and questioned at the same time. How-
ever, the discrepancy vanishes if we assume that the δή-proposition is within
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the scope of the interrogative illocution. The result is that the speaker asks the
addressee, not simply whether p is true or not, but rather whether s/he agrees
on confirming p or inferring p from the common ground (‘do you agree withme
that I confirm/infer that p?’). What is questioned here, then, is the confirmed or
common ground status of the proposition p.
(ii) In the second possible analysis, δή pertains to the interrogative illocution of the
yes/no-question. In this case, the analysis runs parallel to the one given above for
wh-questions (see section 6.2.3). That is, δή marks one of the felicity conditions
as naturally following from the communicative context. As we have seen, this
also leads to two possible,more specific, analyses of the particle: (a) δή indicates
that it follows from the context that the addressee is able and ready to provide
the answer (i.e. knows the answer), or (b) δή indicates that it follows from the
context that the very utterance of the yes/no-question comes as expected for the
addressee.
I have already noted that we do not always have the necessary evidence at our disposal
to make a reasoned decision between these possible more specific analyses. Never-
theless, I am inclined to give more weight to the first analysis in which δή targets the
expressed proposition of the yes/no-question, operating within the scope of the inter-
rogative. I will provide a number of arguments to support my view.
First of all, there is the distributional evidence of the kind of yes/no-questions in
which δή is mostly found (see above), i.e. questions that are in principle indistinguish-
able from (i.e. are syntactically similar to) assertions in Ancient Greek. Given this for-
mal similarity, I find it more attractive to opt for the first analysis of δή in yes/no-ques-
tions, which runs parallel to the analysis in assertions. In other words, semantic simi-
larity follows the formal similarity in this case.
Further support comes from the use of yes/no-questions with δή in Platonic di-
alogue, i.e. in discourse of a highly argumentative nature, in which reasoning over
propositions is of crucial importance. In such contexts then, it seems natural to an-
alyze δή – in line with inferential δή in assertions – as targeting the proposition, rather
than the illocution of the question. Consider the following typical example:
(117) socrates.…We talk about something ‘being carried’ and ‘carrying’, something ‘being
led’ and ‘leading’, something ‘being seen’ and ‘seeing’. And do you understand that all
such examples are different from each other and in what way they are different? –
euthyphro. Yes, I think I understand. – socrates. Isn’t it also the case then, that
‘being loved’ is one thing and ‘loving’ is different from this? – euthyphro. Of course.
σω. λέγε δή μοι, πότερον τὸ φερόμενον διότι φέρεται φερόμενόν ἐστιν, ἢ δι’ ἄλλο τι;
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ευθ. oὔκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο.
σω. καὶ τὸ ἀγόμενον δὴ διότι ἄγεται, καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον διότι ὁρᾶται;
ευθ. πάνυ γε.
socrates. Tell me then: is something ‘being carried’ carried because it’s carried or
for some other reason? – euthyphro. No, it’s for that reason. – socrates. And (καί)
so (δή) ‘being led’ because it’s led, and ‘being seen’ because it’s seen? – euthyphro.
Definitely. (Pl. Euthphr. 10a–b)
This example gives us a typical piece of Socratic dialogue: Socrates unfolds his argu-
ment by posing questions and Euthyphro gives his assent. In the final question pre-
sented here, we find δή. In this case, the proposition expressed by this question is
clearly inferrable fromwhat has been admitted in the preceding steps of the argument.
Socrates uses a set of examples (‘being carried’, ‘being led’ and ‘being seen’) to illustrate
a more general principle and it is clear that all of these examples are like each other in
this respect. Thus, if something holds for one of them, it also holds for the others. It is
this topos that appears to be targeted by δή here: Socrates comes to a conclusionwhich
he assumes to be accessible for Euthyphro as well. In my view, this example is in fact
highly similar to those we have seen in the section on inferential δή above, albeit that
in this case the inferential process, as it were, crosses the boundaries of speech turns.
Now, as explained above, if we interpret this sentence as a yes/no-question rather
than an assertion – which is indeed preferable in this context of question and answer
–we can conclude that Socrates asks Euthyphrowhether he agrees on taking p as com-
mon ground, i.e. that p is arrived at bymeans of a topos-based inference.Wemight say
then that Socrates ‘checks’ the common ground status of the topos here. The result is
a highly biased yes/no-question, which comes very close to an assertion.
A final argument in favour of the first analysis given above concerns the othermain
type of yes/no-questions inwhich δή shows up, viz. questionswhich seem to imply that
the speaker is surprised about p, which may in turn lead to connotations of irony or a
negative stance. Consider the following examples:
(118) [Euthyphro tells why he is prosecuting his father for murder and that his relatives are
angry with him because they find that it is unholy to do so.] … which shows how little
they know, Socrates, what the divine law is in regard to holiness and unholiness.
σω. σὺ δὲ δὴ πρὸς Διός, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, οὑτωσὶ ἀκριβῶς οἴει ἐπίστασθαι περὶ τῶν θείων, ὅπῃ
ἔχει, καὶ τῶν ὁσίων τε καὶ ἀνοσίων, ὥστε τούτων οὕτω πραχθέντων ὡς σὺ λέγεις, οὐ φοβεῖ
δικαζόμενος τῷ πατρί, ὅπως μὴ αὖ σὺ ἀνόσιον πρᾶγμα τυγχάνῃς πράττων;
socrates. But do you think then (δή), in the name of Zeus, Euthyphro, that your
knowledge about the nature of divine laws and holiness and unholiness is so exact
that, when the facts are as you say, you are not afraid of doing something unholy
yourself in prosecuting your father? [A positive answer follows.] (Pl. Euthphr. 4e)
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(119) [Lysistrata explains a magistrate how the women will end the war.] lysistrata. It’s
rather like a ball of yarn when it gets tangled up. We hold it this way, and carefully
wind out the strands on our spindles, now this way, now that way. That’s how we’ll
wind up this war, if we’re allowed: unsnarling it by sending embassies, now this way,
now that way.
πρ. ἐξ ἐρίων δὴ καὶ κλωστήρων καὶ ἀτράκτων πράγματα δεινὰ
παύσειν οἴεσθ᾿; ὡς ἀνόητοι.
magistrate. So (δή) you think that your way with wool and yarnballs and spindles
can stop a terrible crisis? How brainless! (Ar. Lys. 567–572)
(120) [Hermione wants to kill Andromache, a suppliant at the altar of the goddess Thetis.]
αν. σφάζ᾿, αἱμάτου θεᾶς βωμόν, ἣ μέτεισί σε.
ερ. ὦ βάρβαρον σὺ θρέμμα καὶ σκληρὸν θράσος,
ἐγκαρτερεῖς δὴ θάνατον; ἀλλ’ ἐγώ σ’ ἕδρας
ἐκ τῆσδ’ ἑκοῦσαν ἐξαναστήσω τάχα·
andromache. Slay me, bloody the goddess’s altar, who’ll pursue you! – hermione.
You barbarian creature, bold as brass, so (δή) you defy death? But I shall soon make
you leave this seat willingly. (E. Andr. 260–263)
In these examples, the speaker of the δή-question comes to the conclusion that his/her
interlocutor has a certain attitude. In (118) and (119), the addressee is said to be
committed to some proposition (note the verbs οἴει ‘you think’ (sg.) and οἴεσθ’ ‘you
think’ (pl.) respectively), whereas in (119) an emotional attitude is at stake (defiance
of death). As I take it, δή signals that this conclusion is inferred from the preceding
discourse (on the basis of a topos). Moreover, by putting this inference in the form of
an interrogative, the speaker requests the addressee for confirmation of the inferred
stance. The implication in this case is that the speaker finds it hard to believe that the
addressee indeed entertains this attitude, a reading which is further emphasized here
by the exclamative expression πρὸς Διός ‘in the name Zeus’ (cf. my God in modern En-
glish) in (118) and the expressive act ὡς ἀνόητοι ‘how brainless’ in (119).
We might even say, in my opinion, that we are dealing with a kind of rhetorical
question, especially in the two examples from drama, i.e. (119) and (120): the primary
goal of the yes/no-question is to express the speaker’s own surprise about, or negative
stance towards, the stance of the addressee. A real answer from, respectively, Lysistrata
andAndromache is thus not really expected. I thus propose that yes/no-questionswith
δή are non-standard/rhetorical questions which do not count as genuine requests for
information. This might in turn explain, as we have seen for μήν too, why the particle
is almost completely absent in yes/no-questions that are explicitly marked as such by
interrogative particles, which either are neutral interrogative particles (ἆρα) or already
express a strong bias in their own right (μῶν, οὐκοῦν and ἄλλο τι ἤ). I thus find it most
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attractive to analyze δή in yes/no-questions along the lines of the first possible interpre-
tation given above, in which the particle targets the propositional content expressed
by the question.
6.2.5 Conclusion
It is time to sum up the main findings on the attitudinal-interactional usages of δή. In
assertive speech acts, we may distinguish between a use as a marker of confirmation,
as a marker of rhetorical strengthening and as a marker of common ground (recapitu-
lation, topos-based inference or common knowledge). In directives and wh-questions,
on the other hand, the particle functions as a common ground marker operating on
speech act level, indicating that the speech act naturally follows from the communica-
tive context at hand. More in particular, it signals that one of the preparatory condi-
tions of the speech act in question is contextually given, which mostly involves topos-
based reasoning. In yes/no-questions, finally, the particle appears to tie in with its use
in assertive speech acts, which usually turns the question into a somewhat special, bi-
ased question.
6.3 Δή as a discourse-connective particle
In this section, Iwill turn to the usages of δή as a discourse connective particle. I discern
two of them: (i) as a marker of conclusions and (ii) as marker of expected discourse
transitions. I will discuss them one by one.
6.3.1 Marker of conclusions
On the first discourse connective use of δή I will be rather short. As we have seen in
the preceding sections on δή as an attitudinal-interactional marker, the particle often
signals that the information present in the host clause is inferrable from preceding
discourse on the basis of a topos. In most of these cases, if not all of them, we could
just aswell say, inmy opinion, that δή is a connective particlewhich signals a rhetorical
discourse relation of conclusion (see section 2.5.3 for the notion of rhetorical relation).
As I take it, such a reading is especially attractive in cases where δή is the only particle
present between two discourse acts spoken by the same speaker. Let me repeat some
earlier examples to illustrate this:
(57) [Socrates introduces Cleinias into the conversation.]
ἔστι δὲ νέος· φοβούμεθα δὴ περὶ αὐτῷ, οἷον εἰκὸς περὶ νέῳ, μή τις φθῇ ἡμᾶς ἐπ᾿ ἄλλο τι
ἐπιτήδευμα τρέψας τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ διαφθείρῃ.
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He is young; so (δή) we are concerned about him, as is likely with regard to a young
man, lest someone forestall us by turning his inclination to some other course of life
and corrupt him. (Pl. Euthd. 275b)
(67) [Gyges realizes that the queen has really forced him either to kill king Candaules or to
be killed himself.]
αἱρέεται αὐτὸς περιεῖναι. ἐπειρώτα δὴ λέγων τάδε. “ἐπεί με ἀναγκάζεις δεσπότεα τὸν ἐμὸν
κτείνειν οὐκ ἐθέλοντα, φέρε ἀκούσω τέῳ καὶ τρόπῳ ἐπιχειρήσομεν αὐτῷ.”
He chose to stay alive himself. So (δή) he asked the queen, saying the following: “Since
you force me to kill mymaster against my will, come, let me hear too in what way we
will attack him.” (Hdt. 1.11.4)
(85) [Speech of the Athenian general Phormio, who encourages his men before a sea-battle.
He argues at length why his party will have the advantage.]
μὴ δὴ αὐτῶν τὴν τόλμαν δείσητε. πολὺ δὲ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνοις πλείω φόβον παρέχετε καὶ πιστό-
τερον …
Do not fear their daring then (δή). You inspire in them a dread far greater and better
justified … (Th. 2.89.5)
It is precisely examples such as these, in my view, that are indicative of the fuzzy
boundaries between the classes of attitudinal-interactional particles and discourse
connective particles in Ancient Greek. As indicated in various places in this study,
these two categories cannot be distinguished on any formal linguistic grounds and it
is thus to be expected that there are no clear-cut boundaries between the two (see
sections 2.3.3, 2.10 and 4.3.2). What’s at stake here is the question whether the dis-
course coherence relation is explicitly marked by the particle (i.e. as part of its coded
meaning) or only arises by virtue of the context. Since connectives are fundamentally
redundant in nature – a coherence relation of conclusionwould indeed also be present
without the connective – I do find it attractive to analyze the particle as connective,
i.e. as a marker of rhetorical conclusions. This is further supported by the fact that this
use appears to gain frequency within the course of the fourth century (see Denniston
1954: 237–238 for some sensible comments in this respect).
I did not find any undisputed evidence, however, for assigning to δή the status of a
syntactic connective (i.e. a coordinator). That is, δή always appears to be an adverbial
connective particle – which is evidenced by the fact that it regularly co-occurs with
clausal coordinators such as καί and δέ (section 2.5.1 for further discussion). Note that
δή significantly differs from μήν in this respect (cf. section 5.3.1).
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6.3.2 Marker of discourse transitions
I now turn to theuse of δή as amarker of discourse transitions. In this usage, theparticle
is to be taken as belonging to the second type of discourse connectives distinguished
in section 2.5.3 above, viz. sequential or discourse-structural markers. These were de-
fined as the kind of items that do not somuch indicate specific rhetorical relationships,
but rather pertain to the structural and/or thematic organization of the discourse at
large. As a marker of sequential or discourse-structural relations, then, δή invariably
takes sentence-peninitial position, scoping over full sentences or even larger stretches
of discourse.20
From a semantic-functional perspective, as I take it, the particle generally signals
that a transition ismade to the nextmove. That is, the speaker indicates that s/he shifts
the focus of attention to, e.g., the next point of discussion, the next (sub)topic or the
next step within a narrative or a train of thought. In addition, the particle mostly ap-
pears to retain the semantic feature of ‘according-to-expectations’, thus indicating that
the shift or transition is expected, prepared for or naturally following from what has
been discussed in the preceding discourse. An elaborate paraphrase of this meaning
may be ‘as you may expect, we now move on to the next topic/step’, and it may thus
roughly be compared to the meaning of English discourse markers such as then, so,
and now. Denniston (1954: 239) generally speaks about the ‘progressive’ sense of δή
in this case.
Support for this analysis comes first of all from cases in which δή introduces
subtopics, i.e. items which are part of a larger series or thematic framework that is
currently under discussion in the discourse. The particle thus marks out the separate
parts of what I have called a listing structure (see sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3). I give two
examples:
(121) [A scout is providing king Eteocles information on the seven leaders that besiege their
city.]
αγ. τὸν ἕβδομον δὴ τόν τ’ ἐφ’ ἑβδόμαις πύλαις
λέξω, τὸν αὐτοῦ σοῦ κασίγνητον, πόλει
οἵας ἀρᾶται καὶ κατεύχεται τύχας, …
scout. As for the seventh, then (δή), and the one at the Seventh Gate, your own
brother, I will tell what a fate and curse he prays may befall this city, …
(A. Th. 631–633)
20. This is not to say, however, that all instances of δή in sentence-peninitial position are straightaway
to be ascribed to the present category. See rule (ii) in section 4.4 above.
559416-L-bw-Thijs
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 313
6.3. Δή as a discourse-connective particle 299
In example (121), the scout has been asked by Eteocles to provide him information on
all of the seven leaders that besiege Thebes. At this point in the play, he has already
treated six of them and the consideration of the seventh and final leader is thus clearly
prepared for. With δή, the scout explicitly indicates that he proceeds to this next, ex-
pected discourse topic.
(122) 107.1. Arabia, in turn, is the most distant to the south of all inhabited countries, and
this is the only country which yields frankincense and myrrh and cassia and cinna-
mon and gum-mastic. All these but myrrh are difficult for the Arabians to get.
107.2. Frankincense, at any rate (τὸν μέν γε λιβανωτὸν), they gather by burning the
kind of storax that Phoenicians carry to Hellas. This they burn and so get the frank-
incense. For the spice-bearing trees are guarded by small winged snakes of varied
colour, many round each tree. […] Nothing save the smoke of storax will drive them
away from the trees.
108–109. [Digression on snakes and vipers in Arabia.]
110. That frankincense then (τὸν μὲν δὴ λιβανωτὸν τοῦτον), the Arabians get in that
way, but cassia (τὴν δὲ κασίην) they get as follows: [description follows]
111. Αs for cinnamon then (τὸ δὲ δὴ κινάμωμον), they gather it in a fashion even
stranger. [description follows] Thus (οὕτω μὲν) is cinnamon said to be gathered and
so to come from Arabia to other lands.
112. And gum-mastic then (τὸ δὲ δὴ λήδανον) … is yet more strangely produced than
that. [description follows]
113. Let that much (τοσαῦτα μέν) be said of the incense spices; wondrous sweet airs
blow from the land of Arabia. (Hdt. 3.107–113)
This example covers a number of paragraphs from Herodotus book 3, in which he de-
scribes Arabia and their variety of different spices and incense. In section 107.1 a num-
ber of spices are explicitly mentioned and Herodotus then further zooms into the four
spices that are difficult to gather (frankincense, cassia, cinnamon and gum-mastic).
The point of interest here is that he discusses them one by one and that we find δή
at each transition to the next spice that is to be discussed (i.e. at the start of sections
110, 111 and 112). Such examples, in my view, provide clear support for the view that
δή marks discourse transitions that are expected or prepared for in the preceding dis-
course.
It should further be noted that in cases like these δή often co-occurs with the dis-
course connective δέ, yielding the cluster δὲ δή (see sections 111 and 112 in (122)
above). As I have noted before, δέ (‘and, but’) is a contrastive connective which gen-
erally functions as a relatively neutral boundarymarker (‘thematic discontinuity’) and
is thus particularly at home in contexts of topic shift (see section 2.5.3). In my opin-
ion, δή mainly serves to add on the meaning expressed by δέ and to further specify the
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exact discourse-structural relation intended. In other words, the cluster δὲ δή is more
explicit than bare δέ.21 What δή adds to δέ, in my opinion, is that it brings in the no-
tion of expectation and specifically points at major discourse breaks (i.e. transitions
between moves rather than acts).
In addition to its use in listing environments,we also finddiscourse-structural δή at
transitions froma subsidiary to amore central discourse segment. In this case then, the
particle can be seen as a pop-marker, which indicates the return to amore central topic
of discussion after a digression (cf. section 2.5.3). Here is an example from Herodotus
again:
(123) 93.1 There are notmanymarvellous things forme to tell of in Lydia, if it be compared
to other countries, except the gold dust that comes down from Tmolus.
93.2 But (δέ) there is one building to be seen there which is by far the greatest of
all, save for those of Egypt and Babylon. There is the tomb of Alyattes the father of
Croesus, of which the base ismade of great stones and the rest of it ofmounded earth.
(δέ) It was built by the men of the market and the artificers and the prostitutes.
93.3 (δέ) Five corner-stones, still remaining at my time, were set on the top of the
tomb, and on these was graven the record of the work done by each kind. And (καί)
measurement showed that the prostitutes’ share of the work was the greatest.
93.4 For (γὰρ), you see (δή), of the common people of Lydia all the daughters ply the
trade of prostitutes, to collect dowries, till they can get themselves husbands; and (δέ)
they offer themselves in marriage.
93.5 Now (δή) the circumference μέν of the tomb is six furlongs and a third, and (δέ)
its breadth is above two furlongs. And (δέ) there is a great lake close by the tomb,
which, the Lydians say, is fed by ever-flowing springs. (δέ) It is called the Gygaean
lake.
Such μὲν is this tomb then (δή). (Hdt. 1.93.1–5)
The example consists of paragraph 93 of book 1, in which Herodotus gives a descrip-
tion of a noteworthy tomb in Lydia. At 93.4 he shortly interrupts his exposition to pro-
vide somebackground information about the Lydian people, which explains themajor
role of prostitutes in the building of the tomb. Nοte that this digression is marked by
the prototypical push-particle γάρ. At 93.5, we return to the main topic of discussion,
i.e. the tomb, and this transition is marked by δή (‘now as I was saying’; discourse-pop).
Note that these remarks about the size of the tomb have been prepared for in 93.2,
where the tomb was introduced as an extremely large building.
21. Compare, in this respect, the cluster δ’ οὖν ‘but anyway’. See e.g. Denniston (1954: 460f.) andWak-
ker (2009a).
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So far, we have seen examples in which discourse-structural δή occurs in the con-
text of topicmanagement,marking out the thematic structure of the discourse at large:
it may signal the transition to a next item within a thematic chain or the return to a
previous discourse topic. In this capacity, it is at home in passages of a descriptive or ex-
pository nature. But the particle also occurs in more narrative or more argumentative
passages, where it appears to do no more than pointing at the next step in the narra-
tive or the next step within the train of thought or argument unfolded. Two examples
again:
(124) [The Phoenicians came to Argos.] On the fifth or sixth day from their coming, their
wares being almost all sold, there came to the sea shore among many other women
the king’s daughter; her namewas… Io, the daughter of Inachus. These women stood
about the stern of the ship and bought the wares that they fancied,
καὶ τοὺς Φοίνικας διακελευσαμένους ὁρμῆσαι ἐπ᾿ αὐτάς. τὰς μὲν δὴ πλεῦνας τῶν γυναικῶν
ἀποφυγεῖν, τὴν δὲ Ἰοῦν σὺν ἄλλῃσι ἁρπασθῆναι.
and the Phoenicians encouraged each other and rushed to take them.Now (δή)most
μέν of the women escaped, but (δέ) Io with others was carried off; and (δέ) the men
cast her into the ship and made sail away for Egypt. (Hdt. 1.1.4)
In (124), Herodotus narrates the story told by the Persians about the abduction of Io.
What δή appears to do in this example is to signal a transition to the next stage in the
narration of the story. Having told the decisive moment of the story (i.e. the Phoeni-
cians’ sudden attack), Herodotus now moves on to the part where the outcome of the
story is told.22 The use of δή to signal such ‘narrative progression’ is in fact a rather
salient feature of Herodotus’s Histories.23
(125) [Gorgias claims that the rhetorical art is concerned with speech.] socrates. Now do I
understand what you choose to call it? Perhaps I shall get to know this more clearly.
But answer me this: we have arts (τέχναι), have we not? – gorgias. Yes.
σω. πασῶν δή, οἶμαι, τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν μὲν ἐργασία τὸ πολύ ἐστι καὶ λόγου βραχέος δέονται,
ἔνιαι δὲ οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς τέχνης περαίνοιτο ἂν καὶ διὰ σιγῆς …
soc. Then (δή), amongst all arts, as I take it, some consist mainly of work and require
but brief speech, and some do not require speech at all, but the art’s object may be
achieved even in silence … (Pl. Grg. 450c)
22. In terms of the theory of narrative structure (see Labov 1972: 362–370), there is a transition from
the peak (the pivotal moment in the course of events) to the resolution of the story (the outcome/result).
Labov’s theory has been applied to Ancient Greek by, among others, Allan (2009) and Bonifazi, Drum-
men & de Kreij (2016).
23. See Bonifazi (2016: section 4.5.1) for further discussion. But see also section 6.6.4 below for some
critical remarks on Bonifazi’s view.
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In this final example, taken from Platonic dialogue, Socrates is reviewing a definition
givenbyGorgias in a step-by-step fashion.Herewe seehowδή can also beused to signal
the next step in an ongoing train of thought or argument. The example given here is
prototypical in that the step introduced by δή directly follows from, and builds upon,
what has been granted in the immediately preceding step: Socrates first secures that
arts indeed exist, and then goes on to speak about the division of these arts. Thus, the
move introduced by δή naturally follows from the preceding, preparatory, step.
6.3.3 Conclusion
To sum up, in addition to its use as an attitudinal-interactional marker in different
types of speech acts, δή canbe assigned twodiscourse connective functions. In the first,
the particle functions as amarker of the rhetorical relationof conclusion, signaling that
the information in its host act follows as a natural conclusion from the preceding dis-
course unit. In the second, it functions as a discourse-structural marker pertaining to
the thematic organization of the discourse. In this use, the particle signals the transi-
tion to a next expected step or topic of discussion. In the following section, I will turn
to the usages of δή in which it occurs in clause-internal position and has phrasal scope.
6.4 Δή as a phrasal modifier
In the present section, I will zoom into the different usages of δή as a phrasal modifier,
i.e. the cases inwhich it takes scope over individual clause constituents rather than full
clauses or sentences. Undisputed formal evidence for such an analysis, as was shown
in chapter 4, comes from the internal (rather than peninitial) position of the particle
within the clause. In these usages, δή has traditionally been described in very general
terms only, viz. as a particle which simply emphasizes the phrase or word that it as-
sociates with. The main goal of the present section is to see whether we can further
specify this vague notion of emphasis by drawing upon the general theories about fo-
cus modifiers, intensifiers and exactness markers as presented in sections 2.7 to 2.9
of the present study. This will be done by means of a close inspection of the different
recurrent distributional patterns in which ‘phrasal’ δή occurs (cf. section 6.1.2). They
are the following: (i) δή with inherently scalar expressions (i.e. expressions denoting
quantity or degree); (ii) δή with deictic and demonstrative expressions; (iii) δή with
indefinite expressions and (iv) καὶ δή and καὶ δὴ καί.
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6.4.1 With inherently scalar expressions
The first clear pattern in which δή occurs in clause-internal position and unambigu-
ously scopes over the phrase or constituent involves inherently scalar expressions.
Broadly speaking, I take these to be expressions, mostly adjectives and adverbs, which
by their very meaning are associated with a semantic scale of quantity or degree (cf.
section 2.7.2). More in particular, this group includes the following types of expres-
sions (see Denniston 1954: 205–207):
∗ expressions denoting quantity:
− forms of μόνος/μοῦνος ‘alone, only’, ὀλίγος ‘few’, πολύς/πολλός ‘much, many’ and
πᾶς ‘all, every’
− adverbs of frequency, duration, distance and the like, such as πολλά/πολλάκις
‘many times, often’, αἰεί ‘always’, πολλαχοῦ ‘in many places’, πάλαι ‘long ago, for
a long time’, τάχυ ‘soon’ and πόρρω/πρόσω ‘far off ’
− numerals and numeral adverbs such as τρίς ‘thrice’
∗ expressions denoting degree:
− superlative forms (+ πολύ ‘by far’)
− comparative forms (+ πολλῷ/πολύ ‘much, far’)
− positive forms marked by intensifiers such as μάλα ‘very’ and πάνυ ‘altogether,
very’
This usage of phrasal δήwith inherently scalar expressions is in fact quite awidespread
phenomenon, which occurs in a variety of different authors and text types, as the var-
ious examples in this section will show.24
The question now arises, obviously, what is the exact semantic-functional contri-
bution of δή in this particular pattern. If we assume that the particle somehow interacts
with the semantic scales evoked by these expressions of quantity or degree, two possi-
ble interpretations in principle present itself here. These are the following:
(i) δή is a scalar focus modifier indicating a speaker evaluation. Following the dis-
cussion in section 2.7.2, this means that the particle focuses upon the quanti-
tative or degree expression in question and relates this focus value to a set of
ranked alternatives. More specifically, δή may be analyzed as explicitly indicat-
ing that the speaker evaluates the focus value as ranking high on some contex-
24. This includes the genre of Attic drama. As I have argued earlier, its metrical character makes this
genre somewhat exceptional in as far as a clause-internal position of δή does not unambiguously means
phrasal scope (see rule (vi) in section 4.4 above). Nevertheless, given the widespread evidence of this
pattern in prose texts, it seems safe to assume that δή has phrasal scope in cases from drama as well.
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tually construed scale of expectation, which may result into evaluative mean-
ings of remarkability. That is, the quantitative/degree expression is marked as
being, e.g., noteworthy, exceptional, unprecedented or in contrast to a certain
standard. An analysis along these lines has been hinted at by Wakker (1997b:
239–240).
(ii) δή is as a pragmatic marker of exactness or even a true intensifier. Following the
discussion of section 2.9 above, this means that the speaker uses δή to empha-
size the appropriateness and exact applicability of the expression in its scope,
thus explicitly ruling out ‘loose’ interpretations. The particle may thus be com-
pared to (certain usages of) such items as real/really, true/truly, very and right
in English. In some cases, in fact, we may even analyze it as a pure intensify-
ing means marking a high degree (cf. very, really; cf. section 2.8). An analysis
along these lines is indeed suggested by, among others, Denniston (1954),25
Thesleff (1954: 18–19) and Bonifazi, Drummen & de Kreij (2016).26
I would like to emphasize at this point that the two interpretations given here are
closely related and in fact not always easy to disentangle. Expressions that denote high
or extreme values on a quantity/degree scale can often also be construed as being in fo-
cus, which can in turn bemodified by a (scalar) focus modifier. Consider the following
two examples, for instance:
(126) [Mardonius tries to convince Xerxes to undertake an expedition against Athens.]
δέσποτα, οὐκ οἰκός ἐστι Ἀθηναίους ἐργασαμένους πολλὰ δὴ κακὰ Πέρσας μὴ οὐ δοῦναι δί-
κας τῶν ἐποίησαν.
Master, it is not fitting that the Athenians, having wrought the Persians many δή
harms, should not give satisfaction for what they have done. (Hdt. 7.5.2)
(127) [Preparation of the Sicilian expedition, in the presence of a multitude of both Athenians
and strangers.] The strangers and the rest of the multitude had come for a spectacle,
in the feeling that the enterprise was noteworthy and surpassing belief.
παρασκευὴ γὰρ αὕτη ἡπρώτη ἐκπλεύσασαμιᾶς πόλεως δυνάμειἙλληνικῇπολυτελεστάτη
δὴ καὶ εὐπρεπεστάτη τῶν ἐς ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἐγένετο.
25. Denniston (1954: 204) writes: “δή denotes that a thing really and truly is so: or that it is very much
so (in cases where δή is attached to words, such as adjectives, which ἐνδέχονται μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον [‘admit
more and less’, kt]: πολλοὶ δή, ‘really many’, or ‘very many’).”
26. In volume 3 on Attic drama, for example, Drummen makes the following remarks: “When δή has
small scope, over an adjective or adverb that describes a quality in the extreme, it intensifies an expression
of the speaker’s stance, a function that is also common in Homer and historiography” (Drummen 2016b:
ch. 2, §79, emphasis mine).
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For this first armament that sailed off, when it comes to a Hellenic force of one single
state, was the costliest δή and most splendid of those that had occurred up till that
time. (Th. 6.31.1)
In (126), both of the interpretations given above can in principle be defended. If we
take analysis (i), one the one hand, and assume that δή is a scalar focus particle, the
particle would focus on πολλά and evaluate it as ranking high on a scale of expectation
(roughly ‘even many harms’; German ‘sogar/schon viel Schaden’). If we follow analy-
sis (ii), on the other hand, δή would emphasize the exact applicability of πολλά in this
context (‘truly/really many’), or it would even be a true intensifier, i.e. a marker of high
degree (‘very many’). Similarly, in (127), where δή accompanies a superlative expres-
sion, the particle may in principle be seen as an evaluative focus modifying particle,
ruling out more expected alternatives and thus creating a ring of remarkability (‘even
the costliest of all time’). Alternatively, the particlemay be seen as an exactnessmarker
comparable to the use of English very with superlatives (‘the very costliest of all time’).
Although these interpretations may indeed not always be easy to distinguish from
one another – especially in view of the lack of information on intonation in Ancient
Greek – I am inclined to give most weight to the first interpretation and treat δή as an
evaluative focus modifying particle. Still, I do not want to completely rule out a possi-
ble interpretation as an exactness marker, which fits the context quite nicely in some
cases (notably with superlatives). A reading as a true intensifying or degree modifying
particle, however, I believe to be highly unlikely. In the following, I will give a number
of arguments to support this view. Along the way more examples will be discussed.
(i) My first argument concerns the fact that the quantitative expressions that δή may
combine with behave differently with regard to the parameter of boundedness (see
section 2.8 for this notion). In the following two examples, to start with, δή occurs
with unbounded concepts, viz. πολλά (‘many times, often’) and ὀλίγος (‘few’). These
expressions evoke a more-or-less conception and are associated with an unbounded
scale:
(128) ηρ. οἶσθ᾿ οὖν τὸν Οἴτης Ζηνὸς ὑψίστου πάγον;
υλ. οἶδ᾿, ὡς θυτήρ γε πολλὰ δὴ σταθεὶς ἄνω.
heracles. Now do you know the mountain of Oeta, which belongs to highest Zeus?
– hyllus. I know it, since, as a sacrifier at least, I have stood up there even (δή)
many times. (S. Tr. 1191–1192)
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(129) [Speech of the Corcyraeans in Athens, who sum up the many Athenian advantages of
the alliance they are presently offering.]
ἃ ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ ὀλίγοις δὴ ἅμα πάντα ξυνέβη, …
In all history it is to just (δή) few people that these [advantages] have befallen all at
the same time, … (Th. 1.33.2)
In the next two examples, by contrast, δή modifies bounded concepts, viz. πᾶς (‘all,
full’) and μόνος (‘alone, only’). These expressions rather evoke an either-or-conception
and inherently imply some definite boundary or endpoint:
(130) [Siege and battle of Corcyra. The Corcyraeans defeat the Spartan armament lead by
Mnasippus.] At this time the Corcyraeans set up a trophy and gave back the bodies
of the dead under a truce.
ἐκ δὲ τούτου οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐρρωμενέστεροι ἐγεγένηντο, οἱ δ᾿ ἔξω ἐν πάσῃ δὴ ἀθυμίᾳ
ἦσαν.
And after that, the people in the city had become stouter of heart, but those outside
were in even (δή) full desperation. (X. HG 6.2.24)
(131) [Final speech of Pericles, who defends his policy in the war against the desires for pacifi-
cation of some citizens.] Do not be led astray by such citizens, nor persist in your anger
with me … even though the enemy has come and done exactly what he was likely to
do after you refused to listen to his demands
ἐπιγεγένηταί τε πέρα ὧν προσεδεχόμεθα ἡ νόσος ἥδε, πρᾶγμα μόνον δὴ τῶν πάντων ἐλπί-
δος κρεῖσσον γεγενημένον.
and beyond all our expectations this plague has fallen upon us, just the only affair of
all that has occurred beyond our hopes. (Th. 2.64.1)
Finally, there is the frequent combination of δήwith superlative expressions, which are
unbounded concepts by definition, but at the same time denote a value near the end
of a scale. I give two more example here:
(132) τοῦ ποταμοῦ κατελθόντος μέγιστα δὴ τότε ἐπ᾿ ὀκτωκαίδεκα πήχεας, ὡς ὑπερέβαλε τὰς
ἀρούρας, πνεύματος ἐμπεσόντος κυματίης ὁ ποταμὸς ἐγένετο·
After the river [sc. the Nile] came down to the very (δή) greatest extent at that time,
up to a height of eighteen cubits, when it overflowed the fields, roughened by a strong
wind, the river was surging. (Hdt. 2.111.1)
(133) messenger. … All this I report about the commanders; but I have mentioned only a
small part of the great suffering that there was.
βα. αἰαῖ, κακῶν ὕψιστα δὴ κλύω τάδε,
αἴσχη τε Πέρσαις καὶ λιγέα κωκύματα.
queen. Aiai, I hear this as the very (δή) highest of disasters, a cause for shame and for
shrill wailing to the Persians. (A. Pers. 329–332)
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Now if wewant to interpret δή as a true intensifyingmeans, we have to assume that
it canbeusedboth as a scalarmodifier (e.g. very many/often, very few), as a totalitymod-
ifier (e.g. absolutely all/full, completely alone) and as a modifier of superlatives (e.g. by
far the greatest). Recall from section 2.8, however, that there tend to be harmonic re-
lations between intensifiers and the gradable properties they modify: scalar modifiers
tend to modify unbounded concepts, whereas totality modifiers tend to be used for
bounded concepts. In addition, special types of intensifiers are used for superlatives
(e.g. English by far, Dutch verreweg). Given the general theory on intensification, then,
it appears to be somewhat unlikely that δή can be used as each of these different types
of intensifiers.
In these examples, in fact, an interpretation as an evaluative focus modifier seems
indeed more appropriate, given that in all of these examples the quantitative expres-
sion appears to be the focus of the clause in which it occurs. Moreover, these focused
expressions indeed invite for an evaluation in terms of remarkability or noteworthi-
ness. In (130), for example, the use of δή indicates that Xenophon evaluates the des-
peration of the defeated party as being of an exceptional nature. And in (131), Pericles
employs δή to further corroborate the very point that his audience of dissatisfied Athe-
nian citizens is most reluctant to accept: that the war passes off well for them and that
only the plague has comeunexpected. For the exampleswith superlatives, on the other
hand, an interpretation as an exactness marker would also be an attractive possibility
(e.g. ‘the very highest of disasters’): the speaker can be taken to explicitly indicate that
his words are really to be taken at face value and that he is not exaggerating by using
the superlative form here.
(ii) My second argument against a reading as a true intensifier concerns the fact that
δή also occurs with phrases that already consist of other intensifiers, as in the following
three examples:
(134) [Medosades, a Thracian leader, urges Xenophon to summon his two Spartan generals,
Charminus and Polynices.] Upon their arrival Charminus said: “If you have anything
to say to us, Medosades, say it; if not, we have something to say to you.”
ὁ δὲ Μηδοσάδης μάλα δὴ ὑφειμένως· …
AndMedosades replied even (δή) very submissively: [direct speech] (X. An. 7.7.16)
(135) [Imitation of a trial in Athenian court.]
φι. κατάβα, κατάβα, κατάβα, κατάβα.
βδ. καταβήσομαι.
καίτοι τὸ “κατάβα” τοῦτο πολλοὺς δὴ πάνυ
ἐξηπάτηκεν. ἀτὰρ ὅμως καταβήσομαι.
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philocleon. Step down, step down, step down, step down! – bdelycleon. I’ll step
down. Even though that outcry “step down” has fooled even/already (δή) very many
people. But I’ll step down nevertheless. (Ar. V. 979–981)
(136) [The Lacedaemonians are excluded by the Eleans from the temple, sacrifices and con-
tests in Olympia.] And the fear within the assembly was great that the Lacedaemoni-
ans might come with arms, especially as Lichas son of Arcesilaus, a Lacedaemonian,
received blows from the umpires on the course, because [explanation follows].
ὥστε πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον ἐπεφόβηντο πάντες καὶ ἐδόκει τι νέον ἔσεσθαι.
As a result, everybody had become even/already (δή) much more afraid, and it
seemed that there would be some disturbance. Th. 5.50.4)
In these examples, δή combines with phrases that contain the intensifiers μάλα, πάνυ
– both markers of a high degree (‘very’) – and πολλῷ, which intensifies the compara-
tive μᾶλλον (‘muchmore’). It is thus highly unlikely, in my opinion, that δή itself would
function as such an intensifier here. Again, a reading as an evaluative focusing device
is preferable here. Note that in (134), for example, an evaluative reading of notewor-
thiness is well in place, as the highly submissive way in which Medosades replies is in
sharp contrast with his bold words in the preceding conversation with Xenophon. In
(136), in turn, Thucydides uses the particle to underscore the remarkable fact that the
great fear thatwas already there, had increased even further by the incidentwithLichas.
Alternatively, a reading as an exactnessmarkermay be possible in some of these exam-
ples, in line with such translations as ‘very many indeed’, ‘really very many’ in English
or ‘echt heel veel’ in Dutch.
(iii) A third counterargument involves the fact that there is a small number of cases of
δή in combination with numerals. The following is an example from Pindar, in which
δή modifies the numeral adverb ἑξηκοντάκι (‘sixty times’):
(137) [Victory ode for Xenophon of Corinth. The victories of his family are also praised.]
Ἰσθμοῖ τά τ᾿ ἐν Νεμέᾳ παύρῳ ἔπει
θήσω φανέρ᾿ ἀθρό᾿, ἀλαθής τέ μοι
ἔξορκος ἐπέσσεται ἑξηκοντάκι δὴ ἀμφοτέρωθεν
ἁδύγλωσσος βοὰ κάρυκος ἐσλοῦ.
As for their victories at the Isthmus and Nemea, in a brief word I shall reveal their
sum, and my true witness under oath will be the sweet-tongued shout of the noble
herald, as many as (δή) sixty times from both of these places. (Pi. O. 13.98–100)
Examples such as these, though few in number, pose a serious problem for the account
that δή functions as an intensifier, since numerals obviously are no gradable concepts.
Note, again, that a reading as an evaluative scalar focusmodifier is very natural in such
559416-L-bw-Thijs
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 323
6.4. Δή as a phrasal modifier 309
examples (‘as many as’). By using the particle the speaker signals that he evaluates the
absolute value as denoted by the numeral expression as high or extreme on a con-
textually construed scale, which here involves the amount of victories in Isthmus and
Nemea for one single family.
(iv) My fourth argument is of a somewhat different nature and is concerned with the
relationship between δή and its cognate form ἤδη, which functions as a phasal adverb
that is roughly equivalent to English already, German schon and French déjà. That is, it
indicates that some state of affairs occurred earlier than some reference point or earlier
than expected, as in the following prototypical examples:27
(138) Come tell me all the truth then,
ἠ’ ἔτι πὰρ νήεσσιν ἐμὸς πάϊς, ἦέ μιν ἤδη
ἧισι κυσὶν μελεϊστὶ ταμὼν προύθηκεν Ἀχιλλεύς.
whether my son is still (ἔτι) by the ships, or whether Achilles has already (ἤδη) hewn
him limb from limb and cast him before his dogs. (Il. 24.407–409)
(139) καὶ ἤδη τε ἦν μέσον ἡμέρας καὶ οὔπω καταφανεῖς ἦσαν οἱ πολέμιοι·
And it was midday already (ἤδη) and the enemy were not yet (οὔπω) in sight.
(X. An. 1.8.8)
Now, as signaledbyBonifazi (2016: section4.8), the close relationshipbetween δή and
ἤδη had generally already been recognized in earlier scholarship,28 but has been lost
track of since Denniston, who did not include ἤδη in his handbook and has not much
to say about this word in his discussion of δή. Irrespective of the issue of their exact
historical relationship,29 it is important to note that there is a significant distributional
overlap between these two items. Most important for our present purposes is that ἤδη,
just like δή, also regularly occurs with inherently scalar expressions, as shown by the
following examples:
27. The examples are taken fromWakker (2002) and Conti (2017), who analyze the various usages of
ἤδη in Xenophon andHomer, respectively. See also Bonifazi (2016: section 4.8) for a recent treatment of
ἤδη in the context of the stance-taking theory of Du Bois (2007).
28. See for instance Hartung (1828), Heller (1853), Kühner & Gerth (1898–1904: ii, 126) and
Thomas (1894).
29. Some authors take it that δή is a shortened form of ἤδη, whereas others treat ἤδη as a fusion of the
particles ἦ and δή. Both forms already occur in our earliest textual sources, so we can never definitely
settle this issue. In my opinion, the second option appears to bemore natural, given the fact that δή fuses
more oftenwith other expressions. In fact, the derivation of phasal ἤδη (‘already’) out of a positive polarity
particle (ἦ) and an evaluative focus particle (δή) appears to be quite plausible to me.
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(140) καὶ αὐτὸς πολλῶν ἤδη πολέμων ἔμπειρός εἰμι, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ ὑμῶν τοὺς ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ
ἡλικίᾳ ὁρῶ, …
And I myself, Lacedaemonians, have experience of many wars already (ἤδη), and I
see men among you who are in the same age, … (Th. 1.80.1)
(141) πρὸς δ’ ἔτι καὶ χειμὼν ἦν, ὥστ’ ἤδη πάντες ἀπιέναι ἐβούλοντο.
And besides it was winter, too, so that even (ἤδη) all alike wanted to withdraw.
(X. HG 6.5.50)
(142) …, τῷ μεγίστη τίσις ἤδη ἀδικηθέντι ἐγένετο πάντων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν.
[Hermotimus], who had achieved even (ἤδη) the greatest vengeance for wrong done
to him of all people we know. (Hdt. 8.105.1)
As these examples show, ἤδη may also co-occur with quantitative expressions such as
πολύς and πᾶς and with degree expressions such as superlatives. In such cases, I take
it that ἤδη indeed functions as a scalar focus modifier (cf. Wakker 2002). Importantly,
this view is supported by strong cross-linguistic evidence. As shown by König (1991a:
ch. 7), expressions that are used as phasal adverbs often have further usages as scalar
focus modifiers, and more in particular as modifiers that select temporal scales, e.g.
scales of duration or temporal frequency.30 Consider the following examples of ἤδη:
(143) … καὶ οὗτοι ἐπιδειχθήσονται οἷοί εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ὅτι πάλαι ἤδη ἀρξάμενοι οὐδὲν παύ-
ονται κακοτεχνοῦντες …
… and these men will be exhibited in their true character, and you will see that
they have begun long ago already (ἤδη) and by no means stop to play their tricks
… (D. 42.3)
(144) [When some difficulty arises for the people of Pedasa, the priestess of Athena grows a
great beard.]
τοῦτο δέ σφι δὶς ἤδη ἐγένετο.
This had happened to them twice already (ἤδη). (Hdt. 8.104)
Interestingly, very similar examples can be foundwhere a temporal focus value ismod-
ified by δή rather than by ἤδη. We have already seen an example of δή with an adverb
of temporal frequency, viz. (137) above. The following are two cases of δή with the
temporal adverb πάλαι:31
30. See also Kroon & Risselada (1998, 2002) on Latin iam.
31. Here we may also include the cases of δή + αὖτε mentioned in section 6.1.1 above; see examples
(13) and (14) in particular. Here we may compare German schon wieder and Dutch al weer.
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(145) When his life was far spent in this way, Cyrus being a very old man indeed, he came
back to Persia for the seventh time in his reign.
καὶ ὁ μὲν πατὴρ καὶ ἡ μήτηρ πάλαι δὴ ὥσπερ εἰκὸς ἐτετελευτήκεσαν αὐτῷ·
And his father and mother had died already/even (δή) long ago, as was likely.
(X. Cyr. 8.7.1)
(146) ερ. ὅρα νυν εἴ σοι ταῦτ’ ἀρωγὰ φαίνεται.
πρ. ὦπται πάλαι δὴ καὶ βεβούλευται τάδε.
hermes. Consider now whether this attitude seems likely to be to your advantage. –
prometheus. This has been considered and planned already/even (δή) long ago.
(A. Pr. 997–998)
Now the question may arise, obviously, what the differences would be, if any, between
these two closely related expressions in these particular usages. To answer this ques-
tion, I believe a large-scale corpus-based research on ἤδη would be needed, which is
obviously beyond the scope of the present study.32 The point that I would like tomake
here, however, is that the close relationship of δή to ἤδη, both etymologically and dis-
tributionally, provides us with a rather strong argument in favour of a reading of δή as
a scalar (temporal) focus modifier rather than an intensifier.33
(v) The fifth and final argument that I would like to put forward in favour of the view
presented here is concernedwith some of the other usages of δή discussed in this chap-
ter. First of all, I believe that the use as a scalar focus particle could be related nicely
to the use of δή as marker of rhetorical strengthening (see section 6.2.1 above), which
also involves the notion of scalarity. The difference would then mainly be a difference
in scope: whereas δή as a marker of rhetorical strengthening pertains to the proposi-
tions denoted by full clauses or sentences, δή as a scalar focus modifier pertains to the
properties denoted by individual phrases.
Second, a reading as a focus particle could be connected with some of the other
usages of phrasal δή that will be discussed below (e.g. with demonstratives, καὶ δή and
καὶ δὴ καί). Aswewill see, δή in these patterns is also best analyzed as a focusmodifying
particle, whereas intensifyingmeanings are clearly not possible. Given the principle of
methodological minimalism advocated in section 3.4, such interrelations are another
argument in favour of interpreting δή as a focus modifier in its use with inherently
scalar expressions as well.
32. It seems to be clear, at any rate, that δή is never used as a genuine phasal particle, i.e. in contexts such
(138) and (139) above, but always needs a focused temporal adverbial to operate upon. In this respect
ἤδη and δή clearly differ from one another.
33. See also the examples of νῦν δή discussed in section 6.4.2 below.
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To sum up, I have given a number of arguments in support of the first interpretation
that was given above and I believe that δή in its collocation with inherently scalar ex-
pressions is indeed best analyzed as a (temporal) scalar focus modifier which gives
rise to evaluations in terms of remarkability. Alternatively, an interpretation as an ex-
actness marker may be possible (especially in the collocation with superlatives). An
additional reading as a true intensifier, however, is unwarranted in my opinion (pace
Denniston 1954, Bonifazi, Drummen & de Kreij 2016).
The cluster γε δή
I would like to end this section with a number of observations and tentative remarks
on the postpositive particle cluster γε δή. Ιn a few cases, an inherently scalar expression
is not only modified by phrasal δή, but also by the particle γε, which is usually taken to
have phrasal scope too. This results into a cluster of two particles that both appear to
have phrasal scope. I give two examples here:
(147) [Final speech of Pericles, who defends his policy in the war against the desires for paci-
fication of certain citizens.]
τὸν δὲ πόνον τὸν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, μὴ γένηταί τε πολὺς καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον περιγενώμεθα,
ἀρκείτω μὲν ὑμῖν καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἐν οἷς ἄλλοτε πολλάκις γε δὴ ἀπέδειξα οὐκ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸν ὑπο-
πτευόμενον, δηλώσω δὲ καὶ τόδε, …
As to the hardships involved in this war, and your fear that they prove very great and
we succumb after all, let those words be sufficient for you in which at another time,
often (γε) indeed (δή), I have advanced that your fears are groundless, but I will also
show you the following point, … (Th. 2.62.1)
(148) [Socrates says that men engaged in war normally try to propitiate the gods.] “ … But as
to the business of farming, do you think it less necessary to ask the blessing of the
gods?
εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὅτι οἱ σώφρονες καὶ ὑπὲρ ὑγρῶν καὶ ξηρῶν καρπῶν καὶ βοῶν καὶ ἵππων
καὶ προβάτων καὶ ὑπὲρ πάντων γε δὴ τῶν κτημάτων τοὺς θεοὺς θεραπεύουσιν.
For you may be sure”, he said, “that sensible people do service to the gods for fruits
and crops and cattle and horses and sheep, and (καί) indeed (δή) for all (γε) their
possessions.” (X. Oec. 5.20)
Such examples are interesting as far as the division of labour between the two phrasal
particles is concerned, which in turn may tell us something about the meaning of the
individual particles themselves. Unfortunately, the relevant examples of the cluster in
its collocation with scalar expressions are too limited in number to make any solid
claims. Moreover, as I have noted in section 2.7.3 above, I feel that in general the parti-
cle γε, which is probably evenmore subtle and elusive than the particle δή, is still quite
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poorly understood and is certainly in need of a large-scale corpus-based investigation.
Nevertheless, I would like to make some tentative suggestions on the cluster γε δή in
the given examples (cf. my remarks at p. 240 above).
First of all, I find it attractive to assume that the phrase in the scope of the particles
constitutes an individual discourse act, which I have also tried to reflect in my transla-
tions. What appears to happen in these two examples, then, is that the speaker meta-
linguistically corrects an earlier expression in favour of an informationally stronger
one. Thus, in (147) πολλάκις (‘often’) is a stronger expression than the preceding ἄλ-
λοτε (‘at another time’). And in (148), the phrase πάντων τῶν κτημάτων (‘for all pos-
sessions’) is informationally stronger than the individual possessions enumerated just
before, i.e. fruit, crops, cattle, horses and sheep. In my view, both particles can be ana-
lyzed as contributing their own individual meaning in this constellation.
As for the particle γε, to start with, I have already noted in section 2.7.3 that it often
appears to contribute a meaning which is comparable with that of contrastive stress
in modern languages such as English. Clearly, such a meaning would not be inappro-
priate in the proposed analysis, as the phrase in γε’s scope is explicitly contrasted with
previous expressions. Δή, on the other hand, can be described as has been proposed in
the preceding sections, i.e. as a scalar focusmodifying particle (roughly ‘indeed/even’).
Such an analysis then, though tentative in nature, would result into a clear division of
labour between the two phrasal particles: whereas γε signals that the phrase corrects
or is in contrastwith an earlier phrase, δή explicitly indicates that it is also information-
ally and rhetorically stronger (i.e. higher on a contextually given scale). I believe such
an analysis would be preferable to that given by Denniston (1954: 245), who simply
labels such examples of the cluster as “purely emphatic”. This is of course not a very
informative qualification, as it totally obscures the semantic differences between the
two particles.
6.4.2 With demonstrative and deictic expressions
The second major pattern in which δή occurs in clause-internal position and un-
ambiguously scopes over the phrase/constituent involves referential expressions of
a demonstrative or deictic nature. This group notably includes examples of δή with
demonstratives (e.g. οὗτος- and ὅδε-forms), with αὐτός-forms, with personal pronouns
and with the temporal adverb νῦν. I believe that δή in these collocations may gener-
ally be analyzed as highlighting a referent in contrast to a set of contextually relevant
alternatives. As I take it, the particle contributes meaning aspects of exactness (‘pre-
cisely, just, right’) and/or specificity (‘specific/particular’). In many cases, indeed, we
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will see that an interpretation as an identifying fm is attractive, i.e. as a particle indi-
cating focused assertion of identity, including the possible evaluative implications of
remarkability (see section 2.7.2). Such a function can in turn be connected to the fo-
cus-oriented meanings as described in the preceding section (cf. also section 6.4.4 on
the patterns with καί).
It should be noted in advance that, in these particular collocations, δή is quite of-
ten scopally ambiguous. The phrase in question regularly occurs at the very start of
a sentence or a clause and in such cases an interpretation as an aim (i.e. as a com-
mon ground marker) is often also a good option (cf. also example (1) in section 6.1.1
above). However, there are also quite some examples of this collocation where δή is
found in clause-internal position. In such cases, I believe, we cannot but conclude that
the particle has phrasal scope andmodifies the demonstrative or deictic expression in
question. In what follows, I will especially concentrate on these scopally unambiguous
cases.
With demonstratives
I start with cases of δή modifying phrases that contain demonstrative expressions. In
most of these cases, I argue, the contribution of δή can be nicely captured in terms of
the concept of focused assertion of identity. That is, in such cases δή functions aswhat I
have called an identifying focusmodifier and behaves not unlike English just, precisely,
German eben, gerade and Dutch juist, precies.34 As we have seen in section 2.7.2, this
type of fms is “primarily used emphatically to assert the identity of one argument in
a proposition with an argument in a different, contextually given proposition” (König
1991a: 127). Recall that such items are typically used in contexts of identification and
are by definition highly context-dependent in nature, as they establish a link with con-
textually givenmaterial. In turn, this also explains their strong compatibilitywith back-
ward-oriented demonstrative expressions. Let’s look at some examples of this use of δή
in Herodotus:
(149) [Story of the abduction of Io.] Carrying Egyptian and Assyrian merchandise, they
reached other places and also came to Argos in particular.
τὸ δὲ Ἄργος τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον προεῖχε ἅπασι τῶν ἐν τῇ νῦν Ἑλλάδι καλεομένῃ χώρῃ. ἀπι-
κομένους δὲ τοὺς Φοίνικας ἐς δὴ τὸ Ἄργος τοῦτο διατίθεσθαι τὸν φόρτον.
34. Often, a translation bymeans of a cleft-construction also nicely captures the force of δή, inmy opin-
ion.
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Argos was at that time preeminent in every way among the people of what is now
called Hellas. When the Phoenicians had come to precisely (δή) this Argos, they set
out their cargo. (Hdt. 1.1.1–2)
In (149), the place in which the Phoenicians arrived in the story (i.e. Argos) is explic-
itly identified as the place that is most preeminent in Greece at that time – which
Herodotus told us in the immediately preceding discourse. By using δή, Herodotus es-
pecially stresses this identity relation, thus emphasizing the fact that the story of the
abduction of Io was not just set in some insignificant place.
(150) 5.39.At Sparta, Anaxandrides the son of Leon,whohadbeen king,was nowno longer
alive but was dead, and Cleomenes, son of Anaxandrides, held the royal power. This
he had won not by manly merit but by right of birth.
5.39–40. [Digression on Anaxandrides and his wive, who couldn’t get children. The
ephors urge him to take a second wife, which could give him an heir to the throne, and
Anaxandrides consents.]
5.41. χρόνου δὲ οὐ πολλοῦ διελθόντος ἡ ἐσύστερον ἐπελθοῦσα γυνὴ τίκτει τὸν δὴ Κλεομέ-
νεα τοῦτον. καὶ αὕτη τε ἔπεδρον βασιλέα Σπαρτιήτῃσι ἀπέφαινε, …
Andwhen notmuch time had passed, the wife that came later gave birth to precisely
(δή) this Cleomenes. And this woman gave the Spartans an heir to the royal power,
… (Hdt. 5.39–41.1)
In (150), the focus is on the identity relation between (i) the child that was born in
the excursus about Anaxandrides and his wives, and (ii) the person who was already
introduced a little bit earlier as the new king in Sparta (in 5.39). Again, δή focuses on
the demonstrative expression and indicates that a link is establishedwith contextually
given material.
(151) [Argument against democracy and in favour of monarchy.] The rule of the commonal-
itymust of necessity engender evil-mindedness; andwhen evil-mindedness in public
matters is engendered, badmen are not divided by enmity but united by close friend-
ship; for they who would do evil to the commonwealth conspire together to do it.
τοῦτο δὲ τοιοῦτο γίνεται ἐς ὃ ἂν προστάς τις τοῦ δήμου τοὺς τοιούτους παύσῃ. ἐκ δὲ αὐτῶν
θωμάζεται οὗτος δὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου, θωμαζόμενος δὲ ἀν᾿ ὦν ἐφάνη μούναρχος ἐών, …
Such practice continues till someone rises to champion the people’s cause and stops
such evil-doers. Based on these events, this very (δή) man becomes the people’s idol,
and being their idol is made their monarch, … (Hdt. 3.82.4)
In this final example from Herodotus, Darius demonstrates how a democratic govern-
ment will naturally develop into a monarchy. In this case, δή marks the exact identity
relationbetween (i) the personwho stops the evil-mindedpeople that conspire against
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democracy, and (ii) the person who therefore becomes the people’s idol. In this way,
Darius further stresses the very point that he would like to make here, viz. that one
single monarch may arise from a democratic government.
This use of δή is certainly not restricted to Herodotus, however. Very similar cases
are to be found in other authors, which is illustrated here by looking at three more
examples, taken from Plato’s Republic and Thucydides’s Histories:35
(152) [Discussion on the nature of tyranny.] “What do you mean?” I asked. “Will the tyrant
have the nerve to do violence to his father and, if he doesn’t submit, beat him?” –
“Yes,” he said, “once he has disarmed him!”
– πατραλοίαν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, λέγεις τύραννον καὶ χαλεπὸν γηροτρόφον, καὶ ὡς ἔοικε τοῦτο δὴ
ὁμολογουμένη ἂν ἤδη τυραννὶς εἴη, καί …
– “You mean the tyrant is a parricide,” I said, “and a cruel nurse of old age, and as it
seems, just (δή) that is what tyranny would at last be agreed upon to be, and …
(Pl. R. 569b)
(153) [After having determined who are the wise men, Socrates and Glauco are looking for
a next suitable question to discuss.] “So shall we appoint these blind people as our
guardians, or rather those who know every individual thing that exists and don’t fall
short of those others in experience, nor are they inferior to them in any other aspect
of virtue?” – “It would be foolish to choose anyone else,” he said, “unless they were
lacking in these other respects, since in this, just about their most significant point,
they would be outstanding.”
– οὐκοῦν τοῦτο δὴ λέγωμεν, τίνα τρόπον οἷοί τ’ ἔσονται οἱ αὐτοὶ κἀκεῖνα καὶ ταῦτα ἔχειν;
“Shouldn’t we then discuss precisely (δή) that, how these same people will be able to
possess both types of qualities?” (Pl. R. 485a)
What’s at issue in (152) is the exact nature of the tyrant. At the end of the discussion,
the conclusion is reached that a tyrant is ‘a parricide and a cruel nurse of old age’. This
characterization is in turn identified as the true nature of a tyrant and thus finally pro-
vides an answer to the question under discussion here. This identity relation is here
explicitly marked out by δή, in my opinion: ‘precisely that is what we have been look-
ing for all the time.’ Example (153) can be analyzed along very similar lines. Here δή
signals that the previous words of Glauco have precisely hit upon the next question for
discussion that the interlocutors have been looking for. Again, an identity relation is
focused upon.
35. Other examples of this type of use of δή can be found inDenniston (1954: 208–209), sections (viii),
(ix) and (x), who indeed already proposes just and precisely as apt translations.
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(154) [Speech of Alcibiades in Sparta.]
οὕτως ἐμοί τε ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς καὶ ἐς κίνδυνον καὶ ἐς ταλαιπωρίαν πᾶσαν ἀδεῶς χρῆσθαι, ὦ Λα-
κεδαιμόνιοι, γνόντας τοῦτον δὴ τὸν ὑφ᾿ ἁπάντων προβαλλόμενον λόγον ὡς, εἰ πολέμιός γε
ὢν σφόδρα ἔβλαπτον, κἂν φίλος ὢν ἱκανῶς ὠφελοίην, ὅσῳ τὰ μὲν Ἀθηναίων οἶδα, τὰ δ᾿ ὑ-
μέτερα ᾔκαζον, …
So I urge you to use me without misgiving for any danger and for any hardships,
Lacedaemonians, recognising precisely (δή) this saying that is on everybody’s lips,
that if as an enemy I did you exceeding injury, I might also be of some sufficient ser-
vice to you as a friend, in so far as I know the affairs of the Athenians, while I could
only conjecture yours, … (Th. 6.92.5)
In this final example fromThucydides, the use of δή does not somuch signal a linkwith
material mentioned in the preceding discourse, as in the preceding examples. Rather,
δή here emphasizes the identity link with an element present in the communicative
context at large, viz. a well-known saying. Note that this is made explicit here by the
attributive participle construction τὸν ὑφ᾿ ἁπάντων προβαλλόμενον (‘which is on every-
body’s lips’).
Now, as I have also mentioned in section 2.7.2, the strong context-dependency of
identifying fms alsomakes themwell suited to be employed in complex sentences that
consist of a main and a subordinate clause. And indeed, we often find demonstratives
+ δή in so-called correlative patterns, viz. at the start of the main clause following a
subordinate clause, as in ὅτε … τότε δή, ὡς … οὗτω δή (‘when …, then indeed …’) and
ἐπειδή… διὰ ταῦτα δή (‘since…, for that reason indeed…’). Bymodifying the correlative
adverb then, δή can essentially be said to focus on the relationship that obtains between
the subordinate and the main clause.36 Let’s look at some typical examples again:
(155) [Barbarians attack king Brasidas and his army in their retreat.] And when (ὡς) the
troops who had been selected to dash out met them wherever they charged, and
Brasidas himself with his pickedmen sustained their attack, and the Peloponnesians
to their surprise had withstood their first onset and then continued to receive their
attacks and repulse them, and when they ceased, retired themselves, at that point
indeed (τότε δή) most of the barbarians refrained from attacking the Hellenes under
Brasidas in the open country, and leaving a portion of their force to follow and harass
them, the rest, … (Th. 4.127.2)
Example (155) is a very typical instance of a long periodic sentence as we regularly
find them in the narrative of Thucydides. In such cases, δή signals an explicit identity
relation between two points in time. That is, the particle is added to the demonstrative
36. See Kroon&Risselada (1998, 2002) for a similar ideawith regard to the focusing use of Latin iam.
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temporal adverb in order to stress the temporal relation between the subordinate and
the main clause (‘then indeed’, ‘precisely then’, ‘it was then that’). In many cases, this
also leads to evaluative implications of remarkability, which are an important aspect
of the analysis of identifying fms (cf. section 2.7.2). In this example, for instance, the
focus on the temporal adverbmay give rise to the evaluation that it was only relatively
late that the barbarians refrained from their attack (τότε δή ‘only then’).
The following two examples come from Platonic dialogue and involve a causal,
rather than a strictly temporal, relation:
(156) I thought it was a glorious thing to know the causes of everything, why each thing
comes into being and why it perishes and why it exists; and I was always unsettling
myself with such questions as these:
ἆρ᾿ ἐπειδὰν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν σηπεδόνα τινὰ λάβῃ, ὥς τινες ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῷα
συντρέφεται;
Is it true that (ἆρ᾿) when heat and cold obtain a sort of fermentation, as some people
say, it is precisely (δή) at that point that living beings are being organized?
(Pl. Phd. 96b)
(157) [On different kinds of causes.] And again, with regard to our talking with each other,
he would mention other such causes, giving voice and air and hearing and countless
other things of the sort as causes,
ἀμελήσας τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας λέγειν ὅτι, ἐπειδὴἈθηναίοις ἔδοξε βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμοῦ κατα-
ψηφίσασθαι, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον αὖ δέδοκται ἐνθάδε καθῆσθαι, καὶ δικαιότερον
παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἣν ἂν κελεύσωσιν.
while failing to mention the real causes, viz. that since the Athenians decided that
it was best to condemn me, for that reason indeed (δή) I, too, have in turn decided
that it was better to sit here and that it is right for me to stay and undergo whatever
penalty they order. (Pl. Phd. 98d–e)
Example (156) is instructive, in my opinion, in as far as the yes/no-question is clearly
concernedwith the relation between the two events referred to. The focus of this ques-
tion is thus clearly on the temporal adverb, and δή can thus be said to operate upon this
focused expression. Again, it contributes a meaning of exactness in my opinion (‘pre-
cisely then’). In addition, the particle seems to rule out all alternative values and in
fact comes close to an exclusive particle (‘then and only then’). A very similar analysis
applies to (157), I believe. Again, what’s at stake here is the very causal relation itself
and this is stressed by the use of δή modifying the demonstrative adverbial διὰ ταῦτα
(‘for that reason (and no other)’).37
37. More examples of this type can be found in Denniston (1954: 224–227), sections (12) and (13).
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It should also be noted here that δή may be used, in a highly similar way, with
demonstratives that are forward-oriented in nature, i.e. are used to refer to a subordi-
nate clause that follows themain clause (cataphoric use). Consider the following three
examples:
(158) ταῦτα μὲν οὕτω δὴ τελέω, γέρον, ὡς σὺ κελεύεις.
These things I will perform just (δή) in that way, old man, as you bid. (Od. 4.485)
(159) [Tale about a spring with magic water.]
ἀσθενὲς δὲ τὸ ὕδωρ τῆς κρήνης ταύτης οὕτω δή τι ἔλεγον εἶναι οἱ κατάσκοποι ὥστε μηδὲν
οἷόν τ᾿ εἶναι ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῦ ἐπιπλέειν, …
The spies said that thewater of this springwas light inprecisely/even (δή) such away
that nothing would float on it, … (Hdt. 3.23.3)
(160) [On the wealth of the governor of Babylon.]
κυνῶν δὲ Ἰνδικῶν τοσοῦτο δή τι πλῆθος ἐτρέφετο ὥστε τέσσερες τῶν ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ κῶμαι
μεγάλαι, τῶν ἄλλων ἐοῦσαι ἀτελέες, τοῖσι κυσὶ προσετετάχατο σιτία παρέχειν.
Of Indian dogs he kept precisely/even (δή) so great a number that four great villages
of the plain were appointed to provide food for the dogs and eased from all other
burdens. (Hdt. 1.129.4)
In these examples, too, δή can essentially be regarded as a focusmodifying particle that
focuses on the relation between the main and the following subordinate clause, i.e. a
comparative relation in (158) and a consecutive relation in (159) and (160). In the lat-
ter two examples, there are strong evaluative implications of remarkability,which gives
δή almost the status of an evaluative scalar focus modifier (cf. section 6.4.1 above).
I would like to end this section by shortly looking at some cases where demon-
strative + δή – as opposed to most of the examples we have seen so far – occurs at the
very start of a sentence or clause. As I have noted above, in such cases the particle is
scopally ambiguous by definition: it may scope over the demonstrative phrase but it
may also scope over the clause as a whole. As I take it then, δή in many cases may in
principle be analyzed in two different, though closely related, ways. It may be analyzed
along the lines given here, as an identifying fm, or it may be taken as an attitudinal-
interactional marker which recapitulates information from the common ground. Let
me shortly illustrate this by repeating two examples from section 6.2.1 above (p. 254):
(55) [Extensive excursus about Egypt and king Amasis, covering the whole of book 2.]
ἐπὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν Ἄμασιν Καμβύσης ὁ Κύρου ἐστρατεύετο, ἄγων καὶ ἄλλους τῶν ἦρχε καὶ
Ἑλλήνων Ἴωνάς τε καὶ Αἰολέας, δι᾿ αἰτίην τοιήνδε· …
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Against this Amasis δή Cambyses son of Cyrus was marching, taking other people
that he ruled as well as Ionian and Aeolian Greeks, due to the following reason: …
(Hdt. 3.1.1)
(56) [Phaedo states that he had strange emotions when he was present at Socrates’s final day
in prison.] For I was not filled with pity as I might naturally be when present at the
death of a friend. [short explanation follows]
διὰ δὴ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάνυ μοι ἐλεεινὸν εἰσῄει, ὡς εἰκὸς ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι παρόντι πένθει, οὔτε
αὖ ἡδονὴ …
For this reason δή I was not at all filled with pity, as would seem to be natural for
someone present at a scene of mourning, nor yet was I filled with pleasure …
(Pl. Phd. 59a)
In both of these cases, the particlemay in principle be analyzed as having clause scope
and as a means to retrieve information from the common ground – this is indeed how
I analyzed these examples in section 6.2.1 above (‘so’, ‘then’, Dutch ‘dus’). However,
it may also be possible to assign to δή a function as a marker of focused assertion of
identity (‘It was precisely against this Amasis that …’; ‘it was for this reason (and no
other) that …’). In fact, I believe that this ambiguity also carries over to the use of δή in
relative clauses, as in the following typical case:
(161) Perhaps it may seem strange that I go about and interfere in other people’s affairs
to give this advice in private, but do not venture to come before your assembly and
advise the state.
τούτου δὲ αἴτιόν ἐστιν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι
καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμῳδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο·
But the reason for this, as you have heard me say at many times and places, is that
something divine and spiritual comes to me, which δήMeletus also ridiculed in his
indictment. (Pl. Ap. 31c–d)
Here, again, two analyses may be possible in my opinion: ‘the very (δή) thing that
Meletus also ridiculed’ (identifying fm) or ‘which – as you know (δή) – Meletus also
ridiculed’ (common ground marker).
There thus appears to be a fundamental ambiguity when the interpretation of δή
is concerned in examples such as these: it can be a focusmodifier or a common ground
marker. However, I would like to emphasize here that the two readings are in fact very
closely related: as we have seen in this section, identifying fms by definition create
some link with a contextually given proposition present in the common ground. From
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here, it is obviously but a small step to a use as a genuine marker of common ground
information. The two usages may thus also be related on a diachronic level of analy-
sis.38
Be that as it may, as I have demonstrated in this section, there are also quite some
examples in which a reading as an attitudinal-interactional marker is impossible, in
view of the clause-internal position of δή and its restricted syntactic scope. In such
cases, I believe, an interpretation as a focus modifying particle is the only sensible op-
tion in my opinion.
With αὐτός-forms
I now turn to the cases where δή modifies phrases that contain a form of αὐτός. More
specifically, I am concerned here with the emphatic reflexive use of αὐτός (‘self ’), i.e.
its use “as a predicative adjective stressing the identity of a person or thing, in opposi-
tion to other persons or things” (van Emde Boas et al. 2019: 343). Interestingly, such
emphatic reflexive expressions are similar to focus modifying particles in that they
also evoke alternatives to the referent they modify and may contribute similar types
of meanings.39 For Ancient Greek in particular, this can be illustrated by the following
examples of αὐτός (taken from van Emde Boas et al. 2019: 344):
(162) λεγόντων ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν ὧν πρότερον εἰώθεσαν, αὐτὰ δὲ τάδε ὅτι …
saying nothing of what they previously used to say, butmerely/just this, that …
(Th. 1.139.3)
(163) φυλάξαντες … αὐτὸ τὸ περίορθρον
waiting for the exact/precisemoment of dawn [i.e. at the moment of dawn itself]
(Th. 2.3.4)
In these examples, the αὐτός-forms contribute meanings which are similar to that of
scalar exclusive fms (‘merely’) or identifying fms (‘precisely, exactly, very’).
Given this analysis of predicative αὐτός-forms, itmay indeednot come as a surprise
that δή shows up in its immediate vicinity. The semantics of both expressions, as I take
it, are similar in kind and their combination even further enhances the meaning of
exactness and focused assertion of identity. Consider the following three examples:
38. This is also hinted at by Denniston (1954: 236–237).
39. See König (1991a: 87–96), König & Siemund (2000) and especially König & Gast (2006).
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(164) μετὰ ταῦτα δέ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἆρʼ ἐννοοῦμεν ὅτι πρὸς αὐτῷ δὴ τῷ τέλει συχνὸν αὖ διημαρ-
τάνετο;
And after all this, Socrates, do we see that another great error was committed right
(δή) at the very end [i.e. at the end itself]? (Pl. Plt. 276c)
(165) athenian. … Such is the state of the case, provided that one can prove that soul is
older than body, but not otherwise. – clinias. Most true.
αθ. οὐκοῦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπʼ αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο στελλώμεθα;
ath. Then shοuld we not in the next place address ourselves to precisely (δή) that
very task [i.e. proving that soul is older than body]? (Pl. Lg. 892c)
(166) [Women hold possession of the Acropolis. Cinesias is horny and has come to fetch his
wife Myrrhine, but she does not obey him.] cinesias. … Yes, she seems much younger
than I remember, and has a sexier look in her eyes.
χἂ δυσκολαίνει πρὸς ἐμὲ καὶ βρενθύεται,
ταῦτ’ αὐτὰ δή ’σθ’ ἃ καί μ’ ἐπιτρίβει τῷ πόθῳ.
And the way she acted prickly to me and very stuck-up, it’s precisely (δή) that very
thing that stirs me up with passion! (Ar. Lys. 885–888)
Note that the combination of αὐτός and δήmay also be used in demonstrative phrases,
as in (165) and (166). Here we have a close link with the examples that were discussed
in the previous section: the difference is that the demonstrative is now also modified
by the αὐτός-form, which even further corroborates the exactness meaning. Example
(166) is illustrative, furthermore, in that the modified phrase is the focus of a syntac-
tic cleft-construction, which explicitly creates an identification context. And again we
see a clear evaluative aspect of incompatibility or remarkability: Myrrhine’s dismissive
behaviour is precisely what makes Cinesias more aroused.
To sum up, I believe that δή in combination with emphatic reflexive αὐτός-forms
provides further evidence for an interpretation as a focus-oriented particle and an
identifying fm in particular.
With personal pronouns
Further evidence for the interpretation as an identifying fm comes fromcases inwhich
δή modifies personal pronouns, as in the following two examples:
(167) The king was greatly moved at the sight of so notable a man thus mishandled. Leap-
ing upwith a cry fromwhere he sat he asked Zopyrus who had done him this outrage
and why.
οὐκ ἔστι οὗτος ἀνὴρ ὅτι μὴ σύ, τῷ ἐστὶ δύναμις τοσαύτη ἐμὲ δὴ ὧδε διαθεῖναι, οὐδέ τις ἀλ-
λοτρίων, ὦ βασιλεῦ, τάδε ἔργασται, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ ἐμεωυτόν, …
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“There is no such man – save yourself – who has so much power to bring me of all
people (δή) to this current state. No-one else has done this, o King, but it was me
myself. …” (Hdt. 3.155.1)
(168) [Socrates imagines what he could say as a defense when indicted in court.] I shall be
unable either to tell the truth and say:
δικαίως πάντα ταῦτα ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ πράττω τὸ ὑμέτερον δὴ τοῦτο, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί –
οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν·
“It is on just grounds that I say all this, and it is precisely (δή) your interest that I serve
thereby, gentlemen of the jury” – or say anything else. (Pl. Grg. 522c)
In (167), δή modifies the focused personal pronoun ἐμέ (‘me of all people’). The par-
ticle here corroborates the highly remarkable nature of the condition the speaker is
currently in, which is not at all to be expected in view of his esteemed and notable
status. Thus, there is a clear evaluative aspect of contrast or incompatibility between
the present proposition (‘the speaker is badly mishandled’) and a contextually given
proposition (‘the speaker is a notableman’). In (168), in turn, δή stresses the very point
that the Athenians judges are most reluctant to accept, viz. that Socrates practices his
philosophical conversations to their own benefit. Again, there is an aspect of contrast
present: Socrates’s philosophical practice is claimed to be in the interest of precisely
the people who have brought him to court on the assumption that it harms them. And
it is for this reason that Socrates states here that it would be pointless to try and con-
vince the judges of his own right in this way.
With the temporal adverb νῦν
The final important deictic expression that needs to be addressed here is the demon-
strative adverb νῦν (‘now’), since δή has a rather close interaction with this adverb.40
I will discuss a number of possible ways in which I believe this combination can be
used. First, there are cases in which δή is best interpreted as a temporal focus modifier
along the lines described in section 6.4.1 above. In such cases then, νῦν is a focused
constituent and the combination is to be seen as equivalent to Dutch nú al, German
jétzt schon and English even nów, as in the following example:
(169) [Nicias advises the Athenians on the Sicilian expedition.] So much Nicias said, think-
ing that he would deter the Athenians by the multitude of his requirements, or, if he
should be forced to make the expedition, he would in this way set out most safely.
They, however, were not diverted from their eagerness for the voyage by reason of
40. See e.g. lsj s.v. νῦν δή, and Denniston (1954: 206–207).
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the burdensomeness of the equipment, but were far more bent upon it; and the re-
sult was just the opposite of what he had expected.
εὖ τε γὰρ παραινέσαι ἔδοξε καὶ ἀσφάλεια νῦν δή καὶ πολλὴ ἔσεσθαι.
For it seemed to them that he had given good advice and that the security would be
abundant even/already (δή) now. (Th. 6.24.2)
In this example, the issue at stake is the exact moment at which there is enough secu-
rity for Athens to launch an expedition to Sicily. Whereas the Athenian general Nicias
is rather cautious in this respect, showing thatmany preparations still need to bemade
for a safe expedition, the Athenians citizens rather believe that there is already enough
safety at the moment of Nicias’s speech (the story-now), i.e. much sooner than was to
be expected on the basis of Nicias’s advice.
Second, there are examples in which I find it more attractive to interpret δή as an
identifying fm, in line with the examples presented in the preceding sections on δή
with other deictic expressions. In that case, νῦν δή would be comparable to Dutch juist
nu, German gerade jetzt and English now of all times.
(170) … if the soul is immortal then it needs attending to, not only for the sake of this period
of time in which what we call life occurs, but for all time,
καὶ ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει.
and it is precisely (δή) now that the danger also appears to be terrible if you’re going
to neglect it … (Pl. Phd. 107c)
(171) “… but whatever could the remaining [quality] be which would allow the state to
share still further in excellence? I think that this is clearly justice.” – “Clearly.”
– οὐκοῦν, ὦ Γλαύκων, νῦν δὴ ἡμᾶς δεῖ ὥσπερ κυνηγέτας τινὰς θάμνον κύκλῳ περιίστασθαι
προσέχοντας τὸν νοῦν, μή πῃ διαφύγῃ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀφανισθεῖσα ἄδηλος γένηται. φα-
νερὸν γὰρ δὴ ὅτι ταύτῃ πῃ ἔστιν·
– Isn’t it the case then, Glaucon, that precisely (δή) now is the time (of all times) that
we must surround the covert like huntsmen and concentrate to ensure that justice
does not escape and disappear out of sight? For it’s clear, after all, that it’s somewhere
about the place. (Pl. R. 432b–c)
In (170), Socrates wishes to emphasize that good care of the soul is important right
now, i.e. at the very moment at which one is alive. The time at which negligence of
the soul is dangerous is here explicitly identified with the time at which one is alive
(including the moment of utterance). Example (171), in turn, is taken from Plato’s Re-
public, thedialogue about thenatureof justice.Havingdiscussed threeother important
virtues, they now arrive at the moment at which justice can be examined and defined.
Put differently, the moment of utterance is here explicitly identified with a moment
that was already anticipated for a while.
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I now turn to the third use of νῦν δή, which is by far the most frequent one. In
these cases, νῦν δή refers to a point in time just before the moment of utterance (‘a
moment ago’). As such, it can be compared to expressions such as English just now or
Dutch nu net. It should be noted that in this usage the combination is often printed as
one single lexeme νυνδή, i.e. as a fixed, grammaticalized expression that has undergone
univerbation (see section 2.3.2).41 Some typical examples are the following:
(172) [Odysseus to his father, deceivingly:] And tell me this also truly, that I may be sure
εἰ ἐτεόν γ᾿ Ἰθάκην τήνδ᾿ ἱκόμεθ᾿, ὥς μοι ἔειπεν
οὗτος ἀνὴρ νῦν δὴ ξυμβλήμενος ἐνθάδ᾿ ἰόντι.
whether this is really Ithaca to which we have now come, as this man told me who
met me just (δή) now on my way here. (Od. 24.258–260)
(173) οὐδ᾿ ἄρα ὠφελείας, ὦ ἑταῖρε· ἄλλῃ γὰρ αὖ ἀπέδομεν τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον τέχνῃ νύνδη· ἦ γάρ;
Nor then [will temperance be a producer] of benefit, my good friend; for this work,
again, we assigned to another art just now (νύνδη), did we not? (Pl. Chrm. 175a)
(174) a. Or shall I propose a fine, with imprisonment until it is paid?
ἀλλὰ ταὐτόν μοί ἐστιν, ὅπερ νύνδη ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι χρήματα, ὁπόθεν ἐκτίσω.
But that is the very same as what I said just now (νύνδη), for I have no money to
pay with. (Pl. Ap. 37c)
b. δεῖ … τοῦτον μάλιστα τιμᾶσθαί τε καί, ὅπερ εἶπον νύνδη, τὰ νικητήρια φέρειν.
that man should be awarded the highest honour and, as I said just now (νύνδη),
take the prize of victory. (Pl. Lg. 657e)
As can be seen in (172), this particular use already occurs as early as Homeric epic.
But it is most frequent in Platonic dialogue, where speakers often refer back to what
has been discussed in the dialogue a bit earlier, as in (173) and (174). As such, the
construction often shows up in parenthetical constructions with verbs of speech (‘as
we just now said’), as in (174).
What is characteristic of this use of νῦν δή (νύνδη) is the fact that it by definition
occurs in clauses that make reference to the past (e.g. with imperfect or aorist verbs).
In such contexts, indeed, νῦν can no longer be interpreted as making reference to the
actual moment of utterance, but automatically shifts to some point before now. It ap-
41. As I have indicated earlier (see section 1.4.3), it is difficult to obtain definite answers in this respect
and there is considerable variation in the printing practice of modern editions. I refer to Rijksbaron
(2007: 64–68) for an elaborate discussion of the history of νυνδή, which goes back to the 19th-century
scholar Cobet. He also demonstrates that, if the pattern is printed as one fixed phrase, the correct form
must really be paroxytone νύνδη (in line with ἤδη), rather than oxytone νυνδή. I have followed this accen-
tuation in the examples given here.
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pears that δή is addedhere,with its originalmeaningof exactness, to further emphasize
that the moment is still very close to now. In addition, it seems that the combination
has been used so frequently in this type of linguistic context that it wasmore andmore
felt as a fixed idiomatic construction,which in turnmight evenhave coalesced into one
single lexeme (see above). Here we may also compare the development of the English
idiom just now.
As far as Ancient Greek is concerned, indeed, there is also some interesting formal
evidence for the relatively fixed nature of νῦν δή in this particular use. This is first of all
suggested by examples such as the following:
(175) nurse. What whirling words are these you utter again in your frenzy?
νῦν δὴ μὲν ὄρος βᾶσ ̓ ἐπὶ θήρας
πόθον ἐστέλλου, νῦν δ’ αὖ ψαμάθοις
ἐπ ̓ ἀκυμάντοις πώλων ἔρασαι.
Just amoment ago (νῦν δή), on the one hand (μέν), you are off going to themountains
to the hunt you long for, but (δέ) now, on the other hand (αὖ), you yearn for horses
on the sands not reached by the waves. (E. Hipp. 232–235)
(176) ἄναγε τοίνυν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, εἰς τοὐπίσω· νῦν δὴ γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὸ ἑξῆς ἐλάβομεν τῇ γεωμετρίᾳ.
“Then go back a bit,” I said. “For (γάρ) just now (νῦν δή) we didn’t get the subject to
follow geometry in the right way.” (Pl. R. 528a)
In these examples, it is remarkable that δή precedes the discourse-connective parti-
cles μέν and γάρ respectively, whereas the rule is that it should follow them within a
postpositive cluster (see section 4.3.3). It thus seems that νῦν δή has indeed developed
into a fixed construction, which in turn could serve as a prosodic host for postpositives
such as μέν and γάρ.42
42. It should be noted that in such examples the uncommonposition of δή has brought editors to doubt
the soundness of δή. That is, editors have proposed to delete δή, even when no variants are reported in
themanuscripts. In example (176), for instance, δή is bracketed in themost recent oct-edition by Slings
(2003), who formulates themain reasons for deleting δή as follows: “There is no (other) instance of νῦν δὴ
γάρ in Plato. And above all, δὴ γάρ for γὰρ δή is suspect in any Greek author after Homer. Besides, I do not
see any use for δή, which marks statements as self-evident, in this passage, …” (Slings 2005: 127–128).
Slings thus interprets δή as having clausal or sentence scope in this case – in which case I would agree
with him that the order δὴ γάρ is suspect – but he too easily discards the possibility of δή having phrasal
scope over νῦν in this case, the very reason of printing univerbated νυνδή in other cases. The fact that
there are only a few similar examples (see above) is due, I would say, to the fact that the collocation νῦν
δή does simply not occur in sentence-initial position very often. To conclude, I see no need for changing
the reading of the manuscripts, all the more because there are no reported variants.
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A second argument for treating νῦν δή as a fixed pattern is the fact that the combi-
nation itself may be substantivized (τὰ νῦν δή ‘the things [mentioned] just now’), as in
the following examples:
(177) a. εἰ μὲν οὖν σύ με ἠρώτας τι τῶν νύνδη, οἷον …
Now if you asked me about one of the things mentioned just now (νύνδη), such
as … (Pl. Euthphr. 12d)
b. ldots εἰς πάντα τὰ νύνδη καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας, …
…after looking at all the thingsmentioned just now (νύνδη) and others like them,
… (Pl. Prm. 135b)
On the basis of such evidence, I conclude that the patternmay indeed be regarded as a
fixed, possibly univerbated, construction, in which δή does no longer have a semantic
contribution on its own. The whole construction has become an adverbial expression
referring to some time just before the moment of utterance.
All in all, I believe that the use of δή with demonstrative and deictic expressions can
be explained in a fairly univocal way, as it highlights a particular referential expression
in contrast to a set of contextually relevant alternatives. It occurs especially in identifi-
cation contexts and can thus be analyzed as a marker of focused assertion of identity,
contributing meanings of exactness (‘precisely, just, right’).
6.4.3 With indefinite expressions
The next pattern in which δή unambiguously scopes over a phrasal constituent is its
collocation with indefinite expressions such as τις/τι, ποτε or ὅστις, i.e. phrases which
are involved with indefinite reference. The use of δή with this type of phrases does not
occur as much as some of its other usages, but from the 5th-century onwards it oc-
curs often enough to consider it as a distinct pattern, which is indeed done so in older
particle handbooks and lexica.43 Somewhat surprisingly, however, it is but rarelymen-
tioned, let alone more thoroughly discussed, in more recent accounts of the particle.
In my opinion, however, in giving a full-fledged account of δή, this particular use
should certainly not be put aside. Even if some of the combinations may be fixed (i.e.
grammaticalized) constructions, we should try to give an account of how such a con-
struction came intobeing,why δή endedup tobe apart of it andhow this canbe related
to its other usages. In the present section, indeed, I aim to examine these questions in
somewhat more detail.
43. See e.g. Powell (1938: s.v. δή l) and Denniston (1954: 212–213).
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With standard indefinites
We first of all find the particle with standard indefinite pronouns or determiners of the
τις/τι-type and indefinite adverbs such as κ-/ποτε. Let us look at a number of examples
first:
(178) … ἐνθαῦτα καταβὰς κατὰ δή τι πρῆγμα ὁ Ἑρμότιμος ἐς γῆν τὴν Μυσίην, τὴν Χῖοι μὲν νέ-
μονται Ἀταρνεὺς δὲ καλέεται, εὑρίσκει τὸν Πανιώνιον ἐνθαῦτα.
… at that time Hermotimus came down for a certain (δή τι) business to the part
of Mysia that is inhabited by Chians and called Atarneus, and there he found
Panionius. (Hdt. 8.106.1)
(179) [Phaedime is ordered to feel whether the Magian Smerdis has ears or not.]
ἣ μὲν δὴ ὑπεδέξατο ταῦτα τῷ πατρὶ κατεργάσεσθαι. τοῦ δὲ Μάγου τούτου τοῦ Σμέρδιος
Κῦρος ὁ Καμβύσεω ἄρχων τὰ ὦτα ἀπέταμε ἐπ᾿ αἰτίῃ δή τινι οὐ σμικρῇ.
So she promised to achieve her father’s bidding. As to this Magian Smerdis, Cyrus
son of Cambyses had in his reign cut off his ears for some grave reason or other (δή
τινι). (Hdt. 3.69.5)
(180) λέγεται δὲ οὕτως, ὡς ἄρα τελευτήσαντα ἕκαστον ὁ ἑκάστου δαίμων … ἄγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ εἰς
δή τινα τόπον, οἷ δεῖ τοὺς συλλεγέντας διαδικασαμένους εἰς Ἅιδου πορεύεσαι …
And so it is said that after death, the tutelary genius of each person … leads him to a
certain (δή τινα) placewhere the dead are gathered together and, having been judged,
must depart to the other world … (Pl. Phd. 107d–e)
(181) Do you thenwant us to examine howpeople of this sort [sc. people who will best guard
the state] will come to exist and how we shall lead them up to the light,
ὥσπερ ἐξ Ἅιδου λέγονται δή τινες εἰς θεοὺς ἀνελθεῖν;
just as certain people (δή τινες) are said to make their way up from Hades to the
gods? (Pl. R. 521c)
Before looking at the semantic side of the picture, two preliminary remarks should
be made here concerning the position of δή. First, it should be recalled from chap-
ter 4 that in Ancient Greek indefinite pronouns and determiners belong to the group
of r-postpositives. Given the fact that, within a postpositive cluster, particles generally
precede r-postpositives, it is in fact possible that δή does not take the usual peninitial
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position within the phrase it scopes over. Indeed, whereas in (178) δή takes the usual
peninitial position within the phrase it modifies (i.e. κατὰ= δή τι πρῆγμα), in example
(181) the particle rather takes phrase-initial position (δή τινες).44
Second, as we have seen before, in the given examples it is clear that δή has phrasal
scopedue to the clause-internal position of the constituent itself. However, it should be
emphasized that inmany other cases postpositive clusters such as δή τις/τι are found at
the start of a new clause or sentence, so that the scope of δή is in principle ambiguous.
For instance, in conditional clauses starting with εἰ δή τις, we can never be sure – on
the basis of strictly formal grounds at least – whether δή scopes only over the indefi-
nite phrase τις or over the full εἰ-clause, the co-occurrence with τις just being a matter
of coincident collocation of two clausal postpositives. As indicated earlier, we should
definitely be aware of such scopal ambiguities in the analysis of δή’s functions. In the
present section, I will concentrate on the unambiguous cases of δή + indefinite.
Nowwhy is the particle added to these indefinite phrases and what is its semantic
contribution? It is telling in this respect that δή is found only with indefinites that are
specific in nature. I thus propose that δή is added to the indefinite phrase to explicitly
encode the specific indefinite interpretation, signaling that the speaker has a uniquely
identifiable referent inmind. In this way, a nonspecific, generic or free-choice interpre-
tation is explicitly ruled out.Wemay compare thismeaning of δή to that of, e.g., English
a certain, a particular, Dutch een zekere, een bepaalde andGerman ein bestimmter. Here
it should be noted that Ancient Greek does not have a special series of pronouns to en-
code the semantic differences between indefinite pronouns – as opposed to a language
like Latin, which distinguishes between qui-dam, ali-quis, quis-quam, qui-vis and other
pronominal series. It may thus not come as a surprise that particles may be used to
encode some of these semantic distinctions.45 This use of δή as a marker of specificity
may in turn be related to its use as a particularizing focus modifier (‘in particular’; to
be discussed in section 6.4.4 below), and with the meaning aspects of exactness (see
sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 above).
Itmust be emphasized, however, that thismay just not be thewhole story. An addi-
tionalmeaning aspect that appears to arise inmany of the examples is that the speaker
is not able or does not care to identify the specific referent inmore precise terms. That
is, the speakermay not know the exact identity of the referent s/he has inmind ormay
44. In such cases, I assume that the phrase as awhole (i.e. both δή and the indefinite pronounor adverb)
is postpositive in nature, taking a peninitial position within the clause in which the phrase functions as
a constituent.
45. I refer to Haspelmath (1997) for a useful typology of indefinite pronouns and the kind of contexts
in which they can be used.
559416-L-bw-Thijs
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 344
330 Chapter 6. The particle δή
simply be indifferent about it (cf. Denniston 1954: 212–213). This appears to hold,
for instance, for examples such as (178) and (179), where the referent of the indefinite
phrase is just a minor detail that is not relevant to the current episode of the narrative.
The semantic feature ‘speaker-unknown’ can in turn be reflected in translations such
as ‘some- or other’, as I have done here (cf. Haspelmath 1997).
With relative-based indefinites
With regard to the ‘speaker-unknown’ feature, it is useful to pay some further atten-
tion to the cases in which δή co-occurs with relative-based indefinite forms, i.e. with
indefinite relatives such as ὅστις, ὅπου, ὅπως, ὁποῖος and ὁπόσος.46 Interestingly, these
indefinite relatives may be combined with δή in ‘elliptical’ or compressed construc-
tions. In such instances, indefinite relative + δή does not introduce a full relative sub-
ordinate clause, but rather behaves as an indefinite pronoun or determiner in its own
right. Some examples of this particular type of indefinites are the following:47
(182) [The Greek soldiers have finally reached the sea.] And when all had reached the sum-
mit, then indeed they fell to embracing one another, and generals and captains as
well, with tears in their eyes.
καὶ ἐξαπίνης ὅτου δὴ παρεγγυήσαντος οἱ στρατιῶται φέρουσι λίθους καὶ ποιοῦσι κολωνὸν
μέγαν.
And suddenly, at the bidding of someone or other (ὅτου δή), the soldiers began to
bring stones and to build a great cairn. (X. An. 4.7.25)
(183) πρὶν γὰρ ἐξελθεῖν ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου, ἐμπεσόντος ἀνθρώπου τινὸς Ταναγραίου πρὸς κα-
τεγγύην, γραμματεῖον ἔχοντος, προσελθὼν καὶ λαλῶν ὁτιδήποθ ̓ ὑφαιρεῖται τὸ γραμματεῖ-
ον.
For before Aristogeiton was released from prison, a man of Tanagra was thrown
into the prison until he could find bail, and he had a pocket-book. Aristogeiton ac-
costs him and, while chatting on something or other (ὁτιδήποτε), filches the pocket-
book. (D. 25.60)
46. See e.g. Denniston (1954: 220–221) and Bentein (2014).
47. It should be noted that we also find the indefinite temporal adverb ποτε (‘ever’) added to the con-
struction. This full construction, in turn, is sometimes printed as one single lexeme, but there is dramatic
variation in editorial practice in this respect. The particle may be printed as a fully distinct word, it may
be attached to the preceding relative, attached to a following ποτε or to the both of them. See also sec-
tion 1.4.3. I just follow the practice of the editions used here.
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(184) [Thucydides elaborates for a while on the possible intentions Tissaphernes could have
had when he went to Aspendus.]
ἐς δ᾿ οὖν τὴν Ἄσπενδον ᾗτινι δὴ γνώμῃ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης ἀφικνεῖται καὶ τοῖς Φοίνιξι ξυγγί-
γνεται·
But at any rate (δ’ οὖν) Tissaphernes went to Aspendus with some intention or other
(ἧτινι δή) and conferred with the Phoenicians. (Th. 8.87.1)
(185) ἐς τοῦτο δὲ ἐλθεῖν Χέοπα κακότητος ὥστε χρημάτων δεόμενον τὴν θυγατέρα τὴν ἑωυτοῦ
κατίσαντα ἐπ᾿ οἰκήματος προστάξαι πρήσσεσθαι ἀργύριον ὁκόσον δή τι· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό
γε ἔλεγον.
And so evil a man was Cheops that for lack of money he made his own daughter to
sit in a chamber and exact payment however much (ὁκόσον δή τι); for, you see, they
didn’t tell me that. (Hdt. 2.126.1)
In each of these examples, it is clear that the referent of the pronoun is not known to
the speaker or is at least not judged to be ofmajor importance for his current purposes.
Thus, in (182) it does not really seem to matter who it was that gave the order to build
a cairn; in fact, Xenophon might have well forgotten this or might not deem it signif-
icant information. Similarly, in (183), what Aristogeiton was chatting about with the
prisoner is presented as an insignificant detail andDemosthenes clearlywants to focus
on the very act of filching. In (184), Thucydides has just been elaborating for awhile on
the variety of possible intentions that Tissaphernes could have had when he went to
Aspendus. It is clear then that he does not know the actual intentions of Tissaphernes.
At the given point in discourse, he puts the issue aside and continues with the main
line of his story (note also δ’ οὖν ‘but anyway’). And in (185), Herodotus even explic-
itly explains why he is ignorant about the identity of the indefinite referent (i.e. the
size of a certain payment), viz. because his source did not give him the appropriate in-
formation. Indeed, this meaning aspect of ‘speaker-unknown’ or ‘speaker-indifference’
appears to be present in all cases of relative-based indefinites + δή, and it can thus be
considered as part of the encoded meaning of the construction.
In fact, this state of affairs need not surprise us if we look at the diachronic ori-
gin of this type of indefinite pronouns. As has been shown in the cross-linguistic study
of Haspelmath (1997: ch.6), indefinite pronouns often arise from full-fledged clausal
constructions by means of a process of grammaticalization. One of the clausal source
constructions he mentions are so-called ‘no-matter clauses’ or ‘universal concessive
conditionals’ (henceforth uccs; cf. Haspelmath & König 1998). These are interrog-
ative-based clauses that consist of a condition that is irrelevant for the larger point
being made in the main clause (e.g. whoever he is, whatever it was, no matter what it
was). Some relevant examples of such uccs in Ancient Greek are the following:
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(186) [Ariston fancies Agetus’s wife. He makes Agetus to agree to give each other a present:
each of them may choose whatever he wants from the possessions of the other.]
μετὰ δὲ αὐτός τε ὁ Ἀρίστων ἔδωκε τοῦτο, ὅτι δὴ ἦν τὸ εἵλετο τῶν κειμηλίων τῶν Ἀρίστωνος
ὁ Ἄγητος, καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν ὁμοίην ζητέων φέρεσθαι παρ ̓ ἐκείνου, ἐνθαῦτα δὴ τοῦ ἑταίρου τὴν
γυναῖκα ἐπειρᾶτο ἀπάγεσθαι.
Then, Ariston himself gave that thing –whatever (ὅτι δή) it was that Agetus chose out
of Ariston’s treasures – and when he himself was looking for a recompense that he
was fain to win from him, at that point indeed he essayed to take away his friend’s
wife. (Hdt. 6.62.2)
(187) [The rhetorician Tisias has said that the art of speech involves aiming at probability,
defined as that which most people think.]
σω. φεῦ, δεινῶς γ ̓ ἔοικεν ἀποκεκρυμμένην τέχνην ἀνευρεῖν ὁ Τισίας ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις δή ποτ ̓
ὢν τυγχάνει καὶ ὁπόθεν χαίρει ὀνομαζόμενος.
socrates. Oh, a wonderfully hidden art it seems to be which Tisias has invented, or
some other, whosoever (ὅστις δή ποτ’) he happens to be and whatever country he is
proud to call his own. (Pl. Phdr. 273c)
(188) Now if Timocrates would not be liable to prosecution on every count, if he had not
contravened every one of these directions when he introduced his law,
ἓν ἂν αὐτοῦ τις ἐποιεῖτο κατηγόρημα, ὅτι δήποτε τοῦτ ̓ ἦν·
a single charge would be preferred against him, whatever (ὅτι δήποτε) this would
be. (D. 24.19)
Like the pronominal construction exemplified above, these uccs encode a meaning
aspect of ‘speaker-unknown’, indifference or irrelevance. Thus, in (186), the exact iden-
tity of the particular present that was chosen by Agetus from Ariston’s possessions is
not relevant for the main point of the story (how Ariston obtained Agetus’s wife); in-
deed, Herodotus might just not know this detail. However, the existence of a specific
present is presupposed here: linguistic evidence of this interpretation is provided by
the cleft construction and the past tense ἦν (‘was’). Similarly, in (187), it is presupposed
that there exists someuniquely identifiable individual (note the present tense τυγχάνει
ὄν ‘happens to be’) who invented the rhetorical technique in question. But his iden-
tity is unknown to the speaker: it may be Tisias or someone else. And in (188), which
consists of an irrealis-construction, Demosthenes wants to contrast a counterfactual
situation, in which he would lay just a single charge, to the actual situation, in which
he lays multiple charges. What this single charge would have consisted of is presented
as irrelevant.
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Now, as demonstrated by Haspelmath & König (1998), there are a number of
structural features that typically occur in uccs across languages, including scalar fo-
cus particles, ‘emphatic’ particles (now, then etc.) and temporal adverbs meaning ever.
And such features are in turn commonly found as fixed elements of the grammatical-
ized indefinite pronouns that derive from them (cf. Dutch wie dan ook, wie ook maar
andGermanwerauch immer). It is thushighly plausible, I contend, that a similar gram-
maticalization process has taken place inAncientGreek aswell, which in turn explains
the presence of δή and ποτε in the relative-based pronominal constructions cited in
(182) to (185) above.48 These items are simply to be taken as remnants of the original
clausal source constructions of the type cited in (186) to (188), and they may indeed
be taken as no longer making a semantic contribution on their own. As I take it then,
it is not δή itself that marks the meaning aspect of ‘speaker-unknown’ or irrelevance,
but the grammaticalized pronominal construction as a whole.49
The real question to be answered, then, is why δή shows up in the clausal source
construction in the first place and how it can be related with the other usages dis-
cussed in the present chapter. This is not an easy question to answer, however, as the
examples are limited in number. Yet two plausible options can be mentioned here, I
believe.50 First, given the fact that uccs are interrogative-based constructions, a con-
nection could bemadewith the use of δή inwh-questions as discussed in section 6.2.3.
Recall that particles (originally) meaning ‘now’ or ‘then’ are more often found in uccs
cross-linguistically. Second, it would be attractive tomake a connectionwith the use of
δή as a focus modifier as discussed in the preceding sections. As noted above, (scalar)
focus modifiers, too, are cross-linguistically quite common elements in uccs.
48. Interestingly, the fully grammaticalized pronoun οτιδήποτε still survives in modern Greek, viz. as a
free choice pronoun meaning ‘anything’. See e.g. Haspelmath (1997: 266).
49. Let me note here that we also find a relative-based indefinite pronoun featuring the particle οὖν/ὦν.
In fact, expressions such as ὁστισοῦν (‘anyone’), ὁποτεροσοῦν (‘anyone of the two’) and ὁπωσοῦν (‘in any
way’) are quite regular idioms in classical Greek (cf. Denniston 1954: 422, Monteil 1963: 131–133,
Bentein 2014). Although I have not systematically compared the two different constructionsmentioned
here (i.e. those with δή(ποτε) and those with οὖν), it seems that they are in complementary distribution,
not unlike the division of labour between the some- and any- pronominal series in English. Thus, ὁστισ-
οῦν etc. is used as a genuine free choice pronoun (‘anything whatsoever’) or occurs in negative polarity
contexts, whereas ὁστισδή(ποτε) etc. is a specific, ‘speaker-unknown’ pronoun (‘some- or other’), which
does never occur in such contexts. More systematic research is needed, however, to corroborate these
suggestions.
50. Itmay also beworthwhile to connectmy researchmore systematically with Probert’s (2015) study
on Greek relative clauses – which I leave for future research.
559416-L-bw-Thijs
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 348
334 Chapter 6. The particle δή
At any rate, whatever option we choose, we should take into account that the se-
mantics of δή in the original source construction is most probably no longer present
in the pronominal indefinite construction, in which it has become a fixed element of
a larger idiom. It is not entirely clear, however, whether the same holds true for δή in
its use with standard (non-relative) indefinites. Here the particle still appears to con-
tribute a meaning of its own (‘particular’), as I have proposed above.
6.4.4 In combination with καί
In this final subsection, I willmake a number of remarks on the cases of clause-internal
δή in combination with καί (‘and, also, even’). First, I will discuss clause-internal καὶ
δή, which appears to be a fixed combination that functions as a special type of scalar
focus modifier. Then, I will turn to the combination καὶ δὴ καί, which can be used as a
particularizing focus construction.
Clause-internal καὶ δή
Interestingly, there are examples of the combination καὶ δή in clause-internal position
in which both particles seem to have constituent or phrasal scope. Like the examples
discussed in section 6.4.1 above, the phrase in question can usually be construed as
a focused expression, and I take it that καὶ δή must in turn be seen as a scalar focus
modifier, whichmarks the focus value as ranking higher on some contextually relevant
scale than the alternatives under consideration. As we have seen earlier, such markers
further suggest that the focus value is remarkable or goes against expectations. Let us
look at three typical examples first:
(189) [Cyaxares and Cyrus devise a plan: using a hunting party as a pretext, they will bring
troops to the border and then suddenly attack the enemy.]
ὁπότε δὲ σὺ προεληλυθοίης σὺν ᾗ ἔχοις δυνάμει καὶ θηρῴης καὶ δὴ δύο ἡμέρας, πέμψαιμι
ἄν σοι ἱκανοὺς ἱππέας καὶ πεζοὺς τῶν παρʼ ἐμοὶ ἡθροισμένων, οὓς σὺ λαβὼν εὐθὺς ἂν ἴοις,
…
And when you have gone ahead with the forces you have and have been hunting
already even (καὶ δή) for two days, I will send you a sufficient number of the cavalry
and infantry that are mustered with me, which you may take and make an inroad at
once, … (X. Cyr. 2.4.17)
(190) As for the Athenians and those whose place was nearest them, that is, for about half
of the line, their way lay over the beach and level ground; for the Lacedaemonians
and those that were next to them, their way lay through a ravine and among hills.
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ἐν ᾧ δὲ {οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι} ἔτι περιήισαν οὗτοι, οἱ ἐπὶ τῷ ἑτέρῳ κέρεϊ καὶ δὴ ἐμάχοντο.
And while these were still making a circuit, those on the other wing were already
even (καὶ δή) fighting. (Hdt. 9.102.1)
(191) Nowthiswashow theAthenianshadcrossedover to Salamis.As longas they expected
that the Peloponnesian army would come to their aid, they remained in Attica.
ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ μὲν μακρότερα καὶ σχολαίτερα ἐποίεον, ὁ δὲ ἐπιὼν καὶ δὴ ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίῃ ἐλέγετο
εἶναι, οὕτω δὴ ὑπεξεκομίσαντό τε πάντα καὶ αὐτοὶ διέβησαν ἐς Σαλαμῖνα, …
But when the Peloponnesians took longer and longer to act and the invader was said
to be already even (καὶ δή) in Boeotia, then indeed they conveyed all their goods out
of harms way and themselves crossed over to Salamis, … (Hdt. 9.6)
In (189), καὶ δή signals that Cyaxares evaluates the focus value ‘two days’ as a rather
long period of time on a scale specifying the duration of a hunting party. In (190),
in turn, καὶ δή signals that the value of the focused expression ἐμάχοντο (‘they were
fighting’) ranks higher on a temporal scale than the state of affairs expressed in the
preceding clause, viz. making a circuit. In the order of events at battle, making a cir-
cuit normally precedes the actual fighting. In this way, the narrator emphasizes the
remarkability of the described situation, in which one part of the army is still making
preparationswhereas another is already fighting the enemy (cf. also ἔτι ‘still’ in the pre-
ceding clause). And in (191), finally, καὶ δή evokes a scale that specifies the movement
of the Persian army through the Greekmainland, which at the same time also involves
movement through time. The combination thus signals that the focus value ἐν τῇ Βοι-
ωτίῃ (‘in Boeotia’) is evaluated as ranking high on that scale: the Persians are already
even further on their way through Greece than the Peloponnesians had expected.
Now, as we have seen earlier, both particles can in fact also be used as evaluative
scalar fms in their own right (see sections 2.7.3 and 6.4.1). This obviously raises the
question what their individual semantic contributions are in this particular construc-
tion. Or, put differently, how does the combination καὶ δή differ from solitary δή one
the one hand, and from solitary καί on the other? I have to admit that it is not easy
to come up with straightforward and definite answers here, but in the following I will
nevertheless make a number of suggestions.
First of all, it should be noted that combinations of two focus modifiers are in
fact not at all uncommon cross-linguistically. Usually, one particle can then be seen
as taking scope over the other (see König 1991a for examples). A second crucial ob-
servation here, I believe, is that in the cases involving καὶ δή the contextually relevant
scale is generally of a temporal nature, a phenomenonwhichwe encountered earlier in
our discussion of solitary δή in its collocation with inherently scalar expressions (sec-
tion 6.4.1). What δή appears to add to the combination then, I propose, is the explicit
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association with a temporal scale (roughly ‘already’), whereas καί has its regular addi-
tive scalar meaning (‘even’).51 We may compare this to combinations such as Dutch
zelfs al and German sogar schon.52 Again, a comparison with the use of the cognate
ἤδη (and the combination καὶ ἤδη) may be interesting here, which I leave for further
research. What’s clear, at any rate, is that the combination καὶ δή functions as an eval-
uative focus modifier that specifically interacts with temporal scales.
At this point, Iwould like to emphasize that examples very similar to the ones given
so far can in fact also be found outside the genre of historiography, notably in classical
drama.Here, we even find some evidence that the combination is used as a rather fixed
adverbial construction. Consider the following two examples:
(192) antigone. But I think there is no need to go, for I see a man here near us.
οι. ἦ δεῦρο προστείχοντα κἀξωρμημένον;
αν. καὶ δὴ μὲν οὖν παρόντα· χὤ τι σοι λέγειν
εὔκαιρόν ἐστιν, ἔννεφ’, ὡς ἁνὴρ ὅδε.
oedipus. Is he advancing in this direction? – ant. Actually (μὲν οὖν), he is already
even (καὶ δή) present! Say whatever the moment calls for, since the man is here.
(S. OC 28–32)
(193) trygaeus. [to slave] Then go fetch the victim as quick as you can, and I’ll provide us
an altar for the sacrifice. – chorus. [sung] Surely all that Godwills and fortune favors
goes forward according to plan, with one success leading to another at just the right
time.
τρ. ὡς ταῦτα δῆλά γ’ ἔσθ’· ὁ γὰρ βωμὸς θύρασι καὶ δή.
try. How evident that is. Cos’ here is the altar even right (καὶ δή) in front of the door.
[pointing at the stage altar] (Ar. Pax 937–942)
What is conspicuous in (192), for one thing, is that καὶ δή occurs in front of the post-
positive cluster μὲν οὖν, whereas wewould normally expect δή to follow μέν in a cluster.
In view of this unconventional position of δή, we may thus conclude that δή is rather
closely tied to the preceding καί here (see rule (v) in section 4.4). In (193), on the other
hand, the combination rather occurs at the very end of the clause; this is in fact quite
remarkable as it normally precedes the focused expressions (καί being a prepositive ex-
51. It thus seems that solitary δή cannot be usedwith focused expressions that are not inherently scalar
in nature (as in (190) and (191) above). Here scalar καί appears to be needed in addition.
52. English already even appears to be rather forced tome, but I have used it nonetheless inmy transla-
tions of the examples given above. In general, English already is much less flexible than its counterparts
in other Western languages. See König (1991a: ch. 7).
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pression; cf. section 4.2). Again, this leads to the conclusion that καὶ δή has become a
relatively fixed adverbial expression, which has gained more freedom from a prosodic
point of view.
But whatever the exact status of the combination, the analysis proposed above
also appears to hold for many examples of καὶ δή in drama. In (192), for instance, the
combination again interactswith a temporal scale. TheblindOedipus askswhether the
stranger is coming theirway,whereas thisman is in fact alreadypresent, i.e. earlier than
Oedipus had expected. And in (193), the combination seems to signal that Trygaeus
has been able to provide for an altar much earlier than he expected, as he actually hits
upon the altar that is already present on the stage. Two other typical examples:
(194) [Athena tells Odysseus that during the night Ajax set forth to kill him and the other Greek
commanders.]
oδ. ἦ καὶ παρέστη κἀπὶ τέρμ’ ἀφίκετο;
αθ. καὶ δὴ ’πὶ δισσαῖς ἦν στρατηγίσιν πύλαις.
odysseus. Did he really get there and arrive at his goal? – athena. He was already
even (καὶ δή) at the gates of the two commanders. (S. Aj. 48–49)
(195) [Lyssa, the goddess of mad rage, is describing how she will drive Heracles mad and make
him kill his own children.]
ἢν ἰδού· καὶ δὴ τινάσσει κρᾶτα βαλβίδων ἄπο
καὶ διαστρόφους ἑλίσσει σῖγα γοργωποὺς κόρας,
ἀμπνοὰς δ’ οὐ σωφρονίζει, ταῦρος ὣς ἐς ἐμβολήν, …
Ah look there! He is already even (καὶ δή) shaking his head about, having left the
starting gate, and he is silently rolling his fierce eyes out of their sockets; his breathing
is disquieted, like a bull about to charge, and he bellows frightfully, …
(E. HF 867–869)
In (194), καὶ δή evokes a scale that specifies the nightly movement of Ajax towards the
commanders he intended to kill. The particles signal that Athena evaluates the focused
value as ranking high: ‘he was already even at the gates’, i.e. he was already remarkably
close. This example is highly similar to example (191) fromHerodotus, in my opinion.
And in (195), finally, Lyssa has just announced how she will drive Heracles mad. With
καὶ δή she indicates, in my view, that the first indications of this madness are already
taking place at the moment of speaking, i.e. sooner than might have been expected.53
53. I do not agree with Denniston’s description that καὶ δή “signifies, vividly and dramatically, that
something is actually taken place at the moment” and “mark[s] vivid perception by mind, ear, or eye:
‘lo!’, ‘hark!’, ‘see there!’” (1954: 250–251). The actuality rather derives from the use of the present tense, I
believe. Furthermore, translations such as ‘see there‘ or ‘look’ aremuchmore appropriate for interjection-
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Let me finish this section by stating that there has been quite some scholarly de-
bate on the question whether καὶ δή may be understood as the near-equivalent of ἤδη
and accordingly could mean ‘already’ (see van Erp Taalman Kip 2009 and references
therein). One of the main difficulties in this respect is that καὶ δή often occurs at the
very start of clauses or sentences – especially so in drama– so that it is difficult to assess
whether καί is to be understood as adverbial ‘also, even’ or rather as connective ‘and’. In
the latter case, καὶ δή may be read as conveying a meaning of rhetorical strengthening
(‘and indeed’, ‘what’s more’), as we have seen in section 6.2.1 above. Given the possi-
bility of connective καί, van Erp Taalman Kip (2009: 127f.) strongly doubts whether
καὶ δή can ever mean ‘already’. In view of the examples from historiography, however
– which van Erp Taalman Kip leaves out of consideration altogether – I am inclined to
take the opposite stance. In those examples, as I have shown in the present section, καὶ
δή can only be read as an adverbial focusmodifier and the relevant scales are temporal
in nature. And I see no compelling reason why the combination should not so be used
in classical drama as well. What’s more, I believe that even δή in itself (i.e. without καί)
semantically comes close to ἤδη in some of its usages (see section 6.4.1 above).
To sum up, I take it that καὶ δή can be used as scalar focus modifier which specif-
ically interacts with temporal scales. Like other scalar fms, it signals that the speaker
evaluates its focused value as ranking higher than its contextually relevant alternatives.
The presence of δή in the combination can be connectedwith the fm-use of δήwith in-
herently scalar expressions, on the one hand, and with καὶ δή as a marker of rhetorical
strengthening on the other hand. All of these usages involve the notion of scalarity.
The combination καὶ δὴ καί
I now turn to the second special focusing construction involving both δή and καί, viz.
καὶ δὴ καί. In the terminology introduced in section 2.7.2, this construction allows for
a fairly straightforward analysis as a particularizing focus modifier, roughly equivalent
to English (and) in particular or (and) specifically.54 It is a recurrent pattern especially
in Platonic dialogue and Herodotus, as in the following two typical examples:
like markers such as ἰδού – with which καὶ δή indeed also co-occurs in the same utterance, as in (195)
above. See also van Erp Taalman Kip (2009: 127f.), who explictly argues that Denniston’s categorization
of καὶ δή in drama is rather arbitrary and far from illuminating.
54. See Denniston (1954: 255–257) and H. Dik (1995: 45–47).
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(196) [Socrates to Protagoras:] And I also have my reason for being glad to debate with you
rather than with anyone else,
ἡγούμενός σε βέλτιστ’ ἂν ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ὧν εἰκὸς σκοπεῖσθαι τὸν
ἐπιεικῆ καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς.
as I regard you as the best person to investigate both the othermatters that a sensible
man may be expected to examine and in particular (also) (καὶ δὴ καί) virtue.
(Pl. Prt. 348d)
(197) [Persian story of the abduction of Io by the Phoenicians.] The Phoenicians … having
settled in the country which they still occupy, at once began to make long voyages,
ἀπαγινέοντας δὲ φορτία Αἰγύπτιά τε καὶ Ἀσσύρια τῇ τε ἄλλῃ {χώρῃ} ἐσαπικνέεσθαι καὶ
δὴ καὶ ἐς Ἄργος. […] πέμπτῃ δὲ ἢ ἕκτῃ ἡμέρῃ ἀπ’ ἧς ἀπίκοντο, ἐξεμπολημένων σφι σχε-
δὸν πάντων, ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν γυναῖκας ἄλλας τε πολλὰς καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦ βασιλέος
θυγατέρα.
and, carrying Egyptian and Assyrian merchandise, they came to other places and
(καί) also (καί) to Argos in particular (δή). [short excursus on Argos] On the fifth or
sixth day after their arrival, when theirwareswere almost all sold,many otherwomen
came to the shore and (καί) among them (καί) the daughter of the king in particular
(δή). (Hdt. 1.1.2, H. Dik 1995: 46)
As noted by H. Dik (1995: 45–46), καὶ δὴ καί is a special focusing construction which
explicitly signals out one particular element: ‘A, B and especially C’ or ‘(many) other X
and Y in particular’. In (196), for instance, virtue is signaled out from the set of topics
that a reasonable man may be expected to examine. And in (197), Argos is signaled
out from the places the Phoenicians went to and, in turn, the daughter of the king (i.e.
Io) from the women that came to their ship.
What’s characteristic of this construction is that the alternatives are normally ex-
plicitly mentioned in the same sentence, but often only in a rather general way, i.e. by
phrases such as ἄλλος (‘other’; cf. the underlined phrases in the examples above). The
speaker thus signals that thereare alternative values forwhich the open sentenceholds
true, but that just one specific value deserves special attention. In H. Dik’s words, the
speaker “present[s] X as the outcome of a process of selection on the part of the speaker
of information that will be of most interest to his audience” (1995: 45, emphasis origi-
nal). In the narrative of Herodotus, as shown by Dik, the construction is thus typically
used to introduce a new discourse referent which will be of special importance in the
subsequent discourse (e.g. as the location where the narrated events are set or as the
main character of the story).
In my opinion, the three items present in this construction all have their own spe-
cific contribution in arriving at the interpretation given here. The first καί is a syntac-
tic coordinator (‘and’) that indicates the syntactic relation between the focused con-
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stituent with the preceding ἄλλος-phrase. In the typical case, as in the examples given
above, it is a corresponsive coordinator which is explicitly prepared for by another καί
or by τε (bisyndetic coordination). The second καί, in turn, is used as an adverbial par-
ticle in its regular function as an additive focus modifier (‘also’). Finally, δή explicitly
encodes the particularizing aspect of the construction, i.e. the fact that one specific
element is signaled out by the speaker as deserving special attention.
One final qualification is in place here, which concerns the notion of scalarity. In
section 2.7.2, I have stated that particularizers can be seen as additive fms indicating
that the focus value is a particularly clear case for the open proposition in their scope,
whereas the relevant alternatives exhibit the property expressed less clearly. As such,
particularizers usually also involve semantic degree scales in that the focused value is
marked as having a certain property to a higher extent than the alternative values. For
example, in saying Achilles especially loves Patroclus it is suggested that Achilles loves
Patroclus to a higher degree than he loves the other Greeks.
It should be emphasized, however, that the καὶ δὴ καί-construction in itself does
not evoke such a scalar interpretation. In (196), first of all, this is downright impossi-
ble, as we cannot say that the Phoenicians came to Argos in a higher degree than to
the other Greek places (‘coming somewhere’ is not a gradable property). Furthermore,
there are a few cases in which the focused constituent is further modified by μάλιστα,
a true particularizing fm, which does encode such a scalar interpretation (‘mostly, es-
pecially’). Consider for example:
(198) The Egyptians are the healthiest of all men, next to the Libyans – the explanation of
which, in my opinion, is that the climate in all seasons is the same.
ἐν γὰρ τῇσι μεταβολῇσι τοῖσι ἀνθρώποισι αἱ νοῦσοι μάλιστα γίνονται, τῶν τε ἄλλων πάντων
καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν ὡρέων μάλιστα.
For it is due to changes that diseases for menmostly arise, changes of all other things
and (καί) especially (μάλιστα) change of seasons in particular (δή). (Hdt. 2.77.3)
Examples such as these strongly suggest, in my opinion, that the scalar reading is not
due to the καὶ δὴ καί-construction, nor to δή for that matter.
In this respect, then, καὶ δὴ καί is to be seen as a somewhat special and less proto-
typical kind of particularizing construction. Its main function is to explicitly signal out
and focus upon elements which – at the pragmatic level – the speaker considers to be
of particular interest or relevance for the purposes of the current discourse. The pres-
ence of δή in this construction can in turn be connected with the other focus-oriented
usages of the particle.
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6.4.5 Conclusion
In this section, I have discussed the most common distributional patterns of δή as
a phrasal modifier, especially concentrating on the scopally unambiguous cases in
which theparticle occurs in clause-internal position.Wearenow in theposition to con-
clude that the particle has a number of distinct ‘phrasal’ usages. First, it can be used as
scalar focus modifier, viz. in its usage with quantitative and degree expressions and in
certain cases of the combination καὶ δή (‘even, already’). Here, special mention should
bemade of its possible interaction with temporal scales, in which it appears to be very
similar to its cognate ἤδη. Second, it can be used as an identifying focus modifier, no-
tably in its usage with demonstrative and deictic expressions (‘precisely, right, just’).
Third, the combination καὶ δὴ καί serves as a particularizing focus modifier (‘in partic-
ular’). Fourth, in addition to the focus-oriented usages we may recognize a usage as a
pragmaticmarker of exactness, which is useful to explain its usage with superlatives in
particular (‘the very greatest’). Finally, the particle is used with indefinite expressions,
in which it appears to be a marker of specificity (‘a certain, a particular’).
In addition, the particle has become a fixed element in two larger idiomatic con-
structions: (i) the adverbial νύνδη (‘just now, ‘a moment ago’) and (ii) a special type of
grammaticalized indefinite pronoun, viz. ὅστις etc. + δή (ποτε) (‘some- or other’).
6.5 Wrapping up
It is high time to take stock of this chapter and summarize themain findings on the par-
ticle δή and bring them together into a unified overview. As has been demonstrated in
the present chapter, this particle is highly versatile in nature, and indeed much more
versatile than the particle μήν as discussed in the previous chapter. In order to prop-
erly explain the various different usages of δή, I have made reference to quite a lot of
different semantic features. Here I mention seven semantic primitives which I believe
a full-fledged account of δή at any rate needs to take into account: (i) confirmation (p,
I confirm), (ii) according to expectations (i.e. in line with common ground: ‘p, as you
may expect/assume/know’), (iii) textual connectivity (i.e. marking discourse relations
between twodiscourse units), (iv)marking thematic discourse transitions, (v) scalarity
(interaction with a contextually given scale), (vi) focality (interaction with a focused
constituent and its relevant alternative values) and (vii) exactness and/or specificity
(‘precisely, specifically, (in) particular’). The various usages of δή as discussed above
can now be classified according to the presence or absence of these features, which I
have done in table 6.1 at the next page.
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As we have seen in the similar overview for μήν in section 5.4, the + symbol here
indicates the presence of a semantic feature as part of the coded meaning of a partic-
ular usage, whereas ± indicates that a feature is merely a contextually-induced side-
effect, present in some contexts but not in others. For δή it is evenmore apparent than
for μήν that there is no one semantic feature which can cover all of the different usages
of the particle. In fact, it would be difficult to see, in my opinion, how δή as a marker
of expected discourse transitions is to be related to, say, the use of δή as a scalar focus
modifier. These are two very divergent functions which pertain to very different levels
of utterance interpretation. However, the table also shows that it is possible to seman-
tically relate each usage to at least one other usage – which results into a polysemous
network of interconnected particle meanings.
As I have argued in chapter 3, the polyfunctionality of a particle can typically be ex-
plained on the basis of processes of diachronic change. For δή too, indeed, I take it that
such process have taken place, although it is not easy to determine what has been the
earliest sense of the particle: quite some usages are already fairly common in the early
Greek of Homeric epic. Thismeans that part of the analysis of δή’s diachronic develop-
ment can only be tentative in nature. However, there are also some clear indications
that certain usages are to be seen as later meaning extensions that conventionalized
only in the course of the classical period. I will make a number of suggestions here.
An attractive tentative assumption, in my opinion, is that δή originally started out
as a marker of confirmation (‘p indeed’), which is in the middle of the table above.
From here the particle seems to have developed into two opposite directions. One the
one hand, it developed usages as a common ground marker and a discourse connec-
tive (lower half of the table), and on the other hand it developed a number of focus-
oriented meanings as a phrasal modifier (upper half of the table). Here a comparison
can bemade with the English adverb indeed, which has also developed both discourse
connective and focus-oriented meanings from an original confirmatory function (see
Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007).
The general idea is that confirmatory markers are appropriate in different types
of contexts. First, they are very much at home in contexts in which the speaker ac-
cords with a view taken by the addressee or confirms a certain expectation raised by
a preceding proposition. It is highly plausible then, that in such contexts the meaning
aspect of according-to-expectations (‘p, as you may expect/assume/know’) has been
developed as part of the particle’s coded meaning, which gives rise to a use as a gen-
uine marker of common ground (in different types of speech acts). From here the two
discourse connective functions can in turn be derived, which gained currency in the
course of the classical period. As a marker of rhetorical conclusions, δή combines the
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notion of confirmation and according-to-expectation with the feature of textual con-
nectivity, explicitly marking a relation between the contents of two discourse units.
In its discourse-structural use, δή rather functions at the level of the thematic organi-
zation of the discourse, marking the transition to a next expected topic. In this use,
the confirmatory sense appears to be less clearly present. As has been noted before,
the development of connective functions at discourse-level is strongly supported by
the general tendencies of semantic change as we know from Traugott’s work (see sec-
tion 3.2).
Second, confirmatorymarkers are at home in contexts inwhich the speakerwishes
to corroborate his own previous statements, which is often done bymaking a pragmat-
ically stronger utterance or providing more specific information (cf. the use of δή as a
marker of rhetorical strengthening). It is plausible then, as I take it, that in such con-
textsmeaning aspects such as scalarity and exactness/specificity have come into being,
which have subsequently cleared the ground for usages as a genuine focus modifying
particle with phrasal scope (in clause-internal position). The use of δή in clause-inter-
nal position, at any rate, appears to be a somewhat later development of the particle, as
it is but very marginally present in Homeric epic. The rise of explicit focus modifying
usages would be supported by the cross-linguistic tendencies as described by König
(1991a), who states that one of themain historical sources of scalar fms are (meta-lin-
guistic) expressions such as ‘true’, ‘real’ and ‘clear’. We may in particular compare the
German particle ja, a confirmatory answer particle which has also developed a use as
a scalar focus modifier (e.g. Mut, ja Verwegenheit; cf. Foolen 1989).
It is worth noting here that δή in these focus-related usages usually gives rise
to evaluative implications of remarkability or counter-expectation, which are indeed
completely opposite to the coded meanings in its use as a common ground marker.
Note that this state of affairswould be difficult to explain fromamonosemous perspec-
tive, but finds a natural explanation from the diachronic and polysemous perspective
taken here.
6.6 Re-examining previous literature
In this final section, I will re-examine and evaluate some of the earlier literature on δή
in the light of the preceding discussion. In doing so, I will focus on a number of influ-
ential andmuch-citedmodern studies, starting with the chapter on δή in Denniston’s
(1954) particle handbook (section 6.6.1). After that, I will turn to two partly opposing
views on δή as advocated in the 1990s, viz. that of Sicking&vanOphuijsen (1993) on
the one hand (section 6.6.2), and that of Wakker (1994a, 1997a, 1997b) on the other
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hand (section 6.6.3). Finally, I will look at the recent treatment of δή in the multi-vol-
ume, collaborativework onGreek particles by Bonifazi, Drummen&deKreij (2016)
(section 6.6.4).55
6.6.1 Denniston
At the very start of the chapter on δή, Denniston first rejects the view held by the Ger-
man grammarians of his time (i.e. a temporal origin and a value of obviousness; see
section 6.6.2 below) and then presents his own basic semantic value of the particle:
The essential meaning seems clearly to be ‘verily’, ‘actually’, ‘indeed’. δή denotes
that a thing really and truly is so: or that it is very much so […] These meanings
run trough all the non-connective usages of the particle: and the connective use
is easily derived from them. (Denniston 1954: 203–204)
This basic idea is reflected in the ensuing classification of examples, in which a general
distinction is made between three main usages of δή: (1) emphatic, (2) ironic and (3)
connective. I will look at Denniston’s treatment of these three usages one by one.
In his discussion of emphatic δή, Denniston mainly lists the classes of words to
which δή can give emphasis by taking the position behind this word. And it follows
from his overview that the particle can occur behind virtually every word class (e.g.
adjectives, adverbs, pronouns of all different kinds, nouns, verbs and negations). His
classification may thus essentially be regarded as a morphosyntactic one. From a se-
mantic-functional perspective, however, such a classification is obviously not very illu-
minating. For one thing, the majority of the examples listed by Denniston are cases in
which δή occurs in clause- or sentence-initial position and is in fact better analyzed as
an attitudinal-interactional particle operating on full clauses or sentences, rather than
as a particle which emphasizes the preceding word (i.e. the first word of the clause).56
In other words, the distinction between different types of particles as made in the
present study (e.g. between focus-modifying, intensifying or attitudinal-interactional
particles) is completely blurred in Denniston’s presentation.
55. Other important modern studies on δή that deserve mention are Navarre (1932), E. J. Bakker
(1993c, 1997a),Oréal (1997), Cuypers (2005), vanEmdeBoas (2006, 2017a: 68–69), vanErpTaalman
Kip (2009), van der Pas (2014) and Van Rooy (2016). A complete overview of the early modern scholar-
ship on δή can be found in the Online Repository of Particle Studies as drawn up by Bonifazi, Drummen
& de Kreij (2016: vol. 5). In addition, Allan (2020a, 2020b) has recently given an account of the use of
δή in classical drama and Thucydides. His work only became accessible to me after the majority of this
thesis was already finished, but it is for the most part compatible with the approach taken here.
56. In fact, Denniston himself already warns that the usefulness of this categorization is questionable,
since δή seems to be “more able [than γε] to spread its influence over a whole clause” (204).
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A second and related point concerns the fact that Denniston is not able to give
more specific semantic information – in addition to the quote given above – on the
alleged emphaticmeaning of δή, nor to explain, as he himself explicitly states now and
then, how δή differs from other emphatic particles such as γε or μήν. Although he does
make some sensible remarks on someof the individual usages of theparticle, it remains
unclear how the various usages are related to each other. The very general comments as
given above, at any rate, may indeed work for some of the emphatic usages but clearly
not for all of them (e.g. the use of δή with indefinites).57 As I have noted before, Den-
niston’s account especially falls short due to the lack of a proper theoretical framework
dealing with concepts such as focus, speech acts and common ground.
The second major use distinguished by Denniston is the ironic usage, which he
characterizes as a particular variety of the emphatic. Although the interpretation of an
ironic reading is attractive in quite some examples and in general a useful observation,
I amnot convinced that irony canbemarkedby δή as such. Inmyview, it is the interpre-
tation of a whole utterance within a particular communicative context (including δή)
thatmay give rise to an ironical interpretation.58Moreover, if δή occurs often in ironical
contexts, we should try to find an explanation why this is so, i.e. explain why the parti-
cle, in view of its meaning or function, is well compatible with such an interpretation.
In this respect Denniston’s notion of ‘emphasis’ or affirmation alone does not seem
to be sufficient. The assumption of a common ground related meaning, however, as I
have proposed here, may be better suited to explain this compatibility. Here we may
compare, for example, English adverbs such as clearly and of course, which are often
used in ironical contexts (cf. Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007). To conclude, I
believe meanings such as irony, sarcasm or scepticism are best treated as contextual
side-effects of the use of δή as a common groundmarker rather than as meanings that
are coded by the particle itself.59
I now turn to the third major use of δή recognized by Denniston, the connective
use. In his view, the particle can connect two sentences and “expresses post hoc and
propter hoc, and anything between the two” (237, emphasis original). Thus, Denniston
57. See also section 6.4.1 above for a number of arguments against a genuine intensifying reading of δή,
as appears to be Denniston’s idea.
58. Denniston himself would probaby have subscribed to such a conclusion, as he writes: “The task
of classification is difficult, since many uses have an ironical tinge in some contexts but not in others.
It must be understood, then, that in the following pages we are dealing with uses which are largely or
predominantly, but not wholly, ironical” (229).
59. Cf. Wakker (1994a: 352–357, 1997b: 244–245) for similar suggestions. See also Bonifazi (2016:
section 4.5.5) for a useful discussion of δή in ironic contexts in Herodotus and Thucydides.
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explains, the connection can be temporal in nature, when it marks a new stage in a
narrative, fully logical, or something intermediate,whichhe terms the ‘progressive’ use.
In the latter case δή is taken to mark “the progression from one idea to a second of
which the consideration naturally follows” and “the opening of a new section of the
discourse, the broaching of a new topic” (239). As follows from the account unfolded
in the present chapter, I believe that Denniston is essentially on the right track here. In
terms of the account given in the present study, his category of logical connective δή
equates my category of δή as a marker of topos-based conclusions, and his progressive
use by and large accords with my use as a marker of expected discourse transitions.
As far as I am concerned, his ‘temporal’ connective usagemay be subsumed under this
heading aswell (see section 6.3.2). In addition,Denniston is also right in his claims that
these connective usages are later meaning extensions that developed in the course of
the classical period.
Finally, a serious point of criticism is in place concerning Denniston’s treatment
of combinations involving δή. In this respect, his descriptions are generally far from
convincing. The most serious problem, in my opinion, is the fact that Denniston ap-
parently assumes that δή may ‘emphasize’, ‘reinforce’ or ‘strengthen’ (the meaning of)
other particles, which he writes in his discussion of, e.g., ἀλλὰ δή (240), γὰρ δή (243)
and δὲ δή (257). However, given that particles in Greek are prosodically dependent
expressions (i.e. pre- or postpositives), it seems to be very unlikely that they could be
emphasized or stressed by other particles. The fact that δή is found behind these other
particles is simply due to Wackernagel’s Law and the fact that multiple particles may
end up in a postpositive cluster (see section 4.3.3). As I have noted earlier and as I have
demonstrated in my treatment of examples in the current chapter, I believe that the
particles in such clusters generally still have their own semantic contributions. Τhe
clusters mentioned here, for example, can generally be analyzed as a combination of a
discourse connective particle (ἀλλά, γάρ, δέ) and an attitudinal-interactional particle
(δή).
6.6.2 Sicking & van Ophuijsen
A second influential treatment in the modern literature on δή is that advocated in the
work by the Leiden scholars Sicking (1986, 1993, 1997) and van Ophuijsen (1993).
Their analysis of the particle goes back to the views of the German grammarians of the
early 20th century. I quoteKühner&Gerth (1898–1904) as a representative example
here:
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Δή […] hat ursprünglich temporale Bedeutung = schon, nunmehr; aus dieser ent-
wickelte sich die bildliche, in der es auf bereits (iam) Bekanntes, Offenbares,
Augenscheinliches hinweist, so dass es sich oft durch gewiss, offenbar erklären
lässt. (Kühner & Gerth 1898–1904: ii, 123)
Kühner & Gerth thus argue that there are still traces of a temporal meaning of δή (cf.
section 6.4.1 above), but the prevalent and most important meaning in later times is
a sense of familiarity or obviousness. And they indeed also signal the correspondence
with the German modal particle ja.
In their important volume on Attic particle usage, Sicking & van Ophuijsen
(1993) revive this general view of the German grammarians, which had been explicitly
discarded as the right analysis by Denniston (see section 6.6.1 above). Although these
authors do not accord with the alleged temporal origin of δή, they indeed argue that it
must generally be understood as a modal sentence particle with an evidential mean-
ing.60 Sicking, in an appendix on his study on connective particles in Lysias, has the
following general remarks on the particle:
[I]t is possible to describe δή as a primarily ‘evidential’ sentence particle which
presents a statement as immediately evident to the senses or understanding or
as common knowledge. It thus implies that speaker and hearer are in the same
position with respect to this statement. This makes it apt to mark successful in-
teraction, and confers on it what may be called a ‘socializing’ function in that it
brings into relief the information which is shared by the interlocutors.
(Sicking 1993: 52, emphasis original)
And in the second part of the same volume, a similar function for δή is described by
van Ophuijsen, whose conclusions are based on a thorough analysis of all instances in
Plato’s Phaedo. The following two quotes summarize his view:
δή presumes that the addressee – who is supposed to have the same relevant in-
formation at his disposal as the speaker – is ready andwilling to commit himself
to what is being stated; given that it is natural, inmaking a statement, to look for
assent, the point of adding δή is to hint that the addressee is actually bound to
subscribe to the statement as much as the speaker is.
(van Ophuijsen 1993: 82)
60. Letme note here that Sicking& vanOphuijsen use the term ‘evidential’ in a rather loose and general
way. They donot appear to use it in the technical linguistic sense inwhich evidentiality refers to the source
of the proposition presented. Cf. section 2.6.4 above.
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I submit that the basic value of the particle relates towhat is visible to themind’s
eye as well as to the organ of sight, and accordingly both to propositions con-
tained in sentences and clauses and to physical objects referred to by means of
nouns and pronouns and nominal phrases. (van Ophuijsen 1993: 141)
Van Ophuijsen provides the following general paraphrase of the particle: ‘p δή’ = ‘p,
as we both can see’. Subsequently, a number of more specific classes of examples are
discussed in which this general basic meaning is applicable. Thus, it is demonstrated
that δή can be used to indicate that the proposition is based on evidence from per-
ception (so-called ‘visualizing’ use), is a well-known empirical fact, is motivated by the
speaker’s previous words, or is just self-evidential.61
Generally, I believe that Sicking & van Ophuijsen’s revaluation of the earlier Ger-
man accounts is a major improvement as compared to the poor semantic analysis as
given by Denniston.My account of attitudinal-interactional δή in assertive speech acts
by and large corresponds with the ideas spelled out here, although I have phrased it in
a more consistent terminology by using the linguistic theory on common ground.
However, in view of the account of δή as developed in the present chapter, we can
also criticize their account in a number of respects. I discuss three main points here.
First of all, as is evident from thequotes givenabove, Sicking&vanOphuijsen’s descrip-
tions are completely oriented to the use of δή in statements. No systematic attention
is paid to the other types of speech acts in which δή regularly occurs.62 It follows that
their description may indeed hold true for δή-statements, but that this does not carry
over to the use of δή in non-assertive speech acts such as directives and wh-questions.
Recall that these do not express a full proposition p that could be the semantic target
of the particle.
61. Incidentally, the category of ‘visualizing’ δή is not a very convincing one, in my opinion. The few
examples given by van Ophuijsen, at least, can all be explained in alternative ways. One of the examples
he lists, for instance, is example (61) at p. 257 above. Here it is extremely far-fetched to suppose that δή is
used because Socrates refers to Phaedo’s hair, which he probably actually sees and touches. In that case,
we would have rather expected δή to take a position behind the phrase τὰς καλὰς κόμας (‘the beautiful
hair’). However, δή has sentence scope and can better be analyzed, just as I have done above, as a common
ground marker, activating information on the basis of a topos.
62. Sicking (1993: 65, 1997) only makes some remarks on δή in wh-questions. See section 6.2.3 above
for discussion. Van Ophuijsen (1993: 76) is mainly interested in the use of different particles in conclu-
sions and by definition excludes all non-declarative clauses from his research corpus.
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My second point of criticism is that van Ophuijsen (1993) vehemently argues
against Denniston’s category of connective δή. In examples where δή seems to be con-
necting two stages of an argument, he proposes that “δή is sufficiently motivated as
conveying that the second statement is obviously acceptable, given the first” (1993:
147). And he concludes as follows:
[A]ll that we need is an evidential meaning and the recognition that, regardless
of the presence or absence of any coordinator or connector, it is natural to ex-
pect that the supposed self-evidence of the statement find some support in the
preceding statement(s). (van Ophuijsen 1993: 148)
What’s at stake here, indeed, is the difficult question whether or not the notion of tex-
tual connectivity is to be seen as part of the coded semantics of δή. As I have pointed
out in section 6.3.1, it’s unattractive to assign a syntactically connective function to
the particle – and to this extent I would indeed concur with van Ophuijsen – but this
does not rule out the possibility of a semantically connectivemeaning, inwhich δή also
marks the rhetorical relation of conclusion and explicitly establishes discourse coher-
ence between two subsequent discourse units. As I have noted before, it is highly plau-
sible that δή in such cases interacts with a topos in the common ground – a possibility
which is not taken into account by van Ophuijsen.
Furthermore, van Ophuijsen does not discuss any cases in which δή functions as
a marker of expected discourse transitions – probably because there are no clear ex-
amples to be found in the Phaedo which could not also be interpreted as ‘evidential’
in nature. However, as also recognized by Denniston, there are quite some cases in
which such a reading is unattractive or very forced and δή is better treated as a dis-
course-level connective, managing the thematic organization of the discourse (see the
examples given in section 6.3.2). In this respect, I believe van Ophuijsen’s dismissal of
the ‘progressive’ category has really been premature.
My third point of criticism is concerned with the usages of δή in which it has
phrasal scope. Of the various categories I have discussed in section 6.4, Sicking &
van Ophuijsen only recognize so-called ‘anaphoric δή’, in which the particle “accom-
pan[ies] a demonstrative pronoun or otherwise deictic expression referring the hearer
to, andmore often than not summarizing, an earlier expression” (1993: 143). Although
they do acknowledge that δήmay have phrasal scope in such cases, they only list exam-
ples in which δήmay also be explained as having clausal scope (i.e. they do not discuss
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any examples of clause-internal δή + demonstrative).63 All other phrasal usages of δή,
however, are not discussed or only mentioned in passing,64 most probably because
they are absent or only marginally present in the restricted research corpora on which
Sicking&vanOphuijsen’s analysis is based. Again, this results in an incomplete picture
and also has considerable consequences for the validity of their alleged basic value of
δή, as given in the quotes above.
Incidentally, in a somewhat later publication, van Ophuijsen & Stork (1999: 28)
do in fact discuss the use of δή in combination with quantitative expressions. Here it is
telling, inmy opinion, that they want to uphold their basic value of ‘evidentiality’ even
in the cases in which δή has phrasal scope. To illustrate this, I repeat here my example
(126) with their translation:
(126)’ [Mardonius tries to convince Xerxes to undertake an expedition against Athens.]
δέσποτα, οὐκ οἰκός ἐστι Ἀθηναίους ἐργασαμένους πολλὰ δὴ κακὰ Πέρσας μὴ οὐ δοῦναι
δίκας τῶν ἐποίησαν.
Master, it is not beseeming that the Athenians, having wrought great harm to the
Persians, as you know as well as I do (δή) should not give due satisfaction for what
they have done. (Hdt. 7.5.2, transl. van Ophuijsen & Stork 1999: 2)
Inmy opinion, the authors do not take sufficient account of the fact that δή has phrasal
scope here and does not modify a full clause. Moreover, many other examples can be
found in which the translation given here would be wholly out of place. Let me give
just one clear example here, repeated from section 6.4.1:
(128) ηρ. οἶσθ᾿ οὖν τὸν Οἴτης Ζηνὸς ὑψίστου πάγον;
υλ. οἶδ᾿, ὡς θυτήρ γε πολλὰ δὴ σταθεὶς ἄνω.
heracles. Now do you know the mountain of Oeta, which belongs to highest
Zeus? – hyllus. I know it, since, as a sacrifier at least, I have stood up there even
many times. (S. Tr. 1191–1192)
63. Their explanation of this use is far from illuminating, in my opinion. Van Ophuijsen writes, for in-
stance, that “verbal repetition or an anaphoric pronoun help to make a notion more evident” (van Op-
huijsen 1993: 148) –which entirely obscures themeanings that should be attributed to δή in its use with
demonstrative pronouns.
64. Sicking (1993: 53)mentions the stereotyped idiomatic use of δή in “exclamative or virtually ‘elative’
designations of quality or quantity such as πολλὰ δή, ὅσα δή, οἷα δή”. And van Ophuijsen (1993: 143)
mentions in passing the possibility of fixed combinations of superlative + δή and πολὺς δή. Both authors,
however, do not elaborate upon the semantics of δή in these usages or the relationshipswith the proposed
‘evidential’ basic meaning. In his review of the volume, Dover (1995) indeed already argues that “more
allowance might be made to ‘stereotyped combinations’ […], e.g. πολύς + δή, μάλιστα + δή, μόνος + δή.”
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In this case, a translation of πολλὰ δή with ‘many times, as you know as well as I do’
clearly would be out of place, given that the phrase is part of an answer to a standard
wh-question, which implies that the addressee can in no way be expected to know this
information (cf. also van Emde Boas 2006).
What seems to be the case then, is that van Ophuijsen by all means wishes to up-
hold amonosemic analysis and even applies his basic value to examples which appear
to be quite different in nature, both from a formal and a semantic perspective. This
shows, once again, why I think much more attention should be paid to the possibility
of polysemy.
6.6.3 Wakker
I now turn to Wakker’s account of δή, which she has put forward in a number of dif-
ferent publications (1994a: 351–357, 1995, 1997a, 1997b). She takes the intuitions of
Ruijgh (1971: 646–647) as a starting point, who describes the function of δή as indi-
cating “l’importance du fait nouveau qui est le contenu de la phrase”. Wakker further
reinforces Ruijgh’s view in arguing that
δή draws special attention to the importance and interest of the proposition pre-
sented. […]Of course, the basic value of δήmay result inwidely different seman-
tic nuances, depending on the context or situation. After all, a speakermay have
several reasons for demanding special attention. (Wakker 1997b: 238–239)
Her proposed paraphrases of this basic meaning are English ‘look (how interesting)’,
‘you must know’, French ‘voici’ and Dutch ‘zie hier, let wel’.
In her paper on attitudinal-interactional particles in Thucydides and Herodotus,
Wakker (1997b: 239–242) reviews some of themore specific semantic nuances of the
particle, notably: (i) special attention for the focus of a proposition, (ii) special atten-
tion for an interesting and important conclusion,65 (iii) special attention to demon-
strative and deictic expressions that resume preceding discourse.66 Wakker further
acknowledges that the second semantic value may be equated with the evidential in-
terpretation of Sicking & van Ophuijsen, but argues that the difference between the
65. Wakker (1997b: 240) notes that δή “is often found in conclusions and other assertions the truth of
which is observable, immediately understandable, or a generally known fact”, and she suggests that the
particle can here be paraphrased as ‘obviously’, ‘as you see’ or ‘clearly’.
66. Wakker (1997b: 241–242): “the particle accompanies demonstrative or other deictic expressions
which direct the hearer’s attention to earlier discourse which is often summarized. Δή here demands spe-
cial attention on account of the fact that some notion is resumed (“and see/so”), but at the same time
resuming means, of course, that that notion is evident, since it may be found in the speaker’s own pre-
ceding words.”
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two views lies in what they take as the basic meaning of the particle. Wakker takes ev-
identiality or ‘obviously’ explicitly not as the particle’s basic meaning but states that
“this semantic nuance is rather a later development of δή which occurs only in specific
contexts such as conclusions.” (Wakker 1997b: 240).
If we re-examine Wakker’s account in the light of the discussion in the present
chapter, it is clear that it indeed contains a number of components that we have also
seen in my own account. Her evidential and anaphoric semantic nuances go back to
Sicking & van Ophuijsen’s theory and correspond to my analysis in terms of common
ground. In addition, Wakker’s insight that δή can be used to modify a focused con-
stituent foreshadows the various usages of δή as a focus modifier that I have discussed
in section 6.4 above. Now although I realize that Wakker’s description, as she herself
admits, is by no means intended as a full-fledged account of δή – which explains why
many other typical usages of the particle are not at all addressed (e.g. in other speech
act types, the combinations with καί or with indefinites) – I nevertheless want tomake
a number of critical notes on the general way in whichWakker has addressed the par-
ticle in her work.
My main point of criticism concerns Wakker’s notion of ‘basic value’, which sug-
gests that she wishes to maintain a monosemous analysis (i.e. a basic meaning which
may have various semantic nuances). As I have indicated at various places in this study,
however, I strongly doubt whether it is useful to try and search for semantic basic val-
ues in the first place. I maintain that this should at least not be our starting point: basic
meanings can only be deduced, if at all, from a thorough analysis of all of the various
different usages of a particle. As I have stated in section 3.3, indeed, one of the main
problems of basic meanings is that they are often too abstract and general to be useful
in actual practice. I believe that the notion of ‘special attention’ indeed is a clear ex-
ample of this same flaw. Although this value may to some extent work out as a general
denominator for the phrasal focus-oriented usages of δή, it is unsuited, in my opinion,
as a characterization of its interactional-attitudinal and discourse connective usages.
Another problem is that this meaning would in fact also be well applicable to other
particles, notably τοι ‘take note, you know’.
Furthermore, I have to admit that Wakker is not very clear on the exact status of
her ‘semantic nuances’ either. Are these to be seen as part of the coded semantics of the
particle or only as contextually induced meanings? Nuances such as irony, scepticism
and sarcasm, for sure, are put aside as side-effects of δή – rightly so, I believe – but it
remains unclear whether the same holds true for the other nuances she discerns, and
in particular the evidential nuance – which she claims to be a later development of δή.
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To sumup, I believe thatmy polysemous account, inwhich the different usages are
indeed seen as distinct, though interrelated, meanings would provide us with a more
specific and nuanced picture.
6.6.4 Bonifazi, Drummen & de Kreij
The final account I would like to discuss here is the one that is recently put forward in
the collaborative work by Bonifazi, Drummen & de Kreij (2016). Generally speak-
ing, a major advantage of this multi-volume work, especially when compared to the
accounts from the 1990s as discussed in the previous two sections, is the large scale
of the project, as it aims to study particle usage in a variety of different authors, viz.
Homer and Pindar (de Kreij 2016b), Attic drama (Drummen 2016b) and the histori-
ography ofHerodotus andThucydides (Bonifazi 2016). In addition, thework is deeply
rooted inmodern linguistic, discourse-pragmatic, theory and oftenmakes the compar-
ison with discourse markers and pragmatic markers in living languages.
However, notwithstanding their valuable enterprise, I believe that the work also
suffers from a number of drawbacks. For one thing, it must be noted that some im-
portant authors and genres are conspicuously absent from their analysis, notably ora-
tory, Platonic dialogue and the works of Xenophon. This is mainly due to the fact that
the authors do not so much take individual particles as their object of research, as I
have done here, but rather aim to investigate, more generally, particle usage within
specific authors, within specific linguistic contexts or within the context of certain lin-
guistic theories (e.g. Du Bois’s 2007 theory on stance-taking; cf. also my remarks in
section 1.2). It is thus not their main goal to give a full and complete analysis of indi-
vidual items, and comments on individual particles are indeed shattered over various
sections in the work and do not always completely align.
Be that as it may, it is useful to shortly look at their views on the particle δή, which
can be summarized as follows. They essentially recognize three main usages: (i) an
intensifying particle with phrasal scope, (ii) a stancemarker, whichmarks the content
or the uttering of the speech act as evident, perceptible or expected, and (iii) a marker
of narrative progression ormajor narrative steps (moves).67 I believe that this view is a
major improvement on the other ‘modern’ accounts in that proper attention is paid to
67. See de Kreij (2016b: ch.3, §§53–64), Drummen (2016b: ch. 2, §§73–79) and Bonifazi (2016: ch.
4, §§85–127). The latter, however, rather takes ‘certainty or determination’ as the main attitudinal value
of δή in (ii).
559416-L-bw-Thijs
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 369
6.6. Re-examining previous literature 355
the variation in position and scope of δή and that it is recognized that δή has a number
of different, i.e. distinct, encodedmeanings. However, I also would like to mention two
major points of criticism.
First of all, although the authors do recognize that δή can be used as a phrasal
modifier, this point could have been much more elaborated upon, I believe. In fact,
they only regard δή as having phrasal scope in its collocation with inherently scalar ex-
pressions and do not systematically discuss any of the other categories of ‘phrasal δή’
as recognized in the present chapter. In the volume on Herodotus and Thucydides, in
fact, Bonifazi (2016: ch. 4, §§89–91) simply ranges all instances of demonstrative +
δή and καί + δή under the heading of narrative progression, which is a gross oversim-
plification. Moreover, I believe their account would have benefited a lot from using a
proper theory of focus modifiers and intensification (see section 6.4.1 for arguments
against reading δή as a true intensifier).
Second, I believe that muchmore attention could have been paid to the polyfunc-
tionality issue, i.e. the questionwhy one and the same form (δή in this case) has a num-
ber of different usages or senses. Put differently, the question of the interrelations be-
tween different particle usages for the most part remains underexposed in their work.
Bonifazi (2016: ch. 4, §§85-127) seems to want to tackle the issue by characterizing
δή in a rather general way as a marker of speaker involvement or stance. And this in-
volvement of the speaker, as she takes it, can be found either in contexts of narrative
progressionor in contexts of epistemicor emotional evaluation.Compare, for instance,
the following citation:
Ιn Herodotus most instances of δή (which generally appear in combinations
with other particles) mark narrative progression, that is, the voice of the author
as narrator. δή in accompaniment with various linguistic features marks stance:
this occurs when the host discourse act (or move) conveys either sensory per-
ception, or positioning, evaluation, and alignment. More specifically, δή marks
a sense of certainty or determination. (Bonifazi 2016: ch. 4, §109)
Though I do think that a linguistic analysis in terms of stance is very interesting and
it is quite clear that δή occurs often in stance-taking contexts, it is not very attractive,
I believe, to uphold that the main function of δή is to signal stance-taking or speaker
involvement in itself. After all, we might say that this is the general function of all atti-
tudinal-interactional particles (cf. section 2.6.4 on (inter)subjectivity). As to the exact
semantic contribution of δή in such contexts, Bonifazi provides a quite general and
unspecific label – “certainty or determination” on the part of the speaker – which, I
have to admit, remains rather vague in her actual analysis of individual instances. It
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also remains unclear whether, and how, this can be related to the idea of evidentiality
that is put forward by Drummen (2016b) in the volume on Attic drama.Moreover, the
exact interrelationships between the narrative and the stance functions are not clearly
accounted for.
6.6.5 Conclusion
Summing up, I believe that the present case study on the particle δή – perhaps even
more so than was the case for μήν in the previous chapter – corroborates the point
made in the general introduction of this study, viz. that we can only advance when
combining the discourse-pragmatic approaches of the last three decades with the use
of a large-scale, heterogeneous research corpus à la Denniston. Indeed, we have seen
that Denniston’s description of δή especially falls short due to the lack of the proper
modern linguistic tools. In the case of δή, this also resulted in a rather messy presenta-
tion and classification.On the other hand, the twomajor theories of the 1990s, those of
Sicking & van Ophuijsen andWakker respectively, are characterized by a fairly limited
research scope and a tendency towards monosemous descriptions – a combination
which resulted in incomplete and unwarranted conclusions. Especially the lack of at-
tention to the various phrasal usages of δή is remarkable. In the recent major study
by Bonifazi, Drummen & de Kreij, finally, these issues are only solved in part, mainly
because they have not taken individual particles as the vantage point of their research.
In the present chapter, I have tried to improve on these works by presenting an ac-
count of δή which is firmly rooted in linguistic theory (e.g. on focus modifiers, speech
acts and common ground) and based upon a large-scale corpus research. In doing so,
I have paid special attention to the distributional patterns that have been generally
overlooked in themodern literature, notably the use of δή in non-assertive speech acts
and the different usages of δή as a phrasal modifier. My analysis of the various distribu-
tional patterns results in a polysemous picture, in which multiple meanings of δή are
recognized that can be related to each other on both a synchronic and a diachronic
level.
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General conclusion
In the general introduction of this study, I have listed threemain requirements which a
unified account of a givenGreekparticle should at any rate comply to. I have stated that
such an account (i) should be sufficiently rooted in modern semantic and pragmatic
theory, (ii) should properly address the polyfunctionality issue (i.e. provide a princi-
pled explanation as to why the particle receives multiple different senses or interpre-
tations), and (iii) should be based on a sufficiently large and varied research corpus.
In the present study, I have shown what I believe such an account should look like by
presenting a new analysis of the highly versatile particles μήν and δή. In various places
in this study, moreover, I have pointed out how the approach taken here improves on
earlier accounts of these two specific items. In this concluding chapter, I will wrap up
my discussion and once more summarize the main findings and conclusions of my
investigation (section 7.1). In doing so, I will pay special attention to the question –
also posed in the introduction – about the semantic commonalities and differences
of the two particles under consideration. Thereafter, I will discuss some of the open
questions and make a number of suggestions for further research (section 7.2).
7.1 Overview of the main findings
7.1.1 Μήν and δή as attitudinal-interactional markers
I start my overview with the usages of μήν and δή as attitudinal-interactional mark-
ers (aims). Generally speaking, both particles can be analyzed as particles of an inter-
subjective nature, which means that they serve to manage the assumed attitudes and
expectations of the addressee(s) or make reference to the common ground of the dis-
course participants. In this capacity, μήν and δή – like many of the modal particles in
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Germanic languages – have a general relational meaning: they serve to link the infor-
mation in its host clause/sentence topropositionalmaterialwhich is somehowgiven in
the communicative context at hand and which the speaker assumes to be entertained
by the addressee(s). This general intersubjective feature is what μήν and δή have in
common, but they significantly differ as to the particle-specific values they contribute.
Mήν generally expresses contrast or counter-expectation (cf. English in fact, actually,
German doch, Dutch toch), whereas δή rather expresses confirmation and according-
to-expectation (cf. English indeed, then, Dutch inderdaad, dus, immers and German ja).
The main difference between these two particles can thus be spelled out in terms
of the contextually given proposition that each particle ‘reacts to’. In case of μήν, this
proposition is the negated counterpart of the information presented in the host unit,
whereas for δή this proposition actually is equivalent to that information. Put differ-
ently, whereas μήν suggests that the information in the host unit is in contrast to what
may be assumed or expected by the addressee(s) given the communicative context at
hand, δή rather suggests that this information confirms or is in accordance with such
assumptions or expectations. As attitudinal-interactional markers then, the two par-
ticles perform complementary communicative functions. Whereas δή can essentially
be seen as a marker of interpersonal consensus, μήν may rather be characterized as a
marker of interpersonal tension or contrast.
More specific meanings of both particles arise through the interaction of this gen-
eral scheme with various contextual parameters. Most importantly, there is the inter-
action with different speech act types (i.e. assertives, directives, wh-questions, yes/no-
questions): here differences can be spelled out in terms of the semantic target of the
particles, which may be the communicated content or one of the felicity conditions
of the speech act. Further distinctions arise from the status of the contextually given
proposition which the particle points at: this may be either on the table or part of the
common ground, which in turn may be of different types (e.g. arising from preceding
discourse, from general common knowledge or on the basis of topos-based reasoning).
7.1.2 Μήν and δή as discourse connectives
An important general commonality of μήν and δή concerns the fact that both parti-
cles have further developed a number of usages as full-blown discourse connectives, in
which they explicitly mark the relationships between (the contents of) two discourse
segments. For both particles, these connective usages are to be seen as diachronic
meaning extensions, arising in the course of the classical era.
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First, they both can be used as a marker of rhetorical discourse relations. In line
with their semantics as aims, μήν explicitly marks a denial-of-expectation contrast (cf.
English however, yet), whereas δή marks its host unit as an inferential conclusion (cf.
English so, then). Whereas μήν cancels an inference arising from the preceding dis-
course, δή rather confirms it. Or, put differently, whereas μήν signals that a given regu-
larity in the common ground (i.e. a topos p > q) does not apply in the context at hand,
δή indicates that it does.
At this point it should be emphasized, as we have seen at various places in this
study, that this rhetorical connective usage of both particles comes indeed very close
to the attitudinal-interactional use. In both usages, the particles link their host unit
to a contextually given proposition; the sole distinction is that in their connective use
this proposition by definition arises from the preceding discourse (i.e. linguistically
expressed context), whereas this does not need to be the case for the attitudinal-inter-
actional use. Since the distinction between connective and attitudinal-interactional
discourse particles is not formally marked in Ancient Greek clause structure, a rigid
boundary between the two classes is not to be expected. Put differently, it is difficult to
asses to what extent the feature of textual connectivity is part of the conventionalized
semantics of the particles in these cases.
For μήν, however, undisputed evidence for an interpretation as a connective par-
ticle comes from the existence of the μέν/μήν-pattern, in which μήν is used in reaction
to preparatory μέν (cf. German zwar/aber, Dutch weliswaar/maar and the like). In this
pattern, it would even be attractive to analyse μήν as a genuine syntactic coordinator
(i.e. as a clausal conjunction rather than an adverbial connective). For δή, on the other
hand, we lack such formal evidence, but a discourse connective reading seems to be
appropriate in cases of solitary δή (i.e. caseswhere it is the only cohesive device present
between two discourse acts). It is unwarranted, however, to assign to δή the status of a
syntactic coordinator in such cases, especially in view of its recurrent collocation with
the connectives καί and δέ and its usage in apodotic main clauses.
Secondly, both particles also show a clear discourse-structural usage, i.e. as a
marker of sequential discourse relations. In these usages, the particles pertain to the
overall structure of the ongoing discourse, merely signaling the transition to the next
move (e.g. a next topic of discussion, the next part of an argument or the next step in
a narrative). In this usage, as I take it, both particles interact with the discourse partic-
ipants’ expectations about the nature of the subsequent discourse: what are we going
to do next? When δή is concerned, it seems to be the case that its value of according-
to-expectation is still present in its discourse-structural use: δή marks the transition to
a next step or (sub)topic, the discussion of which has been expected, prepared for or
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agreed upon earlier on. Similarly, examples of μήν can be found in which it still has
a value of counter-expectation, roughly ‘unlike what you may expect, there is more to
say about this’. However, in other cases this value does no longer appear to be present,
and μήν appears to have developed into a relatively neutral (i.e. bleached) marker of
thematic discourse boundaries. In this capacity, it is in fact not unlike the discourse
particle δέ.
7.1.3 Δή as a phrasal modifier
Finally, we arrive atwhat is perhaps themost striking difference between the twoparti-
cles studied here, viz. the fact that δή, as opposed to μήν, shows a number of additional
usages in which it syntactically scopes over the phrase or constituent. Undisputed for-
mal evidence for such an analysis comes from the clause-internal position of δή, al-
though a similar analysismay sometimes also applywhen the particle occurs in clause-
or sentence-peninitial position. In these usages, δή can be analyzed as performing a
number of different, though closely related, functions: a scalar focus modifier (‘even’;
cf. German sogar, schon), an indentifying focus modifier (‘precisely’, ‘just’; cf. German
eben, gerade, Dutch juist), a particularizer (‘in particular’), a pragmatic marker of ex-
actness (‘precisely, very’) or as a marker of specificity (‘particular, specific’).
7.1.4 Polysemy
One of the important general tenets of the present study is that the variety of different
meanings of such versatile Greek particles as μήν and δή is best explained in terms of
the concept of polysemy (as opposed to homonymy or monosemy). This means that a
number of conventionalized particle meanings are distinguished, which are neverthe-
less semantically interrelated. The various polysemous senses can be represented as
different nodes within a polysemous network. Synchronic polyfunctionality is in turn
to be seen as the result of the diachronic extension of new senses, which come about
through the gradual conventionalization of pragmatic inferences in specific interac-
tional contexts. New senses of a particle usually do not replace but co-exist alongside
the older ones (layering). For μήν and δή, for instance, we have seen that the discourse
connective meanings can be seen as later meaning extensions, which co-exist along-
side the older attitudinal-interactional ones.
Due to such diachronic developments, which may go in quite different directions,
the various different senses of a particle need no longer necessarily all share a common
(abstract) semantic core.Aswehave seen, this is also the case for the twoparticles stud-
ied here. It seems quite reasonable to say, for instance, that μήν as amarker of thematic
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discourse contrast does not have very much in common with μήν in its original sense
as an affirmative marker (e.g. when used in oaths in combination with ἦ). And simi-
larly, δή as marker of discourse transitions is completely different, I would say, from
its phrasal usages as a focus modifying particle. Assigning a common semantic core to
all of the various usages of these particles would be highly problematic. This is not to
say, however, that it is in principle impossible to unite some of the specific polysemous
meanings under amore general semantic denominator. For μήν, the notion of counter-
expectation can be used as such a schematic meaning, whereas many usages of δή can
be subsumed under the heading of confirmation and/or according-to-expectation. For
most of the phrasal usages of δή, on the other hand, abstract semantic features of ex-
actness, scalarity and focality may be assumed.
The polysemous account given here improves upon some influential accounts
made in the earlier literature in a number of ways. If we look at the monumental par-
ticle handbook of Denniston (1954), to start with, two major points can be made.
First of all, I would like to emphasize that Denniston indeed assumes that one and the
same particle can have a variety of different senses which may change over time (e.g.
both emphatic and connective senses). This stance clearly accords to the polysemous
approach advocated here.What often lacks in his account, however, is a convincing ex-
planation of how these senses are interrelated to each other. In this respect, applying
the research tendencies from the field of historical pragmatics has proven to be useful.
A second, related, point is that Denniston often remains too vague and general
in his description of the different senses recognized. A clear case in point, as I have
demonstrated at various places in this study, is the general notion of ‘emphasis’, which
may in fact apply to a range of more specific particle types (e.g. attitudinal particles,
speech act modifiers, focus modifiers, intensifiers, exactness markers). Especially in
case of the emphatic use of δή, I feel, Denniston’s ‘morphosyntactic’ classification is far
from illuminating. Moreover, Denniston is generally unable to account for the distri-
butional differences between the different emphatic particles he recognizes (e.g. μήν,
δή and γε). In this respect, the use of up-to-date semantic and discourse-pragmatic
theories provides major improvements on his work.
And this is indeed exactly what the particle studies from the 1990s onwards have
demonstrated. At the same time, however, the broader perspective as providedbyDen-
niston and his predecessors was generally lost sight of due to the use of restricted re-
search corpora – which in some cases resulted in incomplete or unwarranted conclu-
sions.Moreover, I have found that some of these authors have been driven toomuch by
the search for a ‘basic meaning’, which is present in all occurrences of a given particle
(i.e. a monosemy approach). Basic meanings have in fact been proposed – and subse-
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quently been taken over in the work of others – without taking into account all of the
discourse patterns in which the item in question actually occurs. For δή, for instance, I
feel that the modern literature has generally been focusing too much on the usages as
an attitudinal-interactional particle, which was at the expense of both the connective
usages (already treated in Denniston) and the usages as a phrasal focusing modifier.
The bottom-up or usage-based approach taken in the present study thus provides
for a completer and more nuanced picture, which enables us to deal better with ques-
tions concerning polyfunctionality. This latter point brings me to the next section, in
which a make some suggestions for future research.
7.2 Suggestions for further research
In general, I believe that the analysis of many other Greek particles may still greatly
benefit from the generalmethodology as taken in the present study (i.e. a combination
of the use of modern linguistic theories and a large-scale corpus-based research). It is
only in this way, I believe, we can slowly move toward a new ‘Denniston’, i.e. a new
handbook of Ancient Greek particles which complies to modern linguistic standards.
Examples of particles which are still not fully understood and for which I expect
such an approach to yield significant results, include ἦ, ἄρα, τοι and γε. For γε in particu-
lar, improvementsmay be expected from incorporating themodern literature on infor-
mation structure, (contrastive) stress and focusmodifiers of the at least-type (e.g. Gast
2013). And here too, a detailed study of its variation in syntactic position in the sen-
tence seems to be useful. Also, I believe an in-depth study of the particle οὖν may still
be worth the effort. Although οὖν predominantly occurs as a discourse-structural pop-
particle, it has also been attributed an attitudinal-interactional usage (see S. J. Bakker
2009) as well as usages where it modifies single phrases or words (so-called ‘ancillary
strengthening’ in Denniston). Here too, a polysemous analysis seems to be very nat-
ural. A better understanding of all of the variant usages of οὖν may in turn throw new
light on the exact semantic differences between οὖν and δή, which appear to have quite
a distributional overlap.
If we further concentrate on the two particles investigated in the present study,
I believe my analysis of μήν needs to be further extended by systematically including
its cognate μέν (see section 5.1.1) as well as the (fixed) clusters μέντοι, μὲν οὖν and μὲν
δή – which, I realize, could have received more attention than I have given it here. In a
similar vein, a better understandingof δήmaybeobtainedby systematically comparing
it with its cognates δῆτα, δήπου, δήθεν and especially ἤδη, with which it bears some
striking distributional similarities (see section 6.4.1). Here, a more precise application
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of theories on polarity, phasality and scalarity may come in useful (see e.g. Hansen
2008, Israel 2011). In addition, more attention should still be paid to less frequent
but puzzling clusters such as γε δή, τοι δή and ἄρα δή. Finally, it may be useful to extend
the research corpuswith texts fromHellenistic and later periods, especiallywith regard
to possible diachronic developments.
I should also add that we may not always want to restrict our view too much to
forms that are realized as particles, but include and compare pragmaticmarkerswhich
are non-particles. As was shown in chapter 2 of this study, many expressions which are
usually classified as adverbs actually belong to similar semantic-functional domains as
particles. It makes sense, for instance, to systematically study connective particles in
comparison to connective adverbs and to treat focus modifying particles (e.g. καί, γε
and δή) together with other focus modifiers such as μόνον (‘only’) and μάλιστα (‘espe-
cially, in particular’).
If nothing more, I hope that the present work encourages readers to dive further into
the pragmatics of the Ancient Greek language. For general linguistics and particle spe-
cialists, on the one hand, Ancient Greek may arouse particular interest in view of its
large inventory of pragmatic particles, its status as a discourse-configurational lan-
guage as well as its wealth of well-documented and accessible data. Even though there
are a number of caveats due to its status as a dead language, it is generally possible to
achieve fairly reliable results on the basis of an in-depth and large-scale corpus-based
research. In my opinion, it is indeed worth to systematically include Ancient Greek in
studies of cross-linguistic comparison, notably when the field of pragmatic particles/
markers is concerned.
For classical scholars and philologists, on the other hand, it goes without say-
ing that there is still much to be learned from linguistically-oriented studies like the
present one. In spite of the long research history on Ancient Greek, I believe a better
understanding of the many intricacies of this language can still be achieved. And this
may eventually lead to a still better understanding, interpretation and literary appre-
ciation of the many important texts written in it.
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Quantitative data
In this appendix I present data about the frequencies of μήν and δή within my corpus
(cf. section 1.3 above). All of the figures are drawn from the digital database Thesaurus
Linguae Graecae (tlg), where I have consistently used the most recent text editions
available. These are the following:1
Iliad West 1998–2000 (Teubner)
Odyssey von der Mühll 1962
Pindar Maehler 1971 (Teubner)
Aeschylus Page 1972 (oct)
Sophocles Lloyd-Jones &Wilson 1990 (oct)
Herodotus Wilson 2015 (oct)
Antiphon Gernet 1923 (Budé)
Euripides Diggle 1981–1994 (oct)
Thucydides Jones & Powell 1942 (oct)
Aristophanes Wilson 2007 (oct)
Lysias Carey 2007 (oct)
Isocrates Brémond &Mathieu 1929–1962 (Budé)
Xenophon Marchant 1900-1921 (oct)
Plato Burnett 1900-1907 (oct), but Slings 2003 (oct) for the Republic
Aeschines Martin & de Budé 1927–1928 (Budé)
Demosthenes Butcher & Rennie 1903–1931 (oct)
1. The tlg is hosted by the University of California, Irvine, and currently directed by Maria C. Pantelia
(see http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu). Unfortunately, some of the more recent and updated text editions are
not (yet) available in the tlg, notably West 2017 (Teubner) for the Odyssey, Duke e.a. 1995 (oct, vol. 1)
for Plato, and Dilts 2002–2009 (oct) for Demosthenes.
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author total words μήν (μάν) δή
n ‰ n ‰
Homer 198.779 31 0,2 980 4,9
Pindar 21.375 30 1,4 19 0,9
Aeschylus 41.881 47 1,1 89 2,1
Sophocles 62.866 49 0,8 148 2,4
Herodotus 185.554 0 0,0 1402 7,6
Antiphon 18.153 10 0,6 21 1,2
Euripides 153.551 121 0,8 340 2,2
Thucydides 150.164 19 0,1 201 1,3
Aristophanes 101.645 112 1,1 285 2,8
Lysias 56.984 12 0,2 53 0,9
Isocrates 119.248 119 1,0 55 0,5
Xenophon 315.469 471 1,5 1139 3,6
Plato 588.029 945 1,6 4565 7,8
Aeschines 48.845 5 0,1 99 2,0
Demosthenes 294.314 285 1,0 511 1,7
Table A.1:General frequencies of μήν (μάν) and δή
Table A.1 gives an overview of the general frequencies of μήν (μάν) and δή within the
different authors inmy corpus. The table gives both absolute and relative numbers, set
against the total number of words of the texts written by the given author.2 Cases of
univerbation involving δή (e.g. νύνδη, δηλαδή, δήπου, δήποτε, ἐπειδή) are not included
here (see sections 1.4.3 and 2.3.2 for discussion).
Tables A.2 and A.3 on the following pages provide information on the frequencies
of particle collocations involving μήν and δή respectively. Some general remarks should
be made in advance.
∗ A line of dots between two particles means that some intervening material is
present in the text. This may be a single word, but it may also consist of a
prosodic word consisting of a combination of one or more prepositives and a
2. For some of these authors, similar general particle frequencies have recently been provided by Boni-
fazi, Drummen&deKreij (2016: vol. 1, ch. 5). It should here be noted thatmy figures differ in a number
of respects. First, I have not included any fragmentarymaterial (see section 1.3). For some authors, more-
over, there is a difference – even without the fragmentary material – in the figure for the total number of
words. This seems to be due to some old quirks in the word count option of the tlg, which have recently
been solved. Finally, Bonifazi, Drummen & de Kreij appear to have missed that the tlg cannot tell the
difference between the particle μήν and the noun of the same form meaning ‘month’. I have manually
excluded all cases of this noun frommy figures (viz. Th. 5.54.2, X. HG 4.5.1, 7.4.28, D. 3.4, 7.37, 24.15, Pl.
Lg. 915d, 958b).
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mobile word (see chapter 4 for discussion). For example, both καὶ ἴστε δή (Pl.
Ap. 21a) and καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιούτου δὴ (Pl. Euthphr. 9a) have been counted as
cases of the category of καί … δή.
∗ Single instances of μήν and δή have sometimes been counted in more than one
category. An instance of ἀλλὰ οὐ μήν, for example, has been counted both in the
category for ἀλλά… μήν and the category for οὐ μήν. And similarly, καὶ δή που has
been counted both for καὶ δή and for δή που. This means that the percentages of
the categories do not add up to a 100%.
∗ When the particle γε is concerned, cases of univerbated ἔγωγε, ἔμοιγε, etc. have
also been taken into account. For the particle περ, on the other hand, I have only
included cases which are given as distinct words in the tlg. That is, ὅσπερ, εἴπερ
etc. are not counted here (see also section 2.3.2).
Additional notes on table A.3:
∗ Cases of univerbation involving δή are not included in this table (see above).
Note that this may actually give a false picture of the collocation between δή
and που (δήπου).
∗ The table includes the dialectical or shortened variant forms of the given lem-
mata. Τhe data for ἀτάρ, for example, include cases of αὐτάρ, που includes Ionic
κου, οὖν includes Ionic ὦν and ἄρα includes the shortened forms ῥα and ῥ.
∗ The numbers for the prepositives ἀλλά, ἀτάρ, ἦ and καί include the cases of, re-
spectively, ἀλλά … δή, ἀτάρ … δή, ἦ … δή and καί … δή (see the general remarks
above). In a similar vein, the numbers for γάρ, μέν and γε include cases of, re-
spectively, γὰρ οὖν δή, μὲν οὖν δή and γε τοι δή.
∗ In case a collocation occurs in two different orders, both of these have been
counted. The category for ἄρα, for example, includes the clusters δὴ ἄρα and ἄρα
δή, the category for γάρ includes γὰρ δή and Homeric δὴ γάρ (cf. section 6.1.1),
and the category for οὖν includes the alternative orders οὖν δή and δή οὖν.
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Deze studie houdt zich bezig met de klasse van partikels in het Oudgrieks, en in het
bijzonder met de partikels die ‘pragmatisch’ van aard zijn. Dit zijn kleine, onverbuig-
bare woordjes die niet bijdragen aan de waarheidsconditionele of descriptieve inhoud
van de uiting waarin ze voorkomen, maar veeleer discourse-procedurele of interactio-
nele betekenisaspecten coderen. In het algemeen kunnen zulke uitdrukkingen gezien
worden als instructies over hoe de uiting waarin ze gebruikt worden is ingebed in de
betreffende communicatieve context. Hiermee zijn ze van essentieel belang voor het
bewerkstelligen van gestroomlijnde communicatie (zowel in geschreven tekst als ge-
sproken conversatie). Enkele veel voorkomende voorbeelden in het Oudgrieks zijn ἀλ-
λά, ἄρα, γάρ, γε, δέ, δή, καί, μέν, μήν, οὖν, που en τοίνυν. In deze studie toon ik aan dat –
ondanks de lange geschiedenis vanonderzoeknaar partikels in hetOudgrieks – er niet-
temin nog steeds veel winst te behalen is in ons begrip en de taalkundige beschrijving
van deze elementen.
In de algemene inleiding (hoofdstuk 1) stel ik allereerst voor dat een volledige be-
schrijving van een Oudgrieks partikel aan tenminste drie belangrijke vereisten dient
te voldoen. Ten eerste moet de analyse voldoende geworteld zijn in moderne seman-
tische en pragmatische taalkundige theorieën. Ten tweede dient ze het bekende pro-
bleem van de polyfunctionaliteit van partikels aan te pakken. Eén en hetzelfde partikel
laat vaak een grote verscheidenheid aan verschillende interpretaties of gebruikswijzen
zien en hun onderlinge relatie is vaak niet direct duidelijk. In de beschrijving van een
partikel dient hiervan een aannemelijke verklaring gegeven teworden. Ten derde dient
ze gebaseerd te zijn op een groot en gevarieerd onderzoekscorpus, dat teksten omvat
van verschillende auteurs, genres en discourse-typen, afkomstig uit verschillende pe-
riodes van de Oudgriekse taal. De oudere lexica, grammatica’s en partikelhandboeken
uit de 19e en het begin van de 20e eeuw schieten in het algemeen tekort met het oog
op de eerste vereiste. De recentere studies van de afgelopen drie decennia zijn echter
vaak gebaseerd op zeer beperkte onderzoekscorpora en voldoen daarmee niet aan de
tweede en derde vereiste.
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Het doel van deze studie is daarom tweeledig. In deel 1 onderzoek ik welke the-
oretische concepten benodigd zijn om een adequate taalkundige beschrijving te ge-
ven van de betekenis van pragmatische partikels in het Oudgrieks (hfst. 2–4). Hierbij
baseer ik me voor een groot deel op de studie van vergelijkbare elementen in heden-
daagse, levende talen zoals het Engels, Frans, Duits en het Nederlands. In deel 2 wordt
de theorie vervolgens toegepast op twee van demeest veelzijdigeOudgriekse partikels,
namelijk μήν en δή. In de vorm van twee gedetailleerde casestudy’s wordt een nieuwe
taalkundige analyse van deze partikels voorgesteld op basis van een grootschalig cor-
pusonderzoek (hfst. 5–6). Ik toon tevens aan op welke punten mijn aanpak eerdere
beschrijvingen van deze twee partikels verbetert.
Hoofdstuk 2 is er op gericht een globaal overzicht te geven van de semantisch-functi-
onele categorieën die van belang zijn voor de beschrijving van pragmatische partikels
in het Oudgrieks, en voor mijn bespreking van μήν en δή in het bijzonder. Ik ga hier
dieper in op de volgende klassen van uitdrukkingen.
(i) Connectieven. Deze groep omvat uitdrukkingen die expliciet een bepaalde
relatie markeren tussen twee talige eenheden. Ik richt me met name op de
klasse van discourse-connectieven (dcs), die relaties aanduiden tussen twee
discourse-eenheden. Om hun betekenis goed te kunnen begrijpen introduceer
ik het Geneva Discourse Model (gdm), een model van de hiërarchische struc-
tuur van tekst en conversatie. Elementaire bouwstenen (discourse acts) kunnen
gecombineerd worden tot grotere discourse-segmenten (moves), die weer deel
uit kunnen maken van een dialogische conversatie-structuur (exchange). Dis-
course-connectieven kunnen op hun beurt gebruikt worden om relaties aan te
duiden op verschillende hiërarchische niveaus. Ik maak daarnaast een onder-
scheid tussen twee subgroepen: (i) connectieven die enkel de structurele en
thematische organisatie van de discourse duidelijk maken (discourse-structural
markers), en (ii) connectieven die ook een specifiekere retorische relatie tus-
sen discourse-eenheden aangeven, bijv. conclusie, (tegen)argument of motiva-
tie (markers of rhetorical relations).
(ii) Attitudinal-interactional markers (aims). Deze groep omvat uitdrukkingen die
geen strikt connectieve maar attitudinele of interactionele betekenisaspecten
bijdragen. Ze hebben betrekking op de relatie tussen uiting en spreker of tussen
spreker en adressaat. Hun primaire functie is het managen van de aannames,
attitudes en verwachtingen van spreker en adressaat ten opzichte van de ge-
communiceerde inhoud of de gemaakte taalhandeling. Ik beweer dat voor een
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goed begrip van deze groep twee theoretische invalshoeken van essentieel be-
lang zijn: (i) de theorie over speech acts (taalhandelingen) en hun verschillende
componenten (e.g. voorbereidende condities, illocutieve kracht); (ii) de theorie
over common ground (gemeenschappelijke gronden). Ik bespreek de relevante
aspecten van deze twee noties en laat zien dat aims hiermee op verschillende
manieren in verband kunnen staan. Verder besteed ik aandacht aan het onder-
scheid tussen subjectieve (spreker-gerichte) en intersubjectieve (adressaat-ge-
richte) uitdrukkingen.
(iii) Focus modifiers (fms). Deze uitdrukkingen worden gebruikt om een gefocuste
constituent uit te lichten en te specificeren hoe deze zich verhoudt tot een set
van relevante alternatieven (e.g. ook, zelfs, alleen, maar, juist). Hier maak ik een
verder onderscheid tussen (i) restrictieve en additieve fms en (ii) scalaire en
niet-scalaire fms, waarbij ik ook het verschil tussen semantische en pragma-
tische schalen nader belicht. Een laatste belangrijke subgroep die besproken
wordt betreft identificerende fms, die gebruikt worden om te benadrukken dat
de focuswaarde gelijk is aan een in de context gegeven element.
(iv) Intensifiers. Deze uitdrukkingen worden gebruikt om de graad of intensiteit uit
te drukken van gradeerbare concepten (e.g. volkomen, bijna, erg, heel, nogal). Ik
besteed hier speciale aandacht aan het verschil tussen gebonden (met een in-
herent eindpunt) en ongebonden (op een open schaal) concepten, en laat zien
dat er speciale intensifiers zijn voor elk van beide groepen.
(v) Markers of non-straightforward communication. Deze groep betreft uitdrukkin-
genwaarmee sprekers commentaar gevenopde geschiktheid ende toepasselijk-
heid van de gebruikte woorden. Ze kunnen gezien worden als speciale uitdruk-
kingen om los taalgebruik te reguleren. Ik onderscheid twee soorten: (i)markers
of approximation, die aangeven dat een bepaalde uitdrukking slechts bij bena-
dering van toepassing is (e.g. zeg maar, een soort van); (ii) exactness markers,
die benadrukken dat een uitdrukking precies van toepassing is (e.g. echt, heus,
letterlijk).
Een algemeen punt dat benadrukt wordt is dat de categorisering van individuele uit-
drukkingen flexibelmoet zijn. De grenzen tussen genoemde categorieën zijn niet strikt
en sommigewoorden kunnen aspecten vanmeerdere klassen combineren. In hetOud-
grieks geldt dit met name voor de grens tussen discourse-connectieven en aims: in te-
genstelling tot veel moderne talen kunnen deze groepen in het Oudgrieks namelijk
niet op morfosyntactische gronden van elkaar onderscheiden worden.
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In hoofdstuk 3 staat het fenomeen van de polyfunctionaliteit van partikels centraal. Ik
laat ten eerste zien dat polyfunctionaliteit gezien kan worden als het resultaat van his-
torische processen van semantische verandering. Nieuwe betekenisaspecten worden
toegevoegd door de geleidelijke conventionalisering van pragmatische inferenties die
in bepaalde gebruikscontexten vaak optreden: contextuele bij-effecten worden lang-
zaamonderdeel vande gecodeerdebetekenis vandeuitdrukking zelf. Tweebelangrijke
regelmatigheden van semantische verandering die behandeldworden, zijn (inter)sub-
jectificatie en het ontstaan van discourse-connectieve betekenisaspecten.
Vervolgens bespreek ik de drie belangrijkste benaderingen van polyfunctionaliteit
van partikels: (i) homonymie, (ii) monosemie en (iii) polysemie. Ik draag een aantal
argumenten aan ten gunste van polysemie, d.w.z. een situatie waarin een polyfuncti-
oneel partikel meerdere geconventionaliseerde betekenissen of gebruiken heeft, die
semantisch gezien echter wel aan elkaar gerelateerd zijn. Een belangrijk punt is dat de
benadering van polysemie het meest overtuigend weet om te gaan met het fenomeen
van diachrone betekenisveranderingen. Hoewel de mogelijkheid niet wordt uitgeslo-
ten ommeer abstracte, overkoepelende basisbetekenissen af te leiden uit de verschil-
lende specifieke gebruikswijzen van een partikel, wordt gesteld dat dit geenszins de
eerste prioriteit dient te zijn. Ik ga dus uit van een bottom-up of usage-based methode.
Het hoofdstuk sluit af met een aantal methodologische overwegingen, waarbij ik en-
kele vuistregels presenteer.
In hoofdstuk 4 geef ik een gedetailleerde analyse van enkele formele aspecten van de
Oudgriekse taal. In moderne talen geeft de positie van een partikel binnen de uiting
vaak een goede indicatie van zijn syntactische bereik en daarmee tevens van zijn mo-
gelijke conventionele betekenissen/functies. In dit hoofdstuk laat ik zien dat dezelfde
gedachtegang ook op het Oudgrieks van toepassing is. Hierbij maak ik een verbinding
met het recente onderzoek naar woordvolgorde in het Oudgrieks.
Veel Oudgriekse partikels (waaronder μήν en δή) behoren tot de klasse van postpo-
sitievewoorden,waarvan de positie overeenstemtmet een regelmatigheid die bekend-
staat als deWet vanWackernagel. Dit houdt in dat deze woorden een positie innemen
na het eerste prosodische woord binnen het syntactische domein waarop ze betrek-
king hebben (zin, clause of constituent/woordgroep). Ik laat zien dat er verschillende
patronen mogelijk zijn afhankelijk van wat als het eerste prosodische woord gezien
wordt.Daarnaast besteed ik speciale aandacht aandepositie vanpartikels binnen clus-
ters van postpositieven en aan hun uitzonderlijke gedrag in de metrische teksten van
559416-L-bw-Thijs
Processed on: 7-5-2021 PDF page: 419
Samenvatting 405
hetAttische drama. Ter afsluiting vanhet hoofdstuk stel ik een aantal vuistregels op die
beschrijven op welke manier de positie van partikels binnen een uiting als aanwijzing
gebruikt kan worden voor hun semantische-functionele analyse.
In hoofdstuk 5 presenteer ik mijn analyse van het Oudgriekse partikel μήν. Na enkele
inleidende opmerkingen over de relatie tussen μήν, μάν en μέν, bespreek ik allereerst
de verschillende gebruiken van μήν als attitudineel-interactioneel partikel. Ik beweer
hier dat μήν een intersubjectief partikel is dat markeert dat bepaalde informatie in de
uiting in oppositie staat tot wat de adressaat zou kunnen denken of verwachten op
basis van de betreffende communicatieve context (vgl. toch, wel in het Nederlands). Ik
besteed speciale aandacht aan de gevallen van μήν in niet-assertieve taalhandelingen
(directieven,w-vragen en ja/nee-vragen) die in demoderne literatuur onderbelicht zijn
gebleven. Ik stel voor dat μήν hier betrekking heeft op de voorbereidende condities
van deze taalhandelingen (in plaats van op de gecommuniceerde inhoud). De sterk
affirmatieve betekenis die in de literatuur vaak aan het partikel wordt toegeschreven
(‘ik verzeker je’) is weliswaar goed van toepassing op het gebruik in assertieven, maar
kan niet gehandhaafd worden in het gebruik in andere soorten taalhandelingen.
Ik onderscheid vervolgens drie gebruiken vanμήν als eendiscourse-connectief par-
tikel. Ten eerste kan μήν gebruikt worden als een marker van de retorische relatie van
denial-of-expectation (ontkenning-van-verwachting). Een sterke aanwijzing voor deze
connectieve functie is het μέν/μήν-patroon, waarin μήν voorafgegaan wordt door het
voorbereidende connectieve partikel μέν (vgl. weliswaar/maar). Ten tweede is er het
gebruik als een discourse-structurele marker waarin μήν een voor de adressaat onver-
wachte overgang in de tekst of conversatie aangeeft. Ten derde wordt μήν gebruikt als
een neutralemarker van discourse-grenzen,waarbij het de overgang naar het volgende
onderwerp aangeeft binnen een groter thematisch geheel.
Vanuit diachroon perspectief is er een ontwikkeling te zien van een puur affirma-
tief partikel naar een contrastief partikel (‘in tegenstelling tot wat je zou kunnen ver-
wachten’), dat ook in niet-assertieve taaldaden gebruikt kanworden.Hiervandaan ont-
wikkelen zich dan de discourse-connectieve betekenisaspecten, waarbij in het gebruik
als marker van thematische overgangen de notie van ‘tegen-verwachtingen-in’ geheel
lijkt te zijn verdwenen. Mijn conclusie is dat er voor μήν geen overkoepelende basis-
betekenis gevonden kan worden, maar dat we te maken hebben met een polyseem
netwerk van (historisch) gerelateerde gebruiken en betekenisaspecten.
Hoofdstuk 6 bevat de tweede casestudy van deze dissertatie, waarin het Oudgriekse
partikel δή centraal staat. Als attitudineel-interactioneel partikel kan δή als het ware
gezienworden als het spiegelbeeld van μήν. Het is een intersubjectief partikel datmar-
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keert dat bepaalde informatie in de uiting overeenkomtmet wat de adressaat zou kun-
nendenkenof verwachten opbasis van de betreffende communicatieve context. In het
algemeen kan δή dus beschouwd worden als een bevestigend partikel (vgl. inderdaad)
of als een marker van common ground (vgl. dus, immers, Duits ja). Ik besteed bijzon-
dere aandacht aan het gebruik van δή in directieven en w-vragen, waarin ik aanneem
dat het partikel betrekking heeft op de voorbereidende condities van deze taalhan-
delingen. Voor ja/nee-vragen stel ik een analyse voor die meer lijkt op die van δή in
assertieven. Ik beschrijf vervolgens twee discourse-connectieve gebruiken: δή als een
marker van de retorische relatie van conclusie, en δή als een marker van grotere dis-
course-overgangen naar een onderwerp dat al verwacht of voorbereid was.
Als laatste ga ik in op de verschillende gebruiken van δή in clause-interne positie,
waarbij het bereik heeft over de woordgroep (in plaats van de clause of de hele zin).
Hier laat ik zien dat δή een aantal nauw-verwante functies kan vervullen, onder andere
als een scalaire focusmodifier (vgl. al, zelfs), als een identificerende focusmodifier (vgl.
juist, net, uitgerekend), als een exactnessmarker (vgl.precies) en als eenmarker van spe-
cificiteit bij indefiniete woordgroepen (vgl. een bepaalde, een zekere). Ook draag ik een
aantal argumenten aan tegen een analyse als een echte intensifier, welke in de litera-
tuur soms wordt voorgesteld.
Vanuit diachroon perspectief lijkt de betekenis van ‘bevestiging’ de oudste te zijn.
Van hieruit hebben zich enerzijds de gebruiken als een echte common ground marker
ontwikkeld, alsmededediscourse-connectieve betekenisaspecten. Anderzijds heeft de
notie van ‘bevestiging’ geleid tot het ontstaan van de gebruiken opwoordgroep-niveau,
waarbij betekenisaspecten als scalariteit en exactness relevant werden. Het lijkt erop
dat er dus een diachrone ontwikkeling is in twee verschillende richtingen. Mijn con-
clusie is dat het niet mogelijk is om alle gebruiken van δή te beschrijven met behulp
van één overkoepelende basisbetekenis. Wederom pleit ik voor een analyse in termen
van een netwerk van meerdere polyseme betekenissen.
In de algemene conclusie (hoofdstuk 7) presenteer ik tenslotte een samenvattend
overzicht van de belangrijkste resultaten van deze dissertatie. Een belangrijke alge-
mene aanbeveling voor hetmodernepartikelonderzoek inhetOudgrieks is dat ermeer
aandacht zoumoeten zijn voor diachrone betekenisveranderingen van partikels en de
mogelijkheid van polysemie. Ik pleit voor het hanteren van een usage-based methode
op basis van grootschalige en gevarieerde onderzoekscorpora. Men zou zich daarbij
veel minder moeten richten op het vinden van één overkoepelende basisbetekenis.
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